title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Office Child Processes
      type: derived
    - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 # Outlook Remote Child Process
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'        # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\msdt.exe'           # CVE-2022-30190
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'        # https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
            - '\wmic.exe'           # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # Several FPs with rundll32.exe
            # We started excluding specific use cases and ended up commenting out the rundll32.exe sub processes completely
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # filter_outlook_photoviewer:  # https://twitter.com/Luke_Hamp/status/1495919717760237568
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains: '\PhotoViewer.dll'
            # filter_outlook_printattachments:  # https://twitter.com/KickaKamil/status/1496238278659485696
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains|all:
            #     - 'shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            #     - '\SYSTEM32\SPOOL\DRIVERS\'
    condition: selection # and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Outlook Macro Created
id: 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
related:
    - id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Parent Double Extension File Execution
id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c
related:
    - id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8 # Image/CommandLine
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detect execution of suspicious double extension files in ParentCommandLine
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7872d8845a332dce517adae9c3389fde5313ff2fed38c2577f3b498da786db68/behavior
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bluebottle-banks-targeted-africa
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-06
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '.doc.lnk'
              - '.docx.lnk'
              - '.xls.lnk'
              - '.xlsx.lnk'
              - '.ppt.lnk'
              - '.pptx.lnk'
              - '.rtf.lnk'
              - '.pdf.lnk'
              - '.txt.lnk'
              - '.doc.js'
              - '.docx.js'
              - '.xls.js'
              - '.xlsx.js'
              - '.ppt.js'
              - '.pptx.js'
              - '.rtf.js'
              - '.pdf.js'
              - '.txt.js'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - '.doc.lnk'
              - '.docx.lnk'
              - '.xls.lnk'
              - '.xlsx.lnk'
              - '.ppt.lnk'
              - '.pptx.lnk'
              - '.rtf.lnk'
              - '.pdf.lnk'
              - '.txt.lnk'
              - '.doc.js'
              - '.docx.js'
              - '.xls.js'
              - '.xlsx.js'
              - '.ppt.js'
              - '.pptx.js'
              - '.rtf.js'
              - '.pdf.js'
              - '.txt.js'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Path In Keyboard Layout IME File Registry Value
id: 9d8f9bb8-01af-4e15-a3a2-349071530530
related:
    - id: b888e3f2-224d-4435-b00b-9dd66e9ea1f1
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of Windows Input Method Editor (IME) keyboard layout feature, which allows an attacker to load a DLL into the process after sending the WM_INPUTLANGCHANGEREQUEST message.
    Before doing this, the client needs to register the DLL in a special registry key that is assumed to implement this keyboard layout. This registry key should store a value named "Ime File" with a DLL path.
    IMEs are essential for languages that have more characters than can be represented on a standard keyboard, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/guntior-story-advanced-bootkit-doesnt-rely-windows-disk-baranov-wue8e/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-21
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_registry:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Control\Keyboard Layouts\'
            - 'Ime File'
    selection_folders_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    condition: selection_registry and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
    - id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_bin_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'toolbox-cmd.exe'
    selection_bin_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' script '
            - ' set '
    selection_susp_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\PerfLogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Ping/Del Command Combination
id: 54786ddc-5b8a-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects a method often used by ransomware. Which combines the "ping" to wait a couple of seconds and then "del" to delete the file in question. Its used to hide the file responsible for the initial infection for example
references:
    - https://blog.sygnia.co/kaseya-ransomware-supply-chain-attack
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/06/23093553/Common-TTPs-of-the-modern-ransomware_low-res.pdf
    - https://www.acronis.com/en-us/blog/posts/lockbit-ransomware/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
author: Ilya Krestinichev
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Note: In the case of sysmon and similar logging utilities, see this discussion https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/discussions/4277
    # Example: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"  /C ping 127.0.0.7 -n 3 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=524288 "C:\Users\User\Desktop\lockbit\lockbit.exe" & Del /f /q "C:\Users\User\Desktop\lockbit\lockbit.exe".
