Sigma (generic) detection rules

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1

Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process"

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova ATT&CK technique id a0459f02-ac51-4c09-b511-b8c9203fc429

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1
id: a0459f02-ac51-4c09-b511-b8c9203fc429
status: test
description: Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process"
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/
    - https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: As this function is usually called from within powershell, classical process creation even would not catch it. This will only catch inline calls via "-Command" or "-ScriptBlock" flags for example.
        CommandLine|contains: 'SyncInvoke '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Process Hollowing Activity

Detects when a memory process image does not match the disk image, indicative of process hollowing.

status test author Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Sittikorn S ATT&CK sub-technique id c4b890e5-8d8c-4496-8c66-c805753817cd

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Process Hollowing Activity
id: c4b890e5-8d8c-4496-8c66-c805753817cd
status: test
description: Detects when a memory process image does not match the disk image, indicative of process hollowing.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SecurePeacock/status/1486054048390332423?s=20
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-sysmon-now-detects-malware-process-tampering-attempts/
author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Sittikorn S
date: 2022-01-25
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055.012
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_tampering
detection:
    selection:
        Type: 'Image is replaced'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIADAP.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\wbem\WMIADAP.exe'
    filter_optional_opera:
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
        Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
    filter_optional_edge:
        Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes. Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.

status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0

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title: Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE
id: 221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes.
    Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-01
modified: 2025-06-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1057
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'process'
    filter_main_creation:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Rule id 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d for `wmic process call create #{process_to_execute}`
            - 'call'
            - 'create'
    filter_main_terminate:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Rule id 49d9671b-0a0a-4c09-8280-d215bfd30662 for `wmic path win32_process where processid=#{processid_to_terminate} call terminate`
            - 'call'
            - 'terminate'
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong High FP

Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products. Adversaries often enumerate security products installed on a system to identify security controls and potential ways to evade detection or disable protection mechanisms. This information helps them plan their next attack steps and choose appropriate techniques to bypass security measures.

status test author Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), juju4, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e568650b-5dcd-4658-8f34-ded0b1e13992

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title: Potential Product Class Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
id: e568650b-5dcd-4658-8f34-ded0b1e13992
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products.
    Adversaries often enumerate security products installed on a system to identify security controls and potential ways to evade detection or disable protection mechanisms.
    This information helps them plan their next attack steps and choose appropriate techniques to bypass security measures.
references:
    - https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/c820c7fea76cf76a861b28ebc77e06100e20ec29/Ransomware/Maze.md
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/4be06ecd234e2110bd615649fe4a6fa95403979acf889d7e45a78985eb50acf9?environmentId=1
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), juju4, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-14
modified: 2025-03-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example: wmic.exe /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AntiVirusProduct'
            - 'AntiSpywareProduct'
            - 'FirewallProduct'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of wmic.exe for reconnaissance of firewall, antivirus and antispywware products.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Product Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall and antivirus products

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali ATT&CK technique id 15434e33-5027-4914-88d5-3d4145ec25a9

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title: Potential Product Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
id: 15434e33-5027-4914-88d5-3d4145ec25a9
status: test
description: Detects the execution of WMIC in order to get a list of firewall and antivirus products
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/03/06/2022-year-in-review/
    - https://www.yeahhub.com/list-installed-programs-version-path-windows/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/253555/software-list-inventory-wmic-product
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2023-02-14
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Product'
    filter_main_call_operations:
        # wmic /node:"#{node}" product where "name like '#{product}%%'" call uninstall
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' uninstall'
            - ' install'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Provlaunch.EXE Binary Proxy Execution Abuse

Detects child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK technique id 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Provlaunch.EXE Binary Proxy Execution Abuse
id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c
related:
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    filter_main_covered_children:
        # Note: this filter is here to avoid duplicate alerting by f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Python DLL SideLoading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of Python DLL files.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id d36f7c12-14a3-4d48-b6b8-774b9c66f44d

