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ATT&CK Technique

KernelCallbackTable

T1574.013 · stealth, execution

Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads. The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded. An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload.

Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading or Process Injection into another process. A pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() Native API function). Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()).

The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered. The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message.

After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload. Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.

Windows
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Actors Using This

1
north_koreaLazarus Group
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack.

Suspicious Process Behavior
  • Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts.
  • Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.
Unauthorized File Access
  • Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization.
  • Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.
Abnormal API Calls
  • Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities.
  • Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like OpenProcess and WriteProcessMemory and terminates the offending process.
Exploit Prevention
  • Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access.
  • Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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Comply & Defend

NIST 800-53CA-07, CM-02, SI-02, SI-03, SI-04, SI-07, SI-10
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