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VMware Carbon Black

3,646 rules · Sigma detections in VMware Carbon Black syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into VMware Carbon Black query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Download all 3,646 rules (.zip, 1.2 MB) Every VMware Carbon Black query in this view, packaged to deploy.
Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance12
Resource Development10
Initial Access10
Execution30
Persistence42
Privilege Escalation20
Stealth79
Defense Impairment32
Credential Access35
Discovery33
Lateral Movement16
Collection20
Command and Control24
Exfiltration10
Impact18
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.
Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.

Detection rules

50 shown of 3,646
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution
Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d
carbon_black query
Image:\\gmer.exe OR (Hashes:MD5=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04* OR Hashes:SHA1=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57* OR Hashes:SHA256=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution
id: 9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d
status: test
description: Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.
references:
    - http://www.gmer.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-05
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\gmer.exe'
    selection_sysmon_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'MD5=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04'
            - 'SHA1=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57'
            - 'SHA256=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Generic Process Access
Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e
carbon_black query
(SourceImage:\\Akagi.exe OR SourceImage:\\Akagi64.exe OR SourceImage:\\atexec_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\Certify.exe OR SourceImage:\\Certipy.exe OR SourceImage:\\CoercedPotato.exe OR SourceImage:\\crackmapexec.exe OR SourceImage:\\CreateMiniDump.exe OR SourceImage:\\dcomexec_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\dpapi_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\findDelegation_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\GetADUsers_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\GetNPUsers_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\getPac_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\getST_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\getTGT_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\gmer.exe OR SourceImage:\\hashcat.exe OR SourceImage:\\htran.exe OR SourceImage:\\ifmap_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\impersonate.exe OR SourceImage:\\Inveigh.exe OR SourceImage:\\LocalPotato.exe OR SourceImage:\\mimikatz_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\mimikatz.exe OR SourceImage:\\netview_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\opdump_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\PasswordDump.exe OR SourceImage:\\Potato.exe OR SourceImage:\\PowerTool.exe OR SourceImage:\\PowerTool64.exe OR SourceImage:\\psexec_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\PurpleSharp.exe OR SourceImage:\\pypykatz.exe OR SourceImage:\\QuarksPwDump.exe OR SourceImage:\\rdp_check_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\Rubeus.exe OR SourceImage:\\SafetyKatz.exe OR SourceImage:\\sambaPipe_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\SelectMyParent.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpChisel.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharPersist.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpEvtMute.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpImpersonation.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpLDAPmonitor.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpLdapWhoami.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpUp.exe OR SourceImage:\\SharpView.exe OR SourceImage:\\smbclient_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\smbserver_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\sniff_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\sniffer_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\split_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\SpoolSample.exe OR SourceImage:\\Stracciatella.exe OR SourceImage:\\SysmonEOP.exe OR SourceImage:\\temp\\rot.exe OR SourceImage:\\ticketer_windows.exe OR SourceImage:\\TruffleSnout.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASany_ofs.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASany.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASx64_ofs.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASx64.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASx86_ofs.exe OR SourceImage:\\winPEASx86.exe OR SourceImage:\\xordump.exe) OR (SourceImage:\\goldenPac* OR SourceImage:\\just_dce_* OR SourceImage:\\karmaSMB* OR SourceImage:\\kintercept* OR SourceImage:\\LocalPotato* OR SourceImage:\\ntlmrelayx* OR SourceImage:\\rpcdump* OR SourceImage:\\samrdump* OR SourceImage:\\secretsdump* OR SourceImage:\\smbexec* OR SourceImage:\\smbrelayx* OR SourceImage:\\wmiexec* OR SourceImage:\\wmipersist* OR SourceImage:HotPotato* OR SourceImage:Juicy\ Potato* OR SourceImage:JuicyPotato* OR SourceImage:PetitPotam* OR SourceImage:RottenPotato*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Generic Process Access
id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e
status: test
description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name
references:
    - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - SourceImage|endswith:
              - '\Akagi.exe'
              - '\Akagi64.exe'
              - '\atexec_windows.exe'
              - '\Certify.exe'
              - '\Certipy.exe'
              - '\CoercedPotato.exe'
              - '\crackmapexec.exe'
              - '\CreateMiniDump.exe'
              - '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dpapi_windows.exe'
              - '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
              - '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\getPac_windows.exe'
              - '\getST_windows.exe'
              - '\getTGT_windows.exe'
              - '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
              - '\gmer.exe'
              - '\hashcat.exe'
              - '\htran.exe'
              - '\ifmap_windows.exe'
              - '\impersonate.exe'
              - '\Inveigh.exe'
              - '\LocalPotato.exe'
              - '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
              - '\mimikatz.exe'
              - '\netview_windows.exe'
              - '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
              - '\opdump_windows.exe'
              - '\PasswordDump.exe'
              - '\Potato.exe'
              - '\PowerTool.exe'
              - '\PowerTool64.exe'
              - '\psexec_windows.exe'
              - '\PurpleSharp.exe'
              - '\pypykatz.exe'
              - '\QuarksPwDump.exe'
              - '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
              - '\Rubeus.exe'
              - '\SafetyKatz.exe'
              - '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
              - '\SelectMyParent.exe'
              - '\SharpChisel.exe'
              - '\SharPersist.exe'
              - '\SharpEvtMute.exe'
              - '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
              - '\SharpLDAPmonitor.exe'
              - '\SharpLdapWhoami.exe'
              - '\SharpUp.exe'
              - '\SharpView.exe'
              - '\smbclient_windows.exe'
              - '\smbserver_windows.exe'
              - '\sniff_windows.exe'
              - '\sniffer_windows.exe'
              - '\split_windows.exe'
              - '\SpoolSample.exe'
              - '\Stracciatella.exe'
              - '\SysmonEOP.exe'
              - '\temp\rot.exe'
              - '\ticketer_windows.exe'
              - '\TruffleSnout.exe'
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
              - '\xordump.exe'
        - SourceImage|contains:
              - '\goldenPac'
              - '\just_dce_'
              - '\karmaSMB'
              - '\kintercept'
              - '\LocalPotato'
              - '\ntlmrelayx'
              - '\rpcdump'
              - '\samrdump'
              - '\secretsdump'
              - '\smbexec'
              - '\smbrelayx'
              - '\wmiexec'
              - '\wmipersist'
              - 'HotPotato'
              - 'Juicy Potato'
              - 'JuicyPotato'
              - 'PetitPotam'
              - 'RottenPotato'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
status test author Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk ATT&CK sub-technique id b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
carbon_black query
TargetImage:\\lsass.exe GrantedAccess:0x1440 CallTrace:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll\+* CallTrace:|UNKNOWN\(* CallTrace:\)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - HandleKatz LSASS Dumper Execution
Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id ca621ba5-54ab-4035-9942-d378e6fcde3c
carbon_black query
(Image:\\loader.exe CommandLine:\-\-pid\:*) OR (Hashes:IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650*) OR ((CommandLine:\-\-pid\:* CommandLine:\-\-outfile\:*) (CommandLine:.dmp* OR CommandLine:lsass* OR CommandLine:.obf* OR CommandLine:dump*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - HandleKatz LSASS Dumper Execution
id: ca621ba5-54ab-4035-9942-d378e6fcde3c
status: test
description: Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-18
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_loader_img:
        Image|endswith: '\loader.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--pid:'
    selection_loader_imphash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055'
            - 'IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--pid:'
            - '--outfile:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.dmp'
            - 'lsass'
            - '.obf'
            - 'dump'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
HackTool - Hashcat Password Cracker Execution
Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf
carbon_black query
Image:\\hashcat.exe OR (CommandLine:\-a\ * CommandLine:\-m\ 1000\ * CommandLine:\-r\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Hashcat Password Cracker Execution
id: 39b31e81-5f5f-4898-9c0e-2160cfc0f9bf
status: test
description: Execute Hashcat.exe with provided SAM file from registry of Windows and Password list to crack against
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1110.002/T1110.002.md#atomic-test-1---password-cracking-with-hashcat
    - https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=hashcat
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\hashcat.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-a '
            - '-m 1000 '
            - '-r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Tools that use similar command line flags and values
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - HollowReaper Execution
Detects usage of HollowReaper, a process hollowing shellcode launcher used for stealth payload execution through process hollowing. It replaces the memory of a legitimate process with custom shellcode, allowing the attacker to execute payloads under the guise of trusted binaries.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 85d23b42-9a9d-4f8f-b3d7-d2733c1d58f5
carbon_black query
Image:\\HollowReaper.exe
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - HollowReaper Execution
id: 85d23b42-9a9d-4f8f-b3d7-d2733c1d58f5
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects usage of HollowReaper, a process hollowing shellcode launcher used for stealth payload execution through process hollowing.
