Home/Detection rules/VMware Carbon Black
Tool
EDR / XDR

VMware Carbon Black

1,715 rules · Sigma detections in VMware Carbon Black syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into VMware Carbon Black query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.

Detection rules

50 shown of 1,715
high
.RDP File Created By Uncommon Application
Detects creation of a file with an ".rdp" extension by an application that doesn't commonly create such files.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id fccfb43e-09a7-4bd2-8b37-a5a7df33386d
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:.rdp (Image:\\brave.exe OR Image:\\CCleaner\ Browser\\Application\\CCleanerBrowser.exe OR Image:\\chromium.exe OR Image:\\firefox.exe OR Image:\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe OR Image:\\iexplore.exe OR Image:\\microsoftedge.exe OR Image:\\msedge.exe OR Image:\\Opera.exe OR Image:\\Vivaldi.exe OR Image:\\Whale.exe OR Image:\\olk.exe OR Image:\\Outlook.exe OR Image:\\RuntimeBroker.exe OR Image:\\Thunderbird.exe OR Image:\\Discord.exe OR Image:\\Keybase.exe OR Image:\\msteams.exe OR Image:\\Slack.exe OR Image:\\teams.exe)
view Sigma YAML
title: .RDP File Created By Uncommon Application
id: fccfb43e-09a7-4bd2-8b37-a5a7df33386d
related:
    - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of a file with an ".rdp" extension by an application that doesn't commonly create such files.
references:
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230726144748/https://blog.thickmints.dev/mintsights/detecting-rogue-rdp/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-18
modified: 2024-11-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.rdp'
        Image|endswith:
            # Covers browsers
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\CCleaner Browser\Application\CCleanerBrowser.exe'
            - '\chromium.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\microsoftedge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\Opera.exe'
            - '\Vivaldi.exe'
            - '\Whale.exe'
            # Covers email clients
            - '\olk.exe' # Outlook
            - '\Outlook.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe' # If the windows mail client is used
            - '\Thunderbird.exe'
            # Covers chat applications
            - '\Discord.exe' # Should open the browser for download, but just in case.
            - '\Keybase.exe'
            - '\msteams.exe'
            - '\Slack.exe'
            - '\teams.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation
Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.
status test author Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3
carbon_black query
((Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\powershell_ise.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:PowerShell.Exe OR OriginalFileName:pwsh.dll)) (CommandLine:Add\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:ConvertTo\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Disable\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Enable\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Export\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Find\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Get\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Grant\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Initialize\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Install\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Join\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:New\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Open\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Read\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Register\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Remove\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Reset\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Resolve\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Restore\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Save\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Search\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Send\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Set\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Start\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Unprotect\-AADInt* OR CommandLine:Update\-AADInt*)
view Sigma YAML
title: AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation
id: c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3
related:
    - id: 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/
    - https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals
author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-23
modified: 2025-02-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.Exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Since most of the cmdlets use a unique enough string which is "-AADInt" we only used that portion. For a complete list please check the references linked above
            - 'Add-AADInt'
            - 'ConvertTo-AADInt'
            - 'Disable-AADInt'
            - 'Enable-AADInt'
            - 'Export-AADInt'
            - 'Find-AADInt'
            - 'Get-AADInt'
            - 'Grant-AADInt'
            - 'Initialize-AADInt'
            - 'Install-AADInt'
            - 'Invoke-AADInt'
            - 'Join-AADInt'
            - 'New-AADInt'
            - 'Open-AADInt'
            - 'Read-AADInt'
            - 'Register-AADInt'
            - 'Remove-AADInt'
            - 'Reset-AADInt'
            - 'Resolve-AADInt'
            - 'Restore-AADInt'
            - 'Save-AADInt'
            - 'Search-AADInt'
            - 'Send-AADInt'
            - 'Set-AADInt'
            - 'Start-AADInt'
            - 'Unprotect-AADInt'
            - 'Update-AADInt'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - PsScript
Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.
status test author Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6
carbon_black query
ScriptBlockText:Add\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:ConvertTo\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Disable\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Enable\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Export\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Find\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Get\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Grant\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Initialize\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Install\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Invoke\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Join\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:New\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Open\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Read\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Register\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Remove\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Reset\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Resolve\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Restore\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Save\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Search\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Send\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Set\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Start\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Unprotect\-AADInt* OR ScriptBlockText:Update\-AADInt*
view Sigma YAML
title: AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - PsScript
id: 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6
related:
    - id: c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/
    - https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals
author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-23
modified: 2025-02-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: Script Block Logging must be enable
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            # Since most of the cmdlets use a unique enough string which is "-AADInt" we only used that portion. For a complete list please check the references linked above
            - 'Add-AADInt'
            - 'ConvertTo-AADInt'
            - 'Disable-AADInt'
            - 'Enable-AADInt'
            - 'Export-AADInt'
            - 'Find-AADInt'
            - 'Get-AADInt'
            - 'Grant-AADInt'
            - 'Initialize-AADInt'
            - 'Install-AADInt'
            - 'Invoke-AADInt'
            - 'Join-AADInt'
            - 'New-AADInt'
            - 'Open-AADInt'
            - 'Read-AADInt'
            - 'Register-AADInt'
            - 'Remove-AADInt'
            - 'Reset-AADInt'
            - 'Resolve-AADInt'
            - 'Restore-AADInt'
            - 'Save-AADInt'
            - 'Search-AADInt'
            - 'Send-AADInt'
            - 'Set-AADInt'
            - 'Start-AADInt'
            - 'Unprotect-AADInt'
            - 'Update-AADInt'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance
Detect priv users or groups recon based on 4661 eventid and known privileged users or groups SIDs
status test author Samir Bousseaden id 35ba1d85-724d-42a3-889f-2e2362bcaf23
carbon_black query
(EventID:4661 (ObjectType:SAM_USER OR ObjectType:SAM_GROUP)) ((ObjectName:\-512 OR ObjectName:\-502 OR ObjectName:\-500 OR ObjectName:\-505 OR ObjectName:\-519 OR ObjectName:\-520 OR ObjectName:\-544 OR ObjectName:\-551 OR ObjectName:\-555) OR ObjectName:admin*) (-SubjectUserName:$)
view Sigma YAML
title: AD Privileged Users or Groups Reconnaissance
id: 35ba1d85-724d-42a3-889f-2e2362bcaf23
status: test
description: Detect priv users or groups recon based on 4661 eventid and known privileged users or groups SIDs
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329163438/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-5-detecting-enumeration.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-07-13
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: enable Object Access SAM on your Domain Controllers'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4661
        ObjectType:
            - 'SAM_USER'
            - 'SAM_GROUP'
    selection_object:
        - ObjectName|endswith:
              - '-512'
              - '-502'
              - '-500'
              - '-505'
              - '-519'
              - '-520'
              - '-544'
              - '-551'
              - '-555'
        - ObjectName|contains: 'admin'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and selection_object and not filter
falsepositives:
    - If source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU
Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject and risky EKU
status test author Orlinum , BlueDefenZer id bfbd3291-de87-4b7c-88a2-d6a5deb28668
carbon_black query
((EventID:4898 (TemplateContent:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2* OR TemplateContent:1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4* OR TemplateContent:1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2* OR TemplateContent:2.5.29.37.0*)) TemplateContent:CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*) OR ((EventID:4899 (NewTemplateContent:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2* OR NewTemplateContent:1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4* OR NewTemplateContent:1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2* OR NewTemplateContent:2.5.29.37.0*)) NewTemplateContent:CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT*)
view Sigma YAML
title: ADCS Certificate Template Configuration Vulnerability with Risky EKU
id: bfbd3291-de87-4b7c-88a2-d6a5deb28668
status: test
description: Detects certificate creation with template allowing risk permission subject and risky EKU
references:
    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
author: Orlinum , BlueDefenZer
date: 2021-11-17
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: Certificate services loaded a template would trigger event ID 4898 and certificate Services template was updated would trigger event ID 4899. A risk permission seems to be coming if template contain specific flag with risky EKU.
