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VMware Carbon Black

3,646 rules · Sigma detections in VMware Carbon Black syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into VMware Carbon Black query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Download all 3,646 rules (.zip, 1.2 MB) Every VMware Carbon Black query in this view, packaged to deploy.
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Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance12
Resource Development10
Initial Access10
Execution30
Persistence42
Privilege Escalation20
Stealth79
Defense Impairment32
Credential Access35
Discovery33
Lateral Movement16
Collection20
Command and Control24
Exfiltration10
Impact18
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.
Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.
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Detection rules

50 shown of 3,646
high Strong Medium FP
DarkGate - Autoit3.EXE Execution Parameters
Detects execution of the legitimate Autoit3 utility from a suspicious parent process. AutoIt3.exe is used within the DarkGate infection chain to execute shellcode that performs process injection and connects to the DarkGate command-and-control server.
status test author Micah Babinski ATT&CK technique id f8e9aa1c-14f2-4dbd-aa59-b98968ed650d
carbon_black query
((Image:\\Autoit3.exe OR OriginalFileName:AutoIt3.exe) (ParentImage:\\cmd.exe OR ParentImage:\\KeyScramblerLogon.exe OR ParentImage:\\msiexec.exe)) (-(Image:\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\AutoIt3\\AutoIt3.exe OR Image:\:\\Program\ Files\\AutoIt3\\AutoIt3.exe))
view Sigma YAML 
title: DarkGate - Autoit3.EXE Execution Parameters
id: f8e9aa1c-14f2-4dbd-aa59-b98968ed650d
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the legitimate Autoit3 utility from a suspicious parent process. AutoIt3.exe is used within
    the DarkGate infection chain to execute shellcode that performs process injection and connects to the DarkGate
    command-and-control server.
references:
    - https://github.security.telekom.com/2023/08/darkgate-loader.html
    - https://www.kroll.com/en/insights/publications/cyber/microsoft-teams-used-as-initial-access-for-darkgate-malware
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/DarkGate/tree/main
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2023-10-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_proc:
        - Image|endswith: '\Autoit3.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AutoIt3.exe'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\KeyScramblerLogon.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
    filter_main_legit_autoit_location:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\AutoIt3\AutoIt3.exe'
            - ':\Program Files\AutoIt3\AutoIt3.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
DarkGate - User Created Via Net.EXE
Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the name of "DarkGate"
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id bf906d7b-7070-4642-8383-e404cf26eba5
carbon_black query
(Image:\\net.exe OR Image:\\net1.exe) (CommandLine:user* CommandLine:add* CommandLine:DarkGate* CommandLine:SafeMode*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: DarkGate - User Created Via Net.EXE
id: bf906d7b-7070-4642-8383-e404cf26eba5
status: test
description: Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the name of "DarkGate"
references:
    - Internal Research
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-27
modified: 2023-10-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # /c net user /add SafeMode DarkGate0!
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'user'
            - 'add'
            - 'DarkGate'
            - 'SafeMode'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Default Cobalt Strike Certificate
Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK tactic-only id 7100f7e3-92ce-4584-b7b7-01b40d3d4118
carbon_black query
"certificate.serial":8BB00EE
view Sigma YAML 
title: Default Cobalt Strike Certificate
id: 7100f7e3-92ce-4584-b7b7-01b40d3d4118
status: test
description: Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
references:
    - https://sergiusechel.medium.com/improving-the-network-based-detection-of-cobalt-strike-c2-servers-in-the-wild-while-reducing-the-6964205f6468
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-06-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.s0154
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: x509
detection:
    selection:
        certificate.serial: 8BB00EE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Default RDP Port Changed to Non Standard Port
Detects changes to the default RDP port. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into a remote system using an interactive session with a graphical user interface. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 509e84b9-a71a-40e0-834f-05470369bd1e
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Control\\Terminal\ Server\\WinStations\\RDP\-Tcp\\PortNumber (-Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000d3d\))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Default RDP Port Changed to Non Standard Port
id: 509e84b9-a71a-40e0-834f-05470369bd1e
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the default RDP port.
    Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into a remote system using an interactive session with a graphical user interface.
    Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-01
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\PortNumber'
    filter_main_port:
        Details: DWORD (0x00000d3d) # 3389
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_change_rdp_port/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Powershell
      technique: T1021.001
      atomic_guid: 2f840dd4-8a2e-4f44-beb3-6b2399ea3771
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Changing RDP Port to Non Standard Port via Command_Prompt
      technique: T1021.001
      atomic_guid: 74ace21e-a31c-4f7d-b540-53e4eb6d1f73
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Delegated Permissions Granted For All Users
Detects when highly privileged delegated permissions are granted on behalf of all users
status test author Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow' ATT&CK technique id a6355fbe-f36f-45d8-8efc-ab42465cbc52
carbon_black query
"properties.message":Add\ delegated\ permission\ grant
view Sigma YAML 
title: Delegated Permissions Granted For All Users
id: a6355fbe-f36f-45d8-8efc-ab42465cbc52
status: test
description: Detects when highly privileged delegated permissions are granted on behalf of all users
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Add delegated permission grant
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Delete All Scheduled Tasks
Detects the usage of schtasks with the delete flag and the asterisk symbol to delete all tasks from the schedule of the local computer, including tasks scheduled by other users.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 220457c1-1c9f-4c2e-afe6-9598926222c1
carbon_black query
Image:\\schtasks.exe (CommandLine:\ \/delete\ * CommandLine:\/tn\ \** CommandLine:\ \/f*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Delete All Scheduled Tasks
id: 220457c1-1c9f-4c2e-afe6-9598926222c1
status: test
description: Detects the usage of schtasks with the delete flag and the asterisk symbol to delete all tasks from the schedule of the local computer, including tasks scheduled by other users.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks-delete
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /delete '
            - '/tn \*'
            - ' /f'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Delete Important Scheduled Task
Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by deleting their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id dbc1f800-0fe0-4bc0-9c66-292c2abe3f78
carbon_black query
(Image:\\schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName:schtasks.exe) (CommandLine:\-delete* OR CommandLine:\/delete* OR CommandLine:–delete* OR CommandLine:—delete* OR CommandLine:―delete*) (CommandLine:\\Windows\\BitLocker* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\ExploitGuard* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\SystemRestore\\SR* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\Windows\ Defender\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\WindowsBackup\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Delete Important Scheduled Task
id: dbc1f800-0fe0-4bc0-9c66-292c2abe3f78
related:
    - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d # TaskScheduler EventLog
      type: similar
    - id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by deleting their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2026-03-11
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/delete'
    selection_cli_task:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more important tasks
            - '\Windows\BitLocker'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
            - '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
            - '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
            - '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_delete/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
Delete Volume Shadow Copies Via WMI With PowerShell
Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell
status stable author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 87df9ee1-5416-453a-8a08-e8d4a51e9ce1
carbon_black query
(Data:Get\-WmiObject* Data:Win32_ShadowCopy*) (Data:Delete\(\)* OR Data:Remove\-WmiObject*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Delete Volume Shadow Copies Via WMI With PowerShell
id: 87df9ee1-5416-453a-8a08-e8d4a51e9ce1
status: stable
description: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods
author: frack113
date: 2021-06-03
modified: 2023-10-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_classic_start
detection:
    selection:
        Data|contains|all:
            - 'Get-WmiObject'
            - 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
        Data|contains:
            - 'Delete()'
            - 'Remove-WmiObject'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell
Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil
status test author Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) ATT&CK technique id 21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:Get\-WmiObject* OR CommandLine:gwmi* OR CommandLine:Get\-CimInstance* OR CommandLine:gcim*) CommandLine:Win32_ShadowCopy* (CommandLine:.Delete\(\)* OR CommandLine:Remove\-WmiObject* OR CommandLine:rwmi* OR CommandLine:Remove\-CimInstance* OR CommandLine:rcim*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell
id: 21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40
related:
    - id: e17121b4-ef2a-4418-8a59-12fb1631fa9e
      type: derived
    - id: c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-20
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_get:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Get-WmiObject'
            - 'gwmi'
            - 'Get-CimInstance'
            - 'gcim'
    selection_shadowcopy:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
    selection_delete:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.Delete()'
            - 'Remove-WmiObject'
            - 'rwmi'
            - 'Remove-CimInstance'
            - 'rcim'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell - PS Script
Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil
status test author Tim Rauch, frack113 ATT&CK technique id c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42
carbon_black query
(ScriptBlockText:Get\-WmiObject* OR ScriptBlockText:gwmi* OR ScriptBlockText:Get\-CimInstance* OR ScriptBlockText:gcim*) ScriptBlockText:Win32_ShadowCopy* (ScriptBlockText:.Delete\(\)* OR ScriptBlockText:Remove\-WmiObject* OR ScriptBlockText:rwmi* OR ScriptBlockText:Remove\-CimInstance* OR ScriptBlockText:rcim*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell - PS Script
id: c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42
related:
    - id: e17121b4-ef2a-4418-8a59-12fb1631fa9e
      type: derived
    - id: 21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html
author: Tim Rauch, frack113
date: 2022-09-20
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_get:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Get-WmiObject'
            - 'gwmi'
            - 'Get-CimInstance'
            - 'gcim'
    selection_shadowcopy:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
    selection_delete:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '.Delete()'
            - 'Remove-WmiObject'
            - 'rwmi'
            - 'Remove-CimInstance'
            - 'rcim'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
status test author Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37
carbon_black query
(Image:\\sc.exe OR OriginalFileName:sc.exe) (CommandLine:sdset* CommandLine:D;*) (CommandLine:;IU* OR CommandLine:;SU* OR CommandLine:;BA* OR CommandLine:;SY* OR CommandLine:;WD*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Deny Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37
related:
    - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Specific Technique
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to deny access to a service that affects critical trustees. This can be used to hide services or make them unstoppable.
references:
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-16
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sdset:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            - 'D;' # Deny Access
    selection_trustee:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
            - ';SU' # Service logon user
            - ';BA' # Built-in administrators
            - ';SY' # Local system
            - ';WD' # Everyone
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device
Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) device. This can be legitimate during VMware Tools troubleshooting or driver conflicts, but may also indicate malware attempting to hijack communication with the hardware via the VMCI device. This has been used to facilitate VMware ESXi vulnerability exploits to escape VMs and execute code on the ESXi host.
status experimental author Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress) ATT&CK sub-technique id 85f520e7-6f5e-43ca-874c-222e5bf9c0de
carbon_black query
(Image:\\devcon.exe OR OriginalFileName:DevCon.exe) CommandLine:\ disable\ * (CommandLine:15AD&DEV_0740* OR CommandLine:VMWVMCIHOSTDEV*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device
id: 85f520e7-6f5e-43ca-874c-222e5bf9c0de
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) device.