    It replaces the memory of a legitimate process with custom shellcode, allowing the attacker to execute payloads under the guise of trusted binaries.
references:
    - https://github.com/vari-sh/RedTeamGrimoire/tree/b5e7635d34db6e1f0398d8847e8f293186e947c5/HollowReaper
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\HollowReaper.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
carbon_black query
(Image:\\htran.exe OR Image:\\lcx.exe) OR (CommandLine:.exe\ \-tran\ * OR CommandLine:.exe\ \-slave\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
status: test
description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
references:
    - https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran
    - https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.s0040
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\htran.exe'
            - '\lcx.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe -tran '
            - '.exe -slave '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution
Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
status test author Vasiliy Burov ATT&CK sub-technique id aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:\-u\ * CommandLine:\-p\ *) (CommandLine:\^USER\^* OR CommandLine:\^PASS\^*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution
id: aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
references:
    - https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
author: Vasiliy Burov
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-u '
            - '-p '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '^USER^'
            - '^PASS^'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Impacket File Indicators
Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.
status experimental author The DFIR Report, IrishDeath ATT&CK sub-technique id 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\\\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Impacket File Indicators
id: 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256
related:
    - id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/05/19/another-confluence-bites-the-dust-falling-to-elpaco-team-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket
author: "The DFIR Report, IrishDeath"
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_names_re:
        TargetFilename|re: '\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$' # https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ead516a1209742efc7ac550707a9304ba08681e9/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L1925C38-L1925C51
    condition: selection_names_re
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution
Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19
carbon_black query
(Image:\\goldenPac* OR Image:\\karmaSMB* OR Image:\\kintercept* OR Image:\\ntlmrelayx* OR Image:\\rpcdump* OR Image:\\samrdump* OR Image:\\secretsdump* OR Image:\\smbexec* OR Image:\\smbrelayx* OR Image:\\wmiexec* OR Image:\\wmipersist*) OR (Image:\\atexec_windows.exe OR Image:\\dcomexec_windows.exe OR Image:\\dpapi_windows.exe OR Image:\\findDelegation_windows.exe OR Image:\\GetADUsers_windows.exe OR Image:\\GetNPUsers_windows.exe OR Image:\\getPac_windows.exe OR Image:\\getST_windows.exe OR Image:\\getTGT_windows.exe OR Image:\\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe OR Image:\\ifmap_windows.exe OR Image:\\mimikatz_windows.exe OR Image:\\netview_windows.exe OR Image:\\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe OR Image:\\opdump_windows.exe OR Image:\\psexec_windows.exe OR Image:\\rdp_check_windows.exe OR Image:\\sambaPipe_windows.exe OR Image:\\smbclient_windows.exe OR Image:\\smbserver_windows.exe OR Image:\\sniff_windows.exe OR Image:\\sniffer_windows.exe OR Image:\\split_windows.exe OR Image:\\ticketer_windows.exe)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution
id: 4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
references:
    - https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-07
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\goldenPac'
              - '\karmaSMB'
              - '\kintercept'
              - '\ntlmrelayx'
              - '\rpcdump'
              - '\samrdump'
              - '\secretsdump'
              - '\smbexec'
              - '\smbrelayx'
              - '\wmiexec'
              - '\wmipersist'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\atexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dpapi_windows.exe'
              - '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
              - '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\getPac_windows.exe'
              - '\getST_windows.exe'
              - '\getTGT_windows.exe'
              - '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
              - '\ifmap_windows.exe'
              - '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
              - '\netview_windows.exe'
              - '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
              - '\opdump_windows.exe'
              - '\psexec_windows.exe'
              - '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
              - '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
              - '\smbclient_windows.exe'
              - '\smbserver_windows.exe'
              - '\sniff_windows.exe'
              - '\sniffer_windows.exe'
              - '\split_windows.exe'
              - '\ticketer_windows.exe'
              # - '\addcomputer_windows.exe'
              # - '\esentutl_windows.exe'
              # - '\getArch_windows.exe'
              # - '\lookupsid_windows.exe'
              # - '\mqtt_check_windows.exe'
              # - '\mssqlclient_windows.exe'
              # - '\mssqlinstance_windows.exe'
              # - '\ntfs-read_windows.exe'
              # - '\ping_windows.exe'
              # - '\ping6_windows.exe'
              # - '\raiseChild_windows.exe'
              # - '\reg_windows.exe'
              # - '\registry-read_windows.exe'
              # - '\services_windows.exe'
              # - '\wmiquery_windows.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the impacket tools
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Koadic Execution
Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
status test author wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
carbon_black query
(Image:\\cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName:Cmd.Exe) (CommandLine:\/q* CommandLine:\/c* CommandLine:chcp*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Koadic Execution
id: 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/
    - https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js
    - https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/
author: wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2020-01-12
modified: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/q'
            - '/c'
            - 'chcp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - KrbRelay Execution
Detects the use of KrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id e96253b8-6b3b-4f90-9e59-3b24b99cf9b4
carbon_black query
(Image:\\KrbRelay.exe OR OriginalFileName:KrbRelay.exe) OR (CommandLine:\ \-spn\ * CommandLine:\ \-clsid\ * CommandLine:\ \-rbcd\ *) OR (CommandLine:shadowcred* CommandLine:clsid* CommandLine:spn*) OR (CommandLine:spn\ * CommandLine:session\ * CommandLine:clsid\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - KrbRelay Execution
id: e96253b8-6b3b-4f90-9e59-3b24b99cf9b4
status: test
description: Detects the use of KrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool
references:
    - https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\KrbRelay.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'KrbRelay.exe' # In case the file has been renamed after compilation
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -spn '
            - ' -clsid '
            - ' -rbcd '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadowcred'
            - 'clsid'
            - 'spn'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'spn '
            - 'session '
            - 'clsid '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - KrbRelayUp Execution
Detects KrbRelayUp used to perform a universal no-fix local privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 12827a56-61a4-476a-a9cb-f3068f191073
carbon_black query
(Image:\\KrbRelayUp.exe OR OriginalFileName:KrbRelayUp.exe) OR (CommandLine:\ relay\ * CommandLine:\ \-Domain\ * CommandLine:\ \-ComputerName\ *) OR (CommandLine:\ krbscm\ * CommandLine:\ \-sc\ *) OR (CommandLine:\ spawn\ * CommandLine:\ \-d\ * CommandLine:\ \-cn\ * CommandLine:\ \-cp\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - KrbRelayUp Execution
id: 12827a56-61a4-476a-a9cb-f3068f191073
status: test
description: Detects KrbRelayUp used to perform a universal no-fix local privilege escalation in Windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced
references:
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-26
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\KrbRelayUp.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'KrbRelayUp.exe' # In case the file has been renamed after compilation
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' relay '
            - ' -Domain '
            - ' -ComputerName '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' krbscm '
            - ' -sc '
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' spawn '
            - ' -d '
            - ' -cn '
            - ' -cp '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.
