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CVE

CVE-2024-27894

The Pulsar Functions Worker includes a capability that permits authenticated users to create functions where the functio

The Pulsar Functions Worker includes a capability that permits authenticated users to create functions where the function's implementation is referenced by a URL. The supported URL schemes include "file", "http", and "https". When a function is created using this method, the Functions Worker will retrieve the implementation from the URL provided by the user.

However, this feature introduces a vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to any file that the Pulsar Functions Worker process has permissions to read. This includes reading the process environment which potentially includes sensitive information, such as secrets. Furthermore, an attacker could leverage this vulnerability to use the Pulsar Functions Worker as a proxy to access the content of remote HTTP and HTTPS endpoint URLs.

This could also be used to carry out denial of service attacks. This vulnerability also applies to the Pulsar Broker when it is configured with "functionsWorkerEnabled=true". This issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.4.0 to 2.10.5, from 2.11.0 to 2.11.3, from 3.0.0 to 3.0.2, from 3.1.0 to 3.1.2, and 3.2.0. 2.10 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 2.10.6. 2.11 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 2.11.4. 3.0 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.0.3. 3.1 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.1.3. 3.2 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.2.1.

Users operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions. The updated versions of Pulsar Functions Worker will, by default, impose restrictions on the creation of functions using URLs. For users who rely on this functionality, the Function Worker configuration provides two configuration keys: "additionalEnabledConnectorUrlPatterns" and "additionalEnabledFunctionsUrlPatterns".

These keys allow users to specify a set of URL patterns that are permitted, enabling the creation of functions using URLs that match the defined patterns. This approach ensures that the feature remains available to those who require it, while limiting the potential for unauthorized access and exploitation.

HIGH · CVSS 8.5 EPSS 0.01895
Schedule remediation
  • CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2024-27894, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

Affected Products & Versions

5
apache pulsar>= 2.4.0 and < 2.10.6
apache pulsar>= 2.11.0 and < 2.11.4
apache pulsar>= 3.0.0 and < 3.0.3
apache pulsar>= 3.1.0 and < 3.1.3
apache pulsarall versions

Affected Packages

1
Language-ecosystem packages (from OSV) tied to this CVE, with the version that fixes it - the dependency-level detail NVD doesn’t carry.
Maven org.apache.pulsar:pulsar-functions-worker HIGH fixed in 2.10.6

Scoring & Timeline

8.5
HIGH · CVSS v3.1 · [email protected]
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD12 Mar 2024 · 07:15 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
SSVC asks the questions that actually drive patch urgency: is it being exploited, can attacks be automated, and how total is the impact.
🔗

References & Sources

3
Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.
threatengine.sh