Sigma (generic) detection rules

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SIEM

Sigma (generic) detection rules

174 rules indexed · SIEM-agnostic detection content

Sigma is the open generic signature format for SIEM systems. Expand any rule to see its raw YAML and convert it inline to native query syntax. Pick a platform above to browse every rule already rendered in that language.

Get the raw rules from SigmaHQ Detection Rules The raw generic YAML, served by SigmaHQ. Pick a platform above to download a ready-to-deploy converted pack.

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Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix

Using these Sigma rules

Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.

Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.

Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.

Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.

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Detection rules

24 shown of 174

critical Moderate Medium FP

Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing - DNS Client

Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 0d18728b-f5bf-4381-9dcf-915539fff6c2

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing - DNS Client
id: 0d18728b-f5bf-4381-9dcf-915539fff6c2
related:
    - id: f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
    - https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
    - https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-16
tags:
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: dns-client
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.'
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 3008
    selection_query_1:
        QueryName|startswith:
            - 'aaa.stage.'
            - 'post.1'
    selection_query_2:
        QueryName|contains: '.stage.123456.'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_query_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing - Sysmon

Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing - Sysmon
id: f356a9c4-effd-4608-bbf8-408afd5cd006
related:
    - id: 0d18728b-f5bf-4381-9dcf-915539fff6c2
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a program that invoked suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
    - https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
    - https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-09
modified: 2023-01-16
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection1:
        QueryName|startswith:
            - 'aaa.stage.'
            - 'post.1'
    selection2:
        QueryName|contains: '.stage.123456.'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share

Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share
id: 889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0
status: test
description: Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations
references:
    - https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481
    - https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html
    - https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1
    - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-07
modified: 2022-10-26
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'New-MailboxExportRequest'
            - ' -Mailbox '
            - ' -FilePath \\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS

Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 4a241dea-235b-4a7e-8d76-50d817b146c4

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS
id: 4a241dea-235b-4a7e-8d76-50d817b146c4
related:
    - id: 889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations
references:
    - https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481
    - https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html
    - https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1
    - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-26
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-MailboxExportRequest'
            - ' -Mailbox '
            - ' -FilePath \\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern

Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126

view Sigma YAML

title: TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern
id: 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126
related:
    - id: 0cbe38c0-270c-41d9-ab79-6e5a9a669290
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects indicators of a UAC bypass method by mocking directories
references:
    - https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/uac-bypass-by-mocking-trusted-directories-24a96675f6e
    - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows
    - https://github.com/netero1010/TrustedPath-UACBypass-BOF
    - https://x.com/Wietze/status/1933495426952421843
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-27
modified: 2025-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows \System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows \SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

Turla Group Commands May 2020

Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c

view Sigma YAML

title: Turla Group Commands May 2020
id: 9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c
status: test
description: Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-26
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1027
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'tracert -h 10 yahoo.com'
            - '.WSqmCons))|iex;'
            - 'Fr`omBa`se6`4Str`ing'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|re: 'net\s+use\s+https://docs.live.net'
        CommandLine|contains: '@aol.co.uk'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Turla Group Lateral Movement

Detects automated lateral movement by Turla group

status test author Markus Neis ATT&CK sub-technique id c601f20d-570a-4cde-a7d6-e17f99cb8e7f

view Sigma YAML

title: Turla Group Lateral Movement
id: c601f20d-570a-4cde-a7d6-e17f99cb8e7f
status: test
description: Detects automated lateral movement by Turla group
references:
    - https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/
author: Markus Neis
date: 2017-11-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1135
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine:
            - 'net use \\\\%DomainController%\C$ "P@ssw0rd" *'
            - 'dir c:\\*.doc* /s'
            - 'dir %TEMP%\\*.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

Turla Group Named Pipes

Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples

status test author Markus Neis ATT&CK technique id 739915e4-1e70-4778-8b8a-17db02f66db1

view Sigma YAML

title: Turla Group Named Pipes
id: 739915e4-1e70-4778-8b8a-17db02f66db1
status: test
description: Detects a named pipe used by Turla group samples
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Markus Neis
date: 2017-11-06
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName:
            - '\atctl'    # https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/a4ddb2664a6c87a1d3c5da5a5a32a5df9a0b0c8f2e951811bd1ec1d44d42ccf1/detection
            - '\comnap'   # https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
            - '\iehelper' # ruag apt case
            - '\sdlrpc'   # project cobra https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
            - '\userpipe' # ruag apt case
            # - '\rpc' # may cause too many false positives : http://kb.palisade.com/index.php?pg=kb.page&id=483
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Low FP

Turla PNG Dropper Service

This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper report by NCC Group in November 2018