    This can be legitimate during VMware Tools troubleshooting or driver conflicts, but may also indicate malware attempting to hijack communication with the hardware via the VMCI device.
    This has been used to facilitate VMware ESXi vulnerability exploits to escape VMs and execute code on the ESXi host.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/devcon
    - https://communities.vmware.com/t5/VMware-Workstation-Pro/VMCI-driver-issues/td-p/2866060
    - https://github.com/search?q=devcon+disable+VMWVMCIHOSTDEV
    - https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit
author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress)
date: 2026-01-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\devcon.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'DevCon.exe'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains: ' disable '
    selection_vmci_pci:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '15AD&DEV_0740' # VMware VMCI PCI device (Vendor 0x15AD = VMware, Device 0x0740 = VMCI)
            - 'VMWVMCIHOSTDEV' # VMware VMCI root host device driver name
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate VMware administration, Tools installation/uninstallation, or troubleshooting driver conflicts.
    - Automated scripts in virtualized environments for device cleanup.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_devcon_disable_vmci_driver/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Devil Bait Potential C2 Communication Traffic
Detects potential C2 communication related to Devil Bait malware
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 514c50c9-373a-46e5-9012-f0327c526c8f
carbon_black query
"cs-method":GET ("cs-uri":\/cross.php*op=* "cs-uri":&dt=* "cs-uri":&uid=*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Devil Bait Potential C2 Communication Traffic
id: 514c50c9-373a-46e5-9012-f0327c526c8f
status: test
description: Detects potential C2 communication related to Devil Bait malware
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2023-08-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri|contains|all:
            - '/cross.php?op='
            - '&dt='
            - '&uid='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea) ATT&CK technique id cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6
carbon_black query
Image:\\devtoolslauncher.exe CommandLine:LaunchForDeploy*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6
status: test
description: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\devtoolslauncher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'LaunchForDeploy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Dfsvc.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Port
Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 4c5fba4a-9ef6-4f16-823d-606246054741
carbon_black query
(Image:\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\* Image:\\dfsvc.exe Initiated:true) (-(DestinationPort:80 OR DestinationPort:443)) (-(DestinationIsIpv6:true DestinationPort:53))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Dfsvc.EXE Initiated Network Connection Over Uncommon Port
id: 4c5fba4a-9ef6-4f16-823d-606246054741
status: test
description: Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/less-smartscreen-more-caffeine-ab-using-clickonce-for-trusted-code-execution-1446ea8051c5
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-12
modified: 2024-01-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\'
        Image|endswith: '\dfsvc.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_known_ports:
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    filter_optional_dns_ipv6:
        # Based on VT. More than 140 binaries made communication over DNS
        DestinationIsIpv6: 'true'
        DestinationPort: 53
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE
Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library
status test author Greg (rule) ATT&CK technique id ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6
carbon_black query
Image:\\msdt.exe ImageLoaded:\\sdiageng.dll
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE
id: ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6
status: test
description: Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library
references:
    - https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-microsoft-msdt-dogwalk/
author: Greg (rule)
date: 2022-06-17
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
    - cve.2022-30190
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\sdiageng.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Diamond Sleet APT DLL Sideloading Indicators
Detects DLL sideloading activity seen used by Diamond Sleet APT
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id d1b65d98-37d7-4ff6-b139-2d87c1af3042
carbon_black query
(Image:\:\\ProgramData\\clip.exe ImageLoaded:\:\\ProgramData\\Version.dll) OR (Image:\:\\ProgramData\\wsmprovhost.exe ImageLoaded:\:\\ProgramData\\DSROLE.dll)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diamond Sleet APT DLL Sideloading Indicators
id: d1b65d98-37d7-4ff6-b139-2d87c1af3042
status: test
description: Detects DLL sideloading activity seen used by Diamond Sleet APT
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith: ':\ProgramData\clip.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: ':\ProgramData\Version.dll'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: ':\ProgramData\wsmprovhost.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: ':\ProgramData\DSROLE.dll'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Diamond Sleet APT DNS Communication Indicators
Detects DNS queries related to Diamond Sleet APT activity
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id fba38e0f-4607-4344-bb8f-a4b50cdeef7f
carbon_black query
QueryName:3dkit.org* OR QueryName:dersmarketim.com* OR QueryName:galerielamy.com* OR QueryName:olidhealth.com*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diamond Sleet APT DNS Communication Indicators
id: fba38e0f-4607-4344-bb8f-a4b50cdeef7f
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries related to Diamond Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains:
            - '3dkit.org'
            - 'dersmarketim.com'
            - 'galerielamy.com'
            - 'olidhealth.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Might generate some false positive if triggered by a user during investigation for example.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Diamond Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
Detects file creation activity that is related to Diamond Sleet APT activity
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id e1212b32-55ff-4dfb-a595-62b572248056
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\4800\-84DC\-063A6A41C5C OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\clip.exe OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\DSROLE.dll OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\Forest64.exe OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\readme.md OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\Version.dll OR TargetFilename:\:\\ProgramData\\wsmprovhost.exe
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diamond Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: e1212b32-55ff-4dfb-a595-62b572248056
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Diamond Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - ':\ProgramData\4800-84DC-063A6A41C5C'
            - ':\ProgramData\clip.exe'
            - ':\ProgramData\DSROLE.dll'
            - ':\ProgramData\Forest64.exe'
            - ':\ProgramData\readme.md'
            - ':\ProgramData\Version.dll'
            - ':\ProgramData\wsmprovhost.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Diamond Sleet APT Process Activity Indicators
Detects process creation activity indicators related to Diamond Sleet APT
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id b5495d8d-24ad-4a44-8caf-ceae9a07a5c2
carbon_black query
CommandLine:\ uTYNkfKxHiZrx3KJ*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diamond Sleet APT Process Activity Indicators