    selection_count:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -n '
    selection_nul:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Nul' # Covers "> Nul" and ">Nul "
    selection_del_param:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -f '
            - ' -q '
    selection_all:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ping' # Covers "ping" and "ping.exe"
            - 'del '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Plink Port Forwarding
id: 48a61b29-389f-4032-b317-b30de6b95314
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Plink tunnel port forwarding to a local port
references:
    - https://www.real-sec.com/2019/04/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling/
    - https://medium.com/@informationsecurity/remote-ssh-tunneling-with-plink-exe-7831072b3d7d
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-19
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description: 'Command-line SSH, Telnet, and Rlogin client'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -R '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity using a remote port forwarding to a local port
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern
id: e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275
related:
    - id: 3b6ab547-8ec2-4991-b9d2-2b06702a48d7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive)
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/jivoi/c354eaaf3019352ce32522f916c03d70
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2022-03-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: # make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive
            - 'IEX ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - ' -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('
            - ' -c (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software installers that pull packages from remote systems and execute them
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns
id: b9d9cc83-380b-4ba3-8d8f-60c0e7e2930c
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combincation with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/b9040c63-c140-479b-ad59-f1bb56ce7a97/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-24
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.Exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -e '
            - ' -en '
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -enco'
    selection_encoded:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' JAB'
            - ' SUVYI'
            - ' SQBFAFgA'
            - ' aWV4I'
            - ' IAB'
            - ' PAA'
            - ' aQBlAHgA'
    filter_gcworker:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
            - '\gc_worker.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Other tools that work with encoded scripts in the command line instead of script files
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell IEX Execution Patterns
id: 09576804-7a05-458e-a817-eb718ca91f54
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-expression?view=powershell-7.2
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-24
modified: 2022-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_combined_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' | iex;'
            - ' | iex '
            - ' | iex}'
            - ' | IEX ;'
            - ' | IEX -Error'
            - ' | IEX (new'
            - ');IEX '
    selection_combined_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '::FromBase64String'
            - '.GetString([System.Convert]::'
    selection_standalone:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ')|iex;$'
            - ');iex($'
            - ');iex $'
            - ' | IEX | '
            - ' | iex\"'
    condition: all of selection_combined_* or selection_standalone
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts that use IEX
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
id: ed965133-513f-41d9-a441-e38076a0798f
related:
    - id: 3d304fda-78aa-43ed-975c-d740798a49c1
      type: derived
    - id: bbb80e91-5746-4fbe-8898-122e2cafdbf4
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-12
modified: 2023-01-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_encoded:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -ec '
    selection_hidden:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -window hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden '
            - ' -w 1 '
    selection_noninteractive:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - ' -noni '
            - ' -noninteractive '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic - PowerShell Module
id: bbb80e91-5746-4fbe-8898-122e2cafdbf4
related:
    - id: 3d304fda-78aa-43ed-975c-d740798a49c1
      type: derived
    - id: ed965133-513f-41d9-a441-e38076a0798f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-12
modified: 2023-01-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_encoded:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - ' -ec '
    selection_hidden:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -window hidden '
            - ' -windowstyle hidden '
            - ' -w 1 '
    selection_noninteractive:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - ' -noni '
            - ' -noninteractive '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
id: ae7fbf8e-f3cb-49fd-8db4-5f3bed522c71
related:
    - id: fce5f582-cc00-41e1-941a-c6fabf0fdb8c
      type: obsolete
    - id: 8ff28fdd-e2fa-4dfa-aeda-ef3d61c62090
      type: similar
    - id: 536e2947-3729-478c-9903-745aaffe60d2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_convert_b64:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - '-nop'
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - ' -c '
            - '[Convert]::FromBase64String'
    selection_iex_selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-noni'
            - '-nop'
            - ' -c '
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
    selection_enc_selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-ep'
            - 'bypass'
            - '-Enc'
    selection_reg_selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'reg'
            - 'add'
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run'
            - '\software\wow6432node\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run'
            - '\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\explorer\run'
    selection_webclient_selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'bypass'
            - '-noprofile'
            - '-windowstyle'
            - 'hidden'
            - 'new-object'
            - 'system.net.webclient'
            - '.download'
    selection_iex_webclient:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
            - '.Download'
    filter_chocolatey:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1"
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1')"
            - 'Write-ChocolateyWarning'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - PowerShell Module
id: 8ff28fdd-e2fa-4dfa-aeda-ef3d61c62090
related:
    - id: fce5f582-cc00-41e1-941a-c6fabf0fdb8c
      type: obsolete
