title: Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading
id: 418dc89a-9808-4b87-b1d7-e5ae0cb6effc
related:
    - id: 7002aa10-b8d4-47ae-b5ba-51ab07e228b9
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-08-02
modified: 2023-08-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\mpclient.dll'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MpCmdRun.exe'
            - '\NisSrv.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading Via Defender Binaries
id: 7002aa10-b8d4-47ae-b5ba-51ab07e228b9
related:
    - id: 418dc89a-9808-4b87-b1d7-e5ae0cb6effc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2023-08-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\MpCmdRun.exe'
            - '\NisSrv.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential MsiExec Masquerading
id: e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144
status: test
description: Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential MuddyWater APT Activity
id: 36222790-0d43-4fe8-86e4-674b27809543
status: test
description: Detects potential Muddywater APT activity
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/iranian-threat-group-updates-ttps-in-spear-phishing-campaign
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.g0069
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_mshta:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'vbscript:Close(Execute("CreateObject('
            - 'powershell'
            - '-w 1 -exec Bypass'
            - '\ProgramData\'
    selection_survey:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Win32_OperatingSystem'
            - 'Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration'
            - 'root\SecurityCenter2'
            - '[System.Net.DNS]'
    selection_pwsh_backdoor:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '[Convert]::ToBase64String'
            - '[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString]'
            - 'GetResponse().GetResponseStream()'
            - '[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create('
            - '-bxor '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
id: 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916
status: test
description: Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -syncwithWU '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion/info.yml

title: Potential NetWire RAT Activity - Registry
id: 1d218616-71b0-4c40-855b-9dbe75510f7f
status: test
description: Detects registry keys related to NetWire RAT
references:
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-netwire-rat-variant-spread-by-phishing
    - https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/netwire-malware-what-it-is-how-it-works-and-how-to-prevent-it-malware-spotlight/
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/guloader-installing-netwire-rat/
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2021/09/threat-thursday-netwire-rat-is-coming-down-the-line
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/41ecdbde-4997-4301-a350-0270448b4c8f/
author: Christopher Peacock
date: 2021-10-07
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_add
detection:
    selection:
        # The configuration information is usually stored under HKCU:\Software\Netwire - RedCanary
        TargetObject|contains: '\software\NetWire'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Netcat Reverse Shell Execution
id: 7f734ed0-4f47-46c0-837f-6ee62505abd9
status: test
description: Detects execution of netcat with the "-e" flag followed by common shells. This could be a sign of a potential reverse shell setup.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
    - https://www.hackingtutorials.org/networking/hacking-netcat-part-2-bind-reverse-shells/
    - https://www.infosecademy.com/netcat-reverse-shells/
    - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/ncat.1.html
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_nc:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/nc'
            - '/ncat'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -c '
            - ' -e '
    selection_shell:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
            - '/bin/ash'
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/bsh'
            - '/bin/csh'
            - '/bin/ksh'
            - '/bin/pdksh'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/tcsh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - '$IFSash'
            - '$IFSbash'
            - '$IFSbsh'
            - '$IFScsh'
            - '$IFSksh'
            - '$IFSpdksh'
            - '$IFSsh'
            - '$IFStcsh'
            - '$IFSzsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Nimbuspwn Exploit CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-27800
id: 7ba05b43-adad-4c02-b5e9-c8c35cdf9fa8
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation attempts of Nimbuspwn vulnerabilities CVE-2022-29799 and CVE-2022-27800 in Linux systems.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/26/microsoft-finds-new-elevation-of-privilege-linux-vulnerability-nimbuspwn/
    - https://github.com/Immersive-Labs-Sec/nimbuspwn
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-05-04
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2022-29799
    - cve.2022-27800
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'networkd-dispatcher'
            - 'Error handling notification for interface'
            - '../../'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Notepad++ CVE-2025-49144 Exploitation
id: 933f0bb5-0681-4fe7-8a17-4e6cccbaac44
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-49144, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Notepad++ installers (v8.8.1 and prior) where the installer calls regsvr32.exe without specifying the full path.
    This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges by placing a malicious regsvr32.exe alongside this Legitimate Notepad++ installer.
