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Sigma (generic) detection rules

3,751 rules indexed · SIEM-agnostic detection content
Sigma is the open generic signature format for SIEM systems. Expand any rule to see its raw YAML and convert it inline to native query syntax. Pick a platform above to browse every rule already rendered in that language.
Get the raw rules from SigmaHQ Detection Rules The raw generic YAML, served by SigmaHQ. Pick a platform above to download a ready-to-deploy converted pack.
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Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance12
Resource Development10
Initial Access10
Execution30
Persistence43
Privilege Escalation20
Stealth83
Defense Impairment32
Credential Access35
Discovery33
Lateral Movement16
Collection20
Command and Control24
Exfiltration10
Impact18
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.
Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.
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Detection rules

50 shown of 3,751
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious File Write to Webapps Root Directory
Detects suspicious file writes to the root directory of web applications, particularly Apache web servers or Tomcat servers. This may indicate an attempt to deploy malicious files such as web shells or other unauthorized scripts.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 89c42960-f244-4dad-9151-ae9b1a3287a2
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious File Write to Webapps Root Directory
id: 89c42960-f244-4dad-9151-ae9b1a3287a2
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious file writes to the root directory of web applications, particularly Apache web servers or Tomcat servers.
    This may indicate an attempt to deploy malicious files such as web shells or other unauthorized scripts.
references:
    - https://labs.watchtowr.com/guess-who-would-be-stupid-enough-to-rob-the-same-vault-twice-pre-auth-rce-chains-in-commvault/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Add more suspicious processes or paths or extensions as needed
    selection_susp_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dotnet.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\java.exe'
    selection_servers:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\apache'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\webapps\ROOT\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.jsp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Files in Default GPO Folder
Detects the creation of copy of suspicious files (EXE/DLL) to the default GPO storage folder
status test author elhoim ATT&CK sub-technique id 5f87308a-0a5b-4623-ae15-d8fa1809bc60
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Files in Default GPO Folder
id: 5f87308a-0a5b-4623-ae15-d8fa1809bc60
status: test
description: Detects the creation of copy of suspicious files (EXE/DLL) to the default GPO storage folder
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/
author: elhoim
date: 2022-04-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation
Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation
id: d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f
related:
    - id: df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive via PowerShell. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=43
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1132.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'MemoryStream'
            - 'H4sI'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative script
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script
Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive in a PowerShell script. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script
id: df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce
related:
    - id: d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive in a PowerShell script. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward.
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=43
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1132.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - 'MemoryStream'
            - 'H4sI'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative script
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Get-ADReplAccount
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 060c3ef1-fd0a-4091-bf46-e7d625f60b73
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Get-ADReplAccount
id: 060c3ef1-fd0a-4091-bf46-e7d625f60b73
status: test
description: |
    The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory.
    These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
references:
    - https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/DSInternals
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.006/T1003.006.md#atomic-test-2---run-dsinternals-get-adreplaccount
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-06
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - Get-ADReplAccount
            - '-All '
            - '-Server '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute
Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute
id: 8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md#atomic-test-2---powershell-execute-com-object
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.015
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - '::GetTypeFromCLSID('
            - '.ShellExecute('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Git Clone
Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id aef9d1f1-7396-4e92-a927-4567c7a495c1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Git Clone
id: aef9d1f1-7396-4e92-a927-4567c7a495c1
status: test
description: Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious
references:
    - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/MichaelKoczwara/12faba9c061c12b5814b711166de8c2f/raw/e2068486692897b620c25fde1ea258c8218fe3d3/history.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-03
modified: 2023-01-10
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1593.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\git.exe'
              - '\git-remote-https.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'git.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' clone '
            - 'git-remote-https '
    selection_keyword:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious keywords
            - 'exploit'
            - 'Vulns'
            - 'vulnerability'
            - 'RemoteCodeExecution'
            - 'Invoke-'
            - 'CVE-'
            - 'poc-'
            - 'ProofOfConcept'
            # Add more vuln names
            - 'proxyshell'
            - 'log4shell'
            - 'eternalblue'
            - 'eternal-blue'
            - 'MS17-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Git Clone - Linux
Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id cfec9d29-64ec-4a0f-9ffe-0fdb856d5446
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Git Clone - Linux
id: cfec9d29-64ec-4a0f-9ffe-0fdb856d5446
status: test
description: Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious
references:
    - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/MichaelKoczwara/12faba9c061c12b5814b711166de8c2f/raw/e2068486692897b620c25fde1ea258c8218fe3d3/history.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-03
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1593.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '/git'
        CommandLine|contains: ' clone '
