Sigma (generic) detection rules

high Moderate High FP

Shai-Hulud NPM Package Malicious Exfiltration via Curl

Detects potential Shai Hulud NPM package attack attempting to exfiltrate data via curl to external webhook sites.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id efd2eb09-b72e-4a61-8dc7-b1382a1e8983

view Sigma YAML

title: Shai-Hulud NPM Package Malicious Exfiltration via Curl
id: efd2eb09-b72e-4a61-8dc7-b1382a1e8983
status: experimental
description: Detects potential Shai Hulud NPM package attack attempting to exfiltrate data via curl to external webhook sites.
references:
    - https://www.getsafety.com/blog-posts/shai-hulud-npm-attack
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-09-24
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/curl'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl'
            - '-d'
            - 'webhook.site/bb8ca5f6-4175-45d2-b042-fc9ebb8170b7'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Low FP

SharpHound Recon Account Discovery

Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.

status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz ATT&CK technique id 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5

view Sigma YAML

title: SharpHound Recon Account Discovery
id: 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wkst/55118c55-2122-4ef9-8664-0c1ff9e168f3
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-WKST.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.discovery
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a opnum:2'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 6bffd098-a112-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a
        OpNum: 2
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Low FP

SharpHound Recon Sessions

Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.

status test author Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz ATT&CK technique id 6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28

view Sigma YAML

title: SharpHound Recon Sessions
id: 6d580420-ff3f-4e0e-b6b0-41b90c787e28
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/02b1f559-fda2-4ba3-94c2-806eb2777183
    - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 opnum:12'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid: 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188
        OpNum: 12
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Shell Execution GCC - Linux

Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution GCC  - Linux
id: 9b5de532-a757-4d70-946c-1f3e44f48b4d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "gcc" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/gcc/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c89/#shell
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/c99/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/c89'
            - '/c99'
            - '/gcc'
        CommandLine|contains: '-wrapper'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash,-s'
            - '/bin/dash,-s'
            - '/bin/fish,-s'
            - '/bin/sh,-s'
            - '/bin/zsh,-s'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Execution Of Process Located In Tmp Directory

Detects execution of shells from a parent process located in a temporary (/tmp) directory

status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk ATT&CK tactic-only id 2fade0b6-7423-4835-9d4f-335b39b83867

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution Of Process Located In Tmp Directory
id: 2fade0b6-7423-4835-9d4f-335b39b83867
status: test
description: Detects execution of shells from a parent process located in a temporary (/tmp) directory
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|startswith: '/tmp/'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bash'
            - '/csh'
            - '/dash'
            - '/fish'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/sh'
            - '/zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Execution via Find - Linux

Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution via Find - Linux
id: 6adfbf8f-52be-4444-9bac-81b539624146
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the find command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or exploitation attempt.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/find/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/find'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' . '
            - '-exec'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Execution via Flock - Linux

Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution via Flock - Linux
id: 4b09c71e-4269-4111-9cdd-107d8867f0cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "flock" command to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/flock/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/flock'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -u '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Shell Execution via Git - Linux

Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution via Git - Linux
id: 47b3bbd4-1bf7-48cc-84ab-995362aaa75a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "git" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/git/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/git'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -p '
            - 'help'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bash 0<&1'
            - 'dash 0<&1'
            - 'sh 0<&1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Execution via Nice - Linux

Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution via Nice - Linux
id: 093d68c7-762a-42f4-9f46-95e79142571a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "nice" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/nice/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/nice'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux

Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status experimental author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth ATT&CK technique id e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.), Florian Roth
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/ash '
            - '/bash '
            - '/dash '
            - '/csh '
            - '/sh '
            - '/zsh '
            - '/tcsh '
            - '/ksh '
            - "'ash "
            - "'bash "
            - "'dash "
            - "'csh "
            - "'sh "
            - "'zsh "
            - "'tcsh "
            - "'ksh "
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which "rsync" is used to execute a shell
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shell Invocation Via Ssh - Linux

Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 8737b7f6-8df3-4bb7-b1da-06019b99b687

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Invocation Via Ssh - Linux
id: 8737b7f6-8df3-4bb7-b1da-06019b99b687
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the "ssh" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/ssh/
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/ssh'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ProxyCommand=;'
            - 'permitlocalcommand=yes'
            - 'localhost'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
            - 'sh 0<&2 1>&2'
            - 'sh 1>&2 0<&2'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Shell Invocation via Env Command - Linux

