title: SonicWall SSL/VPN Jarrewrite Exploitation
id: 6f55f047-112b-4101-ad32-43913f52db46
status: test
description: Detects exploitation attempts of the SonicWall Jarrewrite Exploit
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210126045316/https://darrenmartyn.ie/2021/01/24/visualdoor-sonicwall-ssl-vpn-exploit/
    - https://github.com/darrenmartyn/VisualDoor
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-01-25
modified: 2023-04-27
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/cgi-bin/jarrewrite.sh'
        cs-user-agent|contains:
            - ':;'
            - '() {'
            - '/bin/bash -c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Stale Accounts In A Privileged Role
id: e402c26a-267a-45bd-9615-bd9ceda6da85
status: test
description: Identifies when an account hasn't signed in during the past n number of days.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#potential-stale-accounts-in-a-privileged-role
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-14
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: pim
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'staleSignInAlertIncident'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Investigate if potential generic account that cannot be removed.
level: high

title: StoneDrill Service Install
id: 9e987c6c-4c1e-40d8-bd85-dd26fba8fdd6
status: test
description: This method detects a service install of the malicious Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service service described in StoneDrill report by Kaspersky
references:
    - https://securelist.com/blog/research/77725/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-07
modified: 2021-11-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.g0064
    - attack.t1543.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: NtsSrv
        ImagePath|endswith: ' LocalService'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt
id: 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87
status: test
description: Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220419045003/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/04/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
date: 2018-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.s0002
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: seclogo
        AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter
level: high

title: Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287
id: f74107df-b6c6-4e80-bf00-4170b658162b
status: test
description: Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287
references:
    - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/14/1
    - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-14287
    - https://twitter.com/matthieugarin/status/1183970598210412546
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1548.003
    - cve.2019-14287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -u#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspect Svchost Activity
id: 16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397
status: test
description: It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180718061628/https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2
author: David Burkett, @signalblur
date: 2019-12-28
modified: 2022-06-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|endswith: 'svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\rpcnet.exe'
              - '\rpcnetp.exe'
        - CommandLine: null  # no CommandLine value available
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Rpcnet.exe / rpcnetp.exe which is a lojack style software. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Kamlyuk-Kamluk-Computrace-Backdoor-Revisited.pdf
level: high

title: Suspicious ASPX File Drop by Exchange
id: bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6
related:
    - id: 6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS into a suspicious folder
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
    - https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html
    - https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve-lo-hong-bao-mat-0day-microsoft-exchange-dang-duoc-su-dung-de-tan-cong-cac-to-chuc-tai-viet-nam-9685.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), MSTI (query, idea)
date: 2022-10-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'MSExchange'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'FrontEnd\HttpProxy\'           # from GTSC and MSTI reports
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\' # from GTSC report
    selection_types:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.aspx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.ashx'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer
id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652
related:
    - id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field.
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
    - https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24
    - https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/
    - https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-14
modified: 2025-07-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\ADExp.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64.exe'
              - '\ADExplorer64a.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AdExp'
        - Description: 'Active Directory Editor'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals ADExplorer'
    selection_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: 'snapshot'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious paths
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Activity in Shell Commands
id: 2aa1440c-9ae9-4d92-84a7-a9e5f5e31695
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various exploit codes (see references)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20170319121015/http://www.threatgeek.com/2017/03/widespread-exploitation-attempts-using-cve-2017-5638.html
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/eb6535009f5fdafa954525687f09294918b5398d/modules/exploits/multi/http/struts_code_exec_exception_delegator.rb
    - http://pastebin.com/FtygZ1cg
    - https://artkond.com/2017/03/23/pivoting-guide/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        # Generic suspicious commands
        - 'wget * - http* | perl'
        - 'wget * - http* | sh'
        - 'wget * - http* | bash'
        - 'python -m SimpleHTTPServer'
        - '-m http.server'      # Python 3
        - 'import pty; pty.spawn*'
        - 'socat exec:*'
        - 'socat -O /tmp/*'
        - 'socat tcp-connect*'
        - '*echo binary >>*'
        # Malware
        - '*wget *; chmod +x*'
        - '*wget *; chmod 777 *'
        - '*cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt*'
        # Apache Struts in-the-wild exploit codes
        - '*stop;service iptables stop;*'
        - '*stop;SuSEfirewall2 stop;*'
        - 'chmod 777 2020*'
        - '*>>/etc/rc.local'
        # Metasploit framework exploit codes
        - '*base64 -d /tmp/*'
        - '* | base64 -d *'
        - '*/chmod u+s *'
        - '*chmod +s /tmp/*'
        - '*chmod u+s /tmp/*'
        - '* /tmp/haxhax*'
        - '* /tmp/ns_sploit*'
        - 'nc -l -p *'
        - 'cp /bin/ksh *'
        - 'cp /bin/sh *'
        - '* /tmp/*.b64 *'
        - '*/tmp/ysocereal.jar*'
        - '*/tmp/x *'
        - '*; chmod +x /tmp/*'
        - '*;chmod +x /tmp/*'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
id: 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AddInUtil.exe'
    selection_susp_1_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:'
            - '-PipelineRoot:'
    selection_susp_1_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:.'
            - '-AddInRoot:"."'
            - '-PipelineRoot:.'
            - '-PipelineRoot:"."'
        CurrentDirectory|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection_img and (all of selection_susp_1_* or selection_susp_2)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE
id: a1473adb-5338-4a20-b4c3-126763e2d3d3
status: test
description: Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/05/stay-positive-lolbins-not/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
    selection_cli_dll:
        CommandLine|contains: 'advpack'
    selection_cli_ordinal:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '#+'
              - '12'
        - CommandLine|contains: '#-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
related:
    - id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
    - https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
    - https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
        # Note:
        #   - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
        #   - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
        #       - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
        #       - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
        #   - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
            - ' -remediationScript'
    filter_main_pwsh:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
    filter_main_intune:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Application Allowed Through Exploit Guard
id: 42205c73-75c8-4a63-9db1-e3782e06fda0
status: test
description: Detects applications being added to the "allowed applications" list of exploit guard in order to bypass controlled folder settings
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/10/23/windows-defender-exploit-guard-reduce-the-attack-surface-against-next-generation-malware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Exploit Guard\Controlled Folder Access\AllowedApplications'
    selection_paths:
        TargetObject|contains:
            # Add more paths you don't allow in your org
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\PerfLogs\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
    ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
    Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding
    service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c "ver"'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_execution_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe' # wmic process call create 'reg.exe add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Desktops /t REG_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\tre\Desktops.exe\" random" /f'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
    selection_execution_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg'
            - ' add '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high