    selection_keyword:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious keywords
            - 'exploit'
            - 'Vulns'
            - 'vulnerability'
            - 'RCE'
            - 'RemoteCodeExecution'
            - 'Invoke-'
            - 'CVE-'
            - 'poc-'
            - 'ProofOfConcept'
            # Add more vuln names
            - 'proxyshell'
            - 'log4shell'
            - 'eternalblue'
            - 'eternal-blue'
            - 'MS17-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE
id: d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE
    Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.001
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    # Covers group and localgroup flags
    selection_group_root:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' group '
            - ' localgroup '
    selection_group_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more groups for other languages
            - 'domain admins'
            - ' administrator' # Typo without an 'S' so we catch both
            - ' administrateur' # Typo without an 'S' so we catch both
            - 'enterprise admins'
            - 'Exchange Trusted Subsystem'
            - 'Remote Desktop Users'
            - 'Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance' # French for "Remote Desktop Users"
            - 'Usuarios de escritorio remoto' # Spanish for "Remote Desktop Users"
            - ' /do' # short for domain
    filter_group_add:
        # This filter is added to avoid the potential case where the point is not recon but addition
        CommandLine|contains: ' /add'
    # Covers 'accounts' flag
    selection_accounts_root:
        CommandLine|contains: ' accounts '
    selection_accounts_flags:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /do' # short for domain
    condition: selection_img and ((all of selection_group_* and not filter_group_add) or all of selection_accounts_*)
falsepositives:
    - Inventory tool runs
    - Administrative activity
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious History File Operations
Detects commandline operations on shell history files
status test author Mikhail Larin, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 508a9374-ad52-4789-b568-fc358def2c65
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious History File Operations
id: 508a9374-ad52-4789-b568-fc358def2c65
status: test
description: Detects commandline operations on shell history files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md
author: 'Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.003
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.bash_history'
            - '.zsh_history'
            - '.zhistory'
            - '.history'
            - '.sh_history'
            - 'fish_history'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
    - Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Low FP
Suspicious History File Operations - Linux
Detects commandline operations on shell history files
status test author Mikhail Larin, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id eae8ce9f-bde9-47a6-8e79-f20d18419910
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious History File Operations - Linux
id: eae8ce9f-bde9-47a6-8e79-f20d18419910
status: test
description: 'Detects commandline operations on shell history files'
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md
author: 'Mikhail Larin, oscd.community'
date: 2020-10-17
modified: 2022-11-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.003
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    execve:
        type: EXECVE
    history:
        - '.bash_history'
        - '.zsh_history'
        - '.zhistory'
        - '.history'
        - '.sh_history'
        - 'fish_history'
    condition: execve and history
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
    - Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Hyper-V Cmdlets
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 42d36aa1-3240-4db0-8257-e0118dcdd9cd
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Hyper-V Cmdlets
id: 42d36aa1-3240-4db0-8257-e0118dcdd9cd
status: test
description: Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.md#atomic-test-3---create-and-start-hyper-v-virtual-machine
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.006
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - New-VM
            - Set-VMFirmware
            - Start-VM
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious IIS URL GlobalRules Rewrite Via AppCmd
Detects usage of "appcmd" to create new global URL rewrite rules. This behaviour has been observed being used by threat actors to add new rules so they can access their webshells.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 7c8af9b2-dcae-41a2-a9db-b28c288b5f08
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious IIS URL GlobalRules Rewrite Via AppCmd
id: 7c8af9b2-dcae-41a2-a9db-b28c288b5f08
status: test
description: Detects usage of "appcmd" to create new global URL rewrite rules. This behaviour has been observed being used by threat actors to add new rules so they can access their webshells.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1616702107242971144
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/739120/how-to-add-re-write-global-rule-with-action-type-r
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\appcmd.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'appcmd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - 'config'
            - 'section:system.webServer/rewrite/globalRules'
            - 'commit:'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of appcmd to add new URL rewrite rules
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious IO.FileStream
Open a handle on the drive volume via the \\.\ DOS device path specifier and perform direct access read of the first few bytes of the volume.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 70ad982f-67c8-40e0-a955-b920c2fa05cb
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious IO.FileStream
id: 70ad982f-67c8-40e0-a955-b920c2fa05cb
status: test
description: Open a handle on the drive volume via the \\.\ DOS device path specifier and perform direct access read of the first few bytes of the volume.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1006/T1006.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-09
modified: 2022-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - New-Object
            - IO.FileStream
            - '\\\\.\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Installer Package Child Process
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent process. This includes osascript, JXA, curl and wget amongst other interpreters
status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id e0cfaecd-602d-41af-988d-f6ccebb2af26
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Installer Package Child Process
id: e0cfaecd-602d-41af-988d-f6ccebb2af26
status: test
description: Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent process. This includes osascript, JXA, curl and wget amongst other interpreters
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1071
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_installer:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/package_script_service'
            - '/installer'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
            - '/python'
            - '/ruby'
            - '/perl'
            - '/php'
            - '/javascript'
            - '/osascript'
            - '/tclsh'