    The vulnerability is triggered when the installer attempts to register the NppShell.dll file, which is a component of Notepad++.
references:
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-49144
    - https://x.com/NullSecurityX/status/1937444064867029179
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.008
    - cve.2025-49144
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: 'regsvr32 /s'
        CommandLine|contains: '\contextMenu\NppShell.dll'
    filter_main_legit_regsvr32:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential OGNL Injection Exploitation In JVM Based Application
id: 4d0af518-828e-4a04-a751-a7d03f3046ad
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential OGNL Injection exploitation, which may lead to RCE.
    OGNL is an expression language that is supported in many JVM based systems.
    OGNL Injection is the reason for some high profile RCE's such as Apache Struts (CVE-2017-5638) and Confluence (CVE-2022-26134)
references:
    - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs
author: Moti Harmats
date: 2023-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2017-5638
    - cve.2022-26134
logsource:
    category: application
    product: jvm
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'org.apache.commons.ognl.OgnlException'
        - 'ExpressionSyntaxException'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: high

title: Potential OWASSRF Exploitation Attempt - Proxy
id: 1ddf4596-1908-43c9-add2-1d2c2fcc4797
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt of the OWASSRF variant targeting exchange servers It uses the OWA endpoint to access the powershell backend endpoint
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/owassrf-exploit-analysis-and-recommendations/
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/12/21/cve-2022-41080-cve-2022-41082-rapid7-observed-exploitation-of-owassrf-in-exchange-for-rce/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        sc-status: 200
        c-uri|contains|all:
            - '/owa/'
            - '/powershell'
        c-uri|contains:
            - '@'
            - '%40'
    filter_main_ua:
        c-useragent:
            - 'ClientInfo'
            - 'Microsoft WinRM Client'
            - 'Exchange BackEnd Probes'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Web vulnerability scanners
level: high

title: Potential OWASSRF Exploitation Attempt - Webserver
id: 181f49fa-0b21-4665-a98c-a57025ebb8c7
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempt of the OWASSRF variant targeting exchange servers It uses the OWA endpoint to access the powershell backend endpoint
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/owassrf-exploit-analysis-and-recommendations/
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/12/21/cve-2022-41080-cve-2022-41082-rapid7-observed-exploitation-of-owassrf-in-exchange-for-rce/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-22
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        sc-status: 200
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - '/owa/'
            - '/powershell'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '@'
            - '%40'
    filter_main_ua:
        cs-user-agent:
            - 'ClientInfo'
            - 'Microsoft WinRM Client'
            - 'Exchange BackEnd Probes'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Web vulnerability scanners
level: high

title: Potential Okta Password in AlternateID Field
id: 91b76b84-8589-47aa-9605-c837583b82a9
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a user has potentially entered their password into the
    username field, which will cause the password to be retained in log files.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://www.mitiga.io/blog/how-okta-passwords-can-be-compromised-uncovering-a-risk-to-user-data
    - https://help.okta.com/en-us/Content/Topics/users-groups-profiles/usgp-create-character-restriction.htm
author: kelnage
date: 2023-04-03
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        legacyEventType: 'core.user_auth.login_failed'
    filter_main:
        # Okta service account names start with 0oa
        # Email addresses are the default format for Okta usernames, so attempt
        # to exclude alternateIds that look like valid emails
        # If your Okta configuration uses different character restrictions, you
        # will need to update this regular expression to reflect that or disable the rule for your environment
        # Possible false negatives are failed login attempts with a password that looks like a valid email address
        actor.alternateId|re: '(^0oa.*|[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,10})'
    condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Operation Triangulation C2 Beaconing Activity - DNS
id: 7fc30d63-728d-48d9-ad6f-14d14f4accf7
related:
    - id: aa03c712-75c6-438b-8d42-de88f2427e09 # Proxy C2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential beaconing activity to domains used in 0day attacks on iOS devices and revealed by Kaspersky and the FSB
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation/109842/
    - https://www-fsb-ru.translate.goog/fsb/press/message/[email protected]?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=de&_x_tr_pto=wapp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.g0020
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query:
            - 'addatamarket.net'
            - 'ans7tv.net'
            - 'anstv.net'
            - 'backuprabbit.com'