detection:
    selection10:
        EventID: 4898
        TemplateContent|contains:
            - '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'
            - '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'
            - '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2'
            - '2.5.29.37.0'
    selection11:
        TemplateContent|contains: 'CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT'

    selection20:
        EventID: 4899
        NewTemplateContent|contains:
            - '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'
            - '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'
            - '1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2'
            - '2.5.29.37.0'
    selection21:
        NewTemplateContent|contains: 'CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT'

    condition: (selection10 and selection11) or (selection20 and selection21)
falsepositives:
    - Administrator activity
    - Proxy SSL certificate with subject modification
    - Smart card enrollement
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
ADSelfService Exploitation
Detects suspicious access to URLs that was noticed in cases in which attackers exploitated the ADSelfService vulnerability CVE-2021-40539
status test author Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) id 6702b13c-e421-44cc-ab33-42cc25570f11
carbon_black query
"cs-uri-query":\/help\/admin\-guide\/Reports\/ReportGenerate.jsp* OR "cs-uri-query":\/ServletApi\/..\/RestApi\/LogonCustomization* OR "cs-uri-query":\/ServletApi\/..\/RestAPI\/Connection*
view Sigma YAML
title: ADSelfService Exploitation
id: 6702b13c-e421-44cc-ab33-42cc25570f11
status: test
description: Detects suspicious access to URLs that was noticed in cases in which attackers exploitated the ADSelfService vulnerability CVE-2021-40539
references:
    - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-20
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - cve.2021-40539
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/help/admin-guide/Reports/ReportGenerate.jsp'
            - '/ServletApi/../RestApi/LogonCustomization'
            - '/ServletApi/../RestAPI/Connection'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType
Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98
carbon_black query
ScriptBlockText:\[Ref\].Assembly.GetType* ScriptBlockText:SetValue\($null,$true\)* ScriptBlockText:NonPublic,Static*
view Sigma YAML
title: AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType
id: e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98
status: test
description: Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1588574518057979905?s=20&t=A7hh93ONM7ni1Rj1jO5OaA
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - '[Ref].Assembly.GetType'
            - 'SetValue($null,$true)'
            - 'NonPublic,Static'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
Detects attempts to disable AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) by modifying the AmsiEnable registry value. Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a security feature in Windows that allows applications and services to integrate with anti-malware products for enhanced protection against malicious content. Adversaries may attempt to disable AMSI to evade detection by security software, allowing them to execute malicious scripts or code without being scanned.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Script\\Settings\\AmsiEnable Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)
view Sigma YAML
title: AMSI Disabled via Registry Modification
id: aa37cbb0-da36-42cb-a90f-fdf216fc7467
related:
    - id: 7dbbcac2-57a0-45ac-b306-ff30a8bd2981 # Windows AMSI Related Registry Tampering Via CommandLine
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface) by modifying the AmsiEnable registry value.
    Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a security feature in Windows that allows applications and services to integrate with anti-malware products for enhanced protection against malicious content.
    Adversaries may attempt to disable AMSI to evade detection by security software, allowing them to execute malicious scripts or code without being scanned.
references:
    - https://mostafayahiax.medium.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypassing-methods-9886dda0bf9d
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2019/02/macros-and-more-with-sharpshooter-v2-0/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script\Settings\AmsiEnable'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_amsi_disable/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: AMSI Bypass - Create AMSIEnable Reg Key
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 728eca7b-0444-4f6f-ac36-437e3d751dc0
Convert to SIEM query
high
APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
carbon_black query
Image:\\svchost.exe ImageLoaded:\\clfsw32.dll
view Sigma YAML
title: APT PRIVATELOG Image Load Pattern
id: 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
status: test
description: Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210901184449/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\clfsw32.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rarely observed
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
APT User Agent
Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis id 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
carbon_black query
"c-useragent":SJZJ\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 6.0;\ Win32\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.;\ WOW64;\ rv\:20.0\)\ Gecko\/20100101\ Firefox\/20.0 OR "c-useragent":User\-Agent\:\ Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 8.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ Trident\/4.0;\ SLCC OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 7.4;\ Win32;32\-bit\) OR "c-useragent":webclient OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows;\ U;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.1;\ zh\-EN;\ rv\:1.7.12\)\ Gecko\/200 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSI\ 6.0; OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.3;\ WOW64;\ rv\:28.0\)\ Gecko\/20100101\ Firefox\/28.0 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.2;\ WOW64;\ rv\:20.0\)\ Gecko\/20100101\ Firefox\/ OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.;\ WOW64;\ rv\:20.0\)\ Gecko\/20100101\ Firefox\/2 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0 OR "c-useragent":Netscape OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows;\ U;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.1;\ zh\-EN;\ rv\:1.7.12\)\ Gecko\/20100719\ Firefox\/1.0.7 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows;\ U;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.1;\ en\-US;\ rv\:1.9.2.13\)\ Firefox\/3.6.13\ GTB7.1 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 9.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64;\ Trident\/5.0\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 8.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64;\ Trident\/4.0;\ SLCC2;\ .NETCLR\ 2.0.50727\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 8.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.0;\ SV1\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 11.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ SV1\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 8.0;\ Win32\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\ v5.1\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ rv\:6.0.1\)\ Gecko\/20100101\ Firefox\/6.0.1 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/6.1\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 9.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.3;\ Trident\/5.0\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 6.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.1;\ SV1;\ .NET\ CLR\ 1.1.4322;\ .NET\ CLR\ 2.0.50727;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.0.04506.30;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.0.04506.648;\ InfoPath.1\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64\)\ WinHttp\/1.6.3.8\ \(WinHTTP\/5.1\)\ like\ Gecko OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\ v5.1\ * OR "c-useragent":MSIE\ 8.0 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 7.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ SLCC2;\ .NET\ CLR\ 2.0.50727;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.5.30729;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.0.30729;\ Media\ Center\ PC\ 6.0;\ .NET4.0C;\ .NET4.0E;\ InfoPath.2\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ RMS\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 6.0;\ DynGate\) OR "c-useragent":O\/9.27\ \(W;\ U;\ Z\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 9.