            - '/curl'
            - '/wget'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'preinstall'
            - 'postinstall'
    condition: selection_installer
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software uses the scripts (preinstall, postinstall)
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Invoke-Item From Mount-DiskImage
Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 902cedee-0398-4e3a-8183-6f3a89773a96
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Invoke-Item From Mount-DiskImage
id: 902cedee-0398-4e3a-8183-6f3a89773a96
status: test
description: Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-2---mount-an-iso-image-and-run-executable-from-the-iso
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/mount-diskimage?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-01
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Mount-DiskImage '
            - '-ImagePath '
            - Get-Volume
            - '.DriveLetter'
            - 'invoke-item '
            - '):\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution With DirectIP
Detects calls to PowerShell with Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet using direct IP access
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 1edff897-9146-48d2-9066-52e8d8f80a2f
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution With DirectIP
id: 1edff897-9146-48d2-9066-52e8d8f80a2f
status: test
description: Detects calls to PowerShell with Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet using direct IP access
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # These are all aliases of Invoke-WebRequest
            - 'curl '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - ' irm ' # Space before and after to avoid false positives with 'irm' as a substring
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
    selection_ip:
        # In case of FP with local IPs add additional filters
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://1'
            - '://2'
            - '://3'
            - '://4'
            - '://5'
            - '://6'
            - '://7'
            - '://8'
            - '://9'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Low FP
Suspicious Kerberos RC4 Ticket Encryption
Detects service ticket requests using RC4 encryption type
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 496a0e47-0a33-4dca-b009-9e6ca3591f39
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Kerberos RC4 Ticket Encryption
id: 496a0e47-0a33-4dca-b009-9e6ca3591f39
status: test
description: Detects service ticket requests using RC4 encryption type
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3458
    - https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/TrimarcResearch/Detecting-Kerberoasting-Activity
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-06
modified: 2022-06-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4769
        TicketOptions: '0x40810000'
        TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'
    reduction:
        ServiceName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not reduction
falsepositives:
    - Service accounts used on legacy systems (e.g. NetApp)
    - Windows Domains with DFL 2003 and legacy systems
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Keyboard Layout Load
Detects the keyboard preload installation with a suspicious keyboard layout, e.g. Chinese, Iranian or Vietnamese layout load in user session on systems maintained by US staff only
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 34aa0252-6039-40ff-951f-939fd6ce47d8
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Keyboard Layout Load
id: 34aa0252-6039-40ff-951f-939fd6ce47d8
status: test
description: Detects the keyboard preload installation with a suspicious keyboard layout, e.g. Chinese, Iranian or Vietnamese layout load in user session on systems maintained by US staff only
references:
    - https://renenyffenegger.ch/notes/Windows/registry/tree/HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Keyboard-Layout/Preload/index
    - https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/pull/92/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon config that monitors \Keyboard Layout\Preload subkey of the HKLU hives - see https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/pull/92/files'
detection:
    selection_registry:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Keyboard Layout\Preload\'
            - '\Keyboard Layout\Substitutes\'
        Details|contains:
            - 00000429  # Persian (Iran)
            - 00050429  # Persian (Iran)
            - 0000042a  # Vietnamese
    condition: selection_registry
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or users that actually use the selected keyboard layouts (heavily depends on the organisation's user base)
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created
Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created
id: 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8
related:
    - id: b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/
    - https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles
    - https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321
    - https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-11-07
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.007
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.lnk'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.doc.'
            - '.docx.'
            - '.jpg.'
            - '.pdf.'
            - '.ppt.'
            - '.pptx.'
            - '.xls.'
            - '.xlsx.'
    filter_main_recent:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
    filter_optional_office_recent:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Some additional office application might need to be added
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\'
    filter_optional_office_excel:
        Image|endswith: '\excel.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel'
    filter_optional_office_powerpoint:
        Image|endswith: '\powerpnt.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint'
    filter_optional_office_word:
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some tuning is required for other general purpose directories of third party apps
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_lnk_double_extension/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Log Entries
Detects suspicious log entries in Linux log files
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id f64b6e9a-5d9d-48a5-8289-e1dd2b3876e1
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Log Entries
id: f64b6e9a-5d9d-48a5-8289-e1dd2b3876e1
status: test
description: Detects suspicious log entries in Linux log files
references:
    - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/f6502012b7380208db81f82311ad4a1994d39905/etc/rules/syslog_rules.xml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-25
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: linux
detection:
    keywords:
        # Generic suspicious log lines
        - 'entered promiscuous mode'
        # OSSEC https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/master/etc/rules/syslog_rules.xml
        - 'Deactivating service'
        - 'Oversized packet received from'
        - 'imuxsock begins to drop messages'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Low FP
Suspicious Login Activity Classified By Google
Detects Google Workspace login activity that's classified as suspicious by Google.
