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Deployable detection rules

5 vendor-native detections · ready to paste into your SIEM · cross-linked to ATT&CK
All sources Splunk ESCU · 2,088 Elastic · 1,678 Microsoft Sentinel · 633
technique T1005 ×
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Detections

5 shown of 5
Microsoft Sentinel KQL T1005 ↗
ADFS DKM Master Key Export
'Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory. References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/, https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentine
Show query 
(union isfuzzy=true 
(SecurityEvent 
| where EventID == 4662 // You need to create a SACL on the ADFS Policy Store DKM group for this event to be created. 
| where ObjectServer == 'DS'
| where OperationType == 'Object Access'
//| where ObjectName contains '<GUID of ADFS Policy Store DKM Group object' This is unique to the domain. Check description for more details.
| where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2' // Contact Class
| where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed' // Picture Attribute - Ldap-Display-Name: thumbnailPhoto
| extend AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer
),
( WindowsEvent 
| where EventID == 4662 // You need to create a SACL on the ADFS Policy Store DKM group for this event to be created. 
| where EventData has_all('Object Access', '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2','8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed') 
| extend ObjectServer = tostring(EventData.ObjectServer)
| where ObjectServer == 'DS'
| extend OperationType = tostring(EventData.OperationType)
| where OperationType == 'Object Access'
//| where ObjectName contains '<GUID of ADFS Policy Store DKM Group object' This is unique to the domain. Check description for more details.
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType contains '5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2' // Contact Class
| extend Properties = tostring(EventData.Properties)
| where Properties contains '8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed' // Picture Attribute - Ldap-Display-Name: thumbnailPhoto
| extend AccountName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, DeviceName = Computer
),
(DeviceEvents
| where ActionType =~ "LdapSearch"
| where AdditionalFields.AttributeList contains "thumbnailPhoto"
| where AdditionalFields.DistinguishedName contains "CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data" // Filter results to show only hits related to the ADFS AD container
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
)
)
| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
Microsoft Sentinel KQL T1005 ↗
Microsoft Entra ID Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access
'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Microsoft Entra ID Health monitoring agent. This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent. You can find more information in here https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml '
Show query 
// ADHealth Monitoring Agent Registry Key
let aadHealthMonAgentRegKey = "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Online\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent";
// Filter out known processes
let aadConnectHealthProcs = dynamic ([
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.AadSync.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.AadConnect.Health.AadSync.Host.exe',
    'Microsoft.Azure.ActiveDirectory.Synchronization.Upgrader.exe',
    'miiserver.exe'
]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '4656'
| where EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
| extend ObjectName = column_ifexists("ObjectName", ""),
    ObjectType = column_ifexists("ObjectType", "")
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend SubjectUserName = column_ifexists("SubjectUserName", ""),
    SubjectDomainName = column_ifexists("SubjectDomainName", ""),
    ProcessName = column_ifexists("ProcessName", "")
| extend Process = split(ProcessName, '\\', -1)[-1],
    Account = strcat(SubjectDomainName, "\\", SubjectUserName)
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '4656' and EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '4663'
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\', -1)[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
  (
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '4663' and EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
)
)
// You can filter out potential machine accounts
//| where AccountType != 'Machine'
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0])
| project-away DomainIndex
Microsoft Sentinel KQL T1005 ↗
Microsoft Entra ID Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access
'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Microsoft Entra ID Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAge
Show query 
// ADHealth Monitoring Agent Registry Key
let aadHealthMonAgentRegKey = "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\MicrosoftOnline\\Reporting\\MonitoringAgent";
// Filter out known processes
let aadConnectHealthProcs = dynamic ([
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.Health.AadSync.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe',
    'Microsoft.Identity.AadConnect.Health.AadSync.Host.exe',
    'Microsoft.Azure.ActiveDirectory.Synchronization.Upgrader.exe',
    'miiserver.exe'
]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '4656'
| where EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
| extend ObjectName = column_ifexists("ObjectName", ""),
    ObjectType = column_ifexists("ObjectType", "")
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend SubjectUserName = column_ifexists("SubjectUserName", ""),
    SubjectDomainName = column_ifexists("SubjectDomainName", ""),
    ProcessName = column_ifexists("ProcessName", "")
| extend Process = split(ProcessName, '\\', -1)[-1],
    Account = strcat(SubjectDomainName, "\\", SubjectUserName)
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
  ( WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '4656' and EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == '4663'
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\', -1)[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
),
( WindowsEvent
| where EventID == '4663' and EventData has aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
| where ObjectName == aadHealthMonAgentRegKey
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| extend Process = tostring(split(ProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process !in (aadConnectHealthProcs)
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| summarize StartTime = max(TimeGenerated), EndTime = min(TimeGenerated), count() by EventID, Account, Computer, Process, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, ObjectName, ObjectType, ProcessName
)
)
// You can filter out potential machine accounts
//| where AccountType != 'Machine'
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0])
Splunk ESCU SPL T1005 ↗
ESXi VM Exported via Remote Tool
This detection identifies the use of a remote tool to download virtual machine disk files from a datastore. The NFC protocol is used by management tools to transfer files to and from ESXi hosts, but it can also be abused by attackers or insiders to exfiltrate full virtual disk images
Show query 
`esxi_syslog` Message="*File download from path*" Message="*was initiated from*" | rex field=_raw "from path '\[(?<Datastore>[^\]]+)\](?<VMPath>[^']+)'" | rex field=_raw "initiated from '(?<InitiatorTool>[^/]+)/(?<ToolVersion>[^@]+)@(?<InitiatorIP>\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})'" | rex field=_raw "Z (?<dest>[\w\.]+)\s" | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Datastore VMPath InitiatorTool ToolVersion InitiatorIP dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `esxi_vm_exported_via_remote_tool_filter`
Splunk ESCU SPL T1005 ↗
Sqlite Module In Temp Folder
The following analytic detects the creation of sqlite3.dll files in the %temp% folder. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify when these files are written to the temporary directory. This activity is significant because it is associated with IcedID malware, which uses the sqlite3 module to parse browser databases and steal sensitive information such as banking details, credit card information, and credentials. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to significant data theft and compromise of user accounts.
Show query 
`sysmon` EventCode=11 (TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite32.dll" OR TargetFilename = "*\\sqlite64.dll") (TargetFilename = "*\\temp\\*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by action dest file_name file_path  process_guid process_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sqlite_module_in_temp_folder_filter`
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