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.0;\ Trident\/5.0;\ \ Trident\/5.0* OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 9;\ * OR "c-useragent":hots\ scot OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 10.0;\ Windows\ NT\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64\)\ Chrome\/28.0.1500.95\ Safari\/537.36 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.2;\ Win32;\ rv\:47.0\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 6.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 5.1;SV1; OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(X11;\ Linux\ i686;\ rv\:22.0\)\ Firefox\/22.0 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ Chrome\/72.0.3626.109\ Safari\/537.36 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 10.0;\ Win64;\ x64;\ rv\:FTS_06\)\ Gecko\/22.36.35.06\ Firefox\/2.0 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 10.0;\ Win64;\ x64\)\ AppleWebKit\/537.36\ \(KHTML,\ like\ Gecko\)\ Chrome\/102.0.5005.63\ Safari\/537.36\ Edg\/100.0.1185.39 OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 7.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64;\ Trident\/4.0;\ SLCC2;\ .NET\ CLR\ 2.0.50727;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.5.30729;\ .NET\ CLR\ 3.0.30729;\ InfoPath.3;\ .NET4.0C;\ .NET4.0E\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/4.0\ \(compatible;\ MSIE\ 9.0;\ Windows\ NT\ 10.0;\ .NET4.0C;\ .NET4.0E;\ Tablet\ PC\ 2.0\) OR "c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 10.0;\ Win64;\ x64\)\ AppleWebKit\/537.36\ \(KHTML,\ like\ Gecko\)\ Chrome\/42.0.2311.135\ Safari\/537.36\ Edge\/12.246001
view Sigma YAML
title: APT User Agent
id: 6ec820f2-e963-4801-9127-d8b2dce4d31b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used in APT malware in proxy logs
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2024-02-15
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
         # APT Related
            - 'SJZJ (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32)' # APT Backspace
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0' # APT GrizzlySteppe - ChopStick - US CERT https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2017/02/10/enhanced-analysis-grizzly-steppe
            - 'User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.4; Win32;32-bit)' # Comment Crew Miniasp
            - 'webclient' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/200' # Naikon APT
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSI 6.0;' # SnowGlobe Babar - yes, it is cut
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/28.0' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/2' # Sofacy - Xtunnel
            - 'Mozilla/4.0' # Derusbi backdoor ELF https://github.com/fideliscyber/indicators/tree/master/FTA-1021
            - 'Netscape' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; zh-EN; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20100719 Firefox/1.0.7' # Unit78020 Malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Firefox/3.6.13 GTB7.1' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0)' # Winnti related
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NETCLR 2.0.50727)' # APT17
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.1; SV1)' # Bronze Butler - Daserf
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Win32)' # TSCookie https://app.any.run/tasks/0996b314-5133-491b-8d23-d431ffdec597
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:6.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.1' # Delphi downloader https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/04/24/sednit-update-analysis-zebrocy/
            - 'Mozilla/6.1 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 5.3; Trident/5.0)' # VPNFilter https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; InfoPath.1)' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko' # Sofacy User-Agent https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
            - 'Mozilla v5.1 *' # Sofacy Zebrocy samples
            - 'MSIE 8.0' # Sofacy Azzy Backdoor  from https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a80e29c0757bee05338fd5c22a542d852ad86c477068e3eb4aacc1c3e59e2eef?environmentId=100
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.2)' # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/07/microsoft-office-vulnerabilities-used-to-distribute-felixroot-backdoor.html
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; RMS)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; DynGate)' # Attacks on industrial enterprises using RMS and TeamViewer - https://securelist.com/attacks-on-industrial-enterprises-using-rms-and-teamviewer/87104/
            - 'O/9.27 (W; U; Z)' # Cmstar https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/e4328011bb2b04abc856ccd04404c9f95d67167f6c291d343e8ffa8aa2aa2099/details
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/5.0;  Trident/5.0*' # KerrDown UA
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *' # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
            - 'hots scot' # Unknown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)' # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36' # Hidden Cobra malware
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)' # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1;SV1;' # Mustang Panda https://insights.oem.avira.com/new-wave-of-plugx-targets-hong-kong/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:22.0) Firefox/22.0' # BackdoorDiplomacy https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/backdoordiplomacy-upgrading-quarian-turian/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 Chrome/72.0.3626.109 Safari/537.36' # SideWalk malware used by Sparkling Goblin
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:FTS_06) Gecko/22.36.35.06 Firefox/2.0' # LitePower stager used by WRITE https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.63 Safari/537.36 Edg/100.0.1185.39' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; InfoPath.3; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)' # https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 10.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Tablet PC 2.0)' # PlugX backdoor https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thor-plugx-variant/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.246001'  # RedCurl Downloader APT https://www.facct.ru/blog/redcurl-2024
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Old browsers
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
APT40 Dropbox Tool User Agent
Detects suspicious user agent string of APT40 Dropbox tool
status test author Thomas Patzke id 5ba715b6-71b7-44fd-8245-f66893e81b3d
carbon_black query
"c-useragent":Mozilla\/5.0\ \(Windows\ NT\ 6.1;\ WOW64\)\ AppleWebKit\/537.36\ \(KHTML,\ like\ Gecko\)\ Chrome\/36.0.1985.143\ Safari\/537.36 "cs-host":api.dropbox.com
view Sigma YAML
title: APT40 Dropbox Tool User Agent
id: 5ba715b6-71b7-44fd-8245-f66893e81b3d
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent string of APT40 Dropbox tool
references:
    - Internal research from Florian Roth
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-11-12
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/36.0.1985.143 Safari/537.36'
        cs-host: 'api.dropbox.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Old browsers
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
ASLR Disabled Via Sysctl or Direct Syscall - Linux
Detects actions that disable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux, including: - Use of the `personality` syscall with the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag (0x0040000) - Modification of the /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space file - Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0` Disabling ASLR is often used by attackers during exploit development or to bypass memory protection mechanisms. A successful use of these methods can reduce the effectiveness of ASLR and make memory corruption attacks more reliable.
status experimental author Milad Cheraghi id e497a24e-9345-4a62-9803-b06d7d7cb132
carbon_black query
(type:SYSCALL SYSCALL:personality a0:40000) OR (type:EXECVE a0:sysctl a1:\-w a2:kernel.randomize_va_space=0)
view Sigma YAML
title: ASLR Disabled Via Sysctl or Direct Syscall - Linux
id: e497a24e-9345-4a62-9803-b06d7d7cb132
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects actions that disable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in Linux, including:
      - Use of the `personality` syscall with the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE flag (0x0040000)
      - Modification of the /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space file
      - Execution of the `sysctl` command to set `kernel.randomize_va_space=0`
    Disabling ASLR is often used by attackers during exploit development or to bypass memory protection mechanisms.