            - 'businessvideonews.com'
            - 'cloudsponcer.com'
            - 'datamarketplace.net'
            - 'growthtransport.com'
            - 'mobilegamerstats.com'
            - 'snoweeanalytics.com'
            - 'tagclick-cdn.com'
            - 'topographyupdates.com'
            - 'unlimitedteacup.com'
            - 'virtuallaughing.com'
            - 'web-trackers.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Operation Triangulation C2 Beaconing Activity - Proxy
id: aa03c712-75c6-438b-8d42-de88f2427e09
related:
    - id: 7fc30d63-728d-48d9-ad6f-14d14f4accf7 # DNS C2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential beaconing activity to domains used in 0day attacks on iOS devices and revealed by Kaspersky and the FSB
references:
    - https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation/109842/
    - https://www-fsb-ru.translate.goog/fsb/press/message/[email protected]?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=de&_x_tr_pto=wapp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.g0020
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-host|contains:
            - 'addatamarket.net'
            - 'ans7tv.net'
            - 'anstv.net'
            - 'backuprabbit.com'
            - 'businessvideonews.com'
            - 'cloudsponcer.com'
            - 'datamarketplace.net'
            - 'growthtransport.com'
            - 'mobilegamerstats.com'
            - 'snoweeanalytics.com'
            - 'tagclick-cdn.com'
            - 'topographyupdates.com'
            - 'unlimitedteacup.com'
            - 'virtuallaughing.com'
            - 'web-trackers.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PHP Reverse Shell
id: c6714a24-d7d5-4283-a36b-3ffd091d5f7e
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the PHP CLI with the "-r" flag which allows it to run inline PHP code. The rule looks for calls to the "fsockopen" function which allows the creation of sockets.
    Attackers often leverage this in combination with functions such as "exec" or "fopen" to initiate a reverse shell connection.
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: '@d4ns4n_'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: '/php'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -r '
            - 'fsockopen'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ash'
            - 'bash'
            - 'bsh'
            - 'csh'
            - 'ksh'
            - 'pdksh'
            - 'sh'
            - 'tcsh'
            - 'zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential POWERTRASH Script Execution
id: 4e19528a-f081-40dd-be09-90c39352bd64
status: test
description: Detects potential execution of the PowerShell script POWERTRASH
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.g0046
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'IO.Compression.DeflateStream'
            - 'IO.MemoryStream'
            - '::FromBase64String'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - '.Invoke()'
            - 'GlobalAssemblyCache'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PSFactoryBuffer COM Hijacking
id: 243380fa-11eb-4141-af92-e14925e77c1b
status: test
description: Detects changes to the PSFactory COM InProcServer32 registry. This technique was used by RomCom to create persistence storing a malicious DLL.
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/06/romcom-resurfaces-targeting-ukraine
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/clsid_C90250F3-4D7D-4991-9B69-A5C5BC1C2AE6.html
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6d3ab9e729bb03ae8ae3fcd824474c5052a165de6cb4c27334969a542c7b261d/detection
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/void-rabisu-s-use-of-romcom-backdoor-shows-a-growing-shift-in-th.html
author: BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence Team - @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-07
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.015
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CLSID\{c90250f3-4d7d-4991-9b69-a5c5bc1c2ae6}\InProcServer32\(Default)'
    filter_main:
        Details:
            - '%windir%\System32\ActXPrxy.dll'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\ActXPrxy.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Perl Reverse Shell Execution
id: 259df6bc-003f-4306-9f54-4ff1a08fa38e
status: test
description: Detects execution of the perl binary with the "-e" flag and common strings related to potential reverse shell activity
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: '@d4ns4n_, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/perl'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    selection_content:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'fdopen('
              - '::Socket::INET'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'Socket'
              - 'connect'
              - 'open'
              - 'exec'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via App Paths Default Property
id: 707e097c-e20f-4f67-8807-1f72ff4500d6
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "Default" property for keys located in the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\ registry. Which might be used as a method of persistence
    The entries found under App Paths are used primarily for the following purposes.
    First, to map an application's executable file name to that file's fully qualified path.
    Second, to prepend information to the PATH environment variable on a per-application, per-process basis.