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Python DLL SideLoading
id: d36f7c12-14a3-4d48-b6b8-774b9c66f44d
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of Python DLL files.
references:
    - https://www.securonix.com/blog/seolurker-attack-campaign-uses-seo-poisoning-fake-google-ads-to-install-malware/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/wietze/HijackLibs/tree/dc9c9f2f94e6872051dab58fbafb043fdd8b4176/yml/3rd_party/python
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-10-06
modified: 2025-08-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\python39.dll'
            - '\python310.dll'
            - '\python311.dll'
            - '\python312.dll'
    filter_main_default_install_paths:
        - ImageLoaded|startswith:
              - 'C:\Program Files\Python3'
              - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Python3'
        - ImageLoaded|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python3'
    filter_optional_visual_studio:
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
    filter_optional_anaconda:
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\' # Comment out if you don't use Anaconda in your environment
    filter_optional_cpython:
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - '\cpython\externals\'
            - '\cpython\PCbuild\'
    filter_optional_pyinstaller:
        # Triggered by programs bundled with PyInstaller
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Users'
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI'
    filter_main_legit_signature_details:
        Product: 'Python'
        Signed: 'true'
        Description: 'Python'
        Company: 'Python Software Foundation'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software using Python DLLs
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Low FP

Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708

Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708

status test author Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements) ATT&CK technique id aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708
id: aaa5b30d-f418-420b-83a0-299cb6024885
status: test
description: Detect suspicious error on protocol RDP, potential CVE-2019-0708
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190710034152/https://github.com/zerosum0x0/CVE-2019-0708
    - https://github.com/Ekultek/BlueKeep
author: 'Lionel PRAT, Christophe BROCAS, @atc_project (improvements)'
date: 2019-05-24
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - car.2013-07-002
    - cve.2019-0708
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 56
            - 50
        Provider_Name: TermDD
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Bad connections or network interruptions
# too many false positives
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential RDP Session Hijacking Activity

Detects potential RDP Session Hijacking activity on Windows systems

status test author @juju4 ATT&CK tactic-only id 224f140f-3553-4cd1-af78-13d81bf9f7cc

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential RDP Session Hijacking Activity
id: 224f140f-3553-4cd1-af78-13d81bf9f7cc
status: test
description: Detects potential RDP Session Hijacking activity on Windows systems
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/909449115477659651
author: '@juju4'
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\tscon.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'tscon.exe'
    selection_integrity:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Ransomware or Unauthorized MBR Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE

Detects potential malicious and unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe

status test author @neu5ron ATT&CK sub-technique id c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Ransomware or Unauthorized MBR Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE
id: c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429
status: test
description: Detects potential malicious and unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/bcdedit--set
    - https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1372536434125512712/photo/2
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2019-02-07
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1542.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bcdedit.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete'
            - 'deletevalue'
            - 'import'
            - 'safeboot'
            - 'network'
    condition: all of selection_*
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE

Detects nltest commands that can be used for information discovery

status test author Craig Young, oscd.community, Georg Lauenstein ATT&CK technique id 5cc90652-4cbd-4241-aa3b-4b462fa5a248

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Recon Activity Via Nltest.EXE
id: 5cc90652-4cbd-4241-aa3b-4b462fa5a248
related:
    - id: 410ad193-a728-4107-bc79-4419789fcbf8
      type: similar
    - id: 903076ff-f442-475a-b667-4f246bcc203b
      type: similar
    - id: 77815820-246c-47b8-9741-e0def3f57308
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects nltest commands that can be used for information discovery
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731935(v=ws.11)
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/16/trickbot-leads-up-to-fake-1password-installation/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters
    - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/03e231a6-74bc-467a-acb1-e5676b0fb55e.html
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5360c9d9ffa3b25f6495f7a16e267b719eba2c37/atomics/T1482/T1482.md#atomic-test-2---windows---discover-domain-trusts-with-nltest
author: Craig Young, oscd.community, Georg Lauenstein
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-12-15
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1016
    - attack.t1482
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_nltest:
        - Image|endswith: '\nltest.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'nltestrk.exe'
    selection_recon:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'server'
              - 'query'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/user'
              - 'all_trusts' # Flag for /domain_trusts
              - 'dclist:'
              - 'dnsgetdc:'
              - 'domain_trusts'
              - 'dsgetdc:'
              - 'parentdomain'
              - 'trusted_domains'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration use but user and host must be investigated
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS

Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine

status test author blueteamer8699 ATT&CK sub-technique id 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS
id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe
related:
    - id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 # FileCreate
      type: similar
    - id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58 # ProcCreation Susp
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
references:
    - https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government
author: blueteamer8699
date: 2022-01-03
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1615
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'gatherNetworkInfo.vbs'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential ReflectDebugger Content Execution Via WerFault.EXE

Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebugger key which could be used to store the path to the malware in order to masquerade the execution flow

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential ReflectDebugger Content Execution Via WerFault.EXE
id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd
related:
    - id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebugger key which could be used to store the path to the malware in order to masquerade the execution flow
references:
    - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'WerFault.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -pr '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Register_App.Vbs LOLScript Abuse

Detects potential abuse of the "register_app.vbs" script that is part of the Windows SDK. The script offers the capability to register new VSS/VDS Provider as a COM+ application. Attackers can use this to install malicious DLLs for persistence and execution.

status test author Austin Songer @austinsonger ATT&CK technique id 28c8f68b-098d-45af-8d43-8089f3e35403

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Register_App.Vbs LOLScript Abuse
id: 28c8f68b-098d-45af-8d43-8089f3e35403
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the "register_app.vbs" script that is part of the Windows SDK. The script offers the capability to register new VSS/VDS Provider as a COM+ application. Attackers can use this to install malicious DLLs for persistence and execution.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1456613494783160325?s=20
    - https://github.com/microsoft/Windows-classic-samples/blob/7cbd99ac1d2b4a0beffbaba29ea63d024ceff700/Samples/Win7Samples/winbase/vss/vsssampleprovider/register_app.vbs
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-05
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '.vbs -register ' # register_app.vbs
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Other VB scripts that leverage the same starting command line flags
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via DbgManagedDebugger

Detects the addition of the "Debugger" value to the "DbgManagedDebugger" key in order to achieve persistence. Which will get invoked when an application crashes

status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 9827ae57-3802-418f-994b-d5ecf5cd974b

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via DbgManagedDebugger
id: 9827ae57-3802-418f-994b-d5ecf5cd974b
status: test
description: Detects the addition of the "Debugger" value to the "DbgManagedDebugger" key in order to achieve persistence. Which will get invoked when an application crashes
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/
    - https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-07
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\.NETFramework\DbgManagedDebugger'
    filter:
        Details: '"C:\Windows\system32\vsjitdebugger.exe" PID %d APPDOM %d EXTEXT "%s" EVTHDL %d'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the key to setup a debugger. Which is often the case on developers machines
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Registry Reconnaissance Via PowerShell Script

Detects PowerShell scripts with potential registry reconnaissance capabilities. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about the system credentials, configuration, and installed software.

status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 064060aa-09fb-4636-817f-020a32aa7e9e

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Registry Reconnaissance Via PowerShell Script
id: 064060aa-09fb-4636-817f-020a32aa7e9e
related:
    - id: 970007b7-ce32-49d0-a4a4-fbef016950bd
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell scripts with potential registry reconnaissance capabilities. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about the system credentials, configuration, and installed software.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1012/T1012.md
author: frack113
date: 2023-07-02
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1007
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        # TODO: switch to |re|i: after sigma specification v2 is released
        ScriptBlockText|re: '(Get-Item|gci|Get-ChildItem).{1,64}-Path.{1,64}\\(currentcontrolset\\services|CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run|CurrentVersion\\Run|CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad|CurrentVersion\\Windows\winlogon)\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Due to the nature of the script block, the matching of the string could sometimes result in a false positive. Use this rule to hunt for potential malicious or suspicious scripts.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly

Detects a potential command line flag anomaly related to "regsvr32" in which the "/i" flag is used without the "/n" which should be uncommon.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id b236190c-1c61-41e9-84b3-3fe03f6d76b0

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Regsvr32 Commandline Flag Anomaly
id: b236190c-1c61-41e9-84b3-3fe03f6d76b0
status: test
description: Detects a potential command line flag anomaly related to "regsvr32" in which the "/i" flag is used without the "/n" which should be uncommon.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1282441816986484737?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-07-13
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -i:'
    filter_main_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -n '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator typo might cause some false positives
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Low FP

Potential Remote Command Execution In Pod Container

Detects attempts to execute remote commands, within a Pod's container using e.g. the "kubectl exec" command.