id: b5495d8d-24ad-4a44-8caf-ceae9a07a5c2
status: test
description: Detects process creation activity indicators related to Diamond Sleet APT
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' uTYNkfKxHiZrx3KJ'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation - Registry
Detects registry event related to the creation of a scheduled task used by Diamond Sleet APT during exploitation of Team City CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 9f9f92ba-5300-43a4-b435-87d1ee571688
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tree\\* TargetObject:Windows\ TeamCity\ Settings\ User\ Interface*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation - Registry
id: 9f9f92ba-5300-43a4-b435-87d1ee571688
status: test
description: |
    Detects registry event related to the creation of a scheduled task used by Diamond Sleet APT during exploitation of Team City CVE-2023-42793 vulnerability
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
            - 'Windows TeamCity Settings User Interface'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering
Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used.
status test author Nischal Khadgi ATT&CK technique id b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Control\\Lsa\\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior (-Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering
id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
related:
    - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value.
    During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure.
    Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory.
    If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM.
    If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped.
    If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials
author: Nischal Khadgi
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior'
    filter_main_default_value:
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)' # Default value
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Disable Important Scheduled Task
Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior ATT&CK technique id 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980
carbon_black query
(Image:\\schtasks.exe OR OriginalFileName:schtasks.exe) (CommandLine:\-disable* OR CommandLine:\/disable* OR CommandLine:–disable* OR CommandLine:—disable* OR CommandLine:―disable*) (CommandLine:\\Windows\\BitLocker* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\ExploitGuard* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\ExploitGuard\\ExploitGuard\ MDM\ policy\ Refresh* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\SystemRestore\\SR* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\UpdateOrchestrator\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\Windows\ Defender\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\WindowsBackup\\* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Important Scheduled Task
id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980
related:
    - id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
    - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d # TaskScheduler EventLog
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task
    - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior
date: 2021-12-26
modified: 2026-03-11
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli_disable:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/disable'
    selection_cli_task:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more important tasks
            - '\Windows\BitLocker'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard'
            - '\Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh'
            - '\Windows\SystemRestore\SR'
            - '\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\'
            - '\Windows\Windows Defender\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsBackup\'
            - '\Windows\WindowsUpdate\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_disable/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task
      technique: T1490
      atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope
Detects tampering with the MacroRuntimeScanScope registry key to disable runtime scanning of enabled macros
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id ab871450-37dc-4a3a-997f-6662aa8ae0f1
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\* TargetObject:\\Microsoft\\Office\\* TargetObject:\\Common\\Security*) TargetObject:\\MacroRuntimeScanScope Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope
id: ab871450-37dc-4a3a-997f-6662aa8ae0f1
description: Detects tampering with the MacroRuntimeScanScope registry key to disable runtime scanning of enabled macros
status: test
date: 2022-10-25
modified: 2023-08-17
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2018/09/12/office-vba-amsi-parting-the-veil-on-malicious-macros/
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=office16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_MacroRuntimeScanScope
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/OffensiveVBA/blob/28cc6a2802d8176195ac19b3c8e9a749009a82a3/src/AMSIbypasses.vba
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\'
            - '\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Common\Security'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\MacroRuntimeScanScope'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Disable PUA Protection on Windows Defender
Detects disabling Windows Defender PUA protection
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger ATT&CK technique id 8ffc5407-52e3-478f-9596-0a7371eafe13
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\PUAProtection* Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable PUA Protection on Windows Defender
id: 8ffc5407-52e3-478f-9596-0a7371eafe13
status: test
description: Detects disabling Windows Defender PUA protection
references:
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\PUAProtection'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disable Powershell Command History
Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module
status test author Ali Alwashali ATT&CK sub-technique id 602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150
carbon_black query
ScriptBlockText:Remove\-Module* ScriptBlockText:psreadline*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Powershell Command History
id: 602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150
status: test
description: Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module
references:
    - https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/1062879286749773824
author: Ali Alwashali
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - Remove-Module
            - psreadline
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script that disables the command history
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
status test author Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 919f2ef0-be2d-4a7a-b635-eb2b41fde044
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\MiniNt EventType:CreateKey) OR NewName:HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\MiniNt
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt
id: 919f2ef0-be2d-4a7a-b635-eb2b41fde044
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1182516740955226112
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-25
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1112
    - car.2022-03-001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
    # Sysmon gives us HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\.. if ControlSetXX is the selected one
        - TargetObject: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
          EventType: 'CreateKey'    # we don't want deletekey
    # key rename
        - NewName: 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Low FP
Disable System Firewall
Detects disabling of system firewalls which could be used by adversaries to bypass controls that limit usage of the network.