status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac
carbon_black query
SourceImage:\\winword.exe (CallTrace:\:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v2.* CallTrace:UNKNOWN*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
id: 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac
status: test
description: Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.
references:
    - https://github.com/connormcgarr/LittleCorporal
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1055.003
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.'
            - 'UNKNOWN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - LocalPotato Execution
Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 6bd75993-9888-4f91-9404-e1e4e4e34b77
carbon_black query
Image:\\LocalPotato.exe OR (CommandLine:.exe\ \-i\ C\:\\* CommandLine:\-o\ Windows\\*) OR (Hashes:IMPHASH=E1742EE971D6549E8D4D81115F88F1FC* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=DD82066EFBA94D7556EF582F247C8BB5*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - LocalPotato Execution
id: 6bd75993-9888-4f91-9404-e1e4e4e34b77
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples
references:
    - https://www.localpotato.com/localpotato_html/LocalPotato.html
    - https://github.com/decoder-it/LocalPotato
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-14
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - cve.2023-21746
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\LocalPotato.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.exe -i C:\'
            - '-o Windows\'
    selection_hash_plain:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'IMPHASH=E1742EE971D6549E8D4D81115F88F1FC'
            - 'IMPHASH=DD82066EFBA94D7556EF582F247C8BB5'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - Mimikatz Execution
Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton ATT&CK sub-technique id a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:DumpCreds* OR CommandLine:mimikatz*) OR (CommandLine:\:\:aadcookie* OR CommandLine:\:\:detours* OR CommandLine:\:\:memssp* OR CommandLine:\:\:mflt* OR CommandLine:\:\:ncroutemon* OR CommandLine:\:\:ngcsign* OR CommandLine:\:\:printnightmare* OR CommandLine:\:\:skeleton* OR CommandLine:\:\:preshutdown* OR CommandLine:\:\:mstsc* OR CommandLine:\:\:multirdp*) OR (CommandLine:rpc\:\:* OR CommandLine:token\:\:* OR CommandLine:crypto\:\:* OR CommandLine:dpapi\:\:* OR CommandLine:sekurlsa\:\:* OR CommandLine:kerberos\:\:* OR CommandLine:lsadump\:\:* OR CommandLine:privilege\:\:* OR CommandLine:process\:\:* OR CommandLine:vault\:\:*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Mimikatz Execution
id: a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d
status: test
description: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
references:
    - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1003.004
    - attack.t1003.005
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'DumpCreds'
            - 'mimikatz'
    selection_function_names: # To cover functions from modules that are not in module_names
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '::aadcookie' # misc module
            - '::detours' # misc module
            - '::memssp' # misc module
            - '::mflt' # misc module
            - '::ncroutemon' # misc module
            - '::ngcsign' # misc module
            - '::printnightmare' # misc module
            - '::skeleton' # misc module
            - '::preshutdown'  # service module
            - '::mstsc'  # ts module
            - '::multirdp'  # ts module
    selection_module_names:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'rpc::'
            - 'token::'
            - 'crypto::'
            - 'dpapi::'
            - 'sekurlsa::'
            - 'kerberos::'
            - 'lsadump::'
            - 'privilege::'
            - 'process::'
            - 'vault::'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - NPPSpy Hacktool Usage
Detects the use of NPPSpy hacktool that stores cleartext passwords of users that logged in to a local file
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id cad1fe90-2406-44dc-bd03-59d0b58fe722
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\\NPPSpy.txt OR TargetFilename:\\NPPSpy.dll
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - NPPSpy Hacktool Usage
id: cad1fe90-2406-44dc-bd03-59d0b58fe722
status: test
description: Detects the use of NPPSpy hacktool that stores cleartext passwords of users that logged in to a local file
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md#atomic-test-2---credential-dumping-with-nppspy
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1465282548494487554
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-29
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\NPPSpy.txt'
            - '\NPPSpy.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - NetExec Execution
Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems. Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
status experimental author Chirag Damani ATT&CK technique id 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
carbon_black query
Image:\\nxc.exe (CommandLine:\ ftp\ * OR CommandLine:\ ldap\ * OR CommandLine:\ mssql\ * OR CommandLine:\ nfs\ * OR CommandLine:\ rdp\ * OR CommandLine:\ smb\ * OR CommandLine:\ ssh\ * OR CommandLine:\ vnc\ * OR CommandLine:\ winrm\ * OR CommandLine:\ wmi\ *)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - NetExec Execution
id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration
    In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems.
    Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Chirag Damani
date: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\nxc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ftp '
            - ' ldap '
            - ' mssql '
            - ' nfs '
            - ' rdp '
            - ' smb '
            - ' ssh '
            - ' vnc '
            - ' winrm '
            - ' wmi '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine. NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
carbon_black query
Image:\\nxc\-windows\-latest\\* OR (TargetFilename:\\Temp\\_MEI* TargetFilename:\\nxc\\data\\*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators
id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine.
    NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory
    under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that
    extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution.
    NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for
    Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
    - https://www.netexec.wiki/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains: '\nxc-windows-latest\'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Temp\_MEI'
              - '\nxc\data\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - NoFilter Execution
Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
status test author Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
carbon_black query
(EventID:5447 FilterName:RonPolicy*) OR (EventID:5449 ProviderContextName:RonPolicy*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution
id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1742203752361128162?s=20
author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection_5447:
        EventID: 5447
        FilterName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    selection_5449:
        EventID: 5449
        ProviderContextName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - PCHunter Execution
Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali ATT&CK technique id fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
carbon_black query
(Image:\\PCHunter64.exe OR Image:\\PCHunter32.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:PCHunter.exe OR Description:Epoolsoft\ Windows\ Information\ View\ Tools) OR (Hashes:SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025* OR Hashes:MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7* OR Hashes:SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF* OR Hashes:SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB* OR Hashes:MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14* OR Hashes:SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution
id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-10-10
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1057
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PCHunter64.exe'
            - '\PCHunter32.exe'
    selection_pe:
        - OriginalFileName: 'PCHunter.exe'
        - Description: 'Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025'
            - 'MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7'
            - 'SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32'
            - 'IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF'
            - 'SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB'
            - 'MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14'
            - 'SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C'
            - 'IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution
Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d
carbon_black query
Image:\\SelectMyParent.exe OR (CommandLine:PPID\-spoof* OR CommandLine:ppid_spoof* OR CommandLine:spoof\-ppid* OR CommandLine:spoof_ppid* OR CommandLine:ppidspoof* OR CommandLine:spoofppid* OR CommandLine:spoofedppid* OR CommandLine:\ \-spawnto\ *) OR (OriginalFileName:PPID\-spoof* OR OriginalFileName:ppid_spoof* OR OriginalFileName:spoof\-ppid* OR OriginalFileName:spoof_ppid* OR OriginalFileName:ppidspoof* OR OriginalFileName:spoofppid* OR OriginalFileName:spoofedppid*) OR Description:SelectMyParent OR (Hashes:IMPHASH=04D974875BD225F00902B4CAD9AF3FBC* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=A782AF154C9E743DDF3F3EB2B8F3D16E* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=89059503D7FBF470E68F7E63313DA3AD* OR Hashes:IMPHASH=CA28337632625C8281AB8A130B3D6BAD*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution
id: 52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d
status: test
description: Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/
    - https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-detect-parent-pid-ppid-spoofing-attacks
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/parent-process-id-ppid-spoofing
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/filename%253A*spoof*%2520filename%253A*ppid*/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-23
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SelectMyParent.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'PPID-spoof'
              - 'ppid_spoof'
              - 'spoof-ppid'
              - 'spoof_ppid'
              - 'ppidspoof'
              - 'spoofppid'
              - 'spoofedppid'
              - ' -spawnto '
        - OriginalFileName|contains:
              - 'PPID-spoof'
              - 'ppid_spoof'
              - 'spoof-ppid'
              - 'spoof_ppid'
              - 'ppidspoof'
              - 'spoofppid'
              - 'spoofedppid'
        - Description: 'SelectMyParent'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=04D974875BD225F00902B4CAD9AF3FBC'
              - 'IMPHASH=A782AF154C9E743DDF3F3EB2B8F3D16E'
              - 'IMPHASH=89059503D7FBF470E68F7E63313DA3AD'
              - 'IMPHASH=CA28337632625C8281AB8A130B3D6BAD'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - Potential CobaltStrike Process Injection
Detects a potential remote threat creation with certain characteristics which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons
status test author Olaf Hartong, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42
carbon_black query
StartAddress:0B80 OR StartAddress:0C7C OR StartAddress:0C88
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Potential CobaltStrike Process Injection
id: 6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42
status: test
description: Detects a potential remote threat creation with certain characteristics which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
    - https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-detection-206372d11d0f
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2018/04/09/cobalt-strike-3-11-the-snake-that-eats-its-tail/
author: Olaf Hartong, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2018-11-30
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_remote_thread
detection:
    selection:
        StartAddress|endswith:
            - '0B80'
            - '0C7C'
            - '0C88'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity
Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework
status stable author Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Tim Rauch ATT&CK sub-technique id 10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2
carbon_black query
((ParentImage:\\wmiprvse.exe OR ParentImage:\\mmc.exe OR ParentImage:\\explorer.exe OR ParentImage:\\services.exe) (CommandLine:cmd.exe* CommandLine:\/Q* CommandLine:\/c* CommandLine:\\\\127.0.0.1\\* CommandLine:&1*)) OR ((ParentCommandLine:svchost.exe\ \-k\ netsvcs* OR ParentCommandLine:taskeng.exe*) (CommandLine:cmd.exe* CommandLine:\/C* CommandLine:Windows\\Temp\\* CommandLine:&1*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity
id: 10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2
related:
    - id: e31f89f7-36fb-4697-8ab6-48823708353b
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework
references:
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/wmiexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/atexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/smbexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/dcomexec.py
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.html
author: Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Tim Rauch
date: 2019-09-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_other:
        # *** wmiexec.py
        #    parent is wmiprvse.exe
        #    examples:
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c whoami 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object MMC20
        #   parent is mmc.exe
        #   example:
        #       "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567442499.05 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object ShellBrowserWindow
        #  runs %SystemRoot%\System32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll {c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880} but parent command is explorer.exe
        #  example:
        #   "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd \ 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567520103.71 2>&1
        # *** smbexec.py
        #   parent is services.exe
        #   example:
        #       C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c echo tasklist ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\__output 2^>^&1 > C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & del C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'        # wmiexec
            - '\mmc.exe'        # dcomexec MMC
            - '\explorer.exe'        # dcomexec ShellBrowserWindow
            - '\services.exe'        # smbexec
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/Q'
            - '/c'
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\'
            - '&1'
    selection_atexec:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs'       # atexec on win10 (parent is "C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs")
            - 'taskeng.exe'       # atexec on win7 (parent is "taskeng.exe {AFA79333-694C-4BEE-910E-E57D9A3518F6} S-1-5-18:NT AUTHORITY\System:Service:")
            # cmd.exe /C tasklist /m > C:\Windows\Temp\bAJrYQtL.tmp 2>&1
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/C'
            - 'Windows\Temp\'
            - '&1'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Potential Remote Credential Dumping Activity Via CrackMapExec Or Impacket-Secretsdump
Detects default filenames output from the execution of CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump against an endpoint.
status test author SecurityAura ATT&CK technique id 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
carbon_black query
Image:\\svchost.exe TargetFilename:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\\.tmp$
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Potential Remote Credential Dumping Activity Via CrackMapExec Or Impacket-Secretsdump
id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
status: test
description: Detects default filenames output from the execution of CrackMapExec and Impacket-secretsdump against an endpoint.