    A successful use of these methods can reduce the effectiveness of ASLR and make memory corruption attacks more reliable.
references:
    - https://github.com/CheraghiMilad/bypass-Neo23x0-auditd-config/blob/f1c478a37911a5447d5ffcd580f22b167bf3df14/personality-syscall/README.md
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/personality.2.html
    - https://manual.cs50.io/2/personality
    - https://linux-audit.com/linux-aslr-and-kernelrandomize_va_space-setting/
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-05-26
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1055.009
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection_syscall:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        SYSCALL: 'personality'
        a0: 40000
    selection_sysctl:
        type: 'EXECVE'
        a0: 'sysctl'
        a1: '-w'
        a2: 'kernel.randomize_va_space=0' # 0 = disable
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Debugging or legitimate software testing
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS Config Disabling Channel/Recorder
Detects AWS Config Service disabling
status test author vitaliy0x1 id 07330162-dba1-4746-8121-a9647d49d297
carbon_black query
eventSource:config.amazonaws.com (eventName:DeleteDeliveryChannel OR eventName:StopConfigurationRecorder)
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS Config Disabling Channel/Recorder
id: 07330162-dba1-4746-8121-a9647d49d297
status: test
description: Detects AWS Config Service disabling
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/cloudtrail-log-files-for-aws-config.html
author: vitaliy0x1
date: 2020-01-21
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'config.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'DeleteDeliveryChannel'
            - 'StopConfigurationRecorder'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid change in AWS Config Service
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
status test author faloker id 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
carbon_black query
eventSource:ec2.amazonaws.com "requestParameters.attribute":userData eventName:ModifyInstanceAttribute
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change
id: 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
status: test
description: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-12
modified: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com
        requestParameters.attribute: 'userData'
        eventName: ModifyInstanceAttribute
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid changes to the startup script
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted Or Updated
Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection of its malicious activities. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost. Verify with the user identity that this activity is legitimate.
status experimental author suktech24 id d2656e78-c069-4571-8220-9e0ab5913f19
No stored carbon_black translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted Or Updated
id: d2656e78-c069-4571-8220-9e0ab5913f19
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection of its malicious activities.
    Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost.
    Verify with the user identity that this activity is legitimate.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDetector.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateDetector.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_suspend-disable.html
    - https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/719-39f-9cd/
    - https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/enterprise-edition/policy-reference/aws-policies/aws-general-policies/ensure-aws-guardduty-detector-is-enabled
    - https://docs.stellarcyber.ai/5.2.x/Using/ML/Alert-Rule-Based-Potentially_Malicious_AWS_Activity.html
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_GuardDutyDisabled.yaml
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_guardduty_detector_deletion.toml
    - https://help.fortinet.com/fsiem/Public_Resource_Access/7_4_0/rules/PH_RULE_AWS_GuardDuty_Detector_Deletion.htm
    - https://research.splunk.com/sources/5d8bd475-c8bc-4447-b27f-efa508728b90/
    - https://suktech24.com/2025/07/17/aws-threat-detection-rule-guardduty-detector-disabled-or-suspended/
    - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T156001#atomic-test-46---aws---guardduty-suspension-or-deletion
author: suktech24
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1685.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_event_source:
        eventSource: 'guardduty.amazonaws.com'
    selection_action_delete:
        eventName: 'DeleteDetector'
    selection_action_update:
        eventName: 'UpdateDetector'
        requestParameters.enable: 'false'
    selection_status_success:
        errorCode: 'Success'
    selection_status_null:
        errorCode: null
    condition: selection_event_source and 1 of selection_action_* and 1 of selection_status_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate detector deletion by an admin (e.g., during account decommissioning).
    - Temporary disablement for troubleshooting (verify via change management tickets).
    - Automated deployment tools (e.g. Terraform) managing GuardDuty state.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS GuardDuty Important Change
Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.
status test author faloker id 6e61ee20-ce00-4f8d-8aee-bedd8216f7e3
carbon_black query
eventSource:guardduty.amazonaws.com eventName:CreateIPSet
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS GuardDuty Important Change
id: 6e61ee20-ce00-4f8d-8aee-bedd8216f7e3
status: test
description: Detects updates of the GuardDuty list of trusted IPs, perhaps to disable security alerts against malicious IPs.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/guardduty__whitelist_ip/main.py#L9
author: faloker
date: 2020-02-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_source:
        eventSource: guardduty.amazonaws.com
        eventName: CreateIPSet
    condition: selection_source
falsepositives:
    - Valid change in the GuardDuty (e.g. to ignore internal scanners)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
status test author [email protected] (@danielhbohannon) id db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
carbon_black query
eventSource:iam.amazonaws.com (eventName:GetLoginProfile OR eventName:CreateLoginProfile) userAgent:S3\ Browser*
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser LoginProfile Creation
id: db014773-b1d3-46bd-ba26-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility performing reconnaissance looking for existing IAM Users without a LoginProfile defined then (when found) creating a LoginProfile.
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: [email protected] (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'GetLoginProfile'
            - 'CreateLoginProfile'
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM LoginProfile listing and/or creation
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
status test author [email protected] (@danielhbohannon) id db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
carbon_black query
eventSource:iam.amazonaws.com eventName:PutUserPolicy userAgent:S3\ Browser* (requestParameters:\"arn\:aws\:s3\:\:\:<YOUR\-BUCKET\-NAME>\/*\"* requestParameters:\"s3\:GetObject\"* requestParameters:\"Allow\"*)
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser Templated S3 Bucket Policy Creation
id: db014773-7375-4f4e-b83b-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 browser utility creating Inline IAM policy containing default S3 bucket name placeholder value of "<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>".
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: [email protected] (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com
        eventName: PutUserPolicy
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
        requestParameters|contains|all:
            - '"arn:aws:s3:::<YOUR-BUCKET-NAME>/*"'
            - '"s3:GetObject"'
            - '"Allow"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 browser with accidental creation of default Inline IAM policy without changing default S3 bucket name placeholder value
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
status test author [email protected] (@danielhbohannon) id db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
carbon_black query
eventSource:iam.amazonaws.com (eventName:CreateUser OR eventName:CreateAccessKey) userAgent:S3\ Browser*
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS IAM S3Browser User or AccessKey Creation
id: db014773-d9d9-4792-91e5-133337c0ffee
status: test
description: Detects S3 Browser utility creating IAM User or AccessKey.
references:
    - https://permiso.io/blog/s/unmasking-guivil-new-cloud-threat-actor
author: [email protected] (@danielhbohannon)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.009
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'CreateUser'
            - 'CreateAccessKey'
        userAgent|contains: 'S3 Browser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Valid usage of S3 Browser for IAM User and/or AccessKey creation
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS Identity Center Identity Provider Change
Detects a change in the AWS Identity Center (FKA AWS SSO) identity provider. A change in identity provider allows an attacker to establish persistent access or escalate privileges via user impersonation.
status test author Michael McIntyre @wtfender id d3adb3ef-b7e7-4003-9092-1924c797db35
carbon_black query
(eventSource:sso\-directory.amazonaws.com OR eventSource:sso.amazonaws.com) (eventName:AssociateDirectory OR eventName:DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory OR eventName:DisassociateDirectory OR eventName:EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory)
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS Identity Center Identity Provider Change
id: d3adb3ef-b7e7-4003-9092-1924c797db35
status: test
description: |
    Detects a change in the AWS Identity Center (FKA AWS SSO) identity provider.
