title: Potentially Suspicious File Download From ZIP TLD
id: 0bb4bbeb-fe52-4044-b40c-430a04577ebe
status: test
description: Detects the download of a file with a potentially suspicious extension from a .zip top level domain.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1659175181695287297
    - https://fabian-voith.de/2020/06/25/sysmon-v11-1-reads-alternate-data-streams/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_stream_hash
detection:
    selection:
        Contents|contains: '.zip/'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.bat:Zone'
            - '.dat:Zone'
            - '.dll:Zone'
            - '.doc:Zone'
            - '.docm:Zone'
            - '.exe:Zone'
            - '.hta:Zone'
            - '.pptm:Zone'
            - '.ps1:Zone'
            - '.rar:Zone'
            - '.rtf:Zone'
            - '.sct:Zone'
            - '.vbe:Zone'
            - '.vbs:Zone'
            - '.ws:Zone'
            - '.wsf:Zone'
            - '.xll:Zone'
            - '.xls:Zone'
            - '.xlsm:Zone'
            - '.zip:Zone'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate file downloads from a websites and web services that uses the ".zip" top level domain.
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication
id: 4b89abaa-99fe-4232-afdd-8f9aa4d20382
related:
    - id: 6d8c3d20-a5e1-494f-8412-4571d716cf5c
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1571
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 100
            - 198
            - 200
            - 243
            - 473
            - 666
            - 700
            - 743
            - 777
            - 1443
            - 1515
            - 1777
            - 1817
            - 1904
            - 1960
            - 2443
            - 2448
            - 3360
            - 3675
            - 3939
            - 4040
            - 4433
            - 4438
            - 4443
            - 4444
            - 4455
            - 5445
            - 5552
            - 5649
            - 6625
            - 7210
            - 7777
            - 8143
            - 8843
            - 9631
            - 9943
            - 10101
            - 12102
            - 12103
            - 12322
            - 13145
            - 13394
            - 13504
            - 13505
            - 13506
            - 13507
            - 14102
            - 14103
            - 14154
            - 49180
            - 65520
            - 65535
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_optional_sys_directories:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication - Linux
id: dbfc7c98-04ab-4ab7-aa94-c74d22aa7376
related:
    - id: 4b89abaa-99fe-4232-afdd-8f9aa4d20382
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on threat intelligence reports.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/triton-actor-ttp-profile-custom-attack-tools-detections
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/ukraine-and-sandworm-team
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-non-standard-port-ssh-connection.html
    - https://thehackernews.com/2024/01/systembc-malwares-c2-server-analysis.html
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/sliver-c2-leveraged-by-many-threat-actors
author: hasselj
date: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1571
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 888
            - 999
            - 2200
            - 2222
            - 4000
            - 4444
            - 6789
            - 8531
            - 50501
            - 51820
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'         # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'       # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'        # IPv6 private addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious ODBC Driver Registered
id: e4d22291-f3d5-4b78-9a0c-a1fbaf32a6a4
status: test
description: Detects the registration of a new ODBC driver where the driver is located in a potentially suspicious location
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/odbcconf-lolbin-trifecta/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-23
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\ODBC\ODBCINST.INI\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Driver'
            - '\Setup'
        Details|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location
id: f99abdf0-6283-4e71-bd2b-b5c048a94743
status: test
description: Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1633863678909874176
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/new-security-hardening-policies-for-trusted-documents/ba-p/3023465
    - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1588155401752788994
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-21
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        # Note: we add a parent shell to reduce FP. Add additional 3rd party shells that you might use
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\dopus.exe'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\EXCEL.EXE'
              - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
              - '\WINWORD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Excel.exe'
              - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
              - 'WinWord.exe'
    selection_trusted_location:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: these are the default locations. Admins/Users could add additional ones that you need to cover
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\Startup\'
            - '\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\'
            - '\Microsoft Office\Templates\'
    filter_main_dotx:
        # Note: We add this filter to avoid curious people clicking on template files
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dotx'
            - '.xltx'
            - '.potx'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious Regsvr32 HTTP IP Pattern
id: 2dd2c217-bf68-437a-b57c-fe9fd01d5de8
status: test
description: Detects regsvr32 execution to download and install DLLs located remotely where the address is an IP address.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491
    - https://twitter.com/tccontre18/status/1480950986650832903
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-05-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGSVR32.EXE'
    selection_ip:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /i:http://1'
            - ' /i:http://2'
            - ' /i:http://3'
            - ' /i:http://4'
            - ' /i:http://5'
            - ' /i:http://6'
            - ' /i:http://7'
            - ' /i:http://8'
            - ' /i:http://9'
            - ' /i:https://1'
            - ' /i:https://2'
            - ' /i:https://3'
            - ' /i:https://4'
            - ' /i:https://5'
            - ' /i:https://6'
            - ' /i:https://7'
            - ' /i:https://8'
            - ' /i:https://9'
            - ' -i:http://1'
            - ' -i:http://2'
            - ' -i:http://3'
            - ' -i:http://4'
            - ' -i:http://5'
            - ' -i:http://6'
            - ' -i:http://7'
            - ' -i:http://8'
            - ' -i:http://9'
            - ' -i:https://1'
            - ' -i:https://2'
            - ' -i:https://3'
            - ' -i:https://4'
            - ' -i:https://5'
            - ' -i:https://6'
            - ' -i:https://7'
            - ' -i:https://8'
            - ' -i:https://9'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - FQDNs that start with a number such as "7-Zip"
level: high