references:
    - https://github.com/Porchetta-Industries/CrackMapExec
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ff8c200fd040b04d3b5ff05449646737f836235d/examples/secretsdump.py
author: SecurityAura
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        # CommandLine|contains: 'RemoteRegistry' # Uncomment this line if you collect CommandLine data for files events from more accuracy
        TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\System32\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\.tmp$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - PowerTool Execution
Detects the execution of the tool PowerTool which has the ability to kill a process, delete its process file, unload drivers, and delete the driver files
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id a34f79a3-8e5f-4cc3-b765-de00695452c2
carbon_black query
(Image:\\PowerTool.exe OR Image:\\PowerTool64.exe) OR OriginalFileName:PowerTool.exe
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - PowerTool Execution
id: a34f79a3-8e5f-4cc3-b765-de00695452c2
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the tool PowerTool which has the ability to kill a process, delete its process file, unload drivers, and delete the driver files
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/play-ransomware-s-attack-playbook-unmasks-it-as-another-hive-aff.html
    - https://twitter.com/gbti_sa/status/1249653895900602375?lang=en
    - https://www.softpedia.com/get/Antivirus/Removal-Tools/ithurricane-PowerTool.shtml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-29
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\PowerTool.exe'
              - '\PowerTool64.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'PowerTool.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - Powerup Write Hijack DLL
Powerup tool's Write Hijack DLL exploits DLL hijacking for privilege escalation. In it's default mode, it builds a self deleting .bat file which executes malicious command. The detection rule relies on creation of the malicious bat file (debug.bat by default).
status test author Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash) ATT&CK sub-technique id 602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b96
carbon_black query
(Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe) TargetFilename:.bat
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Powerup Write Hijack DLL
id: 602a1f13-c640-4d73-b053-be9a2fa58b96
status: test
description: |
    Powerup tool's Write Hijack DLL exploits DLL hijacking for privilege escalation.
    In it's default mode, it builds a self deleting .bat file which executes malicious command.
    The detection rule relies on creation of the malicious bat file (debug.bat by default).
references:
    - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Privesc/Write-HijackDll/
author: Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash)
date: 2021-08-21
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.bat'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Any powershell script that creates bat files # highly unlikely (untested)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Pypykatz Credentials Dumping Activity
Detects the usage of "pypykatz" to obtain stored credentials. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database through Windows registry where the SAM database is stored
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404
carbon_black query
(Image:\\pypykatz.exe OR Image:\\python.exe) (CommandLine:live* CommandLine:registry*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Pypykatz Credentials Dumping Activity
id: a29808fd-ef50-49ff-9c7a-59a9b040b404
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "pypykatz" to obtain stored credentials. Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database through Windows registry where the SAM database is stored
references:
    - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-2---registry-parse-with-pypykatz
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - \pypykatz.exe
            - \python.exe
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'live'
            - 'registry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution
Detects usage of the Quarks PwDump tool via commandline arguments
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 0685b176-c816-4837-8e7b-1216f346636b
carbon_black query
Image:\\QuarksPwDump.exe OR (CommandLine:\ \-dhl OR CommandLine:\ \-\-dump\-hash\-local OR CommandLine:\ \-dhdc OR CommandLine:\ \-\-dump\-hash\-domain\-cached OR CommandLine:\ \-\-dump\-bitlocker OR CommandLine:\ \-dhd\  OR CommandLine:\ \-\-dump\-hash\-domain\  OR CommandLine:\-\-ntds\-file)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Quarks PwDump Execution
id: 0685b176-c816-4837-8e7b-1216f346636b
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Quarks PwDump tool via commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/quarkslab/quarkspwdump
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/seedworm-apt-iran-middle-east
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\QuarksPwDump.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine:
            - ' -dhl'
            - ' --dump-hash-local'
            - ' -dhdc'
            - ' --dump-hash-domain-cached'
            - ' --dump-bitlocker'
            - ' -dhd '
            - ' --dump-hash-domain '
            - '--ntds-file'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
status test author Alexander Rausch ATT&CK sub-technique id 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
carbon_black query
(Image:\\rundll32.exe OR Image:\\cmd.exe) (CommandLine:gthread\-3.6.dll* OR CommandLine:\\Windows\\Temp\\tmp.bat* OR CommandLine:sigcmm\-2.4.dll*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Execution
id: 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
status: test
description: Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook a automated breach emulations utility
references:
    - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/
author: Alexander Rausch
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2023-03-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'gthread-3.6.dll'
            - '\Windows\Temp\tmp.bat'
            - 'sigcmm-2.4.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay Execution
Detects the use of RemoteKrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool via CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id a7664b14-75fb-4a50-a223-cb9bc0afbacf
carbon_black query
(Image:\\RemoteKrbRelay.exe OR OriginalFileName:RemoteKrbRelay.exe) OR (CommandLine:\ \-clsid\ * CommandLine:\ \-target\ * CommandLine:\ \-victim\ *) OR (CommandLine:\-rbcd\ * (CommandLine:\-cn\ * OR CommandLine:\-\-computername\ *)) OR (CommandLine:\-chp\ * (CommandLine:\-chpPass\ * CommandLine:\-chpUser\ *)) OR (CommandLine:\-addgroupmember\ * CommandLine:\-group\ * CommandLine:\-groupuser\ *) OR ((CommandLine:\-smb\ * CommandLine:\-\-smbkeyword\ *) (CommandLine:interactive* OR CommandLine:secrets* OR CommandLine:service\-add*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay Execution
id: a7664b14-75fb-4a50-a223-cb9bc0afbacf
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of RemoteKrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool via CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
references:
    - https://github.com/CICADA8-Research/RemoteKrbRelay
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\RemoteKrbRelay.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RemoteKrbRelay.exe'
    selection_cli_required:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -clsid '
            - ' -target '
            - ' -victim '
    # selection_cli_attacks:
    #     # Note: In the current implementation these flags do not require any other flags. Which means they can't be used on their own. They're already covered by "selection_cli_required"
    #     CommandLine|contains:
    #         - '-adcs ' # relay to HTTP Web Enrollment and get certificate
    #         - '-laps ' # relay to LDAP and extract LAPS passwords
    #         - '-ldapwhoami ' # relay to LDAP and get info about relayed user
    #         - '-shadowcred ' # relay to LDAP and setup Shadow Credentials
    selection_cli_attack_smb:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-smb ' # relay to SMB
            - '--smbkeyword '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'interactive'
            - 'secrets'
            - 'service-add'
    selection_cli_attack_rbcd_main:
        CommandLine|contains: '-rbcd ' # relay to LDAP and setup RBCD
    selection_cli_attack_rbcd_options:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-cn ' # Computer name that will be written to msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
            - '--computername ' # Computer name that will be written to msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
    selection_cli_attack_changepass:
        CommandLine|contains: '-chp ' # relay to LDAP and change user password
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-chpPass ' # new password
            - '-chpUser ' # the name of the user whose password you want to change
    selection_cli_attack_addgrpname:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-addgroupmember ' # relay to LDAP and add user to group
            - '-group '
            - '-groupuser '
    condition: selection_img or selection_cli_required or all of selection_cli_attack_rbcd_* or selection_cli_attack_changepass or selection_cli_attack_addgrpname or selection_cli_attack_smb
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay Secrets Dump Module Indicators
Detects the creation of file with specific names used by RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay attack module.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 3ab79e90-9fab-4cdf-a7b2-6522bc742adb
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\:\\windows\\temp\\sam.tmp OR TargetFilename:\:\\windows\\temp\\sec.tmp OR TargetFilename:\:\\windows\\temp\\sys.tmp
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay Secrets Dump Module Indicators
id: 3ab79e90-9fab-4cdf-a7b2-6522bc742adb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of file with specific names used by RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay attack module.