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/app-registration
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.012
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '(Default)'
            - 'Path'
        Details|contains:
            # Add more suspicious paths or binaries as you see fit.
            - '\Users\Public'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - 'iex'
            - 'Invoke-'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications registering their binary from on of the suspicious locations mentioned above (tune it)
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via AutodialDLL
id: e6fe26ee-d063-4f5b-b007-39e90aaf50e3
status: test
description: Detects change the the "AutodialDLL" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the "ws2_32" library
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/autodialdll.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\WinSock2\Parameters\AutodialDLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via CHM Helper DLL
id: 976dd1f2-a484-45ec-aa1d-0e87e882262b
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker modifies the registry key "HtmlHelp Author" to achieve persistence
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/htmlhelpauthor.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-76/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\Location'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\HtmlHelp Author\Location'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via DLLPathOverride
id: a1b1fd53-9c4a-444c-bae0-34a330fc7aa8
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker adds a new "DLLPathOverride" value to the "Natural Language" key in order to achieve persistence which will get invoked by "SearchIndexer.exe" process
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/naturallanguage6.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/12/30/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-98/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_root:
        # The path can be for multiple languages
        # Example:  HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\English_UK
        #           HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\English_US
        #           HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\Neutral
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ContentIndex\Language\'
    selection_values:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\StemmerDLLPathOverride'
            - '\WBDLLPathOverride'
            - '\StemmerClass'
            - '\WBreakerClass'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Excel Add-in - Registry
id: 961e33d1-4f86-4fcf-80ab-930a708b2f82
status: test
description: Detect potential persistence via the creation of an excel add-in (XLL) file to make it run automatically when Excel is started.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4ae9580a1a8772db87a1b6cdb0d03e5af231e966/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence
author: frack113
date: 2023-01-15
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Excel\Options'
        Details|startswith: '/R '
        Details|endswith: '.xll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via GlobalFlags
id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
related:
    - id: c81fe886-cac0-4913-a511-2822d72ff505
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry persistence technique using the GlobalFlags and SilentProcessExit keys
references:
    - https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/
author: Karneades, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Florian Roth
date: 2018-04-11
modified: 2023-06-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.012
    - car.2013-01-002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_global_flag:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\'
            - '\Image File Execution Options\'
            - '\GlobalFlag'
    selection_silent_process:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\'
            - '\SilentProcessExit\'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\ReportingMode'
            - '\MonitorProcess'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via LSA Extensions
id: 41f6531d-af6e-4c6e-918f-b946f2b85a36
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker modifies the "REG_MULTI_SZ" value named "Extensions" to include a custom DLL to achieve persistence via lsass.
    The "Extensions" list contains filenames of DLLs being automatically loaded by lsass.exe. Each DLL has its InitializeLsaExtension() method called after loading.
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/lsaaextension.html
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1476286368385019906
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LsaExtensionConfig\LsaSrv\Extensions'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Logon Scripts - CommandLine
id: 21d856f9-9281-4ded-9377-51a1a6e2a432
related:
    - id: 0a98a10c-685d-4ab0-bddc-b6bdd1d48458
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new LogonScript to the registry value "UserInitMprLogonScript" for potential persistence
references:
    - https://cocomelonc.github.io/persistence/2022/12/09/malware-pers-20.html
author: Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure)
date: 2019-01-12
modified: 2023-06-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1037.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'UserInitMprLogonScript'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate addition of Logon Scripts via the command line by administrators or third party tools
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Office Add-In
id: 8e1cb247-6cf6-42fa-b440-3f27d57e9936
status: test
description: Detects potential persistence activity via startup add-ins that load when Microsoft Office starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel).
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4ae9580a1a8772db87a1b6cdb0d03e5af231e966/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-11
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.006
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wlldropped:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.wll'
    selection_xlldropped:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.xll'
    selection_xladropped:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.xlam'
    selection_generic:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Addins\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.xlam'
            - '.xla'
            - '.ppam'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate add-ins
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Office Startup Folder
id: 0e20c89d-2264-44ae-8238-aeeaba609ece
status: test
description: Detects creation of Microsoft Office files inside of one of the default startup folders in order to achieve persistence.