    A change in identity provider allows an attacker to establish persistent access or escalate privileges via user impersonation.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/app-enablement.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsiamidentitycentersuccessortoawssinglesign-on.html
author: Michael McIntyre @wtfender
date: 2023-09-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource:
            - 'sso-directory.amazonaws.com'
            - 'sso.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AssociateDirectory'
            - 'DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory'
            - 'DisassociateDirectory'
            - 'EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Authorized changes to the AWS account's identity provider
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS KMS Imported Key Material Usage
Detects the import or deletion of key material in AWS KMS, which can be used as part of ransomware attacks. This activity is uncommon and provides a high certainty signal.
status experimental author toopricey id 1279262f-1464-422f-ac0d-5b545320c526
carbon_black query
eventSource:kms.amazonaws.com (eventName:ImportKeyMaterial OR eventName:DeleteImportedKeyMaterial)
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS KMS Imported Key Material Usage
id: 1279262f-1464-422f-ac0d-5b545320c526
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the import or deletion of key material in AWS KMS, which can be used as part of ransomware attacks. This activity is uncommon and provides a high certainty signal.
references:
    - https://www.chrisfarris.com/post/effective-aws-ransomware/
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/ct-importkeymaterial.html
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/developerguide/ct-deleteimportedkeymaterial.html
author: toopricey
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1608.003
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'kms.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'ImportKeyMaterial'
            - 'DeleteImportedKeyMaterial'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use cases for imported key material are rare, but may include, Organizations with hybrid cloud architectures that import external key material for compliance requirements.
    - Development or testing environments that simulate external key management scenarios. Even in these cases, such activity is typically infrequent and should not add significant noise.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
status stable author Sittikorn S id a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
carbon_black query
eventSource:securityhub.amazonaws.com (eventName:BatchUpdateFindings OR eventName:DeleteInsight OR eventName:UpdateFindings OR eventName:UpdateInsight)
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
id: a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
status: stable
description: Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-28
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
        eventName:
            - 'BatchUpdateFindings'
            - 'DeleteInsight'
            - 'UpdateFindings'
            - 'UpdateInsight'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System or Network administrator behaviors
    - DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users. An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
status test author toffeebr33k id 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
No stored carbon_black translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users.
    An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
author: toffeebr33k
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'
    filter_main_user_identity:
        userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user account administration
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
AWS VPC Flow Logs Deleted
Detects the deletion of one or more VPC Flow Logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) through the DeleteFlowLogs API call. Adversaries may delete flow logs to evade detection or remove evidence of network activity, hindering forensic investigations and visibility into malicious operations.
status experimental author Ivan Saakov id e386b9b5-af12-450e-afff-761730fb8a98
No stored carbon_black translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: AWS VPC Flow Logs Deleted
id: e386b9b5-af12-450e-afff-761730fb8a98
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the deletion of one or more VPC Flow Logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) through the DeleteFlowLogs API call.
    Adversaries may delete flow logs to evade detection or remove evidence of network activity, hindering forensic investigations and visibility into malicious operations.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html
    - https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/delete-flow-logs.html
    - https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_ec2_flow_log_deletion
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection_event_name:
        eventName: 'DeleteFlowLogs'
    selection_status_success:
        errorCode: 'Success'
    selection_status_null:
        errorCode: null
    condition: selection_event_name and 1 of selection_status_*
falsepositives:
    - During maintenance operations or testing, authorized administrators may delete VPC Flow Logs as part of routine network management or cleanup activities.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Abusable DLL Potential Sideloading From Suspicious Location
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id 799a5f48-0ac1-4e0f-9152-71d137d48c2a
carbon_black query
(ImageLoaded:\\coreclr.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\facesdk.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\HPCustPartUI.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\libcef.dll OR ImageLoaded:\\ZIPDLL.dll) ((ImageLoaded:\:\\Perflogs\\* OR ImageLoaded:\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR ImageLoaded:\\Temporary\ Internet* OR ImageLoaded:\\Windows\\Temp\\*) OR ((ImageLoaded:\:\\Users\\* ImageLoaded:\\Favorites\\*) OR (ImageLoaded:\:\\Users\\* ImageLoaded:\\Favourites\\*) OR (ImageLoaded:\:\\Users\\* ImageLoaded:\\Contacts\\*) OR (ImageLoaded:\:\\Users\\* ImageLoaded:\\Pictures\\*)))
view Sigma YAML
title: Abusable DLL Potential Sideloading From Suspicious Location
id: 799a5f48-0ac1-4e0f-9152-71d137d48c2a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/f/behind-the-scenes-unveiling-the-hidden-workings-of-earth-preta.html
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_dll:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            # Note: Add more generic DLLs that cannot be pin-pointed to a single application
            - '\coreclr.dll'
            - '\facesdk.dll'
            - '\HPCustPartUI.dll'
            - '\libcef.dll'
            - '\ZIPDLL.dll'
    selection_folders_1:
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_folders_2:
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    condition: selection_dll and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service
Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e
carbon_black query
(Image:\\pwsh.exe OR OriginalFileName:pwsh.dll) (CommandLine:Set\-Service\ * CommandLine:DCLCWPDTSD*) (CommandLine:\-SecurityDescriptorSddl\ * OR CommandLine:\-sd\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service
id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e
related:
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0
      type: derived
    - id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_sddl:
        # Example would be: "D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)S:(AU;FA;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Service '
            - 'DCLCWPDTSD'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl '
            - '-sd '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Rare intended use of hidden services
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS
Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da
carbon_black query
(ScriptBlockText:Set\-Service\ * ScriptBlockText:DCLCWPDTSD*) (ScriptBlockText:\-SecurityDescriptorSddl\ * OR ScriptBlockText:\-sd\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS
id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da
related:
    - id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Service '
            - 'DCLCWPDTSD'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl '
            - '-sd '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare intended use of hidden services
    - Rare FP could occur due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Abused Debug Privilege by Arbitrary Parent Processes
Detection of unusual child processes by different system processes
status test author Semanur Guneysu @semanurtg, oscd.community id d522eca2-2973-4391-a3e0-ef0374321dae
carbon_black query
(((ParentImage:\\winlogon.exe OR ParentImage:\\services.exe OR ParentImage:\\lsass.exe OR ParentImage:\\csrss.exe OR ParentImage:\\smss.exe OR ParentImage:\\wininit.exe OR ParentImage:\\spoolsv.exe OR ParentImage:\\searchindexer.exe) (User:AUTHORI* OR User:AUTORI*)) ((Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe OR Image:\\cmd.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:PowerShell.EXE OR OriginalFileName:pwsh.dll OR OriginalFileName:Cmd.Exe))) (-(CommandLine:\ route\ * CommandLine:\ ADD\ *))
view Sigma YAML
title: Abused Debug Privilege by Arbitrary Parent Processes
id: d522eca2-2973-4391-a3e0-ef0374321dae
status: test
description: Detection of unusual child processes by different system processes
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-74-638.jpg
author: 'Semanur Guneysu @semanurtg, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-28
modified: 2022-11-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\spoolsv.exe'
            - '\searchindexer.exe'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' route '
            - ' ADD '
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame
Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton id 6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
carbon_black query
("properties.message":Add\ user OR "properties.message":Delete\ user) Status:Success
view Sigma YAML
title: Account Created And Deleted Within A Close Time Frame
id: 6f583da0-3a90-4566-a4ed-83c09fe18bbf
status: test
description: Detects when an account was created and deleted in a short period of time.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#short-lived-accounts
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1', Tim Shelton
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2022-08-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add user
            - Delete user
        Status: Success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legit administrative action
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Active Directory User Backdoors
Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
status test author @neu5ron id 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
No stored carbon_black translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Active Directory User Backdoors
id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
references:
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-04-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4738
    filter_empty:
        AllowedToDelegateTo:
            - ''
            - '-'
    filter_null:
        AllowedToDelegateTo: null
    selection_5136_1:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
    selection_5136_2:
        EventID: 5136
        ObjectClass: 'user'
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'