references:
    - https://github.com/CICADA8-Research/RemoteKrbRelay/blob/19ec76ba7aa50c2722b23359bc4541c0a9b2611c/Exploit/RemoteKrbRelay/Relay/Attacks/RemoteRegistry.cs#L31-L40
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - ':\windows\temp\sam.tmp'
            - ':\windows\temp\sec.tmp'
            - ':\windows\temp\sys.tmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags
status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec
carbon_black query
ScriptBlockText:asreproast\ * OR ScriptBlockText:dump\ \/service\:krbtgt\ * OR ScriptBlockText:dump\ \/luid\:0x* OR ScriptBlockText:kerberoast\ * OR ScriptBlockText:createnetonly\ \/program\:* OR ScriptBlockText:ptt\ \/ticket\:* OR ScriptBlockText:\/impersonateuser\:* OR ScriptBlockText:renew\ \/ticket\:* OR ScriptBlockText:asktgt\ \/user\:* OR ScriptBlockText:harvest\ \/interval\:* OR ScriptBlockText:s4u\ \/user\:* OR ScriptBlockText:s4u\ \/ticket\:* OR ScriptBlockText:hash\ \/password\:* OR ScriptBlockText:golden\ \/aes256\:* OR ScriptBlockText:silver\ \/user\:*
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec
related:
    - id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
    - https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'asreproast '
            - 'dump /service:krbtgt '
            - 'dump /luid:0x'
            - 'kerberoast '
            - 'createnetonly /program:'
            - 'ptt /ticket:'
            - '/impersonateuser:'
            - 'renew /ticket:'
            - 'asktgt /user:'
            - 'harvest /interval:'
            - 's4u /user:'
            - 's4u /ticket:'
            - 'hash /password:'
            - 'golden /aes256:'
            - 'silver /user:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load
Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
status test author Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
carbon_black query
Description:st2stager*
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load
id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
related:
    - id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be # Process Creation
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description|contains: 'st2stager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution
Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use via PE metadata
status test author Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be
carbon_black query
Description:st2stager*
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager Execution
id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be
related:
    - id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d # DLL Load
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager use via PE metadata
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-22
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description|contains: 'st2stager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
status test author @kostastsale ATT&CK technique id e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:\ \-\-buildcache\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-\-bhdump\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-\-certdump\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-\-dnsdump\ *) (CommandLine:\ \-c\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-\-cachefilename\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-o\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-\-outputdirectory*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SOAPHound Execution
id: e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
references:
    - https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
    - https://medium.com/falconforce/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws-165aca78288c
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --buildcache '
            - ' --bhdump '
            - ' --certdump '
            - ' --dnsdump '
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' --cachefilename '
            - ' -o '
            - ' --outputdirectory'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SafetyKatz Dump Indicator
Detects default lsass dump filename generated by SafetyKatz.
status test author Markus Neis ATT&CK sub-technique id e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\\Temp\\debug.bin
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SafetyKatz Dump Indicator
id: e074832a-eada-4fd7-94a1-10642b130e16
status: test
description: Detects default lsass dump filename generated by SafetyKatz.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SafetyKatz/blob/715b311f76eb3a4c8d00a1bd29c6cd1899e450b7/SafetyKatz/Program.cs#L63
author: Markus Neis
date: 2018-07-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Temp\debug.bin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate files with similar filename structure
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - SharPersist Execution
Detects the execution of the hacktool SharPersist - used to deploy various different kinds of persistence mechanisms
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 26488ad0-f9fd-4536-876f-52fea846a2e4
carbon_black query
(Image:\\SharPersist.exe OR Product:SharPersist) OR (CommandLine:\ \-t\ schtask\ \-c\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-t\ startupfolder\ \-c\ *) OR (CommandLine:\ \-t\ reg\ \-c\ * CommandLine:\ \-m\ add*) OR (CommandLine:\ \-t\ service\ \-c\ * CommandLine:\ \-m\ add*) OR (CommandLine:\ \-t\ schtask\ \-c\ * CommandLine:\ \-m\ add*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharPersist Execution
id: 26488ad0-f9fd-4536-876f-52fea846a2e4
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool SharPersist - used to deploy various different kinds of persistence mechanisms
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/sharpersist-windows-persistence-toolkit
    - https://github.com/mandiant/SharPersist
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharPersist.exe'
        - Product: 'SharPersist'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -t schtask -c '
            - ' -t startupfolder -c '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t reg -c '
            - ' -m add'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t service -c '
            - ' -m add'
    selection_cli_4:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t schtask -c '
            - ' -m add'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
carbon_black query
Image:\\SharpChisel.exe OR Product:SharpChisel
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata. SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id c7d33b50-f690-4b51-8cfb-0fb912a31e57
carbon_black query
(Image:\\SharpDPAPI.exe OR OriginalFileName:SharpDPAPI.exe) OR ((CommandLine:\ backupkey\ * OR CommandLine:\ blob\ * OR CommandLine:\ certificates\ * OR CommandLine:\ credentials\ * OR CommandLine:\ keepass\ * OR CommandLine:\ masterkeys\ * OR CommandLine:\ rdg\ * OR CommandLine:\ vaults\ *) ((CommandLine:\ \{* CommandLine:\}\:*) OR (CommandLine:\ \/file\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/machine* OR CommandLine:\ \/mkfile\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/password\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/pvk\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/server\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/target\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/unprotect*)))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
id: c7d33b50-f690-4b51-8cfb-0fb912a31e57
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
    SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpDPAPI.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpDPAPI.exe'
    selection_other_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' backupkey '
            - ' blob '
            - ' certificates '
            - ' credentials '
            - ' keepass '
            - ' masterkeys '
            - ' rdg '
            - ' vaults '
    selection_other_options_guid:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' {'
            - '}:'
    selection_other_options_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /file:'
            - ' /machine'
            - ' /mkfile:'
            - ' /password:'
            - ' /pvk:'
            - ' /server:'
            - ' /target:'
            - ' /unprotect'
    condition: selection_img or (selection_other_cli and 1 of selection_other_options_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SharpEvtMute DLL Load
Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685
carbon_black query
Hashes:IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B*
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpEvtMute DLL Load
id: 49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685
related:
    - id: bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c # Process Creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
references:
    - https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-07
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Other DLLs with the same Imphash
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SharpEvtMute Execution
Detects the use of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c
carbon_black query
Image:\\SharpEvtMute.exe OR Description:SharpEvtMute OR (CommandLine:\-\-Filter\ \"rule\ * OR CommandLine:\-\-Encoded\ \-\-Filter\ \\\"*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpEvtMute Execution
id: bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c
related:
    - id: 49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685 # DLL load
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
references:
    - https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-07