status test author Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) ATT&CK technique id a1b0ca4e-7835-413e-8471-3ff2b8a66be6

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Remote Command Execution In Pod Container
id: a1b0ca4e-7835-413e-8471-3ff2b8a66be6
status: test
description: |
    Detects attempts to execute remote commands, within a Pod's container using e.g. the "kubectl exec" command.
references:
    - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Exec%20into%20container/
author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
date: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.t1609
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: application
    product: kubernetes
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        verb: 'create'
        objectRef.resource: 'pods'
        objectRef.subresource: 'exec'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate debugging activity. Investigate the identity performing the requests and their authorization.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host

Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.

status test author James Pemberton ATT&CK sub-technique id ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host
id: ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad
status: test
description: Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.
references:
    - n/a
author: James Pemberton
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ntlm
    definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8001
        TargetName|startswith: 'TERMSRV'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Host connections to valid domains, exclude these.
    - Host connections not using host FQDN.
    - Host connections to external legitimate domains.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling

Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.

status test author Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) ATT&CK technique id 8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
id: 8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f
status: test
description: Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.html
author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ':3389' # RDP port and usual SSH tunneling related switches in command line
    selection_opt:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -L '
            - ' -P '
            - ' -R '
            - ' -pw '
            - ' -ssh '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Low FP

Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity

Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network. This event is best correlated and used as an enrichment to determine the potential lateral movement activity.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9599c180-e3a8-4743-8f92-7fb96d3be648

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Remote WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers Activity
id: 9599c180-e3a8-4743-8f92-7fb96d3be648
status: test
description: |
    Detect potential adversaries leveraging WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers remotely to move laterally in a network.
    This event is best correlated and used as an enrichment to determine the potential lateral movement activity.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/200902-RemoteWMIActiveScriptEventConsumers/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-09-02
modified: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - detection.threat-hunting
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
        ProcessName|endswith: 'scrcons.exe'
    filter_main_local_system:
        TargetLogonId: '0x3e7' # Local System
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - SCCM
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential RjvPlatform.DLL Sideloading From Default Location

Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 259dda31-b7a3-444f-b7d8-17f96e8a7d0d

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential RjvPlatform.DLL Sideloading From Default Location
id: 259dda31-b7a3-444f-b7d8-17f96e8a7d0d
status: test
description: Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1666716511988330499
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemResetPlatform\SystemResetPlatform.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\$SysReset\Framework\Stack\RjvPlatform.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential RoboForm.DLL Sideloading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of "roboform.dll", a DLL used by RoboForm Password Manager

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f64c9b2d-b0ad-481d-9d03-7fc75020892a

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential RoboForm.DLL Sideloading
id: f64c9b2d-b0ad-481d-9d03-7fc75020892a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "roboform.dll", a DLL used by RoboForm Password Manager
references:
    - https://twitter.com/StopMalvertisin/status/1648604148848549888
    - https://twitter.com/t3ft3lb/status/1656194831830401024
    - https://www.roboform.com/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-14
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\roboform.dll'
            - '\roboform-x64.dll'
    filter_main_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - ' C:\Program Files (x86)\Siber Systems\AI RoboForm\'
            - ' C:\Program Files\Siber Systems\AI RoboForm\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\robotaskbaricon.exe'
            - '\robotaskbaricon-x64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - If installed on a per-user level, the path would be located in "AppData\Local". Add additional filters to reflect this mode of installation
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Ruby Reverse Shell

Detects execution of ruby with the "-e" flag and calls to "socket" related functions. This could be an indication of a potential attempt to setup a reverse shell

status test author @d4ns4n_ ATT&CK tactic-only id b8bdac18-c06e-4016-ac30-221553e74f59

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Ruby Reverse Shell
id: b8bdac18-c06e-4016-ac30-221553e74f59
status: test
description: Detects execution of ruby with the "-e" flag and calls to "socket" related functions. This could be an indication of a potential attempt to setup a reverse shell
references:
    - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: '@d4ns4n_'
date: 2023-04-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains: 'ruby'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -e'
            - 'rsocket'
            - 'TCPSocket'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ash'
            - ' bash'
            - ' bsh'
            - ' csh'
            - ' ksh'
            - ' pdksh'
            - ' sh'
            - ' tcsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

status experimental author Elastic (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 86a7c91f-98c3-4f14-a58d-d989421e1234