Detects the use of the env command to invoke a shell. This may indicate an attempt to bypass restricted environments, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary commands.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK sub-technique id bed978f8-7f3a-432b-82c5-9286a9b3031a

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Invocation via Env Command - Linux
id: bed978f8-7f3a-432b-82c5-9286a9b3031a
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of the env command to invoke a shell. This may indicate an attempt to bypass restricted environments, escalate privileges, or execute arbitrary commands.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/env/#shell
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/linux-restricted-shell-breakout-via-linux-binary-s.html
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
modified: 2026-01-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/env'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Github operations such as ghe-backup
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation

Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)

status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation
id: 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7
related:
    - id: dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62)
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
    - https://winscripting.blog/2017/05/12/first-entry-welcome-and-uac-bypass/
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts/tree/master/UACBypass
    - https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2 [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021]
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2022-01-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1546.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        EventType: SetValue
        TargetObject|endswith: 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\SymbolicLinkValue'
        Details|contains: '\Software\Classes\{'
    selection2:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute'
    selection3:
        EventType: SetValue
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - 'Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(Default)'
            - 'Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(Default)'
    filter_sel3:
        Details: '(Empty)'
    condition: selection1 or selection2 or (selection3 and not filter_sel3)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory

Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory

status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 32b96012-7892-429e-b26c-ac2bf46066ff

view Sigma YAML

title: Shell32 DLL Execution in Suspicious Directory
id: 32b96012-7892-429e-b26c-ac2bf46066ff
status: test
description: Detects shell32.dll executing a DLL in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/red-curl-2.html
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - 'Control_RunDLL'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%LocalAppData%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Shellshock Expression

Detects shellshock expressions in log files

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id c67e0c98-4d39-46ee-8f6b-437ebf6b950e

view Sigma YAML

title: Shellshock Expression
id: c67e0c98-4d39-46ee-8f6b-437ebf6b950e
status: test
description: Detects shellshock expressions in log files
references:
    - https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Shellshock_-_Tudor_Enache.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        - '(){:;};'
        - '() {:;};'
        - '() { :;};'
        - '() { :; };'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

ShimCache Flush

Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e

view Sigma YAML

title: ShimCache Flush
id: b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e
status: stable
description: Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence
references:
    - https://medium.com/@blueteamops/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'apphelp.dll'
    selection1b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ShimFlushCache'
            - '#250'
    selection2a:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'kernel32.dll'
    selection2b:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'BaseFlushAppcompatCache'
            - '#46'
    condition: ( selection1a and selection1b ) or ( selection2a and selection2b )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Sign-In From Malware Infected IP

Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.

status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' ATT&CK technique id 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd

view Sigma YAML

title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'malwareInfectedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Using an IP address that is shared by many users
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Low FP

Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met

Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures

status test author Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' ATT&CK sub-technique id b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42

view Sigma YAML

title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
        Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account misconfigured
    - Misconfigured Systems
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices

Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.

status test author Michael Epping, '@mepples21' ATT&CK sub-technique id 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284

view Sigma YAML

title: Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices
id: 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284
status: test
description: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in
author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21'
date: 2022-06-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        DeviceDetail.isCompliant: 'false'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity

Detects a possible remote connections to Silenttrinity c2

status test author Kiran kumar s, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 50e54b8d-ad73-43f8-96a1-5191685b17a4

view Sigma YAML

title: Silenttrinity Stager Msbuild Activity
id: 50e54b8d-ad73-43f8-96a1-5191685b17a4
status: test
description: Detects a possible remote connections to Silenttrinity c2
references:
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/my-first-joyride-with-silenttrinity/
author: Kiran kumar s, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-11
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msbuild.exe'
    filter:
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Initiated: 'true'
    condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Sitecore Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237

Detects exploitation attempts of Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237 found in Report.ashx

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 20c6ed1c-f7f0-4ea3-aa65-4f198e6acb0f

view Sigma YAML

title: Sitecore Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237
id: 20c6ed1c-f7f0-4ea3-aa65-4f198e6acb0f
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts of Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE CVE-2021-42237 found in Report.ashx
references:
    - https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/
    - https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1000776
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-17
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-42237
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx'
        sc-status: 200
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Vulnerability Scanning
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Low FP

Sliver C2 Default Service Installation

Detects known malicious service installation that appear in cases in which a Sliver implants execute the PsExec commands