status test author Pawel Mazur ATT&CK technique id 53059bc0-1472-438b-956a-7508a94a91f0
carbon_black query
type:SERVICE_STOP (unit:firewalld OR unit:iptables OR unit:ufw)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable System Firewall
id: 53059bc0-1472-438b-956a-7508a94a91f0
status: test
description: Detects disabling of system firewalls which could be used by adversaries to bypass controls that limit usage of the network.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md
    - https://firewalld.org/documentation/man-pages/firewall-cmd.html
author: 'Pawel Mazur'
date: 2022-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SERVICE_STOP'
        unit:
            - 'firewalld'
            - 'iptables'
            - 'ufw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
status test author ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113 ATT&CK technique id a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
carbon_black query
(((Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:PowerShell.EXE OR OriginalFileName:pwsh.dll)) (CommandLine:\-DisableBehaviorMonitoring\ $true* OR CommandLine:\-DisableRuntimeMonitoring\ $true*)) OR ((Image:\\sc.exe OR OriginalFileName:sc.exe) ((CommandLine:stop* CommandLine:WinDefend*) OR (CommandLine:delete* CommandLine:WinDefend*) OR (CommandLine:config* CommandLine:WinDefend* CommandLine:start=disabled*)))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring
id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217
status: test
description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/
    - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: 'ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113'
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh_binary:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_pwsh_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true'
            - '-DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true'
    selection_sc_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'WinDefend'
    selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'WinDefend'
            - 'start=disabled'
    condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*)
falsepositives:
    - 'Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice.'
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the Windows registry
status test author AlertIQ, Ján Trenčanský, frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK technique id 0eb46774-f1ab-4a74-8238-1155855f2263
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\* OR TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\ Security\ Center\\* OR TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\*) (((TargetObject:\\DisableAntiSpyware OR TargetObject:\\DisableAntiVirus OR TargetObject:\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring OR TargetObject:\\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen OR TargetObject:\\DisableEnhancedNotifications OR TargetObject:\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem OR TargetObject:\\DisableIOAVProtection OR TargetObject:\\DisableOnAccessProtection OR TargetObject:\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring OR TargetObject:\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable OR TargetObject:\\DisableScriptScanning) Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000001\)) OR ((TargetObject:\\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride OR TargetObject:\\Features\\TamperProtection OR TargetObject:\\MpEngine\\MpEnablePus OR TargetObject:\\PUAProtection OR TargetObject:\\Signature\ Update\\ForceUpdateFromMU OR TargetObject:\\SpyNet\\SpynetReporting OR TargetObject:\\SpyNet\\SubmitSamplesConsent OR TargetObject:\\Windows\ Defender\ Exploit\ Guard\\Controlled\ Folder\ Access\\EnableControlledFolderAccess) Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\))) (-(Image:C\:\\Program\ Files\\Symantec\\Symantec\ Endpoint\ Protection\\* Image:\\sepWscSvc64.exe))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
id: 0eb46774-f1ab-4a74-8238-1155855f2263
related:
    - id: a64e4198-c1c8-46a5-bc9c-324c86455fd4
      type: obsolete
    - id: fd115e64-97c7-491f-951c-fc8da7e042fa
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects when attackers or tools disable Windows Defender functionalities via the Windows registry
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://gist.github.com/anadr/7465a9fde63d41341136949f14c21105
    - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.WindowsDefender::SpyNetReporting
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/32236-enable-disable-microsoft-defender-pua-protection-windows-10-a.html
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html
    - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/123792-turn-off-tamper-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus.html
    - https://securelist.com/key-group-ransomware-samples-and-telegram-schemes/114025/
author: AlertIQ, Ján Trenčanský, frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2024-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\'
    selection_dword_1:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisableAntiSpyware'
            - '\DisableAntiVirus'
            - '\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
            - '\DisableBlockAtFirstSeen'
            - '\DisableEnhancedNotifications'
            - '\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem'
            - '\DisableIOAVProtection'
            - '\DisableOnAccessProtection'
            - '\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - '\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable'
            - '\DisableScriptScanning'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_dword_0:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride'
            - '\Features\TamperProtection'
            - '\MpEngine\MpEnablePus'
            - '\PUAProtection'
            - '\Signature Update\ForceUpdateFromMU'
            - '\SpyNet\SpynetReporting'
            - '\SpyNet\SubmitSamplesConsent'
            - '\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\EnableControlledFolderAccess'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    filter_optional_symantec:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\'
        Image|endswith: '\sepWscSvc64.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_dword_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator actions via the Windows Defender interface
    - Third party Antivirus
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
carbon_black query
(Image:\\appcmd.exe OR OriginalFileName:appcmd.exe) (CommandLine:set* CommandLine:config* CommandLine:section\:httplogging* CommandLine:dontLog\:true*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