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation
id: 86a7c91f-98c3-4f14-a58d-d989421e1234
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories,
    which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.
references:
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31324
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-reliaquest-uncovers-vulnerability-behind-sap-netweaver-compromise/
    - https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/
author: Elastic (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059.003
    - cve.2025-31324
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\j2ee\cluster\apps\sap.com\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\work'
            - '\j2ee\cluster\apps\sap.com\irj\servlet_jsp\irj\root'
    selection_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.jsp'
            - '.java'
            - '.class'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate creation of jsc or java files in these locations
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation - Linux

Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories, which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.

status experimental author Elastic (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 5b91409c-cb18-4ab6-ac75-c5759f998409

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential SAP NetWeaver Webshell Creation - Linux
id: 5b91409c-cb18-4ab6-ac75-c5759f998409
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of suspicious files (jsp, java, class) in SAP NetWeaver directories,
    which may indicate exploitation attempts of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-31324.
references:
    - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31324
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-reliaquest-uncovers-vulnerability-behind-sap-netweaver-compromise/
    - https://onapsis.com/blog/active-exploitation-of-sap-vulnerability-cve-2025-31324/
author: Elastic (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059.003
    - cve.2025-31324
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '/j2ee/cluster/apps/sap.com/irj/servlet_jsp/irj/work/'
            - '/j2ee/cluster/apps/sap.com/irj/servlet_jsp/irj/root/'
    selection_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.jsp'
            - '.java'
            - '.class'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate creation of jsc or java files in these locations
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong High FP

Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE

Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting

status test author Markus Neis, keepwatch ATT&CK sub-technique id 1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE
id: 1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599
status: test
description: Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200329173843/https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation/?edition=2019
author: Markus Neis, keepwatch
date: 2018-11-14
modified: 2023-10-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1558.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\setspn.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'setspn.exe'
        - Description|contains|all:
              - 'Query or reset the computer'
              - 'SPN attribute'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -q '
            - ' /q '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administration activity
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Script Proxy Execution Via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1

Detects the use of the Microsoft signed script "CL_mutexverifiers" to proxy the execution of additional PowerShell script commands

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, frack113 ATT&CK technique id 1e0e1a81-e79b-44bc-935b-ddb9c8006b3d

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Script Proxy Execution Via CL_Mutexverifiers.ps1
id: 1e0e1a81-e79b-44bc-935b-ddb9c8006b3d
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Microsoft signed script "CL_mutexverifiers" to proxy the execution of additional PowerShell script commands
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_mutexverifiers/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, frack113
date: 2022-05-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pwsh:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Note: to avoid potential FPs we assume the script was launched from powershell. But in theory it can be launched by any Powershell like process
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -nologo -windowstyle minimized -file '
    selection_temp:
        # Note: Since the function uses "env:temp" the value will change depending on the context of exec
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Secure Deletion with SDelete

Detects files that have extensions commonly seen while SDelete is used to wipe files.

status test author Thomas Patzke ATT&CK sub-technique id 39a80702-d7ca-4a83-b776-525b1f86a36d

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Secure Deletion with SDelete
id: 39a80702-d7ca-4a83-b776-525b1f86a36d
status: test
description: Detects files that have extensions commonly seen while SDelete is used to wipe files.
references:
    - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/sdelete.htm
    - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-14
modified: 2024-12-13
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1070.004
    - attack.t1027.005
    - attack.t1485
    - attack.t1553.002
    - attack.s0195
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
            - 4658
        ObjectName|endswith:
            - '.AAA'
            - '.ZZZ'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of SDelete
    - Files that are interacted with that have these extensions legitimately
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential SentinelOne Shell Context Menu Scan Command Tampering

Detects potentially suspicious changes to the SentinelOne context menu scan command by a process other than SentinelOne.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 6c304b02-06e6-402d-8be4-d5833cdf8198