title: PowerShell ADRecon Execution
id: bf72941a-cba0-41ea-b18c-9aca3925690d
status: test
description: Detects execution of ADRecon.ps1 for AD reconnaissance which has been reported to be actively used by FIN7
references:
    - https://github.com/sense-of-security/ADRecon/blob/11881a24e9c8b207f31b56846809ce1fb189bcc9/ADRecon.ps1
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/from-pentest-to-apt-attack-cybercriminal-group-fin7-disguises-its-malware-as-an-ethical-hackers-c23c9a75e319
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-07-16
modified: 2022-09-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Function Get-ADRExcelComOb'
            - 'Get-ADRGPO'
            - 'Get-ADRDomainController'
            - 'ADRecon-Report.xlsx' # Default
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
id: fdb62a13-9a81-4e5c-a38f-ea93a16f6d7c
status: test
description: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "FromBase64String" cmdlet in a process command line
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-08-24
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|base64offset|contains: '::FromBase64String'
        # UTF-16 LE
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'OgA6AEYAcgBvAG0AQgBhAHMAZQA2ADQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA'
              - 'oAOgBGAHIAbwBtAEIAYQBzAGUANgA0AFMAdAByAGkAbgBnA'
              - '6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCAGEAcwBlADYANABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Cmdlet
id: 88f680b8-070e-402c-ae11-d2914f2257f1
status: test
description: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "IEX" cmdlet in a process command line
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-08-23
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|base64offset|contains:
              - 'IEX (['
              - 'iex (['
              - 'iex (New'
              - 'IEX (New'
              - 'IEX(['
              - 'iex(['
              - 'iex(New'
              - 'IEX(New'
              - "IEX(('"
              - "iex(('"
        # UTF16 LE
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'SQBFAFgAIAAoAFsA'
              - 'kARQBYACAAKABbA'
              - 'JAEUAWAAgACgAWw'
              - 'aQBlAHgAIAAoAFsA'
              - 'kAZQB4ACAAKABbA'
              - 'pAGUAeAAgACgAWw'
              - 'aQBlAHgAIAAoAE4AZQB3A'
              - 'kAZQB4ACAAKABOAGUAdw'
              - 'pAGUAeAAgACgATgBlAHcA'
              - 'SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3A'
              - 'kARQBYACAAKABOAGUAdw'
              - 'JAEUAWAAgACgATgBlAHcA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
id: 6385697e-9f1b-40bd-8817-f4a91f40508e
related:
    - id: fd6e2919-3936-40c9-99db-0aa922c356f7
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects UTF-8 and UTF-16 Base64 encoded powershell 'Invoke-' calls
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Harjot Singh, @cyb3rjy0t
date: 2022-05-20
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_enc:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e'
    selection_cli_invoke:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Invoke-
            # UTF-16LE
            - 'SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQ'
            - 'kAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0A'
            - 'JAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAtA'
            # UTF-8
            - 'SW52b2tlL'
            - 'ludm9rZS'
            - 'JbnZva2Ut'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load
id: 62b7ccc9-23b4-471e-aa15-6da3663c4d59
related:
    - id: 9c0295ce-d60d-40bd-bd74-84673b7592b1
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects base64 encoded .NET reflective loading of Assembly
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-01
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1620
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # [Reflection.Assembly]::Load(
            - 'WwBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKA'
            - 'sAUgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgBMAG8AYQBkACgA'
            - 'bAFIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBBAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoATABvAGEAZAAoA'
            # [reflection.assembly]::("Load")
            - 'AFsAcgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAGEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgAoACIATABvAGEAZAAiAC'
            - 'BbAHIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBhAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhAGQAIgAp'
            - 'AWwByAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AYQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQBkACIAK'
            # [Reflection.Assembly]::("Load")
            - 'WwBSAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AQQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6ACgAIgBMAG8AYQBkACIAKQ'
            - 'sAUgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgAoACIATABvAGEAZAAiACkA'
            - 'bAFIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBBAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoAKAAiAEwAbwBhAGQAIgApA'
            # [reflection.assembly]::Load(
            - 'WwByAGUAZgBsAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuAC4AYQBzAHMAZQBtAGIAbAB5AF0AOgA6AEwAbwBhAGQAKA'
            - 'sAcgBlAGYAbABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAuAGEAcwBzAGUAbQBiAGwAeQBdADoAOgBMAG8AYQBkACgA'
            - 'bAHIAZQBmAGwAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBhAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkAXQA6ADoATABvAGEAZAAoA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes
id: 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71
related:
    - id: 47688f1b-9f51-4656-b013-3cc49a166a36
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_shadowcopy:
        # Win32_ShadowCopy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBoAGEAZABvAHcAYwBvAHAAeQ'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGgAYQBkAG8AdwBjAG8AcAB5A'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2hhZG93Y29we'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NoYWRvd2NvcH'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TaGFkb3djb3B5'
    selection_cli_scheduledJob:
        # Win32_ScheduledJob
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBjAGgAZQBkAHUAbABlAGQASgBvAGIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAYwBoAGUAZAB1AGwAZQBkAEoAbwBiA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGMAaABlAGQAdQBsAGUAZABKAG8AYg'
            - 'V2luMzJfU2NoZWR1bGVkSm9i'
            - 'dpbjMyX1NjaGVkdWxlZEpvY'
            - 'XaW4zMl9TY2hlZHVsZWRKb2'
    selection_cli_process:
        # Win32_Process
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcw'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBQAHIAbwBjAGUAcwBzA'
            - 'V2luMzJfUHJvY2Vzc'
            - 'dpbjMyX1Byb2Nlc3'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Qcm9jZXNz'
    selection_cli_useraccount:
        # Win32_UserAccount
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AVQBzAGUAcgBBAGMAYwBvAHUAbgB0A'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFUAcwBlAHIAQQBjAGMAbwB1AG4AdA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBVAHMAZQByAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQA'
            - 'V2luMzJfVXNlckFjY291bn'
            - 'dpbjMyX1VzZXJBY2NvdW50'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Vc2VyQWNjb3Vud'
    selection_cli_loggedonuser:
        # Win32_LoggedOnUser
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8ATABvAGcAZwBlAGQATwBuAFUAcwBlAHIA'
            - 'cAaQBuADMAMgBfAEwAbwBnAGcAZQBkAE8AbgBVAHMAZQByA'
            - 'XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBMAG8AZwBnAGUAZABPAG4AVQBzAGUAcg'
            - 'V2luMzJfTG9nZ2VkT25Vc2Vy'
            - 'dpbjMyX0xvZ2dlZE9uVXNlc'
            - 'XaW4zMl9Mb2dnZWRPblVzZX'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Called from an Executable Version Mismatch
id: c70e019b-1479-4b65-b0cc-cd0c6093a599
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell called from an executable by the version mismatch method
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
author: Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2023-10-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_classic_start
detection:
    selection_engine:
        Data|contains:
            - 'EngineVersion=2.'
            - 'EngineVersion=4.'
            - 'EngineVersion=5.'
    selection_host:
        Data|contains: 'HostVersion=3.'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Credential Prompt
id: ca8b77a9-d499-4095-b793-5d5f330d450e
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell calling a credential prompt
references:
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/850381440629981184
    - https://t.co/ezOTGy1a1G
author: John Lambert (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'PromptForCredential'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Defender Threat Severity Default Action Set to 'Allow' or 'NoAction'
id: 1e8a9b4d-3c2a-4f9b-8d1e-7c6a5b4f3d2e
related:
    - id: 5a9e1b2c-8f7d-4a1e-9b3c-0f6d7e5a4b1f
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of PowerShell to execute the 'Set-MpPreference' cmdlet to configure Windows Defender's threat severity default action to 'Allow' (value '6') or 'NoAction' (value '9').
    This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level.
    An attacker might use this technique via the command line to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/security-malware-windows-defender-threatseveritydefaultaction
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/7215831c-8252-4ae3-8d43-db588e82f952
    - https://gist.github.com/Dump-GUY/8daef859f382b895ac6fd0cf094555d2
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_action:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-LowThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-ModerateThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-HighThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-SevereThreatDefaultAction'
            - '-ltdefac '
            - '-mtdefac '
            - '-htdefac '
            - '-stdefac '
    selection_value:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Allow'
            - '6'
            - 'NoAction'
            - '9'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Highly unlikely
level: high