status experimental author Tom Kluter ATT&CK sub-technique id 38360161-76c4-4283-842e-efcf997dafc8
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Login Activity Classified By Google
id: 38360161-76c4-4283-842e-efcf997dafc8
status: experimental
description: Detects Google Workspace login activity that's classified as suspicious by Google.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_login
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_login_less_secure_app
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#suspicious_programmatic_login
author: Tom Kluter
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.login
detection:
    selection:
        protoPayload.Servicename: 'login.googleapis.com'
        protoPayload.metadata.event.eventName:
            - 'suspicious_login_less_secure_app'
            - 'suspicious_login'
            - 'suspicious_programmatic_login'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate logins
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity
Detects when a user manipulates with Firmward Password on MacOS. NOTE - this command has been disabled on silicon-based apple computers.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger ATT&CK tactic-only id 7ed2c9f7-c59d-4c82-a7e2-f859aa676099
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious MacOS Firmware Activity
id: 7ed2c9f7-c59d-4c82-a7e2-f859aa676099
status: test
description: Detects when a user manipulates with Firmward Password on MacOS. NOTE - this command has been disabled on silicon-based apple computers.
references:
    - https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/blob/932a51f3e819dd3e02ebfcf3ef433cfffafbe28b/rules/os/os_firmware_password_require.yaml
    - https://www.manpagez.com/man/8/firmwarepasswd/
    - https://support.apple.com/guide/security/firmware-password-protection-sec28382c9ca/web
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-30
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection1:
        Image: '/usr/sbin/firmwarepasswd'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'setpasswd'
            - 'full'
            - 'delete'
            - 'check'
    condition: selection1
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Msbuild Execution By Uncommon Parent Process
Detects suspicious execution of 'Msbuild.exe' by a uncommon parent process
status test author frack113 ATT&CK tactic-only id 33be4333-2c6b-44f4-ae28-102cdbde0a31
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Msbuild Execution By Uncommon Parent Process
id: 33be4333-2c6b-44f4-ae28-102cdbde0a31
status: test
description: Detects suspicious execution of 'Msbuild.exe' by a uncommon parent process
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/abdf586e-df0c-4d39-89a7-06bf24913401/
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/msbuild.exe
author: frack113
date: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\MSBuild.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSBuild.exe'
    filter_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\devenv.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'
            - '\python.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\nuget.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_parent
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious MsiExec Embedding Parent
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy the execution of malicious payloads
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 4a2a2c3e-209f-4d01-b513-4155a540b469
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious MsiExec Embedding Parent
id: 4a2a2c3e-209f-4d01-b513-4155a540b469
status: test
description: Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy the execution of malicious payloads
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-04-16
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'MsiExec.exe'
            - '-Embedding '
    filter_splunk_ufw:
        Image|endswith: ':\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Program Files\SplunkUniversalForwarder\bin\'
    filter_vs:
        - CommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
              - '\MsiExec.exe -Embedding '
              - 'Global\MSI0000'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL
id: 6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads.
    Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
    - https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2026-01-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /Y'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Program Files\'
            - '\MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - '\MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Windows\System32\'
            - '\MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install From Remote Location
Detects usage of Msiexec.exe to install packages hosted remotely quietly
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8150732a-0c9d-4a99-82b9-9efb9b90c40c
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install From Remote Location
id: 8150732a-0c9d-4a99-82b9-9efb9b90c40c
related:
    - id: f7b5f842-a6af-4da5-9e95-e32478f3cd2f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of Msiexec.exe to install packages hosted remotely quietly
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-28
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msiexec.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Note that there is no space before and after the arguments because it's possible to write a commandline as such
        # Example: msiexec -q/i [MSI Package]
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '-i'
            - '-package'
            - '-a'
            - '-j'
    selection_quiet:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-q'
    selection_remote:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http'
            - '\\\\'
    filter_optional_openoffice:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\OpenOffice'
            - 'Installation Files\openoffice'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Network Connection to IP Lookup Service APIs
Detects external IP address lookups by non-browser processes via services such as "api.ipify.org". This could be indicative of potential post compromise internet test activity.