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential SentinelOne Shell Context Menu Scan Command Tampering
id: 6c304b02-06e6-402d-8be4-d5833cdf8198
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious changes to the SentinelOne context menu scan command by a process other than SentinelOne.
references:
    - https://mrd0x.com/sentinelone-persistence-via-menu-context/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-03-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\shell\SentinelOneScan\command\'
    filter_main_sentinelone_default_scan_binary:
        Details|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SentinelOne\Sentinel Agent'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne\Sentinel Agent'
        Details|contains: '\SentinelScanFromContextMenu.exe'
    filter_main_sentinelone_binary:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\SentinelOne\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SentinelOne\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Functionality Abuse

Detects potential "ShellDispatch.dll" functionality abuse to execute arbitrary binaries via "ShellExecute"

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 82343930-652f-43f5-ab70-2ee9fdd6d5e9

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Functionality Abuse
id: 82343930-652f-43f5-ab70-2ee9fdd6d5e9
status: test
description: Detects potential "ShellDispatch.dll" functionality abuse to execute arbitrary binaries via "ShellExecute"
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/06/07/this-lolbin-doesnt-exist/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: 'RunDll_ShellExecuteW'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Sideloading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll"

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 844f8eb2-610b-42c8-89a4-47596e089663

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title: Potential ShellDispatch.DLL Sideloading
id: 844f8eb2-610b-42c8-89a4-47596e089663
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll"
references:
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/06/07/this-lolbin-doesnt-exist/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\ShellDispatch.dll'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        - ImageLoaded|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
        - ImageLoaded|contains: ':\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers may trigger some false positives
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Shellcode Injection

Detects potential shellcode injection as seen used by tools such as Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject.

status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK technique id 250ae82f-736e-4844-a68b-0b5e8cc887da

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Shellcode Injection
id: 250ae82f-736e-4844-a68b-0b5e8cc887da
status: test
description: Detects potential shellcode injection as seen used by tools such as Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject.
references:
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/PSInject
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-03-11
modified: 2024-07-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x147a'
            - '0x1f3fff'
        CallTrace|contains: 'UNKNOWN'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\Wbem\Wmiprvse.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe'
    filter_optional_dell_folders:
        # If dell software is installed we get matches like these
        # Example 1:
        #   SourceImage: C:\Program Files\Dell\SupportAssistAgent\bin\SupportAssistAgent.exe
        #   TargetImage: C:\Program Files\Dell\TechHub\Dell.TechHub.exe
        #   GrantedAccess: 0x1F3FFF
        # Example 2:
        #   SourceImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\DCF\Dell.DCF.UA.Bradbury.API.SubAgent.exe
        #   TargetImage: C:\Program Files\Dell\TechHub\Dell.TechHub.exe
        #   GrantedAccess: 0x1F3FFF
        # Example 3:
        #   SourceImage: C:\Program Files\Dell\TechHub\Dell.TechHub.exe
        #   TargetImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\DCF\Dell.DCF.UA.Bradbury.API.SubAgent.exe
        #   GrantedAccess: 0x1F3FFF
        SourceImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dell\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\'
        TargetImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dell\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\'
    filter_optional_dell_specifc:
        SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\ServiceShell.exe'
        TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE'
    filter_optional_visual_studio:
        SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
        TargetImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE

Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe. Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims

status test author Markus Neis ATT&CK sub-technique id 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8

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title: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE
id: 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8
related:
    - id: 18ee686c-38a3-4f65-9f44-48a077141f42
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe.
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
author: Markus Neis
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\sdbinst.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'sdbinst.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '.sdb'
    filter_optional_iis:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Expected behavior for IIS Express (e.g. https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/15d4ff941f77f7bdfc9dfb2399b7b952a0a2c860976ef3e835998ff4796e5e91?environmentId=120)
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
            - ':\Program Files\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Low FP

Potential Sidecar Injection Into Running Deployment

Detects attempts to inject a sidecar container into a running deployment. A sidecar container is an additional container within a pod, that resides alongside the main container. One way to add containers to running resources like Deployments/DeamonSets/StatefulSets, is via a "kubectl patch" operation. By injecting a new container within a legitimate pod, an attacker can run their code and hide their activity, instead of running their own separated pod in the cluster.

status test author Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) ATT&CK technique id ad9012a6-e518-4432-9890-f3b82b8fc71f