    selection_5136_3:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
    condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Activity From Anonymous IP Address
Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8
carbon_black query
riskEventType:riskyIPAddress
view Sigma YAML
title: Activity From Anonymous IP Address
id: be4d9c86-d702-4030-b52e-c7859110e5e8
status: test
description: Identifies that users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#activity-from-anonymous-ip-address
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'riskyIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Add Debugger Entry To Hangs Key For Persistence
Detects when an attacker adds a new "Debugger" value to the "Hangs" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked when an application crashes
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 833ef470-fa01-4631-a79b-6f291c9ac498
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows\ Error\ Reporting\\Hangs\\Debugger*
view Sigma YAML
title: Add Debugger Entry To Hangs Key For Persistence
id: 833ef470-fa01-4631-a79b-6f291c9ac498
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker adds a new "Debugger" value to the "Hangs" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked when an application crashes
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wer_debugger.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-116/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs\Debugger'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This value is not set by default but could be rarly used by administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source. Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
carbon_black query
(Image:\\winget.exe OR OriginalFileName:winget.exe) (CommandLine:source\ * CommandLine:add\ * CommandLine:http\:\/\/*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Add Insecure Download Source To Winget
id: 81a0ecb5-0a41-4ba1-b2ba-c944eb92bfa2
related:
    - id: 05ebafc8-7aa2-4bcd-a269-2aec93f9e842
      type: similar
    - id: c15a46a0-07d4-4c87-b4b6-89207835a83b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of winget to add a new insecure (http) download source.
    Winget will not allow the addition of insecure sources, hence this could indicate potential suspicious activity (or typos)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/source
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\winget.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winget.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'source '
            - 'add '
            - 'http://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives might occur if the users are unaware of such control checks
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d
carbon_black query
(Image:\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) CommandLine:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot* (CommandLine:\ copy\ * OR CommandLine:\ add\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
id: d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d
related:
    - id: fc0e89b5-adb0-43c1-b749-c12a10ec37de
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not
references:
    - https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_safeboot:
        CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' copy '
            - ' add '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_safeboot/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high
Added Credentials to Existing Application
Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik' id cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628
carbon_black query
"properties.message":Update\ application\ –\ Certificates\ and\ secrets\ management OR "properties.message":Update\ Service\ principal\/Update\ Application
view Sigma YAML
title: Added Credentials to Existing Application
id: cbb67ecc-fb70-4467-9350-c910bdf7c628
status: test
description: Detects when a new credential is added to an existing application. Any additional credentials added outside of expected processes could be a malicious actor using those credentials.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-credentials
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-05-26
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.001
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Update application – Certificates and secrets management
            - Update Service principal/Update Application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When credentials are added/removed as part of the normal working hours/workflows
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Adwind RAT / JRAT
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community id 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:\\AppData\\Roaming\\Oracle* CommandLine:\\java* CommandLine:.exe\ *) OR (CommandLine:cscript.exe* CommandLine:Retrive* CommandLine:.vbs\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: Adwind RAT / JRAT
id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
status: test
description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
    - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2017-11-10
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Oracle'
              - '\java'
              - '.exe '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'Retrive'
              - '.vbs '
    condition: selection
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community id 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
carbon_black query
(TargetFilename:\\AppData\\Roaming\\Oracle\\bin\\java* TargetFilename:.exe*) OR (TargetFilename:\\Retrive* TargetFilename:.vbs*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Adwind RAT / JRAT File Artifact
id: 0bcfabcb-7929-47f4-93d6-b33fb67d34d1
related:
    - id: 1fac1481-2dbc-48b2-9096-753c49b4ec71
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects javaw.exe in AppData folder as used by Adwind / JRAT
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ba86fa0d4b6af2db0656a88b1dd29f36fe362473ae8ad04255c4e52f214a541c?environmentId=100
    - https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom Ueltschi, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2017-11-10
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java'
              - '.exe'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Retrive'
              - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors. This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76
carbon_black query
(Image:\\wbadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName:WBADMIN.EXE) ((CommandLine:delete* CommandLine:backup*) CommandLine:keepVersions\:0*)
view Sigma YAML
title: All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
id: 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76
related:
    - id: 89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe".
    This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors.
    This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell
    - https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/ranzy-ransomware-better-encryption-among-new-features-of-thunderx-derivative/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/ransomware-report-avaddon-and-new-techniques-emerge-industrial-sector-targeted
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/b/lockbit-attempts-to-stay-afloat-with-a-new-version/technical-appendix-lockbit-ng-dev-analysis.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-systemstatebackup
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WBADMIN.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'backup' # Also covers "SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP"
        CommandLine|contains: 'keepVersions:0'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration
Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d
carbon_black query
(EventID:2033 OR EventID:2059) (-ModifyingApplication:\:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe) (-(ModifyingApplication:\:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\Platform\\* ModifyingApplication:\\MsMpEng.exe*))
view Sigma YAML
title: All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration
id: 79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d
status: test
description: Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-17
modified: 2024-01-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2033 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer
            - 2059 # All rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration on this computer. (Windows 11)
    filter_main_svchost:
        ModifyingApplication|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_msmpeng:
        ModifyingApplication|contains|all:
            - ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6c8fbee5-dee8-49bc-851d-c3142d02aa47
carbon_black query
((Image:\\sc.exe OR OriginalFileName:sc.exe) (CommandLine:sdset* CommandLine:A;*) (CommandLine:;IU* OR CommandLine:;SU* OR CommandLine:;BA* OR CommandLine:;SY* OR CommandLine:;WD*)) (-ParentImage:C\:\\Hexnode\\Hexnode\ Agent\\Current\\HexnodeAgent.exe)
view Sigma YAML
title: Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE
id: 6c8fbee5-dee8-49bc-851d-c3142d02aa47
related:
    - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 # Generic SD tampering
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DACL modifications to allow access to a service from a suspicious trustee. This can be used to override access restrictions set by previous ACLs.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1628720819537936386
    - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        - Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sc.exe'
    selection_sdset:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sdset'
            - 'A;' # Allow Access
    selection_trustee:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';IU' # Interactively logged-on user
            - ';SU' # Service logon user
            - ';BA' # Built-in administrators
            - ';SY' # Local system
            - ';WD' # Everyone
    filter_optional_hexnode:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Anomalous Token
Indicates that there are abnormal characteristics in the token such as an unusual token lifetime or a token that is played from an unfamiliar location.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow' id 6555754e-5e7f-4a67-ad1c-4041c413a007
carbon_black query
riskEventType:anomalousToken
view Sigma YAML
title: Anomalous Token
id: 6555754e-5e7f-4a67-ad1c-4041c413a007
status: test
description: Indicates that there are abnormal characteristics in the token such as an unusual token lifetime or a token that is played from an unfamiliar location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-token
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anomalousToken'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Anomalous User Activity
Indicates that there are anomalous patterns of behavior like suspicious changes to the directory.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id 258b6593-215d-4a26-a141-c8e31c1299a6
carbon_black query
riskEventType:anomalousUserActivity
view Sigma YAML
title: Anomalous User Activity
id: 258b6593-215d-4a26-a141-c8e31c1299a6
status: test
description: Indicates that there are anomalous patterns of behavior like suspicious changes to the directory.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-user-activity
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anomalousUserActivity'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Anonymous IP Address
Indicates sign-ins from an anonymous IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN.