    - id: ae7fbf8e-f3cb-49fd-8db4-5f3bed522c71
      type: similar
    - id: 536e2947-3729-478c-9903-745aaffe60d2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_convert_b64:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - '-nop'
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - ' -c '
            - '[Convert]::FromBase64String'
    selection_iex:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-noni'
            - '-nop'
            - ' -c '
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
    selection_enc:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-ep'
            - 'bypass'
            - '-Enc'
    selection_reg:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'reg'
            - 'add'
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - '\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run'
            - '\software\wow6432node\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run'
            - '\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\explorer\run'
    selection_webclient:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - 'bypass'
            - '-noprofile'
            - '-windowstyle'
            - 'hidden'
            - 'new-object'
            - 'system.net.webclient'
            - '.download'
    selection_iex_webclient:
        ContextInfo|contains|all:
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
            - '.Download'
    filter_chocolatey:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1"
            - 'Write-ChocolateyWarning'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
id: 36210e0d-5b19-485d-a087-c096088885f0
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation with a parameter substring
references:
    - http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Daniel Bohannon (idea), Roberto Rodriguez (Fix)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -windowstyle h '
            - ' -windowstyl h'
            - ' -windowsty h'
            - ' -windowst h'
            - ' -windows h'
            - ' -windo h'
            - ' -wind h'
            - ' -win h'
            - ' -wi h'
            - ' -win h '
            - ' -win hi '
            - ' -win hid '
            - ' -win hidd '
            - ' -win hidde '
            - ' -NoPr '
            - ' -NoPro '
            - ' -NoProf '
            - ' -NoProfi '
            - ' -NoProfil '
            - ' -nonin '
            - ' -nonint '
            - ' -noninte '
            - ' -noninter '
            - ' -nonintera '
            - ' -noninterac '
            - ' -noninteract '
            - ' -noninteracti '
            - ' -noninteractiv '
            - ' -ec '
            - ' -encodedComman '
            - ' -encodedComma '
            - ' -encodedComm '
            - ' -encodedCom '
            - ' -encodedCo '
            - ' -encodedC '
            - ' -encoded '
            - ' -encode '
            - ' -encod '
            - ' -enco '
            - ' -en '
            - ' -executionpolic '
            - ' -executionpoli '
            - ' -executionpol '
            - ' -executionpo '
            - ' -executionp '
            - ' -execution bypass'
            - ' -executio bypass'
            - ' -executi bypass'
            - ' -execut bypass'
            - ' -execu bypass'
            - ' -exec bypass'
            - ' -exe bypass'
            - ' -ex bypass'
            - ' -ep bypass'
            - ' /windowstyle h '
            - ' /windowstyl h'
            - ' /windowsty h'
            - ' /windowst h'
            - ' /windows h'
            - ' /windo h'
            - ' /wind h'
            - ' /win h'
            - ' /wi h'
            - ' /win h '
            - ' /win hi '
            - ' /win hid '
            - ' /win hidd '
            - ' /win hidde '
            - ' /NoPr '
            - ' /NoPro '
            - ' /NoProf '
            - ' /NoProfi '
            - ' /NoProfil '
            - ' /nonin '
            - ' /nonint '
            - ' /noninte '
            - ' /noninter '
            - ' /nonintera '
            - ' /noninterac '
            - ' /noninteract '
            - ' /noninteracti '
            - ' /noninteractiv '
            - ' /ec '
            - ' /encodedComman '
            - ' /encodedComma '
            - ' /encodedComm '
            - ' /encodedCom '
            - ' /encodedCo '
            - ' /encodedC '
            - ' /encoded '
            - ' /encode '
            - ' /encod '
            - ' /enco '
            - ' /en '
            - ' /executionpolic '
            - ' /executionpoli '
            - ' /executionpol '
            - ' /executionpo '
            - ' /executionp '
            - ' /execution bypass'
            - ' /executio bypass'
            - ' /executi bypass'
            - ' /execut bypass'
            - ' /execu bypass'
            - ' /exec bypass'
            - ' /exe bypass'
            - ' /ex bypass'
            - ' /ep bypass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PowerShell Parent Process
id: 754ed792-634f-40ae-b3bc-e0448d33f695
related:
    - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious or uncommon parent processes of PowerShell
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=26
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Harish Segar
date: 2020-03-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        - ParentImage|contains: 'tomcat'
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\amigo.exe'
              - '\browser.exe'
              - '\chrome.exe'
              - '\firefox.exe'
              - '\httpd.exe'
              - '\iexplore.exe'
              - '\jbosssvc.exe'
              - '\microsoftedge.exe'
              - '\microsoftedgecp.exe'
              - '\MicrosoftEdgeSH.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\nginx.exe'
              - '\outlook.exe'
              - '\php-cgi.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\safari.exe'
              - '\services.exe'
              - '\sqlagent.exe'
              - '\sqlserver.exe'
              - '\sqlservr.exe'
              - '\vivaldi.exe'
              - '\w3wp.exe'
    selection_powershell:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/c powershell'  # FPs with sub processes that contained "powershell" somewhere in the command line
              - '/c pwsh'
        - Description: 'Windows PowerShell'
        - Product: 'PowerShell Core 6'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Other scripts
level: high

title: Suspicious Printer Driver Empty Manufacturer
id: e0813366-0407-449a-9869-a2db1119dc41
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious printer driver installation with an empty Manufacturer value
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1410545674773467140
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574
    - cve.2021-1675
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers'
            - '\Manufacturer'
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_cutepdf:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CutePDF Writer v4.0\'
    filter_vnc:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\VNC Printer (PS)\'
            - '\VNC Printer (UD)\'