title: Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder
id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.
references:
    - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032 # Private Report
    - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70 # Private Report
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: 'The DFIR Report'
date: 2025-01-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml

title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.g0046
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\EQNEDT32.exe'
            # - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
        Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Binary Writes Via AnyDesk
id: 2d367498-5112-4ae5-a06a-96e7bc33a211
status: test
description: |
    Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll".
    According to RedCanary research it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll,
    which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API. (See reference section for more details)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-28
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\AnyDeskMSI.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    filter_dlls:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\gcapi.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
    - id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 # BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
    Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\baaupdate.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Browser Activity
id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6
status: test
description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'suspiciousBrowser'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Suspicious Calculator Usage
id: 737e618a-a410-49b5-bec3-9e55ff7fbc15
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of 'calc.exe' with command line parameters or in a suspicious directory, which is likely caused by some PoC or detection evasion.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1094080242686312448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\calc.exe '
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith: '\calc.exe'
    filter_main_known_locations:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\System32\'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection_1 or ( selection_2 and not filter_main_known_locations )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access
id: 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3
status: test
description: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder
references:
    - https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072
author: Den Iuzvyk
date: 2020-06-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1125
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\'
            - '\NonPackaged'
    selection_2:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - microphone
            - webcam
    selection_3:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - ':#Windows#Temp#'
            - ':#$Recycle.bin#'
            - ':#Temp#'
            - ':#Users#Public#'
            - ':#Users#Default#'
            - ':#Users#Desktop#'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices
level: high