status test author Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' id 53acd925-2003-440d-a1f3-71a5253fe237
carbon_black query
riskEventType:anonymizedIPAddress
view Sigma YAML
title: Anonymous IP Address
id: 53acd925-2003-440d-a1f3-71a5253fe237
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from an anonymous IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/riskdetection?view=graph-rest-1.0
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anonymous-ip-address
author: Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anonymizedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Antivirus Filter Driver Disallowed On Dev Drive - Registry
Detects activity that indicates a user disabling the ability for Antivirus mini filter to inspect a "Dev Drive".
status test author @kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 31e124fb-5dc4-42a0-83b3-44a69c77b271
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\FilterManager\\FltmgrDevDriveAllowAntivirusFilter Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000000\)
view Sigma YAML
title: Antivirus Filter Driver Disallowed On Dev Drive - Registry
id: 31e124fb-5dc4-42a0-83b3-44a69c77b271
status: test
description: |
    Detects activity that indicates a user disabling the ability for Antivirus mini filter to inspect a "Dev Drive".
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1720419490519752955
author: '@kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-11-05
modified: 2024-08-16
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\FilterManager\FltmgrDevDriveAllowAntivirusFilter'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Antivirus Hacktool Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
carbon_black query
(Signature:ATK\/* OR Signature:Exploit.Script.CVE* OR Signature:HKTL* OR Signature:HTOOL* OR Signature:PWS.* OR Signature:PWSX* OR Signature:SecurityTool*) OR (Signature:Adfind* OR Signature:Brutel* OR Signature:BruteR* OR Signature:Cobalt* OR Signature:COBEACON* OR Signature:Cometer* OR Signature:DumpCreds* OR Signature:FastReverseProxy* OR Signature:Hacktool* OR Signature:Havoc* OR Signature:Impacket* OR Signature:Keylogger* OR Signature:Koadic* OR Signature:Mimikatz* OR Signature:Nighthawk* OR Signature:PentestPowerShell* OR Signature:Potato* OR Signature:PowerSploit* OR Signature:PowerSSH* OR Signature:PshlSpy* OR Signature:PSWTool* OR Signature:PWCrack* OR Signature:PWDump* OR Signature:Rozena* OR Signature:Rusthound* OR Signature:Sbelt* OR Signature:Seatbelt* OR Signature:SecurityTool* OR Signature:SharpDump* OR Signature:SharpHound* OR Signature:Shellcode* OR Signature:Sliver* OR Signature:Snaffler* OR Signature:SOAPHound* OR Signature:Splinter* OR Signature:Swrort* OR Signature:TurtleLoader*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Antivirus Hacktool Detection
id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith:
              - 'ATK/'  # Sophos
              - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
              - 'HKTL'
              - 'HTOOL'
              - 'PWS.'
              - 'PWSX'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              # - 'FRP.'
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'Adfind'
              - 'Brutel'
              - 'BruteR'
              - 'Cobalt'
              - 'COBEACON'
              - 'Cometer'
              - 'DumpCreds'
              - 'FastReverseProxy'
              - 'Hacktool'
              - 'Havoc'
              - 'Impacket'
              - 'Keylogger'
              - 'Koadic'
              - 'Mimikatz'
              - 'Nighthawk'
              - 'PentestPowerShell'
              - 'Potato'
              - 'PowerSploit'
              - 'PowerSSH'
              - 'PshlSpy'
              - 'PSWTool'
              - 'PWCrack'
              - 'PWDump'
              - 'Rozena'
              - 'Rusthound'
              - 'Sbelt'
              - 'Seatbelt'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              - 'SharpDump'
              - 'SharpHound'
              - 'Shellcode'
              - 'Sliver'
              - 'Snaffler'
              - 'SOAPHound'
              - 'Splinter'
              - 'Swrort'
              - 'TurtleLoader'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
carbon_black query
(Filename:\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR Filename:\:\\Temp\\* OR Filename:\:\\Users\\Default\\* OR Filename:\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR Filename:\:\\Windows\\* OR Filename:\/www\/* OR Filename:\\inetpub\\* OR Filename:\\tsclient\\* OR Filename:apache* OR Filename:nginx* OR Filename:tomcat* OR Filename:weblogic*) OR (Filename:.asax OR Filename:.ashx OR Filename:.asmx OR Filename:.asp OR Filename:.aspx OR Filename:.bat OR Filename:.cfm OR Filename:.cgi OR Filename:.chm OR Filename:.cmd OR Filename:.dat OR Filename:.ear OR Filename:.gif OR Filename:.hta OR Filename:.jpeg OR Filename:.jpg OR Filename:.jsp OR Filename:.jspx OR Filename:.lnk OR Filename:.msc OR Filename:.php OR Filename:.pl OR Filename:.png OR Filename:.ps1 OR Filename:.psm1 OR Filename:.py OR Filename:.pyc OR Filename:.rb OR Filename:.scf OR Filename:.sct OR Filename:.sh OR Filename:.svg OR Filename:.txt OR Filename:.vbe OR Filename:.vbs OR Filename:.war OR Filename:.wll OR Filename:.wsf OR Filename:.wsh OR Filename:.xll OR Filename:.xml)
view Sigma YAML
title: Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
id: c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
status: test
description: |
    Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection_path:
        Filename|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '/www/'
            # - '\Client\'
            - '\inetpub\'
            - '\tsclient\'
            - 'apache'
            - 'nginx'
            - 'tomcat'
            - 'weblogic'
    selection_ext:
        Filename|endswith:
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dat'
            - '.ear'
            - '.gif'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.lnk'
            - '.msc'
            - '.php'
            - '.pl'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.py'
            - '.pyc'
            - '.rb'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.sh'
            - '.svg'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wll'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.xml'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Antivirus Web Shell Detection
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell. It's highly recommended to tune this rule to the specific strings used by your anti virus solution by downloading a big WebShell repository from e.g. github and checking the matches. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id fdf135a2-9241-4f96-a114-bb404948f736
carbon_black query
(Signature:ASP.* OR Signature:IIS\/BackDoor* OR Signature:JAVA\/Backdoor* OR Signature:JSP.* OR Signature:Perl.* OR Signature:PHP.* OR Signature:Troj\/ASP* OR Signature:Troj\/JSP* OR Signature:Troj\/PHP* OR Signature:VBS\/Uxor*) OR (Signature:ASP_* OR Signature:ASP\:* OR Signature:ASP.Agent* OR Signature:ASP\/* OR Signature:Aspdoor* OR Signature:ASPXSpy* OR Signature:Backdoor.ASP* OR Signature:Backdoor.Java* OR Signature:Backdoor.JSP* OR Signature:Backdoor.PHP* OR Signature:Backdoor.VBS* OR Signature:Backdoor\/ASP* OR Signature:Backdoor\/Java* OR Signature:Backdoor\/JSP* OR Signature:Backdoor\/PHP* OR Signature:Backdoor\/VBS* OR Signature:C99shell* OR Signature:Chopper* OR Signature:filebrowser* OR Signature:JSP_* OR Signature:JSP\:* OR Signature:JSP.Agent* OR Signature:JSP\/* OR Signature:Perl\:* OR Signature:Perl\/* OR Signature:PHP_* OR Signature:PHP\:* OR Signature:PHP.Agent* OR Signature:PHP\/* OR Signature:PHPShell* OR Signature:PShlSpy* OR Signature:SinoChoper* OR Signature:Trojan.ASP* OR Signature:Trojan.JSP* OR Signature:Trojan.PHP* OR Signature:Trojan.VBS* OR Signature:VBS.Agent* OR Signature:VBS\/Agent* OR Signature:Webshell*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Antivirus Web Shell Detection
id: fdf135a2-9241-4f96-a114-bb404948f736
status: test
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a web shell.