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Sidecar Injection Into Running Deployment
id: ad9012a6-e518-4432-9890-f3b82b8fc71f
status: test
description: |
    Detects attempts to inject a sidecar container into a running deployment.
    A sidecar container is an additional container within a pod, that resides alongside the main container.
    One way to add containers to running resources like Deployments/DeamonSets/StatefulSets, is via a "kubectl patch" operation.
    By injecting a new container within a legitimate pod, an attacker can run their code and hide their activity, instead of running their own separated pod in the cluster.
references:
    - https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/manage-kubernetes-objects/update-api-object-kubectl-patch
    - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Sidecar%20Injection/
author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
date: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.t1609
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: application
    product: kubernetes
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        verb: 'patch'
        apiGroup: 'apps'
        objectRef.resource: 'deployments'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential SolidPDFCreator.DLL Sideloading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SolidPDFCreator.dll"

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id a2edbce1-95c8-4291-8676-0d45146862b3

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential SolidPDFCreator.DLL Sideloading
id: a2edbce1-95c8-4291-8676-0d45146862b3
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SolidPDFCreator.dll"
references:
    - https://lab52.io/blog/new-mustang-pandas-campaing-against-australia/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\SolidPDFCreator.dll'
    filter_main_path:
        Image|endswith: '\SolidPDFCreator.exe'
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SolidDocuments\SolidPDFCreator\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\SolidDocuments\SolidPDFCreator\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Suspicious Activity Using SeCEdit

Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy

status test author Janantha Marasinghe ATT&CK sub-technique id c2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0eb

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Activity Using SeCEdit
id: c2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0eb
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy
references:
    - https://blueteamops.medium.com/secedit-and-i-know-it-595056dee53d
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/secedit
author: Janantha Marasinghe
date: 2022-11-18
modified: 2022-12-30
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1505.005
    - attack.t1556.002
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1574.007
    - attack.t1564.002
    - attack.t1546.008
    - attack.t1546.007
    - attack.t1547.014
    - attack.t1547.010
    - attack.t1547.002
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\secedit.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SeCEdit'
    selection_flags_discovery:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/export'
            - '/cfg'
    selection_flags_configure:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/configure'
            - '/db'
    # filter:
    #     SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'  SubjectUserName is from event ID 4719 in the Windows Security log
    condition: selection_img and (1 of selection_flags_*)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Suspicious Browser Launch From Document Reader Process

Detects when a browser process or browser tab is launched from an application that handles document files such as Adobe, Microsoft Office, etc. And connects to a web application over http(s), this could indicate a possible phishing attempt.

status test author Joseph Kamau ATT&CK sub-technique id 1193d960-2369-499f-a158-7b50a31df682

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Browser Launch From Document Reader Process
id: 1193d960-2369-499f-a158-7b50a31df682
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a browser process or browser tab is launched from an application that handles document files such as Adobe, Microsoft Office, etc. And connects to a web application over http(s), this could indicate a possible phishing attempt.
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/69c5abaa-92ad-45ba-8c53-c11e23e05d04/ # PDF Document
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/64043a79-165f-4052-bcba-e6e49f847ec1/ # Office Document
author: Joseph Kamau
date: 2024-05-27
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Acrobat Reader'
            - 'Microsoft Office'
            - 'PDF Reader'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\maxthon.exe'
            - '\seamonkey.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    filter_main_microsoft_help:
        CommandLine|contains: 'https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/'
    filter_optional_foxit:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://ad.foxitsoftware.com/adlog.php?'
            - 'https://globe-map.foxitservice.com/go.php?do=redirect'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely in most cases, further investigation should be done in the commandline of the browser process to determine the context of the URL accessed.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Suspicious Change To Sensitive/Critical Files

Detects changes of sensitive and critical files. Monitors files that you don't expect to change without planning on Linux system. These files include, but are not limited to, system configuration files, authentication files, and critical application files. Attackers often target these files to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or disrupt system operations.

status test author @d4ns4n_ (Wuerth-Phoenix) ATT&CK sub-technique id 86157017-c2b1-4d4a-8c33-93b8e67e4af4