title: Suspicious CertReq Command to Download
id: 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file.
    This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files.
    Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certreq.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertReq.exe'
    selection_cli_flag_post:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-Post'
    selection_cli_flag_config:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-config'
    selection_cli_http:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System
id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d
status: test
description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
    - https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM
    - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30'
detection:
    selection:
        ParentUser|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        ParentUser|endswith:
            - '\NETWORK SERVICE'
            - '\LOCAL SERVICE'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        User|endswith: # System
            - '\SYSTEM'
            - '\Système'
            - '\СИСТЕМА'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    filter_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE
id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987
related:
    - id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\bginfo.exe'
            - '\bginfo64.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\'
              - '\AppData\Roaming\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Manage Engine ServiceDesk
id: cea2b7ea-792b-405f-95a1-b903ea06458f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the "Manage Engine ServiceDesk Plus" Java web service
references:
    - https://www.horizon3.ai/manageengine-cve-2022-47966-technical-deep-dive/
    - https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-47966/blob/3a51c6b72ebbd87392babd955a8fbeaee2090b35/CVE-2022-47966.py
    - https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/saml-show-stopper/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-18
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\ManageEngine\ServiceDesk\'
            - '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'  # Often used in POCs
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # - '\hh.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\scriptrunner.exe'
    filter_main_net:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' stop'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate sub processes started by Manage Engine ServiceDesk Pro
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of SQL Server
id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445
related:
    - id: 344482e4-a477-436c-aa70-7536d18a48c7
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: FPT.EagleEye Team, wagga
date: 2020-12-11
modified: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # You can add other uncommon or suspicious processes
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\ping.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\tasklist.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    filter_optional_datev:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\'
        ParentImage|endswith: 'DATEV_DBENGINE\MSSQL\Binn\sqlservr.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE
id: 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e
related:
    - id: 5394fcc7-aeb2-43b5-9a09-cac9fc5edcd5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe
    - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-14
modified: 2024-08-29
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wermgr.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ipconfig.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\WerConCpl.dll'
            - 'LaunchErcApp '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-queuereporting'
            - '-responsepester'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process of AspNetCompiler
id: 9ccba514-7cb6-4c5c-b377-700758f2f120 # SuspChild
related:
    - id: 4c7f49ee-2638-43bb-b85b-ce676c30b260 # TMP File
      type: similar
    - id: 9f50fe98-fe5c-4a2d-86c7-fad7f63ed622 # Susp Paths
      type: similar
    - id: a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00 # Exec
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "aspnet_compiler.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Aspnet_Compiler/
    - https://ijustwannared.team/2020/08/01/the-curious-case-of-aspnet_compiler-exe/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\aspnet_compiler.exe'
    selection_child:
        # Note: add other potential suspicious child processes and paths
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Roaming\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\Temp\'
              - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process of Notepad++ Updater - GUP.Exe
id: bb0e87ce-c89f-4857-84fa-095e4483e9cb
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious child process creation by the Notepad++ updater process (gup.exe).
    This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware.
references:
    - https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/
    - https://www.heise.de/en/news/Notepad-updater-installed-malware-11109726.html
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
    - https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/
    - https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-03
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\gup.exe'
    selection_child_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    selection_child_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'curl'
            - 'finger'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'wget'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process of SolarWinds WebHelpDesk
id: 8c7f4a2d-3b9e-4f1c-9a6d-2e8f5c3d9a1b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious child processes spawned by SolarWinds WebHelpDesk (WHD) application, which may indicate exploitation activity leveraging RCE vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-40551, CVE-2025-40536, or CVE-2025-26399
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk-cve-2025-26399
    - https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/success_center/whd/content/release_notes/whd_2026-1_release_notes.htm
author: Huntress Team, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025-26399
    - cve.2025-40536
    - cve.2025-40551
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains: '\WebHelpDesk\bin\'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'tomcat'
    selection_suspicious_child:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-enc'
            - 'base64'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'curl'
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'irm '
            - 'iwr '
            - 'mshta'
            - 'msiexec'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
            - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
            - 'wget'
            - 'wmic'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Chromium Browser Instance Executed With Custom Extension
id: 27ba3207-dd30-4812-abbf-5d20c57d474e
related:
    - id: 88d6e60c-759d-4ac1-a447-c0f1466c2d21
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start an instance with a custom extension
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/chromeloader/
    - https://emkc.org/s/RJjuLa
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lnk-between-browsers
author: Aedan Russell, frack113, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-19
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1176.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--load-extension='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_susp_load_extension/info.yml