    It's highly recommended to tune this rule to the specific strings used by your anti virus solution by downloading a big WebShell repository from e.g. github and checking the matches.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://github.com/tennc/webshell
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/bd1d52289203866645e556e2766a21d2275877fbafa056a76fe0cf884b7f8819/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/308487ed28a3d9abc1fec7ebc812d4b5c07ab025037535421f64c60d3887a3e8/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7d3cb8a8ff28f82b07f382789247329ad2d7782a72dde9867941f13266310c80/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e841675a4b82250c75273ebf0861245f80c6a1c3d5803c2d995d9d3b18d5c4b5/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a80042c61a0372eaa0c2c1e831adf0d13ef09feaf71d1d20b216156269045801/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b219f7d3c26f8bad7e175934cd5eda4ddb5e3983503e94ff07d39c0666821b7e/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b8702acf32fd651af9f809ed42d15135f842788cd98d81a8e1b154ee2a2b76a2/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13ae8bfbc02254b389ab052aba5e1ba169b16a399d9bc4cb7414c4a73cd7dc78/detection
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith:
              - 'ASP.'
              - 'IIS/BackDoor'
              - 'JAVA/Backdoor'
              - 'JSP.'
              - 'Perl.'
              - 'PHP.'
              - 'Troj/ASP'
              - 'Troj/JSP'
              - 'Troj/PHP'
              - 'VBS/Uxor' # looking for 'VBS/' would also find downloader's and droppers meant for desktops
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'ASP_' # looking for 'VBS_' would also find downloader's and droppers meant for desktops
              - 'ASP:'
              - 'ASP.Agent'
              - 'ASP/'
              # - 'ASP/Agent'
              - 'Aspdoor'
              - 'ASPXSpy'
              - 'Backdoor.ASP'
              - 'Backdoor.Java'
              - 'Backdoor.JSP'
              - 'Backdoor.PHP'
              - 'Backdoor.VBS'
              - 'Backdoor/ASP'
              - 'Backdoor/Java'
              - 'Backdoor/JSP'
              - 'Backdoor/PHP'
              - 'Backdoor/VBS'
              - 'C99shell'
              - 'Chopper'
              - 'filebrowser'
              - 'JSP_'
              - 'JSP:'
              - 'JSP.Agent'
              - 'JSP/'
              # - 'JSP/Agent'
              - 'Perl:'
              - 'Perl/'
              - 'PHP_'
              - 'PHP:'
              - 'PHP.Agent'
              - 'PHP/'
              # - 'PHP/Agent'
              - 'PHPShell'
              - 'PShlSpy'
              - 'SinoChoper'
              - 'Trojan.ASP'
              - 'Trojan.JSP'
              - 'Trojan.PHP'
              - 'Trojan.VBS'
              - 'VBS.Agent'
              - 'VBS/Agent'
              - 'Webshell'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Apache Segmentation Fault
Detects a segmentation fault error message caused by a crashing apache worker process
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 1da8ce0b-855d-4004-8860-7d64d42063b1
carbon_black query
"exit\ signal\ Segmentation\ Fault"
view Sigma YAML
title: Apache Segmentation Fault
id: 1da8ce0b-855d-4004-8860-7d64d42063b1
status: test
description: Detects a segmentation fault error message caused by a crashing apache worker process
references:
    - http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1633
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-28
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
logsource:
    service: apache
    definition: 'Requirements: Must be able to collect the error.log file'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'exit signal Segmentation Fault'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - ProcessCreation
Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a commandline perspective
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id c8a5f584-cdc8-42cc-8cce-0398e4265de3
carbon_black query
ParentImage:\\bash (CommandLine:id\ \-Gn\ `* OR CommandLine:id\ \-Gn\ '*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - ProcessCreation
id: c8a5f584-cdc8-42cc-8cce-0398e4265de3
status: test
description: Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a commandline perspective
references:
    - https://github.com/W01fh4cker/cve-2022-33891/blob/fd973b56e78bca8822caa3a2e3cf1b5aff5d0950/cve_2022_33891_poc.py
    - https://sumsec.me/2022/CVE-2022-33891%20Apache%20Spark%20shell%20command%20injection.html
    - https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-33891
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\bash'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'id -Gn `'
            - "id -Gn '"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high
Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - Weblogs
Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a weblogs perspective
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 1a9a04fd-02d1-465c-abad-d733fd409f9c
carbon_black query
"cs-uri-query":*doAs=`*
view Sigma YAML
title: Apache Spark Shell Command Injection - Weblogs
id: 1a9a04fd-02d1-465c-abad-d733fd409f9c
status: test
description: Detects attempts to exploit an apache spark server via CVE-2014-6287 from a weblogs perspective
references:
    - https://github.com/W01fh4cker/cve-2022-33891/blob/fd973b56e78bca8822caa3a2e3cf1b5aff5d0950/cve_2022_33891_poc.py
    - https://sumsec.me/2022/CVE-2022-33891%20Apache%20Spark%20shell%20command%20injection.html
    - https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/36315/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-19
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2022-33891
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '?doAs=`'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Web vulnerability scanners
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
Showing 1-50 of 1,715