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ATT&CK Technique

Local Storage Discovery

T1680 · discovery

Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access. On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as esxcli to list storage connected to the host as well as .vmdk files.

On Windows systems, adversaries can use wmic logicaldisk get to find information about local network drives. They can also use Get-PSDrive in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as GetDriveType. Linux has commands such as parted, lsblk, fdisk, lshw, and df that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space.

The command diskutil on MacOS can be used to list disks while system_profiler SPStorageDataType can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as describe volume in AWS, gcloud compute disks list in GCP, and az disk list in Azure.

ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSWindows
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Actors Using This

5
russiaAPT29
chinaAPT41
north_koreaLazarus Group
russiaTurla
chinaVolt Typhoon
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
reconnaissance earlier
T1593 · Search Open Websites/Domains ×10.20T1589 · Gather Victim Identity Information ×5.71
resource-development earlier
T1586 · Compromise Accounts ×7.14T1584.004 · Server ×3.86
initial-access earlier
T1195.002 · Compromise Software Supply Chain ×5.10T1195 · Supply Chain Compromise ×3.48
execution earlier
T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation ×4.25
privilege-escalation earlier
T1546 · Event Triggered Execution ×4.88
credential-access earlier
T1003.002 · Security Account Manager ×3.48
discovery same
T1016.001 · Internet Connection Discovery ×23.80T1069.002 · Domain Groups ×9.52
command-and-control later
T1104 · Multi-Stage Channels ×47.60T1008 · Fallback Channels ×23.80T1001 · Data Obfuscation ×21.16
other same
T1070.006 · Timestomp ×4.92
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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