title: Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern
id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
related:
    - id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
    Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
references:
    - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
    - https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
    - https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
    - https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ # filefix variant
author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.t1204.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '#'
    selection_cli_captcha:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'account'
            - 'anti-bot'
            - 'botcheck'
            - 'captcha'
            - 'challenge'
            - 'confirmation'
            - 'fraud'
            - 'human'
            - 'identification'
            - 'identificator'
            - 'identity'
            - 'robot'
            - 'validation'
            - 'verification'
            - 'verify'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation
id: f2c64357-b1d2-41b7-849f-34d2682c0fad
status: test
description: Detects scheduled task creation using "schtasks" that contain potentially suspicious or uncommon commands
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/512c1352-6380-4436-b27d-bb62f0c020d6/
    - https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1506480588827467785
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/Create '
    selection_pattern_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/sc minute '
            - '/ru system '
    selection_pattern_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd /c'
            - 'cmd /k'
            - 'cmd /r'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
    selection_uncommon:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -decode '
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' bypass '
            - ' IEX'
            - '.DownloadData'
            - '.DownloadFile'
            - '.DownloadString'
            - '/c start /min ' # https://twitter.com/RedDrip7/status/1506480588827467785
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'mshta http'
            - 'mshta.exe http'
    selection_anomaly_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
    selection_anomaly_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cscript'
            - 'curl'
            - 'wscript'
    condition: selection_schtasks and ( all of selection_pattern_* or selection_uncommon or all of selection_anomaly_* )
falsepositives:
    - Software installers that run from temporary folders and also install scheduled tasks are expected to generate some false positives
level: high

title: Suspicious Computer Account Name Change CVE-2021-42287
id: 45eb2ae2-9aa2-4c3a-99a5-6e5077655466
status: test
description: Detects the renaming of an existing computer account to a account name that doesn't contain a $ symbol as seen in attacks against CVE-2021-42287
references:
    - https://medium.com/@mvelazco/hunting-for-samaccountname-spoofing-cve-2021-42287-and-domain-controller-impersonation-f704513c8a45
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-22
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1098
    - cve.2021-42287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4781 # rename user
        OldTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    filter:
        NewTargetUserName|contains: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Control Panel DLL Load
id: d7eb979b-c2b5-4a6f-a3a7-c87ce6763819
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Rundll32 execution from control.exe as used by Equation Group and Exploit Kits
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rikvduijn/status/853251879320662017
    - https://twitter.com/felixw3000/status/853354851128025088
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-15
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\System32\control.exe'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Shell32.dll'
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Creation with Colorcpl
id: e15b518d-b4ce-4410-a9cd-501f23ce4a18
status: test
description: Once executed, colorcpl.exe will copy the arbitrary file to c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\
references:
    - https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1480468728324231172?s=20
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-21
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\colorcpl.exe'
    filter_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.icm'
            - '.gmmp'
            - '.cdmp'
            - '.camp'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
related:
    - id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
      type: derived
    - id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81 # Curl download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
references:
    - https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-18---curl-download-file
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_curl:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.temp'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_optional_git_windows:
        # Example FP
        #   CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe" --silent --show-error --output C:/Users/test/AppData/Local/Temp/gfw-httpget-jVOEoxbS.txt --write-out %{http_code} https://gitforwindows.org/latest-tag.txt
        ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--silent --show-error --output '
            - 'gfw-httpget-'
            - 'AppData'
    condition: selection_curl and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Curl Download File
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a

title: Suspicious CustomShellHost Execution
id: 84b14121-9d14-416e-800b-f3b829c5a14d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of CustomShellHost.exe where the child isn't located in 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'. CustomShellHost is a known LOLBin that can be abused by attackers for defense evasion techniques.
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/180
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/CustomShellHost/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CustomShellHost.exe'
    filter_main_explorer:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - False positives are unlikely, investigate matches carefully.
level: high

title: Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793
related:
    - id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Appdata\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing
id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing - Network
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA'
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing - Network
id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA' # Follows this pattern UWhRCAAAAA..BAAA
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Debugger Registration Cmdline
id: ae215552-081e-44c7-805f-be16f975c8a2
status: test
description: Detects the registration of a debugger for a program that is available in the logon screen (sticky key backdoor).
references:
    - https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-09-06
modified: 2022-08-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sethc.exe'
            - 'utilman.exe'
            - 'osk.exe'
            - 'magnify.exe'
            - 'narrator.exe'
            - 'displayswitch.exe'
            - 'atbroker.exe'
            - 'HelpPane.exe'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Command
id: bb58aa4a-b80b-415a-a2c0-2f65a4c81009
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr execution with parameters used to download files from the Internet
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /lockscreenurl:'
    selection1_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    selection_reg:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg delete'
            - '\PersonalizationCSP'
    condition: ( selection1 and not selection1_filter ) or selection_reg
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Target File
id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores a file to a suspicious location or contains a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Personalization\LockScreenImage\'
    filter1:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\'
    filter2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    condition: selection and not filter1 and not filter2
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: Suspicious DotNET CLR Usage Log Artifact
id: e0b06658-7d1d-4cd3-bf15-03467507ff7c
related:
    - id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
      type: derived
    - id: e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the creation of Usage Log files by the CLR (clr.dll). These files are named after the executing process once the assembly is finished executing for the first time in the (user) session context.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
    - https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular/blob/fa1ae53132403d262be2bbd7f17ceea7e15e8c78/11_file_create/include_dotnet.xml
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221026202428/https://gist.github.com/code-scrap/d7f152ffcdb3e0b02f7f394f5187f008
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
author: frack113, omkar72, oscd.community, Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2022-11-18
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: UsageLogs folder must be monitored by the sysmon configuration'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\UsageLogs\cmstp.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\cscript.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\mshta.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\msxsl.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\regsvr32.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\rundll32.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\svchost.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\wscript.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\wmic.exe.log'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        # This filter requires the event to be enriched by additional information such as ParentImage and CommandLine activity
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MsiExec.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: ' -Embedding'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Temp'
            - 'zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675
level: high