    filter_pdf24:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Version-3\PDF24\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Alerts on legitimate printer drivers that do not set any more details in the Manufacturer value
level: high

title: Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
id: cc08d590-8b90-413a-aff6-31d1a99678d7
status: test
description: Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
references:
    - https://windows-internals.com/printdemon-cve-2020-1048/
author: EagleEye Team, Florian Roth
date: 2020-05-13
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - cve.2020-1048
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Add-PrinterPort -Name'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.bat'
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Generic / Text Only'
    condition: (selection1 and selection2) or selection3
falsepositives:
    - New printer port install on host
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze
id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c
related:
    - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b
      type: similar
    - id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques.
    This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend EDR/AV processes, allowing malicious activity to execute undetected during the suspension period.
references:
    - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
    definition: |
        Requires Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with CallTrace enabled.
        Example sysmon config snippet with grouping, as logging individual ProcessAccess events can generate excessive logs:
        <ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
            <Rule groupRelation="and">
            <TargetImage condition="end with">\MsMpEng.exe</TargetImage>
            <SourceImage condition="end with">\WerFaultSecure.exe</SourceImage>
            </Rule>
        </ProcessAccess>
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\WerFaultSecure.exe'
        TargetImage|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - '\dbgcore.dll'
            - '\dbghelp.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access/info.yml

title: Suspicious Process Access to LSASS with Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs
id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd
related:
    - id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious process access to LSASS.exe from processes located in uncommon locations with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace.
    These DLLs contain functions like MiniDumpWriteDump that can be abused for credential dumping purposes. While modern tools like Mimikatz have moved to using ntdll.dll,
    dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll are still used by basic credential dumping utilities and legacy tools for LSASS memory access and process suspension techniques.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpwritedump
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_lsass_calltrace:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'dbgcore.dll'
            - 'dbghelp.dll'
    # The following selection is commented out and not enabled by default because any access to LSASS with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace from uncommon locations is assumed to be suspicious,
    # but it may reduce false positives if the rule is too noisy. These GrantedAccess bits are commonly used for dumping LSASS memory.
    # Uncomment if you observe false positives with the default rule.
    # selection_granted_access:
    #     GrantedAccess|contains:
    #         - '0x1fffff'
    #         - '0x10'
    #         - '0x1010'
    #         - '0x1410'
    #         - '0x1438'
    selection_susp_location:
        SourceImage|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Documents\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Possibly during software installation or update processes
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml

title: Suspicious Process By Web Server Process
id: 8202070f-edeb-4d31-a010-a26c72ac5600
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious processes being spawned by a web server process which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or exploitation
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
author: Thomas Patzke, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-11-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\php.exe'
            - '\tomcat.exe'
            - '\UMWorkerProcess.exe'  # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/detection-response-to-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities.html
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\ws_TomcatService.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
            - 'catalina.home'
            - 'catalina.jar'
    selection_anomaly_children:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\arp.exe'
            - '\at.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\dsget.exe'
            - '\hostname.exe'
            - '\nbtstat.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netdom.exe'
            - '\netsh.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\ntdsutil.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\qprocess.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\qwinsta.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\sc.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wusa.exe'
    filter_main_fp_1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c C:\ManageEngine\ADManager "Plus\ES\bin\elasticsearch.bat -Enode.name=RMP-NODE1 -pelasticsearch-pid.txt'
    filter_main_fp_2:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sc query'
            - 'ADManager Plus'
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and selection_anomaly_children and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Particular web applications may spawn a shell process legitimately
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
related:
    - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d # Generic
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'call '
            - 'create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more susupicious paths and binaries as you see fit in your env
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Execution From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder
id: 5ce0f04e-3efc-42af-839d-5b3a543b76c0
related:
    - id: cd8b36ac-8e4a-4c2f-a402-a29b8fbd5bca
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects process execution from a fake recycle bin folder, often used to avoid security solution.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cloaked-ursa-phishing/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-12
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            # e.g. C:\$RECYCLER.BIN
            - 'RECYCLERS.BIN\'
            - 'RECYCLER.BIN\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE
id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
related:
    - id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
      type: similar
    - id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location.
    Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240731-jh4crsycnb/behavioral2
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/process-masquerading/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_img_location:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ofn:
        OriginalFileName: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution/info.yml

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil
id: 8bc64091-6875-4881-aaf9-7bd25b5dda08
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
    - https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/ntds-dit/
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Gather/Copy-VSS.ps1
    - https://github.com/zcgonvh/NTDSDumpEx
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/d297adcebb5c1df6fe30b12ca79b161deb71571c/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-11
modified: 2022-11-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_tool:
        # https://github.com/zcgonvh/NTDSDumpEx
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\NTDSDump.exe'
              - '\NTDSDumpEx.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              # ntdsdumpex.exe -d ntds.dit -o hash.txt -s system.hiv
              - 'ntds.dit'
              - 'system.hiv'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'NTDSgrab.ps1'
    selection_oneliner_1:
        # powershell "ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp' q q"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ac i ntds'
            - 'create full'
    selection_onliner_2:
        # cmd.exe /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.dit
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c copy '
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    selection_onliner_3:
        # ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\windows\temp\data\" "quit" "quit"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'activate instance ntds'
            - 'create full'
    selection_powershell:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'ntds.dit'
    set1_selection_ntds_dit:
        CommandLine|contains: 'ntds.dit'
    set1_selection_image_folder:
        - ParentImage|contains:
              - '\apache'
              - '\tomcat'
              - '\AppData\'
              - '\Temp\'
              - '\Public\'
              - '\PerfLogs\'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\apache'
              - '\tomcat'
              - '\AppData\'
              - '\Temp\'
              - '\Public\'
              - '\PerfLogs\'
    condition: 1 of selection* or all of set1*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Spawned by CentreStack Portal AppPool
id: 2d79e371-2a27-42de-87a4-b4213fc72a6a
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects unexpected command shell execution (cmd.exe) from w3wp.exe when tied to CentreStack's portal.config, indicating potential exploitation (e.g., CVE-2025-30406)
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30406
    - https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/racing-to-exploit-centrestacks-cve-2025-30406/
    - https://gladinetsupport.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/gladinet/securityadvisory-cve-2005.pdf
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/centrestack-rce-exploited-as-zero-day-to-breach-file-sharing-servers/
author: Jason Rathbun (Blackpoint Cyber)
date: 2025-04-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1505.003
    - cve.2025-30406
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\portal\portal.config'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Potentially if other portal services run on w3wp with a apppool\portal\portal.config, if you want to increase scope you could add user IIS APPPOOL\portal.