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 1228f8e2-7e79-4dea-b0ad-c91f1d5016c1

view Sigma YAML

title: Turla PNG Dropper Service
id: 1228f8e2-7e79-4dea-b0ad-c91f1d5016c1
status: test
description: This method detects malicious services mentioned in Turla PNG dropper report by NCC Group in November 2018
references:
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/11/22/turla-png-dropper-is-back/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-11-23
modified: 2021-11-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.g0010
    - attack.t1543.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'WerFaultSvc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

UNC2452 PowerShell Pattern

Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 actors as mentioned in Microsoft and Symantec reports

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id b7155193-8a81-4d8f-805d-88de864ca50c

view Sigma YAML

title: UNC2452 PowerShell Pattern
id: b7155193-8a81-4d8f-805d-88de864ca50c
status: test
description: Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 actors as mentioned in Microsoft and Symantec reports
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/solarwinds-raindrop-malware
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-7---create-a-process-using-wmi-query-and-an-encoded-command
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1047
    - detection.emerging-threats
    # - sunburst
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist'
            - 'rundll32 c:\windows'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'wmic /node:'
            - 'process call create "rundll32 c:\windows'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

UNC4841 - Potential SEASPY Execution

Detects execution of specific named binaries which were used by UNC4841 to deploy their SEASPY backdoor

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id f6a711f3-d032-4f9e-890b-bbe776236c84

view Sigma YAML

title: UNC4841 - Potential SEASPY Execution
id: f6a711f3-d032-4f9e-890b-bbe776236c84
status: test
description: Detects execution of specific named binaries which were used by UNC4841 to deploy their SEASPY backdoor
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/barracuda-esg-exploited-globally
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/BarracudaMailService'
            - '/resize2fstab'
            - '/resize_reisertab'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Ursnif Malware C2 URL Pattern

Detects Ursnif C2 traffic.

status stable author Thomas Patzke ATT&CK sub-technique id 932ac737-33ca-4afd-9869-0d48b391fcc9

view Sigma YAML

title: Ursnif Malware C2 URL Pattern
id: 932ac737-33ca-4afd-9869-0d48b391fcc9
status: stable
description: Detects Ursnif C2 traffic.
references:
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ursnif-variant-spreading-word-document.html
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-12-19
modified: 2021-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    b64encoding:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '_2f'
            - '_2b'
    urlpatterns:
        c-uri|contains|all:
            - '.avi'
            - '/images/'
    condition: b64encoding and urlpatterns
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

WCE wceaux.dll Access

Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host

status test author Thomas Patzke ATT&CK technique id 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67

view Sigma YAML

title: WCE wceaux.dll Access
id: 1de68c67-af5c-4097-9c85-fe5578e09e67
status: test
description: Detects wceaux.dll access while WCE pass-the-hash remote command execution on source host
references:
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-14
modified: 2025-01-30
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectName|endswith: '\wceaux.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Strong Medium FP

WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent

Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 797011dc-44f4-4e6f-9f10-a8ceefbe566b

view Sigma YAML

title: WMI Backdoor Exchange Transport Agent
id: 797011dc-44f4-4e6f-9f10-a8ceefbe566b
status: test
description: Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters
references:
    - https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182389676876980224
    - https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1182391019633029120
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-11
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\EdgeTransport.exe'
    filter_conhost:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe'
    filter_oleconverter:  # FP also documented in https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=18
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
        Image|endswith: '\Bin\OleConverter.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

WannaCry Ransomware Activity

Detects WannaCry ransomware activity

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro ATT&CK sub-technique id 41d40bff-377a-43e2-8e1b-2e543069e079

view Sigma YAML

title: WannaCry Ransomware Activity
id: 41d40bff-377a-43e2-8e1b-2e543069e079
status: test
description: Detects WannaCry ransomware activity
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100
    - https://x.com/nas_bench/status/1868639048484425963
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1222.001
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1490
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\tasksche.exe'
              - '\mssecsvc.exe'
              - '\taskdl.exe'
              - '\taskhsvc.exe'
              - '\taskse.exe'
              - '\111.exe'
              - '\lhdfrgui.exe'
              # - '\diskpart.exe'  # cannot be used in a rule of level critical
              - '\linuxnew.exe'
              - '\wannacry.exe'
        - Image|contains: 'WanaDecryptor'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: '@[email protected]'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Strong Low FP

Webshell Remote Command Execution

Detects possible command execution by web application/web shell

status test author Ilyas Ochkov, Beyu Denis, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id c0d3734d-330f-4a03-aae2-65dacc6a8222

view Sigma YAML

title: Webshell Remote Command Execution
id: c0d3734d-330f-4a03-aae2-65dacc6a8222
status: test
description: Detects possible command execution by web application/web shell
references:
    - Personal Experience of the Author
    - https://www.vaadata.com/blog/what-is-command-injection-exploitations-and-security-best-practices/
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
    definition: |
        Required auditd configuration:
        -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
        -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
        -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execveat -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
        -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execveat -F euid=33 -k detect_execve_www
        Change the number "33" to the ID of your WebServer user. Default: www-data:x:33:33
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        SYSCALL:
            - 'execve'
            - 'execveat'
        euid: 33
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity
    - Crazy web applications
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin

Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool

status test author elhoim ATT&CK technique id 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45

view Sigma YAML

title: Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin
id: 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45
status: test
description: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026
    - https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py
author: elhoim
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2021-42278
    - cve.2021-42287
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: security
    product: windows
detection:
    # Not adding an EventID on purpose to try to match on any event in security (including use of account), not just 4741 (computer account created)
    selection1:
        SamAccountName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        SamAccountName|endswith: '$'
    selection2:
        TargetUserName|startswith: 'SAMTHEADMIN-'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Windows Credential Editor Registry

Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2

view Sigma YAML

title: Windows Credential Editor Registry
id: a6b33c02-8305-488f-8585-03cb2a7763f2
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Credential Editor (WCE)
references:
    - https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-12-31
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0005
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: Services\WCESERVICE\Start
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Strong Medium FP

Winnti Malware HK University Campaign

Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti malware noticed in Dec/Jan 2020 in a campaign against Honk Kong universities

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis ATT&CK sub-technique id 3121461b-5aa0-4a41-b910-66d25524edbb

view Sigma YAML

title: Winnti Malware HK University Campaign
id: 3121461b-5aa0-4a41-b910-66d25524edbb
status: test
description: Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti malware noticed in Dec/Jan 2020 in a campaign against Honk Kong universities
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/01/31/winnti-group-targeting-universities-hong-kong/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis
date: 2020-02-01
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.g0044
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp'
            - '\hpqhvind.exe'
        Image|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\DRM'
    selection2:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\DRM'
        Image|endswith: '\wmplayer.exe'
    selection3:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Test.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\wmplayer.exe'
    selection4:
        Image: 'C:\ProgramData\DRM\CLR\CLR.exe'
    selection5:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\DRM\Windows'
        Image|endswith: '\SearchFilterHost.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Strong Medium FP

Winnti Pipemon Characteristics

Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti Pipemon malware reported by ESET

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 73d70463-75c9-4258-92c6-17500fe972f2

view Sigma YAML

title: Winnti Pipemon Characteristics
id: 73d70463-75c9-4258-92c6-17500fe972f2
status: stable
description: Detects specific process characteristics of Winnti Pipemon malware reported by ESET
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/21/no-game-over-winnti-group/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2020-07-30
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.g0044
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'setup0.exe -p'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'setup.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-x:0'
            - '-x:1'
            - '-x:2'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate setups that use similar flags
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate High FP

Wmiexec Default Output File

Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 8d5aca11-22b3-4f22-b7ba-90e60533e1fb

view Sigma YAML

title: Wmiexec Default Output File
id: 8d5aca11-22b3-4f22-b7ba-90e60533e1fb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default output filename used by the wmiexec tool
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-detect-and-prevent-impackets-wmiexec/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/f4b848fa27654ca95bc0f4c73dbba8b9c2c9f30a/examples/wmiexec.py
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|re: '\\Windows\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # Admin$
        - TargetFilename|re: 'C:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # C$
        - TargetFilename|re: 'D:\\__1\d{9}\.\d{1,7}$' # D$
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File

Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK sub-technique id 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c

view Sigma YAML

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack - File
id: 614a7e17-5643-4d89-b6fe-f9df1a79641c
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Low FP

Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools

This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with "kali" hostname.

status stable author Demyan Sokolin @_drd0c, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 18f37338-b9bd-4117-a039-280c81f7a596

view Sigma YAML

title: Zerologon Exploitation Using Well-known Tools
id: 18f37338-b9bd-4117-a039-280c81f7a596
status: stable
description: This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with "kali" hostname.
references:
    - https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-for-zerologon-f65c61586382
author: 'Demyan Sokolin @_drd0c, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2021-05-30
tags:
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    service: system
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 5805
            - 5723
    keywords:
        - kali
        - mimikatz
    condition: selection and keywords
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

critical Moderate Medium FP

ZxShell Malware

Detects a ZxShell start by the called and well-known function name

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro ATT&CK sub-technique id f0b70adb-0075-43b0-9745-e82a1c608fcc

view Sigma YAML

title: ZxShell Malware
id: f0b70adb-0075-43b0-9745-e82a1c608fcc
status: test
description: Detects a ZxShell start by the called and well-known function name
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5d2a4cde9fa7c2fdbf39b2e2ffd23378d0c50701a3095d1e91e3cf922d7b0b16?environmentId=100
    - https://pub-7cb8ac806c1b4c4383e585c474a24719.r2.dev/116309e7121bc8b0e66e4166c06f7b818e1d3629.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2017-07-20
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.s0412
    - attack.g0001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'zxFunction'
            - 'RemoteDiskXXXXX'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

Convert to SIEM query

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