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpEvtMute.exe'
        - Description: 'SharpEvtMute'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '--Filter "rule '
              - '--Encoded --Filter \"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution
Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
status test author Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a
carbon_black query
(Image:\\SharpImpersonation.exe OR OriginalFileName:SharpImpersonation.exe) OR ((CommandLine:\ user\:* CommandLine:\ binary\:*) OR (CommandLine:\ user\:* CommandLine:\ shellcode\:*) OR (CommandLine:\ technique\:CreateProcessAsUserW* OR CommandLine:\ technique\:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution
id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a
related:
    - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
references:
    - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpImpersonation.exe'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' binary:'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' shellcode:'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' technique:CreateProcessAsUserW'
              - ' technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - SharpLdapWhoami Execution
Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative that queries the LDAP service on a domain controller
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id d9367cbb-c2e0-47ce-bdc0-128cb6da898d
carbon_black query
Image:\\SharpLdapWhoami.exe OR (OriginalFileName:SharpLdapWhoami* OR Product:SharpLdapWhoami) OR (CommandLine:\ \/method\:ntlm OR CommandLine:\ \/method\:kerb OR CommandLine:\ \/method\:nego OR CommandLine:\ \/m\:nego OR CommandLine:\ \/m\:ntlm OR CommandLine:\ \/m\:kerb)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpLdapWhoami Execution
id: d9367cbb-c2e0-47ce-bdc0-128cb6da898d
status: test
description: Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative that queries the LDAP service on a domain controller
references:
    - https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpLdapWhoami
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-29
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\SharpLdapWhoami.exe'
    selection_pe: # in case the file has been renamed after compilation
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'SharpLdapWhoami'
        - Product: 'SharpLdapWhoami'
    selection_flags1:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' /method:ntlm'
            - ' /method:kerb'
            - ' /method:nego'
            - ' /m:nego'
            - ' /m:ntlm'
            - ' /m:kerb'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Programs that use the same command line flags
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution
Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
status test author Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec) ATT&CK sub-technique id 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
carbon_black query
(Image:\\SharpMove.exe OR OriginalFileName:SharpMove.exe) OR (CommandLine:computername=* (CommandLine:action=create* OR CommandLine:action=dcom* OR CommandLine:action=executevbs* OR CommandLine:action=hijackdcom* OR CommandLine:action=modschtask* OR CommandLine:action=modsvc* OR CommandLine:action=query* OR CommandLine:action=scm* OR CommandLine:action=startservice* OR CommandLine:action=taskscheduler*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution
id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options.
references:
    - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/
author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec)
date: 2024-01-29
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpMove.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe
    selection_cli_computer:
        # In its current implementation the "computername" flag is required in all actions
        CommandLine|contains: 'computername='
    selection_cli_actions:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'action=create'
            - 'action=dcom'
            - 'action=executevbs'
            - 'action=hijackdcom'
            - 'action=modschtask'
            - 'action=modsvc'
            - 'action=query'
            - 'action=scm'
            - 'action=startservice'
            - 'action=taskscheduler'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - SharpView Execution
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d
carbon_black query
OriginalFileName:SharpView.exe OR Image:\\SharpView.exe OR (CommandLine:Add\-RemoteConnection* OR CommandLine:Convert\-ADName* OR CommandLine:ConvertFrom\-SID* OR CommandLine:ConvertFrom\-UACValue* OR CommandLine:Convert\-SidToName* OR CommandLine:Export\-PowerViewCSV* OR CommandLine:Find\-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier* OR CommandLine:Find\-DomainProcess* OR CommandLine:Find\-DomainShare* OR CommandLine:Find\-DomainUserEvent* OR CommandLine:Find\-DomainUserLocation* OR CommandLine:Find\-ForeignGroup* OR CommandLine:Find\-ForeignUser* OR CommandLine:Find\-GPOComputerAdmin* OR CommandLine:Find\-GPOLocation* OR CommandLine:Find\-Interesting* OR CommandLine:Find\-LocalAdminAccess* OR CommandLine:Find\-ManagedSecurityGroups* OR CommandLine:Get\-CachedRDPConnection* OR CommandLine:Get\-DFSshare* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainComputer* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainController* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainDFSShare* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainDNSRecord* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainFileServer* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainForeign* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainGPO* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainGroup* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainGUIDMap* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainManagedSecurityGroup* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainObject* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainOU* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainPolicy* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainSID* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainSite* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainSPNTicket* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainSubnet* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainTrust* OR CommandLine:Get\-DomainUserEvent* OR CommandLine:Get\-ForestDomain* OR CommandLine:Get\-ForestGlobalCatalog* OR CommandLine:Get\-ForestTrust* OR CommandLine:Get\-GptTmpl* OR CommandLine:Get\-GroupsXML* OR CommandLine:Get\-LastLoggedOn* OR CommandLine:Get\-LoggedOnLocal* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetComputer* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetDomain* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetFileServer* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetForest* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetGPO* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetGroupMember* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetLocalGroup* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetLoggedon* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetOU* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetProcess* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetRDPSession* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetSession* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetShare* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetSite* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetSubnet* OR CommandLine:Get\-NetUser* OR CommandLine:Get\-PathAcl* OR CommandLine:Get\-PrincipalContext* OR CommandLine:Get\-RegistryMountedDrive* OR CommandLine:Get\-RegLoggedOn* OR CommandLine:Get\-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection* OR CommandLine:Get\-WMIRegLastLoggedOn* OR CommandLine:Get\-WMIRegMountedDrive* OR CommandLine:Get\-WMIRegProxy* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-ACLScanner* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-CheckLocalAdminAccess* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-Kerberoast* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-MapDomainTrust* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-RevertToSelf* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-Sharefinder* OR CommandLine:Invoke\-UserImpersonation* OR CommandLine:Remove\-DomainObjectAcl* OR CommandLine:Remove\-RemoteConnection* OR CommandLine:Request\-SPNTicket* OR CommandLine:Set\-DomainObject* OR CommandLine:Test\-AdminAccess*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpView Execution
id: b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d
related:
    - id: dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems
references:
    - https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-4---system-discovery-using-sharpview
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-10
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1049
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1135
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpView.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpView.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # - 'Add-DomainGroupMember'
              # - 'Add-DomainObjectAcl'
              # - 'Add-ObjectAcl'
              - 'Add-RemoteConnection'
              - 'Convert-ADName'
              - 'ConvertFrom-SID'
              - 'ConvertFrom-UACValue'
              - 'Convert-SidToName'
              # - 'ConvertTo-SID'
              - 'Export-PowerViewCSV'
              # - 'Find-DomainLocalGroupMember'