references:
    - https://insight-jp.nttsecurity.com/post/102hojk/operation-restylink-apt-campaign-targeting-japanese-companies
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/troubleshoot/excel/use-startup-folders
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_word_paths:
        - TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Office'
              - '\Program Files'
              - '\STARTUP'
    selection_word_extension:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.doc'
            - '.docm'
            - '.docx'
            - '.dot'
            - '.dotm'
            - '.rtf'
    selection_excel_paths:
        - TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART'
        - TargetFilename|contains|all:
              - '\Office'
              - '\Program Files'
              - '\XLSTART'
    selection_excel_extension:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.xls'
            - '.xlsm'
            - '.xlsx'
            - '.xlt'
            - '.xltm'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.exe'
            - '\EXCEL.exe'
    condition: (all of selection_word_* or all of selection_excel_*) and not filter_main_office
falsepositives:
    - Loading a user environment from a backup or a domain controller
    - Synchronization of templates
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Mpnotify
id: 92772523-d9c1-4c93-9547-b0ca500baba3
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker register a new SIP provider for persistence and defense evasion
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/mpnotify.html
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggY3srD9dYs&ab_channel=GrzegorzTworek
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\mpnotify'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Might trigger if a legitimate new SIP provider is registered. But this is not a common occurrence in an environment and should be investigated either way
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via MyComputer Registry Keys
id: 8fbe98a8-8f9d-44f8-aa71-8c572e29ef06
status: test
description: Detects modification to the "Default" value of the "MyComputer" key and subkeys to point to a custom binary that will be launched whenever the associated action is executed (see reference section for example)
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/18/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-55/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-09
modified: 2024-01-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer'
        TargetObject|endswith: '(Default)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely but if you experience FPs add specific processes and locations you would like to monitor for
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Form
id: c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new Outlook form which can contain malicious code
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=76
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=79
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/outlook/concepts/outlook-forms/create-an-outlook-form
    - https://www.slipstick.com/developer/custom-form/clean-outlooks-forms-cache/
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1137.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\FORMS\IPM'
            - '\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Forms' # Windows XP
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of outlook forms
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page
id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
related:
    - id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page.
    An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-09
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\WebView\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\URL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook LoadMacroProviderOnBoot Setting
id: 396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading of any configured VBA project/module
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\LoadMacroProviderOnBoot'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Today Page
id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1
related:
    - id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential persistence activity via outlook today page.
    An attacker can set a custom page to execute arbitrary code and link to it via the registry values "URL" and "UserDefinedUrl".
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=74
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change
author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand
date: 2021-06-10
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Office\'
            - '\Outlook\Today\'
    selection_value_stamp:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Stamp'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    selection_value_url:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\URL'
            - '\UserDefinedUrl'
    filter_main_office:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\Updates\'
        Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via PlistBuddy
id: 65d506d3-fcfe-4071-b4b2-bcefe721bbbb
status: test
description: Detects potential persistence activity using LaunchAgents or LaunchDaemons via the PlistBuddy utility
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
    - https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/PlistBuddy/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1543.001
    - attack.t1543.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/PlistBuddy'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'RunAtLoad'
            - 'true'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'LaunchAgents'
            - 'LaunchDaemons'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task
id: b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df
related:
    - id: 6e8811ee-90ba-441e-8486-5653e68b2299
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-08
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-k netsvcs'
            - '-s Schedule'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ' -windowstyle hidden'
            - ' -w hidden'
            - ' -ep bypass'
            - ' -noni'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Security Descriptors - ScriptBlock
id: 2f77047c-e6e9-4c11-b088-a3de399524cd
status: test
description: Detects usage of certain functions and keywords that are used to manipulate security descriptors in order to potentially set a backdoor. As seen used in the DAMP project.
references:
    - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'win32_Trustee'
            - 'win32_Ace'
            - '.AccessMask'
            - '.AceType'
            - '.SetSecurityDescriptor'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '\Lsa\JD'
            - '\Lsa\Skew1'
            - '\Lsa\Data'
            - '\Lsa\GBG'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database In Uncommon Location
id: 6b6976a3-b0e6-4723-ac24-ae38a737af41
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a new shim database where the file is located in a non-default location
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
    - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Erickson/Asia-14-Erickson-Persist-It-Using-And-Abusing-Microsofts-Fix-It-Patches.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB\'
            - '\DatabasePath'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Details|contains: ':\Windows\AppPatch\Custom'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Persistence Via TypedPaths
id: 086ae989-9ca6-4fe7-895a-759c5544f247
status: test
description: Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry from a non standard application. Which might indicate persistence attempt
references:
    - https://twitter.com/dez_/status/1560101453150257154
    - https://forensafe.com/blogs/typedpaths.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-22
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\'
    filter:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Pikabot C2 Activity
id: cae6cee6-0244-44d2-84ed-e65f548eb7dc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of rundll32 that leads to an external network connection.