status test author Janantha Marasinghe, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id edf3485d-dac4-4d50-90e4-b0e5813f7e60
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Network Connection to IP Lookup Service APIs
id: edf3485d-dac4-4d50-90e4-b0e5813f7e60
related:
    - id: ec82e2a5-81ea-4211-a1f8-37a0286df2c2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects external IP address lookups by non-browser processes via services such as "api.ipify.org". This could be indicative of potential post compromise internet test activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/rsp/scripts/blob/c8bb272d68164a9836e4f273d8f924927f39b8c6/externalip-benchmark.md
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-302a
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
author: Janantha Marasinghe, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-24
modified: 2024-03-22
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1016
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - DestinationHostname:
              - 'www.ip.cn'
              - 'l2.io'
        - DestinationHostname|contains:
              - 'api.2ip.ua'
              - 'api.bigdatacloud.net'
              - 'api.ipify.org'
              - 'bot.whatismyipaddress.com'
              - 'canireachthe.net'
              - 'checkip.amazonaws.com'
              - 'checkip.dyndns.org'
              - 'curlmyip.com'
              - 'db-ip.com'
              - 'edns.ip-api.com'
              - 'eth0.me'
              - 'freegeoip.app'
              - 'geoipy.com'
              - 'getip.pro'
              - 'icanhazip.com'
              - 'ident.me'
              - 'ifconfig.io'
              - 'ifconfig.me'
              - 'ip-api.com'
              - 'ip.360.cn'
              - 'ip.anysrc.net'
              - 'ip.taobao.com'
              - 'ip.tyk.nu'
              - 'ipaddressworld.com'
              - 'ipapi.co'
              - 'ipconfig.io'
              - 'ipecho.net'
              - 'ipinfo.io'
              - 'ipip.net'
              - 'ipof.in'
              - 'ipv4.icanhazip.com'
              - 'ipv4bot.whatismyipaddress.com'
              - 'ipv6-test.com'
              - 'ipwho.is'
              - 'jsonip.com'
              - 'myexternalip.com'
              - 'seeip.org'
              - 'wgetip.com'
              - 'whatismyip.akamai.com'
              - 'whois.pconline.com.cn'
              - 'wtfismyip.com'
    filter_optional_brave:
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_optional_maxthon:
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_optional_opera:
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_optional_safari:
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_optional_seamonkey:
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_optional_vivaldi:
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_optional_whale:
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the external websites for troubleshooting or network monitoring
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious New Instance Of An Office COM Object
Detects an svchost process spawning an instance of an office application. This happens when the initial word application creates an instance of one of the Office COM objects such as 'Word.Application', 'Excel.Application', etc. This can be used by malicious actors to create malicious Office documents with macros on the fly. (See vba2clr project in the references)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 9bdaf1e9-fdef-443b-8081-4341b74a7e28
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious New Instance Of An Office COM Object
id: 9bdaf1e9-fdef-443b-8081-4341b74a7e28
status: test
description: |
    Detects an svchost process spawning an instance of an office application. This happens when the initial word application creates an instance of one of the Office COM objects such as 'Word.Application', 'Excel.Application', etc.
    This can be used by malicious actors to create malicious Office documents with macros on the fly. (See vba2clr project in the references)
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/office/troubleshoot/office-developer/automate-word-create-file-using-visual-basic
    - https://github.com/med0x2e/vba2clr
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-13
modified: 2023-12-19
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.threat-hunting
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\msaccess.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\visio.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of office automation via scripting
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share
Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share
id: 1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a
status: test
description: Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.md#atomic-test-2---map-admin-share-powershell
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/new-psdrive?view=powershell-7.2
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-13
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'New-PSDrive'
            - '-psprovider '
            - 'filesystem'
            - '-root '
            - '\\\\'
            - '$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider
Detects suspicious use of the WSMAN provider without PowerShell.exe as the host application.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK sub-technique id df9a0e0e-fedb-4d6c-8668-d765dfc92aa7
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Non PowerShell WSMAN COM Provider
id: df9a0e0e-fedb-4d6c-8668-d765dfc92aa7
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of the WSMAN provider without PowerShell.exe as the host application.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
    - https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
    - https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: powershell-classic
detection:
    selection:
        Data|contains: 'ProviderName=WSMan'
    filter_main_ps:
        Data|contains:
            - 'HostApplication=powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            # In some cases powershell was invoked with inverted slashes
            - 'HostApplication=C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
            - 'HostApplication=C:/Windows/SysWOW64/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
    filter_main_host_application_null:
        # Note: Since we're using the raw data field to match. There is no easy way to filter out cases where the "HostApplication" field is null (i.e doesn't exist). We're practically forced to use a regex.