title: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
related:
    - id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c # ParentImage/ParentCommandLine
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns
references:
    - https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html
    - https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-06-26
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '      .exe'
            - '______.exe'
            - '.doc.exe'
            - '.doc.js'
            - '.docx.exe'
            - '.docx.js'
            - '.gif.exe'
            - '.jpeg.exe'
            - '.jpg.exe'
            - '.mkv.exe'
            - '.mov.exe'
            - '.mp3.exe'
            - '.mp4.exe'
            - '.pdf.exe'
            - '.pdf.js'
            - '.png.exe'
            - '.ppt.exe'
            - '.ppt.js'
            - '.pptx.exe'
            - '.pptx.js'
            - '.rtf.exe'
            - '.rtf.js'
            - '.svg.exe'
            - '.txt.exe'
            - '.txt.js'
            - '.xls.exe'
            - '.xls.js'
            - '.xlsx.exe'
            - '.xlsx.js'
            - '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '      .exe'
            - '______.exe'
            - '.doc.exe'
            - '.doc.js'
            - '.docx.exe'
            - '.docx.js'
            - '.gif.exe'
            - '.jpeg.exe'
            - '.jpg.exe'
            - '.mkv.exe'
            - '.mov.exe'
            - '.mp3.exe'
            - '.mp4.exe'
            - '.pdf.exe'
            - '.pdf.js'
            - '.png.exe'
            - '.ppt.exe'
            - '.ppt.js'
            - '.pptx.exe'
            - '.pptx.js'
            - '.rtf.exe'
            - '.rtf.js'
            - '.svg.exe'
            - '.txt.exe'
            - '.txt.js'
            - '.xls.exe'
            - '.xls.js'
            - '.xlsx.exe'
            - '.xlsx.js'
            - '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Double Extension Files
id: b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e
related:
    - id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
      type: derived
    - id: 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects dropped files with double extensions, which is often used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hide default extensions by default.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/
    - https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles
    - https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321
    - https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
    - https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-06-19
modified: 2026-03-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_gen:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.iso'
            - '.rar'
            - '.svg'
            - '.zip'
            # - '.lnk'  # legitimate links can happen just anywhere
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.doc.'
            - '.docx.'
            - '.gif.'
            - '.jpeg.'
            - '.jpg.'
            - '.mp3.'
            - '.mp4.'
            - '.pdf.'
            - '.png.'
            - '.ppt.'
            - '.pptx.'
            - '.rtf.'
            - '.svg.'
            - '.txt.'
            - '.xls.'
            - '.xlsx.'
    selection_exe:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.rar.exe'
            - '.zip.exe'
    # Note: If you wanna keep using the ".lnk" extension. You might uncomment this filter and add additional locations
    # filter_main_lnk:
    #     TargetFilename|contains:
    #         - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\'
    #         - '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
    filter_icons_linux:
        TargetFilename|startswith: '/usr/share/icons/'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Download From Direct IP Via Bitsadmin
id: 99c840f2-2012-46fd-9141-c761987550ef
related:
    - id: 90f138c1-f578-4ac3-8c49-eecfd847c8b7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file using an URL that contains an IP
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/breaking-the-silence-recent-truebot-activity/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://1'
            - '://2'
            - '://3'
            - '://4'
            - '://5'
            - '://6'
            - '://7'
            - '://8'
            - '://9'
    filter_seven_zip:
        CommandLine|contains: '://7-' # For https://7-zip.org/
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_direct_ip/info.yml

title: Suspicious Download From File-Sharing Website Via Bitsadmin
id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_domain:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com' # bitsadmin /transfer n https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll %PUBLIC%\calc.dll
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate apps use this, but limited.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b