id: e4ed6030-ffe5-4e6a-8a8a-ab3c1ab9d94e
status: test
description: Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.002/T1562.002.md#atomic-test-1---disable-windows-iis-http-logging
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - 'config'
            - 'section:httplogging'
            - 'dontLog:true'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disable of ETW Trace - Powershell
Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8
carbon_black query
ScriptBlockText:Remove\-EtwTraceProvider\ * OR (ScriptBlockText:Set\-EtwTraceProvider\ * ScriptBlockText:0x11*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable of ETW Trace - Powershell
id: 115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8
related:
    - id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
references:
    - https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2022-11-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_pwsh_remove:   # Autologger provider removal
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Remove-EtwTraceProvider '
    selection_pwsh_set:   # Provider “Enable” property modification
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-EtwTraceProvider '
            - '0x11'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell
Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 99c4658d-2c5e-4d87-828d-7c066ca537c3
carbon_black query
(ScriptBlockText:Disable\-WindowsOptionalFeature* ScriptBlockText:\-Online* ScriptBlockText:\-FeatureName*) (ScriptBlockText:Windows\-Defender\-Gui* OR ScriptBlockText:Windows\-Defender\-Features* OR ScriptBlockText:Windows\-Defender* OR ScriptBlockText:Windows\-Defender\-ApplicationGuard*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature Command PowerShell
id: 99c4658d-2c5e-4d87-828d-7c066ca537c3
status: test
description: |
    Detect built in PowerShell cmdlet Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature, Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
    Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5b67c9b141fa3918017f8fa44f2f88f0b1ecb9e1/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/disable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: frack113
date: 2022-09-10
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature'
            - '-Online'
            - '-FeatureName'
    selection_feature:
        # Add any important windows features
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Windows-Defender-Gui'
            - 'Windows-Defender-Features'
            - 'Windows-Defender'
            - 'Windows-Defender-ApplicationGuard'
            # - 'Containers-DisposableClientVM' # Windows Sandbox
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects command lines that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id fb50eb7a-5ab1-43ae-bcc9-091818cb8424
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:\ \-name\ IEHarden\ * CommandLine:\ \-value\ 0\ *) OR (CommandLine:\ \-name\ DEPOff\ * CommandLine:\ \-value\ 1\ *) OR (CommandLine:\ \-name\ DisableFirstRunCustomize\ * CommandLine:\ \-value\ 2\ *)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabled IE Security Features
id: fb50eb7a-5ab1-43ae-bcc9-091818cb8424
status: test
description: Detects command lines that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-06-19
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name IEHarden '
            - ' -value 0 '
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name DEPOff '
            - ' -value 1 '
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -name DisableFirstRunCustomize '
            - ' -value 2 '
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Disabled Volume Snapshots
Detects commands that temporarily turn off Volume Snapshots
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id dee4af55-1f22-4e1d-a9d2-4bdc7ecb472a
carbon_black query
CommandLine:\\Services\\VSS\\Diag* CommandLine:\/d\ Disabled*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabled Volume Snapshots
id: dee4af55-1f22-4e1d-a9d2-4bdc7ecb472a
status: test
description: Detects commands that temporarily turn off Volume Snapshots
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1354766164166115331
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-28
modified: 2023-12-15
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Services\VSS\Diag'
            - '/d Disabled'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog
Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id fcddca7c-b9c0-4ddf-98da-e1e2d18b0157
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\WINEVT\\Channels\\Microsoft\-Windows\-Windows\ Defender\/Operational\\Enabled* Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabled Windows Defender Eventlog
id: fcddca7c-b9c0-4ddf-98da-e1e2d18b0157
status: test
description: Detects the disabling of the Windows Defender eventlog as seen in relation to Lockbit 3.0 infections
references:
    - https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543900539280293889/photo/2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational\Enabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other Antivirus software installations could cause Windows to disable that eventlog (unknown)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Disabling Multi Factor Authentication
Detects disabling of Multi Factor Authentication.
status test author Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule) ATT&CK sub-technique id 60de9b57-dc4d-48b9-a6a0-b39e0469f876
carbon_black query
Operation:Disable\ Strong\ Authentication.*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabling Multi Factor Authentication
id: 60de9b57-dc4d-48b9-a6a0-b39e0469f876
status: test
description: Detects disabling of Multi Factor Authentication.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/c783dd98-c703-4252-9e8a-f19d9f5c949e/
author: Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556.006
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        Operation|contains: 'Disable Strong Authentication.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events. By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
status experimental author Matt Anderson (Huntress) ATT&CK technique id a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
carbon_black query
((Image:\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) (CommandLine:\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderApiLogger\\Start* OR CommandLine:\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\DefenderAuditLogger\\Start*) (CommandLine:add* CommandLine:0*)) (-CommandLine:0x00000001*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6
related:
    - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events.