        # If you're already mapping and extracting the field, then obviously use that directly.
        Data|re: 'HostId=[a-zA-Z0-9-]{36}\s+EngineVersion='
    filter_optional_hexnode:
        Data|contains: 'HostApplication=C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Google API
Detects a non-browser process interacting with the Google API which could indicate the use of a covert C2 such as Google Sheet C2 (GC2-sheet)
status experimental author Gavin Knapp ATT&CK technique id 7e9cf7b6-e827-11ed-a05b-0242ac120003
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Google API
id: 7e9cf7b6-e827-11ed-a05b-0242ac120003
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a non-browser process interacting with the Google API which could indicate the use of a covert C2 such as Google Sheet C2 (GC2-sheet)
references:
    - https://github.com/looCiprian/GC2-sheet
    - https://youtu.be/n2dFlSaBBKo
    - https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/gcat_threathorizons_full_apr2023.pdf
    - https://www.tanium.com/blog/apt41-deploys-google-gc2-for-attacks-cyber-threat-intelligence-roundup/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-command-and-control-red-team-tool-in-attacks/
author: Gavin Knapp
date: 2023-05-01
modified: 2025-02-22
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            # Note: Please add additional google API related domains that might be abused.
            - 'drive.googleapis.com'
            - 'oauth2.googleapis.com'
            - 'sheets.googleapis.com'
            - 'www.googleapis.com'
    filter_optional_brave:
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_optional_chrome:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_optional_google_drive:
        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\'
        Image|endswith: '\GoogleDriveFS.exe'
    filter_optional_firefox:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_optional_ie:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - ':\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_optional_maxthon:
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        - Image|contains: ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith:
              - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - ':\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - ':\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_optional_opera:
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_optional_safari:
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_optional_seamonkey:
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_optional_vivaldi:
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_optional_whale:
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    filter_optional_googleupdate:
        Image|endswith: '\GoogleUpdate.exe'
    filter_optional_outlook_exe:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    filter_main_empty:
        Image: ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications communicating with the "googleapis.com" endpoints that are not already in the exclusion list. This is environmental dependent and requires further testing and tuning.
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Telegram API
Detects an a non-browser process interacting with the Telegram API which could indicate use of a covert C2
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id c3dbbc9f-ef1d-470a-a90a-d343448d5875
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Telegram API
id: c3dbbc9f-ef1d-470a-a90a-d343448d5875
status: test
description: Detects an a non-browser process interacting with the Telegram API which could indicate use of a covert C2
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/small-sieve/NCSC-MAR-Small-Sieve.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains: 'api.telegram.org'
    # Other browsers or apps known to use telegram should be added
    # TODO: Add full paths for default install locations
    filter_main_brave:
        Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
    filter_main_chrome:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
    filter_main_firefox:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
    filter_main_ie:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
    filter_main_maxthon:
        Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
    filter_main_edge_1:
        - Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
        - Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        - Image:
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
              - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
    filter_main_edge_2:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
    filter_main_opera:
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_main_safari:
        Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
    filter_main_seamonkey:
        Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
    filter_main_vivaldi:
        Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
    filter_main_whale:
        Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications communicating with the Telegram API e.g. web browsers not in the exclusion list, app with an RSS  etc.
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Low FP
Suspicious OAuth App File Download Activities
Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an app downloads multiple files from Microsoft SharePoint or Microsoft OneDrive in a manner that is unusual for the user.
status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger ATT&CK tactic-only id ee111937-1fe7-40f0-962a-0eb44d57d174
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious OAuth App File Download Activities
id: ee111937-1fe7-40f0-962a-0eb44d57d174
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an app downloads multiple files from Microsoft SharePoint or Microsoft OneDrive in a manner that is unusual for the user.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Suspicious OAuth app file download activities'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error
Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error
id: e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc
status: test
description: Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
references:
    - https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca/ssherr.c
    - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/sshd_rules.xml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-30
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: sshd
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'unexpected internal error'
        - 'unknown or unsupported key type'
        - 'invalid certificate signing key'
        - 'invalid elliptic curve value'
        - 'incorrect signature'
        - 'error in libcrypto'
        - 'unexpected bytes remain after decoding'
        - 'fatal: buffer_get_string: bad string'
        - 'Local: crc32 compensation attack'
        - 'bad client public DH value'
        - 'Corrupted MAC on input'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 9976fa64-2804-423c-8a5b-646ade840773
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections
id: 9976fa64-2804-423c-8a5b-646ade840773
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
    The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-5---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---smtp
    - https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-07
modified: 2022-09-21
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort:
            - 25
            - 587
            - 465
            - 2525
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_clients:
        Image|endswith:
            - \thunderbird.exe
            - \outlook.exe
    filter_mailserver:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
    filter_outlook:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_'
        Image|endswith: '\HxTsr.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Other SMTP tools
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP
Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.
status test author xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) ATT&CK technique id 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In TMP
id: 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
status: test
description: |
  Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder.
