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ATT&CK Technique

Time Based Checks

T1497.003 · stealth, discovery

Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock. Adversaries may use calls like GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.

LinuxmacOSWindows

Actors Using This

14
russia_speaking_cybercrime8Base
commercial_cybercrime_uefi_bootkitBlackLotus
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeDarkGate Operators
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeEmotet Operators
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeGrandoreiro
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeGuildma / Astaroth
russia_speaking_organized_cybercrimeIcedID / BokBot Operators (Lunar Spider)
north_koreaLazarus Group
latin_america_brazilian_organized_cybercrimeMekotio
palestinian_territoriesMolerats / Gaza Cybergang

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
command-and-control later

Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
shlinux, macosDelay execution with ping
Uses the ping command to introduce a delay before executing a malicious payload.
ping -c #{ping_count} 8.8.8.8 > /dev/null
#{evil_command}

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

Caldera Emulation

1
MITRE Caldera abilities that emulate this technique - each is an executable action for automated adversary emulation.
defense-evasiondarwin, linux, windows1-min sleep
sleep 60

Comply & Defend

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