level: high

title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE
id: 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
related:
    - id: dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231230220738/https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Florian Roth
date: 2021-12-17
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'        # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate calls to system binaries
    - Company specific internal usage
level: high

title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM
id: 5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis
references:
    - Internal Research
date: 2021-05-20
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wsmprovhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate WinRM usage
level: high

title: Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE
id: a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d
status: test
description: Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall
references:
    - https://www.virusradar.com/en/Win32_Kasidet.AD/description
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/07e789f4f2f3259e7559fdccb36e96814c2dbff872a21e1fa03de9ee377d581f?environmentId=100
author: Sander Wiebing, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2020-05-25
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1686.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'firewall'
              - 'add'
              - 'allowedprogram'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'advfirewall'
              - 'firewall'
              - 'add'
              - 'rule'
              - 'action=allow'
              - 'program='
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin\'
            - ':\RECYCLER.BIN\'
            - ':\RECYCLERS.BIN\'
            - ':\SystemVolumeInformation\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Desktop\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\addins\'
            - ':\Windows\cursors\'
            - ':\Windows\debug\'
            - ':\Windows\drivers\'
            - ':\Windows\fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\help\'
            - ':\Windows\system32\tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
            - '%Public%\'
            - '%TEMP%'
            - '%TMP%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Program Names
id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\CVE-202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
              - '\CVE202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\poc.exe'
              - '\artifact.exe'
              - '\artifact64.exe'
              - '\artifact_protected.exe'
              - '\artifact32.exe'
              - '\artifact32big.exe'
              - 'obfuscated.exe'
              - 'obfusc.exe'
              - '\meterpreter'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'inject.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-CVE'
            - 'pupy.ps1'
            - 'payload.ps1'
            - 'beacon.ps1'
            - 'PowerView.ps1'
            - 'bypass.ps1'
            - 'obfuscated.ps1'
            - 'obfusc.ps1'
            - 'obfus.ps1'
            - 'obfs.ps1'
            - 'evil.ps1'
            - 'MiniDogz.ps1'
            - '_enc.ps1'
            - '\shell.ps1'
            - '\rshell.ps1'
            - 'revshell.ps1'
            - '\av.ps1'
            - '\av_test.ps1'
            - 'adrecon.ps1'
            - 'mimikatz.ps1'
            - '\PowerUp_'
            - 'powerup.ps1'
            - '\Temp\a.ps1'
            - '\Temp\p.ps1'
            - '\Temp\1.ps1'
            - 'Hound.ps1'
            - 'encode.ps1'
            - 'powercat.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high

title: Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution
id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-11
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 5145
        ShareName: '\\\\\*\\IPC$' # looking for the string \\*\IPC$
        RelativeTargetName|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        RelativeTargetName|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection1 and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
related:
    - id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
      type: derived
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: smb_files
detection:
    selection:
        path|contains|all:
            - '\\'
            - '\IPC$'
        name|endswith:
            - '-stdin'
            - '-stdout'
            - '-stderr'
    filter:
        name|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON
id: f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/rdp-session-hijacking-with-tscon/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1563.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /dest:rdp-tcp#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess
id: a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
status: test
description: Detects a explorer.exe sub process of the RazerInstaller software which can be invoked from the installer to select a different installation folder but can also be exploited to escalate privileges to LOCAL SYSTEM
references:
    - https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437
    - https://streamable.com/q2dsji
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\RazerInstaller.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
    filter_main_razer:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
level: high

title: Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS
id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58
related:
    - id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 # FileCreate
      type: similar
    - id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe # ProcCreation LOLBIN
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
references:
    - https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1615
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'gatherNetworkInfo.vbs'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share
id: ab9e3b40-0c85-4ba1-aede-455d226fd124
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2023-12-28
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_redirect:
        CommandLine|contains: '>'
    selection_share:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\'
            - '\\\\localhost\\admin$\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker
id: 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'REG'
            - 'ADD'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE'
            - '/v'
            - '/f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableBDEWithNoTPM'
            - 'UseAdvancedStartup'
            - 'UseTPM'
            - 'UseTPMKey'
            - 'UseTPMKeyPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessageSource'
            - 'UseTPMPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Registry Modification From ADS Via Regini.EXE
id: 77946e79-97f1-45a2-84b4-f37b5c0d8682