title: PowerShell Download and Execution Cradles
id: 85b0b087-eddf-4a2b-b033-d771fa2b9775
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell download and execution cradles.
references:
    - https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/88e8eca34464a547c90d9140d70e9866dcbc6a12/Download-Cradles.cmd
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-24
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_download:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.DownloadString('
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod '
            - 'irm '  # powershell -ep bypass -w h -c irm test.domain/ffe | iex
    selection_iex:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ';iex $'
            - '| IEX'
            - '|IEX '
            - 'I`E`X'
            - 'I`EX'
            - 'IE`X'
            - 'iex '
            - 'IEX ('
            - 'IEX('
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some PowerShell installers were seen using similar combinations. Apply filters accordingly
level: high

title: PowerShell Execution With Potential Decryption Capabilities
id: 434c08ba-8406-4d15-8b24-782cb071a691
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell commands that decrypt an ".LNK" "file to drop the next stage of the malware.
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/chinese-threat-actors-targeting-europe-in-smugx-campaign/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-30
modified: 2023-12-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        OriginalFileName:
            - 'PowerShell.EXE'
            - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli_dir:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "Get-ChildItem "
            - "dir "
            - "gci "
            - "ls "
    selection_cli_gc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "Get-Content "
            - "gc "
            - 'cat '
            - 'type '
            - 'ReadAllBytes'
    selection_cli_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' ^| '
              - '\*.lnk'
              - '-Recurse'
              - '-Skip '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -ExpandProperty '
              - '\*.lnk'
              - 'WriteAllBytes'
              - ' .length '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PowerShell Get-Process LSASS
id: b2815d0d-7481-4bf0-9b6c-a4c48a94b349
status: test
description: Detects a "Get-Process" cmdlet and it's aliases on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220205033028/https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # You can add more permutation as you see fit
            - 'Get-Process lsas'
            - 'ps lsas'
            - 'gps lsas'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock
id: 84c174ab-d3ef-481f-9c86-a50d0b8e3edb
status: test
description: Detects a Get-Process command on lsass process, which is in almost all cases a sign of malicious activity
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220205033028/https://twitter.com/PythonResponder/status/1385064506049630211
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Get-Process lsass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certificate exports invoked by administrators or users (depends on processes in the environment - filter if unusable)
level: high

title: PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
id: fecfd1a1-cc78-4313-a1ea-2ee2e8ec27a7
status: test
description: Detects changes to the registry for the currently logged-in user. In order to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging or transcription and script execution logging
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-32---windows-powershell-logging-disabled
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1564.001
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\' # PowerShell 5
            - '\Microsoft\PowerShellCore\' # PowerShell 7
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\ModuleLogging\EnableModuleLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockLogging'
            - '\ScriptBlockLogging\EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'
            - '\Transcription\EnableTranscripting'
            - '\Transcription\EnableInvocationHeader'
            - '\EnableScripts'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_powershell_logging_disabled/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable PowerShell Logging via Registry
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 95b25212-91a7-42ff-9613-124aca6845a8

title: PowerShell PSAttack
id: b7ec41a4-042c-4f31-a5db-d0fcde9fa5c5
status: test
description: Detects the use of PSAttack PowerShell hack tool
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921
author: Sean Metcalf (source), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'PS ATTACK!!!'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell SAM Copy
id: 1af57a4b-460a-4738-9034-db68b880c665
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell scripts accessing SAM hives
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1420546784250769408
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-29
modified: 2023-01-06
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
            - 'System32\config\sam'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Copy-Item'
            - 'cp $_.'
            - 'cpi $_.'
            - 'copy $_.'
            - '.File]::Copy('
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Some rare backup scenarios
    - PowerShell scripts fixing HiveNightmare / SeriousSAM ACLs
level: high

title: PowerShell Script Change Permission Via Set-Acl
id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
      type: derived
    - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell execution to set the ACL of a file or a folder
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
            - '-Path '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services
id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
status: test
description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ImagePath|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services - Security
id: 2a926e6a-4b81-4011-8a96-e36cc8c04302
related:
    - id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder
id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
      type: derived
    - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 # PsScript High
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
    selection_paths:
        # Note: Add more suspicious paths
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-Path "C:\Windows'
            - "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
            - '-Path %windir%'
            - '-Path $env:windir'
    selection_permissions:
        # Note: Add more suspicious permissions
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FullControl'
            - 'Allow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript
id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478
related:
    - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 # PsScript Low
      type: derived
    - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 # ProcCreation Susp
      type: derived
    - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a # ProcCreation Low
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-18
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1222
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Set-Acl '
            - '-AclObject '
    selection_paths:
        # Note: Add more suspicious paths
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-Path "C:\Windows'
            - '-Path "C:/Windows'
            - "-Path 'C:\\Windows"
            - "-Path 'C:/Windows"
            - '-Path C:\\Windows'
            - '-Path C:/Windows'
            - '-Path $env:windir'
            - '-Path "$env:windir'
            - "-Path '$env:windir"
    selection_permissions:
        # Note: Add more suspicious permissions
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'FullControl'
            - 'Allow'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell ShellCode
id: 16b37b70-6fcf-4814-a092-c36bd3aafcbd
status: test
description: Detects Base64 encoded Shellcode
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1063072865992523776
author: David Ledbetter (shellcode), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-11-17
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'OiCAAAAYInlM'
            - 'OiJAAAAYInlM'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerShell Web Access Feature Enabled Via DISM
id: 7e8f2d3b-9c1a-4f67-b9e8-8d9006e0e51f
status: test
description: Detects the use of DISM to enable the PowerShell Web Access feature, which could be used for remote access and potential abuse
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/enable-windowsoptionalfeature
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-241a
    - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/7e67b659af9148fa593cf2402edebb41
author: Michael Haag
date: 2024-09-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dism.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'DISM.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'WindowsPowerShellWebAccess'
            - '/online'
            - '/enable-feature'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell Web Access installations by administrators
level: high