    The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique to initiate C2-communication through hard-coded Windows binaries.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d72af640b71b8e3eca3eba660dd7c7f029ff8852bcacaa379e7b6c57cf4d9b44
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6bb4cdbaef03b732a93559a58173e7f16b29bfb159a1065fae9185000ff23b4b
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot/blob/7f7723a74ca325ec54c6e61e076acce9a4b20538/Pikabot_06.12.2023.txt
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-27
modified: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1573
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
    definition: 'Requirements: By default the network_connection type event might not contain the ParentImage. Make sure you collect such fields in order to use this rule'
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Pikabot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
            - '\SearchProtocolHost.exe'
            - '\sndvol.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wwahost.exe'
        Protocol: tcp
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Pikabot Discovery Activity
id: 698d4431-514f-4c82-af4d-cf573872a9f5
status: test
description: |
    Detects system discovery activity carried out by Pikabot, such as incl. network, user info and domain groups.
    The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique as part of its C2-botnet registration with a short collection time frame (less than 1 minute).
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/72f1a5476a845ea02344c9b7edecfe399f64b52409229edaf856fcb9535e3242
    - https://tria.ge/231023-lpw85she57/behavioral2
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-27
modified: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1049
    - attack.t1087
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
    definition: 'Requirements: By default the process_creation type event might not contain the GrandParentImage. Make sure you collect such fields in order to use this rule'
detection:
    selection_parent:
        - GrandParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
              - '\SearchProtocolHost.exe'
    selection_child:
        CommandLine:
            # Note: Only add strings as seen used by Pikabot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - 'ipconfig.exe /all'
            - 'netstat.exe -aon'
            - 'whoami.exe /all'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Pikabot Hollowing Activity
id: d8937fe7-42d5-4b4d-8178-e089c908f63f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of rundll32 that leads to the invocation of legitimate Windows binaries.
    The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique for process hollowing through hard-coded Windows binaries
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b6e8910fb9b3bb1fcddefd35ff0ed8624930d30d6977e11808c8330415685a62
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6bb4cdbaef03b732a93559a58173e7f16b29bfb159a1065fae9185000ff23b4b
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot/blob/7f7723a74ca325ec54c6e61e076acce9a4b20538/Pikabot_06.12.2023.txt
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2023-10-27
modified: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.012
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Pikabot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
            - '\SearchProtocolHost.exe'
            - '\sndvol.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wwahost.exe'
    filter_main_legit_sndvol:
        Image|endswith: '\sndvol.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'mmsys.cpl'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential PlugX Activity
id: aeab5ec5-be14-471a-80e8-e344418305c2
status: test
description: Detects the execution of an executable that is typically used by PlugX for DLL side loading starting from an uncommon location
references:
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/03/10/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-36/
    - https://countuponsecurity.com/2017/06/07/threat-hunting-in-the-enterprise-with-appcompatprocessor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-12
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.s0013
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cammute:
        Image|endswith: '\CamMute.exe'
    filter_cammute:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Lenovo\Communication Utility\'
            - '\Lenovo\Communications Utility\'
    selection_chrome_frame:
        Image|endswith: '\chrome_frame_helper.exe'
    filter_chrome_frame:
        Image|contains: '\Google\Chrome\application\'
    selection_devemu:
        Image|endswith: '\dvcemumanager.exe'
    filter_devemu:
        Image|contains: '\Microsoft Device Emulator\'
    selection_gadget:
        Image|endswith: '\Gadget.exe'
    filter_gadget:
        Image|contains: '\Windows Media Player\'
    selection_hcc:
        Image|endswith: '\hcc.exe'
    filter_hcc:
        Image|contains: '\HTML Help Workshop\'
    selection_hkcmd:
        Image|endswith: '\hkcmd.exe'
    filter_hkcmd:
        Image|contains:
            - '\System32\'
            - '\SysNative\'
            - '\SysWow64\'
    selection_mc:
        Image|endswith: '\Mc.exe'
    filter_mc:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio'
            - '\Microsoft SDK'
            - '\Windows Kit'
    selection_msmpeng:
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
    filter_msmpeng:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Security Client\'
            - '\Windows Defender\'
            - '\AntiMalware\'
    selection_msseces:
        Image|endswith: '\msseces.exe'
    filter_msseces:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Security Center\'
            - '\Microsoft Security Client\'
            - '\Microsoft Security Essentials\'
    selection_oinfo:
        Image|endswith: '\OInfoP11.exe'
    filter_oinfo:
        Image|contains: '\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\'
    selection_oleview:
        Image|endswith: '\OleView.exe'
    filter_oleview:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio'