related:
    - id: 5f60740a-f57b-4e76-82a1-15b6ff2cb134
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of an alternate data stream with regini.exe, regini.exe can be used to modify registry keys.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regini/
    - https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regini
author: Eli Salem, Sander Wiebing, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regini.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'REGINI.EXE'
    selection_re:
        CommandLine|re: ':[^ \\]'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share
id: 88a87a10-384b-4ad7-8871-2f9bf9259ce5
status: test
description: Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\REGSVR32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Decrease to medium if this is something common in your org
level: high

title: Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
related:
    - id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d # Outlook Child Processes
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=49
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        Image|startswith: '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Renamed Comsvcs DLL Loaded By Rundll32
id: 8cde342c-ba48-4b74-b615-172c330f2e93
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 loading a renamed comsvcs.dll to dump process memory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1555200155351228419
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-14
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        Hashes|contains:
            # Add more hashes for other windows versions
            - IMPHASH=eed93054cb555f3de70eaa9787f32ebb # Windows 11 21H2 x64
            - IMPHASH=5e0dbdec1fce52daae251a110b4f309d # Windows 10 1607
            - IMPHASH=eadbccbb324829acb5f2bbe87e5549a8 # Windows 10 1809
            - IMPHASH=407ca0f7b523319d758a40d7c0193699 # Windows 10 2004 x64
            - IMPHASH=281d618f4e6271e527e6386ea6f748de # Windows 10 2004 x86
    filter:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\comsvcs.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE
id: 2d32dd6f-3196-4093-b9eb-1ad8ab088ca5
related:
    - id: 5f03babb-12db-4eec-8c82-7b4cb5580868
      type: derived
    - id: 65d2be45-8600-4042-b4c0-577a1ff8a60e
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-22
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\odbcconf.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'odbcconf.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -f '
    filter_main_rsp_ext:
        CommandLine|contains: '.rsp'
    filter_main_runonce_odbc:
        # When odbcconf is run with the "/R" flag, it creates a "runonce" key to run at the next reboot
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\runonce.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\odbcconf.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe /E /F "C:\WINDOWS\system32\odbcconf.tmp"'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Reverse Shell Command Line
id: 738d9bcf-6999-4fdb-b4ac-3033037db8ab
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands or program code that may be executed or used in command line to establish a reverse shell
references:
    - https://alamot.github.io/reverse_shells/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'BEGIN {s = "/inet/tcp/0/'
        - 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/'
        - 'bash -i >& /dev/udp/'
        - 'sh -i >$ /dev/udp/'
        - 'sh -i >$ /dev/tcp/'
        - '&& while read line 0<&5; do'
        - '/bin/bash -c exec 5<>/dev/tcp/'
        - '/bin/bash -c exec 5<>/dev/udp/'
        - 'nc -e /bin/sh '
        - '/bin/sh | nc'
        - 'rm -f backpipe; mknod /tmp/backpipe p && nc '
        - ';socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i))))'
        - ';STDIN->fdopen($c,r);$~->fdopen($c,w);system$_ while<>;'
        - '/bin/sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3'
        - 'uname -a; w; id; /bin/bash -i'
        - '$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2); $stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length); $stream.Flush()};'
        - ';os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);os.putenv(''HISTFILE'',''/dev/null'');'
        - '.to_i;exec sprintf("/bin/sh -i <&%d >&%d 2>&%d",f,f,f)'
        - ';while(cmd=c.gets);IO.popen(cmd,"r"){|io|c.print'
        - 'socat exec:''bash -li'',pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane tcp:'
        - 'rm -f /tmp/p; mknod /tmp/p p &&'
        - ' | /bin/bash | telnet '
        - ',echo=0,raw tcp-listen:'
        - 'nc -lvvp '
        - 'xterm -display 1'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Run Key from Download
id: 9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be
status: test
description: Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c5bef5b7-f484-4c43-9cf3-d5c5c7839def/
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
            - '\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software installers downloaded and used by users
level: high

title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File
id: 731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32.exe'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.sys,'
            - '.sys '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension
id: 4aa6040b-3f28-44e3-a769-9208e5feb5ec
related:
    - id: 089fc3d2-71e8-4763-a8a5-c97fbb0a403e
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution
author: Hieu Tran
date: 2023-03-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.bmp'
            - '.cr2'
            - '.eps'
            - '.gif'
            - '.ico'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.nef'
            - '.orf'
            - '.png'
            - '.raw'
            - '.sr2'
            - '.tif'
            - '.tiff'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript
id: 1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'Execute'
            - 'RegRead'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious SQL Error Messages
id: 8a670c6d-7189-4b1c-8017-a417ca84a086
status: test
description: Detects SQL error messages that indicate probing for an injection attack
references:
    - http://www.sqlinjection.net/errors
author: Bjoern Kimminich
date: 2017-11-27
modified: 2023-02-12
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: sql
    definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL ERROR and above)'
detection:
    keywords:
        # Oracle
        - quoted string not properly terminated
        # MySQL
        - You have an error in your SQL syntax
        # SQL Server
        - Unclosed quotation mark
        # SQLite
        - 'near "*": syntax error'
        - SELECTs to the left and right of UNION do not have the same number of result columns
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - A syntax error in MySQL also occurs in non-dynamic (safe) queries if there is an empty in() clause, that may often be the case.
level: high