title: PowerShell Web Access Installation - PsScript
id: 5f9c7f1a-7c21-4c39-b2f3-8d8006e0e51f
status: test
description: Detects the installation and configuration of PowerShell Web Access, which could be used for remote access and potential abuse
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/powershellwebaccess/install-pswawebapplication
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-241a
    - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/7e67b659af9148fa593cf2402edebb41
author: Michael Haag
date: 2024-09-03
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_install:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Install-WindowsFeature WindowsPowerShellWebAccess'
    selection_config:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Install-PswaWebApplication'
    selection_auth:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Add-PswaAuthorizationRule'
            - '-UserName *'
            - '-ComputerName *'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell Web Access installations by administrators
level: high

title: PowerShell as a Service in Registry
id: 4a5f5a5e-ac01-474b-9b4e-d61298c9df1d
status: test
description: Detects that a powershell code is written to the registry as a service.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ImagePath'
        Details|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PowerView PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock
id: dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa
related:
    - id: b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Cmdlet names from PowerView of the PowerSploit exploitation framework.
references:
    - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/stable/Recon/README
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Recon
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2277
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-18
modified: 2023-11-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Export-PowerViewCSV'
            - 'Find-DomainLocalGroupMember'
            - 'Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier'
            - 'Find-DomainProcess'
            - 'Find-DomainShare'
            - 'Find-DomainUserEvent'
            - 'Find-DomainUserLocation'
            - 'Find-ForeignGroup'
            - 'Find-ForeignUser'
            - 'Find-GPOComputerAdmin'
            - 'Find-GPOLocation'
            - 'Find-InterestingDomain' # Covers: Find-InterestingDomainAcl, Find-InterestingDomainShareFile
            - 'Find-InterestingFile'
            - 'Find-LocalAdminAccess'
            - 'Find-ManagedSecurityGroups'
            - 'Get-CachedRDPConnection'
            - 'Get-DFSshare'
            - 'Get-DomainDFSShare'
            - 'Get-DomainDNSRecord'
            - 'Get-DomainDNSZone'
            - 'Get-DomainFileServer'
            - 'Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping'
            - 'Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup'
            - 'Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping'
            - 'Get-LastLoggedOn'
            - 'Get-LoggedOnLocal'
            - 'Get-NetFileServer'
            - 'Get-NetForest' # Covers: Get-NetForestCatalog, Get-NetForestDomain, Get-NetForestTrust
            - 'Get-NetGPOGroup'
            - 'Get-NetProcess'
            - 'Get-NetRDPSession'
            - 'Get-RegistryMountedDrive'
            - 'Get-RegLoggedOn'
            - 'Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection'
            - 'Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn'
            - 'Get-WMIRegMountedDrive'
            - 'Get-WMIRegProxy'
            - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
            - 'Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess'
            - 'Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin'
            - 'Invoke-EventHunter'
            - 'Invoke-FileFinder'
            - 'Invoke-Kerberoast'
            - 'Invoke-MapDomainTrust'
            - 'Invoke-ProcessHunter'
            - 'Invoke-RevertToSelf'
            - 'Invoke-ShareFinder'
            - 'Invoke-UserHunter'
            - 'Invoke-UserImpersonation'
            - 'Remove-RemoteConnection'
            - 'Request-SPNTicket'
            - 'Resolve-IPAddress'
            # - 'Get-ADObject'  # prone to FPs
            # - 'Get-Domain'  # too many FPs  # Covers Cmdlets like: DomainComputer, DomainController, DomainDFSShare, DomainDNSRecord, DomainGPO, etc.
            # - 'Add-DomainGroupMember'
            # - 'Add-DomainObjectAcl'
            # - 'Add-ObjectAcl'
            # - 'Add-RemoteConnection'
            # - 'Convert-ADName'
            # - 'Convert-NameToSid'
            # - 'ConvertFrom-UACValue'
            # - 'ConvertTo-SID'
            # - 'Get-DNSRecord'
            # - 'Get-DNSZone'
            # - 'Get-DomainComputer'
            # - 'Get-DomainController'
            # - 'Get-DomainGroup'
            # - 'Get-DomainGroupMember'
            # - 'Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup'
            # - 'Get-DomainObject'
            # - 'Get-DomainObjectAcl'
            # - 'Get-DomainOU'
            # - 'Get-DomainPolicy'
            # - 'Get-DomainSID'
            # - 'Get-DomainSite'
            # - 'Get-DomainSPNTicket'
            # - 'Get-DomainSubnet'
            # - 'Get-DomainUser'
            # - 'Get-DomainUserEvent'
            # - 'Get-Forest' # Covers: Get-ForestDomain, Get-ForestGlobalCatalog, Get-ForestTrust
            # - 'Get-IPAddress'
            # - 'Get-NetComputer' # Covers: Get-NetComputerSiteName
            # - 'Get-NetDomain' # Covers: Get-NetDomainController, Get-NetDomainTrust
            # - 'Get-NetGroup' # Covers: Get-NetGroupMember
            # - 'Get-NetLocalGroup' # Covers: NetLocalGroupMember
            # - 'Get-NetLoggedon'
            # - 'Get-NetOU'
            # - 'Get-NetSession'
            # - 'Get-NetShare'
            # - 'Get-NetSite'
            # - 'Get-NetSubnet'
            # - 'Get-NetUser'
            # - 'Get-ObjectAcl'
            # - 'Get-PathAcl'
            # - 'Get-Proxy'
            # - 'Get-SiteName'
            # - 'Get-UserEvent'
            # - 'Get-WMIProcess'
            # - 'New-DomainGroup'
            # - 'New-DomainUser'
            # - 'Set-ADObject'
            # - 'Set-DomainObject'
            # - 'Set-DomainUserPassword'
            # - 'Test-AdminAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powershell Add Name Resolution Policy Table Rule
id: 4368354e-1797-463c-bc39-a309effbe8d7
status: test
description: |
  Detects powershell scripts that adds a Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) rule for the specified namespace.
  This will bypass the default DNS server and uses a specified server for answering the query.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1569497348841287681
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dnsclient/add-dnsclientnrptrule?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: Borna Talebi
date: 2021-09-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Add-DnsClientNrptRule'
            - '-Namesp'
            - '-NameSe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
id: c6fb44c6-71f5-49e6-9462-1425d328aee3
status: test
description: Detects base64 encoded "MpPreference" PowerShell cmdlet code that tries to modifies or tamper with Windows Defender AV
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/configure-process-opened-file-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://twitter.com/AdamTheAnalyst/status/1483497517119590403
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-04
modified: 2023-01-30
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|base64offset|contains:
              - 'Add-MpPreference '
              - 'Set-MpPreference '
              - 'add-mppreference '
              - 'set-mppreference '
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # UTF16-LE
              - 'QQBkAGQALQBNAHAAUAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQBuAGMAZQAgA'
              - 'EAZABkAC0ATQBwAFAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIA'
              - 'BAGQAZAAtAE0AcABQAHIAZQBmAGUAcgBlAG4AYwBlACAA'
              - 'UwBlAHQALQBNAHAAUAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQBuAGMAZQAgA'
              - 'MAZQB0AC0ATQBwAFAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIA'
              - 'TAGUAdAAtAE0AcABQAHIAZQBmAGUAcgBlAG4AYwBlACAA'
              - 'YQBkAGQALQBtAHAAcAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQBuAGMAZQAgA'
              - 'EAZABkAC0AbQBwAHAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIA'
              - 'hAGQAZAAtAG0AcABwAHIAZQBmAGUAcgBlAG4AYwBlACAA'
              - 'cwBlAHQALQBtAHAAcAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQBuAGMAZQAgA'
              - 'MAZQB0AC0AbQBwAHAAcgBlAGYAZQByAGUAbgBjAGUAIA'
              - 'zAGUAdAAtAG0AcABwAHIAZQBmAGUAcgBlAG4AYwBlACAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powershell DNSExfiltration
id: d59d7842-9a21-4bc6-ba98-64bfe0091355
status: test
description: DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048/T1048.md#atomic-test-3---dnsexfiltration-doh
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-07
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        - ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
        - ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
              - ' -i '
              - ' -d '
              - ' -p '
              - ' -doh '
              - ' -t '
    condition: selection_cmdlet
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script
level: high