  This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2022-11-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: 'PROCEXP152.sys'
    filter:
        Image|contains:
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Package Installed - Linux
Detects installation of suspicious packages using system installation utilities
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 700fb7e8-2981-401c-8430-be58e189e741
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Package Installed - Linux
id: 700fb7e8-2981-401c-8430-be58e189e741
status: test
description: Detects installation of suspicious packages using system installation utilities
references:
    - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/MichaelKoczwara/12faba9c061c12b5814b711166de8c2f/raw/e2068486692897b620c25fde1ea258c8218fe3d3/history.txt
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-03
modified: 2026-01-01
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553.004
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_tool_apt:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/apt'
            - '/apt-get'
        CommandLine|contains: 'install'
    selection_tool_yum:
        Image|endswith: '/yum'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'localinstall'
            - 'install'
    selection_tool_rpm:
        Image|endswith: '/rpm'
        CommandLine|contains: '-i'
    selection_tool_dpkg:
        Image|endswith: '/dpkg'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '--install'
            - '-i'
    selection_keyword:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious packages
            - 'nmap'
            - ' nc'
            - 'netcat'
            - 'wireshark'
            - 'tshark'
            - 'openconnect'
            - 'proxychains'
            - 'socat'
    condition: 1 of selection_tool_* and selection_keyword
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious PowerShell Download - PoshModule
Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id de41232e-12e8-49fa-86bc-c05c7e722df9
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Download - PoshModule
id: de41232e-12e8-49fa-86bc-c05c7e722df9
related:
    - id: 65531a81-a694-4e31-ae04-f8ba5bc33759
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-8.0
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-8.0
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2023-01-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection_webclient_:
        ContextInfo|contains: 'System.Net.WebClient'
    selection_function:
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - '.DownloadString('
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell Download - Powershell Script
Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 403c2cc0-7f6b-4925-9423-bfa573bed7eb
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Download - Powershell Script
id: 403c2cc0-7f6b-4925-9423-bfa573bed7eb
related:
    - id: 65531a81-a694-4e31-ae04-f8ba5bc33759
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-8.0
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-8.0
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-05
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    webclient:
        ScriptBlockText|contains: 'System.Net.WebClient'
    download:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - '.DownloadFileAsync('
            - '.DownloadString('
            - '.DownloadStringAsync('
    condition: webclient and download
falsepositives:
    - PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell In Registry Run Keys
Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys
status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell In Registry Run Keys
id: 8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c
status: test
description: Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys
references:
    - https://github.com/frack113/atomic-red-team/blob/a9051c38de8a5320b31c7039efcbd3b56cf2d65a/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-9---systembc-malware-as-a-service-registry
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-17
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run' # Also covers "RunOnce" and "RunOnceEx"
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
        Details|contains:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh '
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - '.DownloadFile('
            - '.DownloadString('
            - ' -w hidden '
            - ' -w 1 '
            - '-windowstyle hidden'
            - '-window hidden'
            - ' -nop '
            - ' -encodedcommand '
            - '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass'
            - 'Invoke-Expression'
            - 'IEX ('
            - 'Invoke-Command'
            - 'ICM -'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'IWR '
            - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
            - 'IRM '
            - ' -noni '
            - ' -noninteractive '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin or third party scripts. Baseline according to your environment
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell Invocation From Script Engines
Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 95eadcb2-92e4-4ed1-9031-92547773a6db
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocation From Script Engines
id: 95eadcb2-92e4-4ed1-9031-92547773a6db
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs
references:
    - https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2017/03/20/attackers-leverage-excel-powershell-dns-latest-non-malware-attack/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_health_service:
        CurrentDirectory|contains: '\Health Service State\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM)
    - Other scripts
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 536e2947-3729-478c-9903-745aaffe60d2
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
id: 536e2947-3729-478c-9903-745aaffe60d2
related:
    - id: fce5f582-cc00-41e1-941a-c6fabf0fdb8c
      type: obsolete
    - id: ae7fbf8e-f3cb-49fd-8db4-5f3bed522c71
      type: similar
    - id: 8ff28fdd-e2fa-4dfa-aeda-ef3d61c62090
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_convert_b64:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-nop'
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - ' -c '
            - '[Convert]::FromBase64String'
    selection_iex:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-noni'
            - '-nop'
            - ' -c '
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
    selection_enc:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -w '
            - 'hidden'
            - '-ep'
            - 'bypass'
            - '-Enc'
    selection_reg:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'reg'
            - 'add'
            - '\software\'
    selection_webclient:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'bypass'
            - '-noprofile'
            - '-windowstyle'
            - 'hidden'
            - 'new-object'
            - 'system.net.webclient'
            - '.download'
    selection_iex_webclient:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'iex'
            - 'New-Object'
            - 'Net.WebClient'
            - '.Download'
    filter_chocolatey:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1"
            - 'Write-ChocolateyWarning'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden
status test author frack113, Tim Shelton (fp AWS) ATT&CK sub-technique id 313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option
id: 313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.