              - 'Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier'
              - 'Find-DomainProcess'
              - 'Find-DomainShare'
              - 'Find-DomainUserEvent'
              - 'Find-DomainUserLocation'
              - 'Find-ForeignGroup'
              - 'Find-ForeignUser'
              - 'Find-GPOComputerAdmin'
              - 'Find-GPOLocation'
              - 'Find-Interesting' # 'Find-InterestingDomainAcl', 'Find-InterestingDomainShareFile', 'Find-InterestingFile'
              - 'Find-LocalAdminAccess'
              - 'Find-ManagedSecurityGroups'
              # - 'Get-ADObject'
              - 'Get-CachedRDPConnection'
              - 'Get-DFSshare'
              # - 'Get-DNSRecord'
              # - 'Get-DNSZone'
              # - 'Get-Domain'
              - 'Get-DomainComputer'
              - 'Get-DomainController'
              - 'Get-DomainDFSShare'
              - 'Get-DomainDNSRecord'
              # - 'Get-DomainDNSZone'
              - 'Get-DomainFileServer'
              - 'Get-DomainForeign' # 'Get-DomainForeignGroupMember', 'Get-DomainForeignUser'
              - 'Get-DomainGPO' # 'Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping', 'Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup', 'Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping'
              - 'Get-DomainGroup' # 'Get-DomainGroupMember'
              - 'Get-DomainGUIDMap'
              - 'Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup'
              - 'Get-DomainObject' # 'Get-DomainObjectAcl'
              - 'Get-DomainOU'
              - 'Get-DomainPolicy' # 'Get-DomainPolicyData'
              - 'Get-DomainSID'
              - 'Get-DomainSite'
              - 'Get-DomainSPNTicket'
              - 'Get-DomainSubnet'
              - 'Get-DomainTrust' # 'Get-DomainTrustMapping'
              # - 'Get-DomainUser'
              - 'Get-DomainUserEvent'
              # - 'Get-Forest'
              - 'Get-ForestDomain'
              - 'Get-ForestGlobalCatalog'
              - 'Get-ForestTrust'
              - 'Get-GptTmpl'
              - 'Get-GroupsXML'
              # - 'Get-GUIDMap'
              # - 'Get-IniContent'
              # - 'Get-IPAddress'
              - 'Get-LastLoggedOn'
              - 'Get-LoggedOnLocal'
              - 'Get-NetComputer' # 'Get-NetComputerSiteName'
              - 'Get-NetDomain' # 'Get-NetDomainController', 'Get-NetDomainTrust'
              - 'Get-NetFileServer'
              - 'Get-NetForest' # 'Get-NetForestCatalog', 'Get-NetForestDomain', 'Get-NetForestTrust'
              - 'Get-NetGPO' # 'Get-NetGPOGroup'
              # - 'Get-NetGroup'
              - 'Get-NetGroupMember'
              - 'Get-NetLocalGroup' # 'Get-NetLocalGroupMember'
              - 'Get-NetLoggedon'
              - 'Get-NetOU'
              - 'Get-NetProcess'
              - 'Get-NetRDPSession'
              - 'Get-NetSession'
              - 'Get-NetShare'
              - 'Get-NetSite'
              - 'Get-NetSubnet'
              - 'Get-NetUser'
              # - 'Get-ObjectAcl'
              - 'Get-PathAcl'
              - 'Get-PrincipalContext'
              # - 'Get-Proxy'
              - 'Get-RegistryMountedDrive'
              - 'Get-RegLoggedOn'
              # - 'Get-SiteName'
              # - 'Get-UserEvent'
              # - 'Get-WMIProcess'
              - 'Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection'
              - 'Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn'
              - 'Get-WMIRegMountedDrive'
              - 'Get-WMIRegProxy'
              - 'Invoke-ACLScanner'
              - 'Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess'
              - 'Invoke-Kerberoast'
              - 'Invoke-MapDomainTrust'
              - 'Invoke-RevertToSelf'
              - 'Invoke-Sharefinder'
              - 'Invoke-UserImpersonation'
              # - 'New-DomainGroup'
              # - 'New-DomainUser'
              - 'Remove-DomainObjectAcl'
              - 'Remove-RemoteConnection'
              - 'Request-SPNTicket'
              # - 'Resolve-IPAddress'
              # - 'Set-ADObject'
              - 'Set-DomainObject'
              # - 'Set-DomainUserPassword'
              - 'Test-AdminAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution
Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS. Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.
status test author @Kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5
carbon_black query
(CommandLine:\ \-Inject\ * (CommandLine:\ \-PayloadArgs\ * OR CommandLine:\ \-PayloadFile\ *)) OR ((CommandLine:\ approve\ * OR CommandLine:\ create\ * OR CommandLine:\ check\ * OR CommandLine:\ delete\ *) (CommandLine:\ \/payload\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/payload=* OR CommandLine:\ \/updateid\:* OR CommandLine:\ \/updateid=*))
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution
id: b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS.
    Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.
references:
    - https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-sharpwsus/
    - https://github.com/nettitude/SharpWSUS
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210512154016/https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu/blob/master/WSUSpendu.ps1
author: '@Kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2022-10-07
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_wsuspendu_inject:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -Inject '
    selection_wsuspendu_payload:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -PayloadArgs '
            - ' -PayloadFile '
    selection_sharpwsus_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' approve '
            - ' create '
            - ' check '
            - ' delete '
    selection_sharpwsus_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /payload:'
            - ' /payload='
            - ' /updateid:'
            - ' /updateid='
    condition: all of selection_wsuspendu_* or all of selection_sharpwsus_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
status test author pH-T (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
carbon_black query
Image:\\Stracciatella.exe OR OriginalFileName:Stracciatella.exe OR Description:Stracciatella OR (Hashes:SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956* OR Hashes:SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a*)
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution
id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539
status: test
description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics.
references:
    - https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Stracciatella.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Stracciatella.exe'
        - Description: 'Stracciatella'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956'
              - 'SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
HackTool - SysmonEnte Execution
Detects the use of SysmonEnte, a tool to attack the integrity of Sysmon
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id d29ada0f-af45-4f27-8f32-f7b77c3dbc4e
carbon_black query
(((TargetImage:\:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe* OR TargetImage:\:\\Windows\\Sysmon64.exe*) GrantedAccess:0x1400) (-((SourceImage:\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR SourceImage:\:\\Program\ Files\\* OR SourceImage:\:\\Windows\\System32\\* OR SourceImage:\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*) OR (SourceImage:\:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\Platform\\* SourceImage:\\MsMpEng.exe)))) OR CallTrace:Ente
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - SysmonEnte Execution
id: d29ada0f-af45-4f27-8f32-f7b77c3dbc4e
status: test
description: Detects the use of SysmonEnte, a tool to attack the integrity of Sysmon
references:
    - https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/09/attacks-on-sysmon-revisited-sysmonente.html
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/SysmonEnte/
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/SysmonEnte/blob/fe267690fcc799fbda15398243615a30451d9099/screens/1.png
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-07
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sysmon:
        TargetImage|contains:
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon.exe'
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
        GrantedAccess: '0x1400'
    selection_calltrace:
        CallTrace: 'Ente'
    filter_main_generic:
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    filter_main_msdefender:
        SourceImage|contains: ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
        SourceImage|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
    condition: ( selection_sysmon and not 1 of filter_main_* ) or selection_calltrace
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution
Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a
carbon_black query
OriginalFileName:TruffleSnout.exe OR Image:\\TruffleSnout.exe
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution
id: 69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a
status: test
description: Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
    - https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout
    - https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout/blob/7c2f22e246ef704bc96c396f66fa854e9ca742b9/TruffleSnout/Docs/USAGE.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-20
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'TruffleSnout.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\TruffleSnout.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
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