title: Powershell Defender Disable Scan Feature
id: 1ec65a5f-9473-4f12-97da-622044d6df21
status: test
description: Detects requests to disable Microsoft Defender features using PowerShell commands
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d609799091731d83d75ec5d1f030571af20c45efeeb94840b67ea09a3283ab65/behavior/C2AE
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/content%253A%2522Set-MpPreference%2520-Disable%2522/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-03
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-MpPreference '
            - 'Set-MpPreference '
    selection_cli_option:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DisableArchiveScanning '
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring '
            - 'DisableIOAVProtection '
            - 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring '
            - 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen '
            - 'DisableCatchupFullScan '
            - 'DisableCatchupQuickScan '
    selection_cli_value:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '$true'
            - ' 1 '
    selection_encoded_modifier:
        CommandLine|base64offset|contains:
            # Note: Since this is calculating offsets casing is important
            - 'disablearchivescanning '
            - 'DisableArchiveScanning '
            - 'disablebehaviormonitoring '
            - 'DisableBehaviorMonitoring '
            - 'disableblockatfirstseen '
            - 'DisableBlockAtFirstSeen '
            - 'disablecatchupfullscan '
            - 'DisableCatchupFullScan '
            - 'disablecatchupquickscan '
            - 'DisableCatchupQuickScan '
            - 'disableioavprotection '
            - 'DisableIOAVProtection '
            - 'disablerealtimemonitoring '
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring '
    selection_encoded_direct:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBSAGUAYQBsAHQAaQBtAGUATQBvAG4AaQB0AG8AcgBpAG4AZwAgA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAUgBlAGEAbAB0AGkAbQBlAE0AbwBuAGkAdABvAHIAaQBuAGcAIA'
            - 'EAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAFIAZQBhAGwAdABpAG0AZQBNAG8AbgBpAHQAbwByAGkAbgBnACAA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBJAE8AQQBWAFAAcgBvAHQAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AIA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUASQBPAEEAVgBQAHIAbwB0AGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuACAA'
            - 'EAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAEkATwBBAFYAUAByAG8AdABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBCAGUAaABhAHYAaQBvAHIATQBvAG4AaQB0AG8AcgBpAG4AZwAgA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAQgBlAGgAYQB2AGkAbwByAE0AbwBuAGkAdABvAHIAaQBuAGcAIA'
            - 'EAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAEIAZQBoAGEAdgBpAG8AcgBNAG8AbgBpAHQAbwByAGkAbgBnACAA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBCAGwAbwBjAGsAQQB0AEYAaQByAHMAdABTAGUAZQBuACAA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAQgBsAG8AYwBrAEEAdABGAGkAcgBzAHQAUwBlAGUAbgAgA'
            - 'EAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAEIAbABvAGMAawBBAHQARgBpAHIAcwB0AFMAZQBlAG4AIA'
            - 'ZABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQByAGUAYQBsAHQAaQBtAGUAbQBvAG4AaQB0AG8AcgBpAG4AZwAgA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAcgBlAGEAbAB0AGkAbQBlAG0AbwBuAGkAdABvAHIAaQBuAGcAIA'
            - 'kAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAHIAZQBhAGwAdABpAG0AZQBtAG8AbgBpAHQAbwByAGkAbgBnACAA'
            - 'ZABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBpAG8AYQB2AHAAcgBvAHQAZQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AIA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAaQBvAGEAdgBwAHIAbwB0AGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuACAA'
            - 'kAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAGkAbwBhAHYAcAByAG8AdABlAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgA'
            - 'ZABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBiAGUAaABhAHYAaQBvAHIAbQBvAG4AaQB0AG8AcgBpAG4AZwAgA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAYgBlAGgAYQB2AGkAbwByAG0AbwBuAGkAdABvAHIAaQBuAGcAIA'
            - 'kAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAGIAZQBoAGEAdgBpAG8AcgBtAG8AbgBpAHQAbwByAGkAbgBnACAA'
            - 'ZABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBiAGwAbwBjAGsAYQB0AGYAaQByAHMAdABzAGUAZQBuACAA'
            - 'QAaQBzAGEAYgBsAGUAYgBsAG8AYwBrAGEAdABmAGkAcgBzAHQAcwBlAGUAbgAgA'
            - 'kAGkAcwBhAGIAbABlAGIAbABvAGMAawBhAHQAZgBpAHIAcwB0AHMAZQBlAG4AIA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBDAGEAdABjAGgAdQBwAEYAdQBsAGwAUwBjAGEAbgA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBDAGEAdABjAGgAdQBwAFEAdQBpAGMAawBTAGMAYQBuAA'
            - 'RABpAHMAYQBiAGwAZQBBAHIAYwBoAGkAdgBlAFMAYwBhAG4AbgBpAG4AZwA'
    condition: all of selection_cli_* or 1 of selection_encoded_*
falsepositives:
    - Possible administrative activity
    - Other Cmdlets that may use the same parameters
level: high