    In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.md
author: frack113, Tim Shelton (fp AWS)
date: 2021-10-20
modified: 2023-01-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'WindowStyle'
            - 'Hidden'
    filter:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - ':\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\'
            - '$PSScriptRoot\Module\WorkspaceScriptModule\WorkspaceScriptModule'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Powercfg Execution To Change Lock Screen Timeout
Detects suspicious execution of 'Powercfg.exe' to change lock screen timeout
status test author frack113 ATT&CK tactic-only id f8d6a15e-4bc8-4c27-8e5d-2b10f0b73e5b
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Powercfg Execution To Change Lock Screen Timeout
id: f8d6a15e-4bc8-4c27-8e5d-2b10f0b73e5b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious execution of 'Powercfg.exe' to change lock screen timeout
references:
    - https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/powercfg-command-line-options
author: frack113
date: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_power:
        - Image|endswith: '\powercfg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'PowerCfg.exe'
    selection_standby:
        # powercfg.exe /SETACVALUEINDEX SCHEME_CURRENT SUB_VIDEO VIDEOCONLOCK
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '/setacvalueindex '
              - 'SCHEME_CURRENT'
              - 'SUB_VIDEO'
              - 'VIDEOCONLOCK'
        # powercfg -change -standby-timeout-dc 3000
        # powercfg -change -standby-timeout-ac 3000
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '-change '
              - '-standby-timeout-'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Process Start Locations
Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations
status test author juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community ATT&CK technique id 15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process Start Locations
id: 15b75071-74cc-47e0-b4c6-b43744a62a2b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process run from unusual locations
references:
    - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2013-05-002
author: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-01-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\RECYCLER\'
              - ':\SystemVolumeInformation\'
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
              - 'C:\Windows\debug\'
              - 'C:\Windows\fonts\'
              - 'C:\Windows\help\'
              - 'C:\Windows\drivers\'
              - 'C:\Windows\addins\'
              - 'C:\Windows\cursors\'
              - 'C:\Windows\system32\tasks\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious RASdial Activity
Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe
status test author juju4 ATT&CK technique id 6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious RASdial Activity
id: 6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/subTee/status/891298217907830785
author: juju4
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'rasdial.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using the PowerShell Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id c8a180d6-47a3-4345-a609-53f9c3d834fc
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Using Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
id: c8a180d6-47a3-4345-a609-53f9c3d834fc
related:
    - id: cef24b90-dddc-4ae1-a09a-8764872f69fc
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using the PowerShell Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
references:
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-10
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Covers group and localgroup flags
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Get-LocalGroupMember '
    selection_group:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more groups for other languages
            - 'domain admins'
            - ' administrator' # Typo without an 'S' so we catch both
            - ' administrateur' # Typo without an 'S' so we catch both
            - 'enterprise admins'
            - 'Exchange Trusted Subsystem'
            - 'Remote Desktop Users'
            - 'Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance' # French for "Remote Desktop Users"
            - 'Usuarios de escritorio remoto' # Spanish for "Remote Desktop Users"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Moderate High FP
Suspicious Recursive Takeown
Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands takeown which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 554601fb-9b71-4bcc-abf4-21a611be4fde
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Recursive Takeown
id: 554601fb-9b71-4bcc-abf4-21a611be4fde
status: test
description: Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands takeown which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/takeown
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.001/T1222.001.md#atomic-test-1---take-ownership-using-takeown-utility
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-30
modified: 2022-11-21
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1222.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\takeown.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/f '
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Scripts created by developers and admins
    - Administrative activity
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
medium Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Rejected SMB Guest Logon From IP
Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w ATT&CK sub-technique id 71886b70-d7b4-4dbf-acce-87d2ca135262
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Rejected SMB Guest Logon From IP
id: 71886b70-d7b4-4dbf-acce-87d2ca135262
status: test
description: Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service
references:
    - https://twitter.com/KevTheHermit/status/1410203844064301056
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210629055600/https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210701042336/https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w
date: 2021-06-30
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: smbclient-security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 31017
        UserName: ''
        ServerName|startswith: '\1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Account fallback reasons (after failed login with specific account)
level: medium
Convert to SIEM query
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