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 31c51af6-e7aa-4da7-84d4-8f32cc580af2

view Sigma YAML

title: Sliver C2 Default Service Installation
id: 31c51af6-e7aa-4da7-84d4-8f32cc580af2
status: test
description: Detects known malicious service installation that appear in cases in which a Sliver implants execute the PsExec commands
references:
    - https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/blob/79f2d48fcdfc2bee4713b78d431ea4b27f733f30/client/command/commands.go#L1231
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/24/looking-for-the-sliver-lining-hunting-for-emerging-command-and-control-frameworks/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_eid:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service_1:
        ImagePath|re: '^[a-zA-Z]:\\windows\\temp\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{10}\.exe'
    selection_service_2:
        ServiceName:
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Sliver implant'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_service_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Small Sieve Malware CommandLine Indicator

Detects specific command line argument being passed to a binary as seen being used by the malware Small Sieve.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 21117127-21c8-437a-ae03-4b51e5a8a088

view Sigma YAML

title: Small Sieve Malware CommandLine Indicator
id: 21117127-21c8-437a-ae03-4b51e5a8a088
status: test
description: Detects specific command line argument being passed to a binary as seen being used by the malware Small Sieve.
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/small-sieve/NCSC-MAR-Small-Sieve.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|endswith: '.exe Platypus'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Small Sieve Malware File Indicator Creation

Detects filename indicators that contain a specific typo seen used by the Small Sieve malware.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 39466c42-c189-476a-989f-8cdb135c163a

view Sigma YAML

title: Small Sieve Malware File Indicator Creation
id: 39466c42-c189-476a-989f-8cdb135c163a
status: test
description: Detects filename indicators that contain a specific typo seen used by the Small Sieve malware.
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/small-sieve/NCSC-MAR-Small-Sieve.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_typo_path:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\Roaming\'
            - '\Local\'
    selection_typo_keyword:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'Microsift'
    selection_ioc:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt'
    condition: all of selection_typo_* or selection_ioc
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Small Sieve Malware Registry Persistence

Detects registry value with specific intentional typo and strings seen used by the Small Sieve malware

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 65c6e3c1-fb28-4c03-a51e-84919d8185f1

view Sigma YAML

title: Small Sieve Malware Registry Persistence
id: 65c6e3c1-fb28-4c03-a51e-84919d8185f1
status: test
description: Detects registry value with specific intentional typo and strings seen used by the Small Sieve malware
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/small-sieve/NCSC-MAR-Small-Sieve.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\'
    selection_value:
        - TargetObject|contains: 'Microsift'
        - Details|contains: '.exe Platypus'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Sofacy Trojan Loader Activity

Detects Trojan loader activity as used by APT28

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id ba778144-5e3d-40cf-8af9-e28fb1df1e20

view Sigma YAML

title: Sofacy Trojan Loader Activity
id: ba778144-5e3d-40cf-8af9-e28fb1df1e20
status: test
description: Detects Trojan loader activity as used by APT28
references:
    - https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/unit42-sofacy-attacks-multiple-government-entities/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ff808d0a12676bfac88fd26f955154f8884f2bb7c534b9936510fd6296c543e8?environmentId=110
    - https://twitter.com/ClearskySec/status/960924755355369472
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-01
modified: 2023-05-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.g0007
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
    - car.2013-10-002
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_path:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%LOCALAPPDATA%'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
    selection_extensions:
        - CommandLine|contains: '.dat",'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '.dll #1'
              - '.dll" #1'
              - '.dll",#1'
    filter_main_exclude_temp:
        CommandLine|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

SonicWall SSL/VPN Jarrewrite Exploitation

Detects exploitation attempts of the SonicWall Jarrewrite Exploit

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 6f55f047-112b-4101-ad32-43913f52db46

view Sigma YAML

title: SonicWall SSL/VPN Jarrewrite Exploitation
id: 6f55f047-112b-4101-ad32-43913f52db46
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts of the SonicWall Jarrewrite Exploit
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210126045316/https://darrenmartyn.ie/2021/01/24/visualdoor-sonicwall-ssl-vpn-exploit/
    - https://github.com/darrenmartyn/VisualDoor
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-25
modified: 2023-04-27
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/cgi-bin/jarrewrite.sh'
        cs-user-agent|contains:
            - ':;'
            - '() {'
            - '/bin/bash -c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role

Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.

status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' ATT&CK technique id e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85

view Sigma YAML

title: Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role
id: e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85
status: test
description: Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#potential-stale-accounts-in-a-privileged-role
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'staleSignInAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Low FP

StoneDrill Service Install

This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9e987c6c-4c1e-40d8-bd85-dd26fba8fdd6

view Sigma YAML

title: StoneDrill Service Install
id: 9e987c6c-4c1e-40d8-bd85-dd26fba8fdd6
status: test
description: This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky
references:
    - https://securelist.com/blog/research/77725/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-07
modified: 2021-11-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.g0064
    - attack.t1543.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: NtsSrv
        ImagePath|endswith: ' LocalService'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Low FP

Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt

Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule) ATT&CK sub-technique id 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87

view Sigma YAML

title: Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt
id: 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87
status: test
description: Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220419045003/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/04/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
date: 2018-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.s0002
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: seclogo
        AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287

Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f74107df-b6c6-4e80-bf00-4170b658162b

view Sigma YAML

title: Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287
id: f74107df-b6c6-4e80-bf00-4170b658162b
status: test
description: Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287
references:
    - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/14/1
    - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-14287
    - https://twitter.com/matthieugarin/status/1183970598210412546
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1548.003
    - cve.2019-14287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -u#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong High FP

Suspect Svchost Activity

It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.

status test author David Burkett, @signalblur ATT&CK technique id 16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspect Svchost Activity
id: 16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397
status: test
description: It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180718061628/https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2
author: David Burkett, @signalblur
date: 2019-12-28
modified: 2022-06-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|endswith: 'svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\rpcnet.exe'
              - '\rpcnetp.exe'
        - CommandLine: null  # no CommandLine value available
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Rpcnet.exe / rpcnetp.exe which is a lojack style software. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Kamlyuk-Kamluk-Computrace-Backdoor-Revisited.pdf
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious ASPX File Drop by Exchange

Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS into a suspicious folder

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query, idea) ATT&CK sub-technique id bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious ASPX File Drop by Exchange
id: bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6
related:
    - id: 6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS into a suspicious folder
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
    - https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html
    - https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve-lo-hong-bao-mat-0day-microsoft-exchange-dang-duoc-su-dung-de-tan-cong-cac-to-chuc-tai-viet-nam-9685.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query, idea)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'MSExchange'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'FrontEnd\HttpProxy\'           # from GTSC and MSTI reports
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\' # from GTSC report
    selection_types:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.aspx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.ashx'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer

Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652
related:
    - id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
    - https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24
    - https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/
    - https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-14
modified: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\ADExp.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AdExp'
        - Description: 'Active Directory Editor'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals ADExplorer'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: 'snapshot'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious paths
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Suspicious Activity in Shell Commands

Detects suspicious shell commands used in various exploit codes (see references)

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2aa1440c-9ae9-4d92-84a7-a9e5f5e31695

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Activity in Shell Commands
id: 2aa1440c-9ae9-4d92-84a7-a9e5f5e31695
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various exploit codes (see references)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20170319121015/http://www.threatgeek.com/2017/03/widespread-exploitation-attempts-using-cve-2017-5638.html
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts_code_exec_exception_delegator.rb
    - http://pastebin.com/FtygZ1cg
    - https://artkond.com/2017/03/23/pivoting-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        # Generic suspicious commands
        - 'wget * - http* | perl'
        - 'wget * - http* | sh'
        - 'wget * - http* | bash'
        - 'python -m SimpleHTTPServer'
        - '-m http.server'      # Python 3
        - 'import pty; pty.spawn*'
        - 'socat exec:*'
        - 'socat -O /tmp/*'
        - 'socat tcp-connect*'
        - '*echo binary >>*'
        # Malware
        - '*wget *; chmod +x*'
        - '*wget *; chmod 777 *'
        - '*cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt*'
        # Apache Struts in-the-wild exploit codes
        - '*stop;service iptables stop;*'
        - '*stop;SuSEfirewall2 stop;*'
        - 'chmod 777 2020*'
        - '*>>/etc/rc.local'
        # Metasploit framework exploit codes
        - '*base64 -d /tmp/*'
        - '* | base64 -d *'
        - '*/chmod u+s *'
        - '*chmod +s /tmp/*'
        - '*chmod u+s /tmp/*'
        - '* /tmp/haxhax*'
        - '* /tmp/ns_sploit*'
        - 'nc -l -p *'
        - 'cp /bin/ksh *'
        - 'cp /bin/sh *'
        - '* /tmp/*.b64 *'
        - '*/tmp/ysocereal.jar*'
        - '*/tmp/x *'
        - '*; chmod +x /tmp/*'
        - '*;chmod +x /tmp/*'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution

Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri) ATT&CK technique id 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
id: 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AddInUtil.exe'
    selection_susp_1_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:'
            - '-PipelineRoot:'
    selection_susp_1_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:.'
            - '-AddInRoot:"."'
            - '-PipelineRoot:.'
            - '-PipelineRoot:"."'
        CurrentDirectory|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection_img and (all of selection_susp_1_* or selection_susp_2)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id a1473adb-5338-4a20-b4c3-126763e2d3d3

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE
id: a1473adb-5338-4a20-b4c3-126763e2d3d3
status: test
description: Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/05/stay-positive-lolbins-not/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_dll:
        CommandLine|contains: 'advpack'
    selection_cli_ordinal:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '#+'
              - '12'
        - CommandLine|contains: '#-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution

Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards ATT&CK technique id c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
related:
    - id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
    - https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
    - https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
        # Note:
        #   - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
        #   - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
        #       - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
        #       - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
        #   - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
            - ' -remediationScript'
    filter_main_pwsh:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
    filter_main_intune:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Suspicious Application Allowed Through Exploit Guard

Detects applications being added to the "allowed applications" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 42205c73-75c8-4a63-9db1-e3782e06fda0

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Application Allowed Through Exploit Guard
id: 42205c73-75c8-4a63-9db1-e3782e06fda0
status: test
description: Detects applications being added to the "allowed applications" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/10/23/windows-defender-exploit-guard-reduce-the-attack-surface-against-next-generation-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\AllowedApplications'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Add more paths you don't allow in your org
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process

Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.

status experimental author Micah Babinski ATT&CK technique id 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
    ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
    Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding
    service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c "ver"'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI

Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_execution_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe' # wmic process call create 'reg.exe add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Desktops /t REG_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\tre\Desktops.exe\" random" /f'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
    selection_execution_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg'
            - ' add '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder

Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.

status experimental author The DFIR Report ATT&CK technique id b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder
id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.
references:
    - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032 # Private Report
    - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70 # Private Report
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: 'The DFIR Report'
date: 2025-01-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application

Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)

status test author Jason Lynch ATT&CK sub-technique id aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.g0046
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\EQNEDT32.exe'
            # - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
        Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk

Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll". According to RedCanary research it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll, which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk
id: 2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211
status: test
description: |
    Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll".
    According to RedCanary research it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll,
    which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_dlls:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\gcapi.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution

Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes. Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.

status experimental author andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
    - id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 # BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
    Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\baaupdate.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Browser Activity

Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser

status test author Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' ATT&CK technique id 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Browser Activity
id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6
status: test
description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousBrowser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Calculator Usage

Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Calculator Usage
id: 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\calc.exe '
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '\calc.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection_1 or ( selection_2 and not filter_main_known_locations )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access

Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder

status test author Den Iuzvyk ATT&CK technique id 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access
id: 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3
status: test
description: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder
references:
    - https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072
author: Den Iuzvyk
date: 2020-06-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1125
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\'
            - '\NonPackaged'
    selection_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - microphone
            - webcam
    selection_3:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - ':#Windows#Temp#'
            - ':#$Recycle.bin#'
            - ':#Temp#'
            - ':#Users#Public#'
            - ':#Users#Default#'
            - ':#Users#Desktop#'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious CertReq Command to Download

Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file. This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files. Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.

status experimental author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious CertReq Command to Download
id: 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file.
    This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files.
    Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certreq.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertReq.exe'
    selection_cli_flag_post:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-Post'
    selection_cli_flag_config:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-config'
    selection_cli_http:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Suspicious Child Process Created as System

Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts

status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR) ATT&CK sub-technique id 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System
id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d
status: test
description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
    - https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM
    - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30'
detection:
    selection:
        ParentUser|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        ParentUser|endswith:
            - '\NETWORK SERVICE'
            - '\LOCAL SERVICE'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        User|endswith: # System
            - '\SYSTEM'
            - '\Système'
            - '\СИСТЕМА'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    filter_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

Sigma (generic) detection rules

Detection rules