title: Powershell Install a DLL in System Directory
id: 63bf8794-9917-45bc-88dd-e1b5abc0ecfd
status: test
description: Uses PowerShell to install/copy a file into a system directory such as "System32" or "SysWOW64"
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md#atomic-test-1---install-and-register-password-filter-dll
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2024-01-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1556.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(Copy-Item|cpi) .{2,128} -Destination .{1,32}\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powershell Token Obfuscation - Process Creation
id: deb9b646-a508-44ee-b7c9-d8965921c6b6
related:
    - id: f3a98ce4-6164-4dd4-867c-4d83de7eca51
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects TOKEN OBFUSCATION technique from Invoke-Obfuscation
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Examples:
        #   IN`V`o`Ke-eXp`ResSIOn (Ne`W-ob`ject Net.WebClient).DownloadString
        #   &('In'+'voke-Expressi'+'o'+'n') (.('New-Ob'+'jec'+'t') Net.WebClient).DownloadString
        #   &("{2}{3}{0}{4}{1}"-f 'e','Expression','I','nvok','-') (&("{0}{1}{2}"-f'N','ew-O','bject') Net.WebClient).DownloadString
        - CommandLine|re: '\w+`(?:\w+|-|.)`[\w+|\s]'
        # - CommandLine|re: '\((\'(\w|-|\.)+\'\+)+\'(\w|-|\.)+\'\)' TODO: fixme
        - CommandLine|re: '"(?:\{\d\})+"\s*-f'
        #   ${e`Nv:pATh}
        - CommandLine|re: '(?i)\$\{`?e`?n`?v`?:`?p`?a`?t`?h`?\}'
    filter_main_envpath:
        CommandLine|contains: '${env:path}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f
status: test
description: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
author: Samir Bousseaden, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Maxence Fossat
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'ntSecurityDescriptor'
        AttributeValue|contains:
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter_main_dns_object_class:
        ObjectClass:
            - 'dnsNode'
            - 'dnsZoneScope'
            - 'dnsZone'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
level: high