    By setting the 'Start' value to '0' for the 'DefenderApiLogger' or 'DefenderAuditLogger' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events
    from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique.
references:
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/
    - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions
author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
date: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_reg_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start'
            - '\Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start'
    selection_reg_add:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'add'
            - '0'
    filter_main_enable:
        CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Discovery Using AzureHound
Detects AzureHound (A BloodHound data collector for Microsoft Azure) activity via the default User-Agent that is used during its operation after successful authentication.
status test author Janantha Marasinghe ATT&CK sub-technique id 35b781cc-1a08-4a5a-80af-42fd7c315c6b
carbon_black query
userAgent:azurehound* ResultType:0
view Sigma YAML 
title: Discovery Using AzureHound
id: 35b781cc-1a08-4a5a-80af-42fd7c315c6b
status: test
description: Detects AzureHound (A BloodHound data collector for Microsoft Azure) activity via the default User-Agent that is used during its operation after successful authentication.
references:
    - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound
author: Janantha Marasinghe
date: 2022-11-27
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.004
    - attack.t1526
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        userAgent|contains: 'azurehound'
        ResultType: 0
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
DotNet CLR DLL Loaded By Scripting Applications
Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of potential suspicious execution.
status test author omkar72, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
carbon_black query
(Image:\\cmstp.exe OR Image:\\cscript.exe OR Image:\\mshta.exe OR Image:\\msxsl.exe OR Image:\\regsvr32.exe OR Image:\\wmic.exe OR Image:\\wscript.exe) (ImageLoaded:\\clr.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\mscoree.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\mscorlib.dll)
view Sigma YAML 
title: DotNet CLR DLL Loaded By Scripting Applications
id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
status: test
description: Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of potential suspicious execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript
    - https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221026202428/https://gist.github.com/code-scrap/d7f152ffcdb3e0b02f7f394f5187f008
author: omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msxsl.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            # - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\clr.dll'
            - '\mscoree.dll'
            - '\mscorlib.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Driver Added To Disallowed Images In HVCI - Registry
Detects changes to the "HVCIDisallowedImages" registry value to potentially add a driver to the list, in order to prevent it from loading.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe) ATT&CK tactic-only id 555155a2-03bf-4fe7-af74-d176b3fdbe16
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Control\\CI\\* TargetObject:\\HVCIDisallowedImages*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Driver Added To Disallowed Images In HVCI - Registry
id: 555155a2-03bf-4fe7-af74-d176b3fdbe16
related:
    - id: 44cee399-f6b1-45cc-a87c-ea14c6064d6b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "HVCIDisallowedImages" registry value to potentially add a driver to the list, in order to prevent it from loading.
references:
    - https://github.com/yardenshafir/conference_talks/blob/3de1f5d7c02656c35117f067fbff0a219c304b09/OffensiveCon_2023_Your_Mitigations_are_My_Opportunities.pdf
    - https://x.com/yarden_shafir/status/1822667605175324787
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2023-12-05
modified: 2024-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Control\CI\'
            - '\HVCIDisallowedImages'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of this key would also trigger this. Investigate the driver being added and make sure its intended
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Driver Load From A Temporary Directory
Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
carbon_black query
ImageLoaded:\\Temp\\*
view Sigma YAML 
title: Driver Load From A Temporary Directory
id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
status: test
description: Detects a driver load from a temporary directory
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Dumping of Sensitive Hives Via Reg.EXE
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Endgame, JHasenbusch, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id fd877b94-9bb5-4191-bb25-d79cbd93c167
carbon_black query
(Image:\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) (CommandLine:\ save\ * OR CommandLine:\ export\ * OR CommandLine:\ ˢave\ * OR CommandLine:\ eˣport\ *) (CommandLine:hklm* OR CommandLine:hk˪m* OR CommandLine:hkey_local_machine* OR CommandLine:hkey_˪ocal_machine* OR CommandLine:hkey_loca˪_machine* OR CommandLine:hkey_˪oca˪_machine*) (CommandLine:\\system* OR CommandLine:\\sam* OR CommandLine:\\security* OR CommandLine:\\ˢystem* OR CommandLine:\\syˢtem* OR CommandLine:\\ˢyˢtem* OR CommandLine:\\ˢam* OR CommandLine:\\ˢecurity*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Dumping of Sensitive Hives Via Reg.EXE
id: fd877b94-9bb5-4191-bb25-d79cbd93c167
related:
    - id: 038cd51c-3ad8-41c5-ba8f-5d1c92f3cc1e
      type: obsolete
    - id: 4d6c9da1-318b-4edf-bcea-b6c93fa98fd0
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/aed95fc6-5e3f-49dc-8b35-06508613f979.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Endgame, JHasenbusch, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, frack113
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-12-13
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - car.2013-07-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' save '
            - ' export '
            - ' ˢave '
            - ' eˣport '
    selection_cli_hklm:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hklm'
            - 'hk˪m'
            - 'hkey_local_machine'
            - 'hkey_˪ocal_machine'
            - 'hkey_loca˪_machine'
            - 'hkey_˪oca˪_machine'
    selection_cli_hive:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\system'
            - '\sam'
            - '\security'
            - '\ˢystem'
            - '\syˢtem'
            - '\ˢyˢtem'
            - '\ˢam'
            - '\ˢecurity'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
carbon_black query
Image:\/esxcli CommandLine:system* (CommandLine:\ permission\ * CommandLine:\ set* CommandLine:Admin*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
id: 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
references:
    - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1059.012
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
        CommandLine|contains: 'system'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' permission '
            - ' set'
            - 'Admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK technique id a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
carbon_black query
(EventID:4657 ObjectName:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework ObjectValueName:ETWEnabled NewValue:0) OR (EventID:4657 ObjectName:\\Environment* (ObjectValueName:COMPlus_ETWEnabled OR ObjectValueName:COMPlus_ETWFlags) NewValue:0)
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Registry
id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
related:
    - id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2022-12-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework'
        ObjectValueName: 'ETWEnabled'
        NewValue: 0
    selection_complus:
        EventID: 4657
        ObjectName|contains: '\Environment'
        ObjectValueName:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        NewValue: 0
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK technique id bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\ETWEnabled Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)) OR ((TargetObject:\\COMPlus_ETWEnabled OR TargetObject:\\COMPlus_ETWFlags) (Details:0 OR Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)))
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544
related:
    - id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_etw_enabled:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\ETWEnabled'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    selection_complus:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - '\COMPlus_ETWFlags'
        Details:
            - 0 # For REG_SZ type
            - 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine
Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK technique id 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4
carbon_black query
CommandLine:COMPlus_ETWEnabled* OR CommandLine:COMPlus_ETWFlags*
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine
id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine.