            - '\Microsoft SDK'
            - '\Windows Kit'
            - '\Windows Resource Kit\'
    selection_rc:
        Image|endswith: '\rc.exe'
    filter_rc:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Microsoft Visual Studio'
            - '\Microsoft SDK'
            - '\Windows Kit'
            - '\Windows Resource Kit\'
            - '\Microsoft.NET\'
    condition: ( selection_cammute and not filter_cammute ) or ( selection_chrome_frame and not filter_chrome_frame ) or ( selection_devemu and not filter_devemu ) or ( selection_gadget and not filter_gadget ) or ( selection_hcc and not filter_hcc ) or ( selection_hkcmd and not filter_hkcmd ) or ( selection_mc and not filter_mc ) or ( selection_msmpeng and not filter_msmpeng ) or ( selection_msseces and not filter_msseces ) or ( selection_oinfo and not filter_oinfo ) or ( selection_oleview and not filter_oleview ) or ( selection_rc and not filter_rc )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
id: d7bcd677-645d-4691-a8d4-7a5602b780d1
status: test
description: Detects the PowerShell command lines with special characters
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=64
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (fp)
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_re:
        # TODO: Optimize for PySIGMA
        - CommandLine|re: '\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+.*\+'
        - CommandLine|re: '\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{.*\{'
        - CommandLine|re: '\^.*\^.*\^.*\^.*\^'
        - CommandLine|re: '`.*`.*`.*`.*`'
    filter_optional_amazonSSM:
        ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\ssm-document-worker.exe
    filter_optional_defender_atp:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'new EventSource("Microsoft.Windows.Sense.Client.Management"'
            - 'public static extern bool InstallELAMCertificateInfo(SafeFileHandle handle);'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Amazon SSM Document Worker
    - Windows Defender ATP
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - ProcCreation
id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f
related:
    - id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 # ProcCreation Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 # ProcCreation Cmdlet
      type: similar
    - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b # PowerShell ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy registry key in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution from the CommandLine
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.3
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy'
            - '\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy'
    selection_values:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Bypass'
            - 'RemoteSigned'
            - 'Unrestricted'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Execution Via DLL
id: 6812a10b-60ea-420c-832f-dfcc33b646ba
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential PowerShell execution from a DLL instead of the usual PowerShell process as seen used in PowerShdll.
    This detection assumes that PowerShell commands are passed via the CommandLine.
references:
    - https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll/blob/62cfa172fb4e1f7f4ac00ca942685baeb88ff356/README.md
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-25
modified: 2024-03-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\InstallUtil.exe'
              - '\RegAsm.exe'
              - '\RegSvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.EXE'
              - 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Default.GetString'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'ICM '
            - 'IEX '
            - 'Invoke-Command'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
id: b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4
status: test
description: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers
references:
    - https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-10-11
modified: 2023-05-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'hctac'
            - 'kaerb'
            - 'dnammoc'
            - 'ekovn' # Also covers 'ekovni'
            - 'eliFd'
            - 'rahc'
            - 'etirw'
            - 'golon'
            - 'tninon'
            - 'eddih'
            - 'tpircS'
            - 'ssecorp'
            - 'llehsrewop'
            - 'esnopser'
            - 'daolnwod'
            - 'tneilCbeW'
            - 'tneilc'
            - 'ptth'
            - 'elifotevas'
            - '46esab'
            - 'htaPpmeTteG'
            - 'tcejbO'
            - 'maerts'
            - 'hcaerof'
            - 'retupmoc'
    filter_main_encoded_keyword:
        # We exclude usage of encoded commands as they might generate FPs as shown here:
        #   https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/2720
        #   https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/4270
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -enc '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via WCHAR/CHAR
id: e312efd0-35a1-407f-8439-b8d434b438a6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1281103918693482496
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-09
modified: 2025-03-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '[char]0x'
            - '(WCHAR)0x'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Powershell ReverseShell Connection
id: edc2f8ae-2412-4dfd-b9d5-0c57727e70be
status: stable
description: Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells. As seen used by the Nishang "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" reverse shell and other.
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1
author: FPT.EagleEye, wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-03
modified: 2023-04-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' Net.Sockets.TCPClient'
            - '.GetStream('
            - '.Write('
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - In rare administrative cases, this function might be used to check network connectivity
level: high