title: Prefetch File Deleted
id: 0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of a prefetch file which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hunting-for-ttps-with-prefetch-files/
author: Cedric MAURUGEON
date: 2021-09-29
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_delete
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: ':\Windows\Prefetch\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pf'
    filter_main_svchost:
        Image|endswith: ':\windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Primary Refresh Token Access Attempt
id: a84fc3b1-c9ce-4125-8e74-bdcdb24021f1
status: test
description: Indicates access attempt to the PRT resource which can be used to move laterally into an organization or perform credential theft
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#possible-attempt-to-access-primary-refresh-token-prt
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'attemptedPrtAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This detection is low-volume and is seen infrequently in most organizations. When this detection appears it's high risk, and users should be remediated.
level: high

title: PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction
id: cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/PrintBrm/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\PrintBrm.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -f'
            - '.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation
id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b
related:
    - id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
    selection_args:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'echo'
            - '>'
            - '\\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Other programs that cause these patterns (please report)
level: high

title: Privileged User Has Been Created
id: 0ac15ec3-d24f-4246-aa2a-3077bb1cf90e
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new user to a privileged group such as "root" or "sudo"
references:
    - https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2018/cc-2825
    - https://linux.die.net/man/8/useradd
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/25acadc0b43a07125a8a5b599b28bbc1a91ffb06/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md#atomic-test-5---create-a-new-user-in-linux-with-root-uid-and-gid
author: Pawel Mazur
date: 2022-12-21
modified: 2025-01-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: linux
    definition: '/var/log/secure on REHL systems or /var/log/auth.log on debian like Systems needs to be collected in order for this detection to work'
detection:
    # Example of the events that could be observed when matching these would be as follow
    #   Dec 21 16:42:19 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter1, UID=1000, GID=0, home=/root, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:13:54 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=john, UID=0, GID=0, home=/home/john, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:24:40 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter3, UID=1000, GID=10, home=/home/butter3, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:30:22 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter4, UID=1000, GID=27, home=/home/butter4, shell=/bin/bash
    selection_new_user:
        - 'new user'
    selection_uids_gids:
        - 'GID=0,' # root group
        - 'UID=0,' # root UID
        - 'GID=10,' # wheel group
        - 'GID=27,' # sudo group
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high

title: Process Execution Error In JVM Based Application
id: d65f37da-a26a-48f8-8159-3dde96680ad2
status: test
description: Detects process execution related exceptions in JVM based apps, often relates to RCE
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Cannot run program'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessImpl'
        - 'java.lang.ProcessBuilder'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder
id: 3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.
references:
    - https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt
    - https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/
    - https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/blob/cb22598bb70651f88e0285abc8d835757d2cb596/hunts/suspicious_process_creation_via_windows_event_logs.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-07-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\All Users\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\NetworkService\'
            - ':\Windows\addins\'
            - ':\Windows\debug\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\Help\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\Media\'
            - ':\Windows\repair\'
            - ':\Windows\security\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '$Recycle.bin'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Intel\Logs\'
            - '\RSA\MachineKeys\'
    filter_optional_ibm:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\Public\IBM\ClientSolutions\Start_Programs\'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\Citrix\UpdaterBinaries\'
        Image|endswith: '\CitrixReceiverUpdater.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Process Explorer Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary
id: de46c52b-0bf8-4936-a327-aace94f94ac6
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself.
    Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/process-explorer
    - https://github.com/Yaxser/Backstab
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/stopping-vulnerable-driver-attacks
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/04/19/aukill-edr-killer-malware-abuses-process-explorer-driver/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\PROCEXP'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.sys'
    filter_main_process_explorer:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process explorer binaries
level: high

title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain
id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
related:
    - id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains.
    Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
    While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/
    - https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/
    - https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-16
modified: 2025-07-30
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.ngrok-free.app'
            - '.ngrok-free.dev'
            - '.ngrok.app'
            - '.ngrok.dev'
            - '.ngrok.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
# Note: The level of this rule is related to your internal policy.
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL
id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
related:
    - id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
    - https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
    - https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '#-'
            - '#+'
            - '#24'
            - '24 '
            - 'MiniDump' # Matches MiniDump and MinidumpW
            - '#65560' # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around.  for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
    selection_generic:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '24'
            - 'comsvcs'
            - 'full'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' #'
            - ',#'
            - ', #'
            - '"#'
    condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Process Memory Dump via RdrLeakDiag.EXE
id: edadb1e5-5919-4e4c-8462-a9e643b02c4b
related:
    - id: 6355a919-2e97-4285-a673-74645566340d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Microsoft Windows Resource Leak Diagnostic tool "rdrleakdiag.exe" to dump process memory
references:
    - https://www.pureid.io/dumping-abusing-windows-credentials-part-1/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rdrleakdiag/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1299071304805560321?s=21
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/06/05/operation-crimson-palace-a-technical-deep-dive
author: Cedric MAURUGEON, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-24
modified: 2024-08-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rdrleakdiag.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: RdrLeakDiag.exe
    selection_cli_dump:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '/memdmp'
            - 'fullmemdmp'
    selection_cli_output_process:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /o ' # Output
            - ' /p ' # Process
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high