    This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
    - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
    - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
    - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
    - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2022-12-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled'
            - 'COMPlus_ETWFlags'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
ETW Trace Evasion Activity
Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
status test author @neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:cl* CommandLine:\/Trace*) OR (CommandLine:clear\-log* CommandLine:\/Trace*) OR (CommandLine:sl* CommandLine:\/e\:false*) OR (CommandLine:set\-log* CommandLine:\/e\:false*) OR (CommandLine:logman* CommandLine:update* CommandLine:trace* CommandLine:\-\-p* CommandLine:\-ets*) OR CommandLine:Remove\-EtwTraceProvider* OR (CommandLine:Set\-EtwTraceProvider* CommandLine:0x11*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: ETW Trace Evasion Activity
id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
    - https://abuse.io/lockergoga.txt
    - https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: '@neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community'
date: 2019-03-22
modified: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.t1685
    - car.2016-04-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_clear_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cl'
            - '/Trace'
    selection_clear_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'clear-log'
            - '/Trace'
    selection_disable_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sl'
            - '/e:false'
    selection_disable_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set-log'
            - '/e:false'
    selection_disable_3:   # ETW provider removal from a trace session
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'logman'
            - 'update'
            - 'trace'
            - '--p'
            - '-ets'
    selection_pwsh_remove:   # Autologger provider removal
        CommandLine|contains: 'Remove-EtwTraceProvider'
    selection_pwsh_set:   # Provider “Enable” property modification
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-EtwTraceProvider'
            - '0x11'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Email Exifiltration Via Powershell
Detects email exfiltration via powershell cmdlets
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Azure-Sentinel (idea) ATT&CK tactic-only id 312d0384-401c-4b8b-abdf-685ffba9a332
carbon_black query
(Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe) (CommandLine:Add\-PSSnapin* CommandLine:Get\-Recipient* CommandLine:\-ExpandProperty* CommandLine:EmailAddresses* CommandLine:SmtpAddress* CommandLine:\-hidetableheaders*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Email Exifiltration Via Powershell
id: 312d0384-401c-4b8b-abdf-685ffba9a332
status: test
description: Detects email exfiltration via powershell cmdlets
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/7e6aa438e254d468feec061618a7877aa528ee9f/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Email%20data%20exfiltration%20via%20PowerShell.yaml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems),  Azure-Sentinel (idea)
date: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Add-PSSnapin'
            - 'Get-Recipient'
            - '-ExpandProperty'
            - 'EmailAddresses'
            - 'SmtpAddress'
            - '-hidetableheaders'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Emotet Loader Execution Via .LNK File
Detects the Emotet Epoch4 loader as reported by @malware_traffic back in 2022. The ".lnk" file was delivered via phishing campaign.
status test author @kostastsale ATT&CK sub-technique id 1f32d820-1d5c-43fe-8fe2-feef0c952eb7
carbon_black query
(ParentImage:\\cmd.exe OR ParentImage:\\explorer.exe OR ParentImage:\\powershell.exe) (Image:\\cmd.exe OR Image:\\powershell.exe) (CommandLine:findstr* CommandLine:.vbs* CommandLine:.lnk*)
view Sigma YAML 
title: Emotet Loader Execution Via .LNK File
id: 1f32d820-1d5c-43fe-8fe2-feef0c952eb7
status: test
description: |
    Detects the Emotet Epoch4 loader as reported by @malware_traffic back in 2022.
    The ".lnk" file was delivered via phishing campaign.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220422215221/https://twitter.com/malware_traffic/status/1517622327000846338
    - https://twitter.com/Cryptolaemus1/status/1517634855940632576
    - https://tria.ge/220422-1pw1pscfdl/
    - https://tria.ge/220422-1nnmyagdf2/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-04-22
modified: 2024-08-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'findstr'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.lnk'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
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