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Change To Sensitive/Critical Files
id: 86157017-c2b1-4d4a-8c33-93b8e67e4af4
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes of sensitive and critical files. Monitors files that you don't expect to change without planning on Linux system.
    These files include, but are not limited to, system configuration files, authentication files, and critical application files.
    Attackers often target these files to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or disrupt system operations.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/defender-for-cloud/file-integrity-monitoring-overview#which-files-should-i-monitor
author: '@d4ns4n_ (Wuerth-Phoenix)'
date: 2023-05-30
modified: 2026-03-18
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/cat'
            - '/echo'
            - '/grep'
            - '/head'
            - '/more'
            - '/tail'
        CommandLine|contains: '>'
    selection_img_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/emacs'
            - '/nano'
            - '/sed'
            - '/vi'
            - '/vim'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/login'
            - '/bin/passwd'
            - '/boot/'
            - '/etc/*.conf'
            - '/etc/cron.' # Covers different cron config files "daily", "hourly", etc.
            - '/etc/crontab'
            - '/etc/hosts'
            - '/etc/init.d'
            - '/etc/sudoers'
            - '/opt/bin/'
            - '/sbin' # Covers: '/opt/sbin', '/usr/local/sbin/', '/usr/sbin/'
            - '/usr/bin/'
            - '/usr/local/bin/'
    filter_main_mdadm.conf:
        Image|endswith: '/bin/sed'
        CommandLine|startswith:
            - 'sed -i /^*'
            - 'sed -ne s/^'
        CommandLine|endswith: '/etc/mdadm/mdadm.conf'
    condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_paths and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives are to be expected on user or administrator machines. Apply additional filters as needed.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Suspicious PowerShell Keywords

Detects potentially suspicious keywords that could indicate the use of a PowerShell exploitation framework

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Perez Diego (@darkquassar), Tuan Le (NCSGroup) ATT&CK sub-technique id 1f49f2ab-26bc-48b3-96cc-dcffbc93eadf

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
id: 1f49f2ab-26bc-48b3-96cc-dcffbc93eadf
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious keywords that could indicate the use of a PowerShell exploitation framework
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/entering-a-covenant-net-command-and-control-e11038bcf462
    - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1
    - https://github.com/hlldz/Phant0m/blob/30c2935d8cf4aafda17ee2fab7cd0c4aa9a607c2/old/Invoke-Phant0m.ps1
    - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/0dbe00ad401daa7137c81c99c268cfb7
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Perez Diego (@darkquassar), Tuan Le (NCSGroup)
date: 2019-02-11
modified: 2023-04-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'System.Reflection.Assembly.Load($'
            - '[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($'
            - '[Reflection.Assembly]::Load($'
            - 'System.Reflection.AssemblyName'
            - 'Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess'
            - 'Reflection.Emit.CustomAttributeBuilder'
            - 'Runtime.InteropServices.UnmanagedType'
            - 'Runtime.InteropServices.DllImportAttribute'
            - 'SuspendThread'
            - 'rundll32'
            # - 'FromBase64'
            # - 'Invoke-WMIMethod' # Prone to FP
            # - 'http://127.0.0.1' # Prone to FP
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Suspicious PowerShell Module File Created

Detects the creation of a new PowerShell module in the first folder of the module directory structure "\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\malware\malware.psm1". This is somewhat an uncommon practice as legitimate modules often includes a version folder.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id e8a52bbd-bced-459f-bd93-64db45ce7657

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious PowerShell Module File Created
id: e8a52bbd-bced-459f-bd93-64db45ce7657
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new PowerShell module in the first folder of the module directory structure "\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\malware\malware.psm1". This is somewhat an uncommon practice as legitimate modules often includes a version folder.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/developer/module/understanding-a-windows-powershell-module?view=powershell-7.3
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Note: Don't include PowerShell 7 as it has default modules that don't follow this logic
            - '\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.ps'
            - '\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positive rate will vary depending on the environments. Additional filters might be required to make this logic usable in production.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential Suspicious Registry File Imported Via Reg.EXE

Detects the import of '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility

status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali ATT&CK technique id 62e0298b-e994-4189-bc87-bc699aa62d97

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Registry File Imported Via Reg.EXE
id: 62e0298b-e994-4189-bc87-bc699aa62d97
related:
    - id: 73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/reg-import
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' import '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate import of keys
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong High FP

Potential Suspicious Windows Feature Enabled

Detects usage of the built-in PowerShell cmdlet "Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature" used as a Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images

status test author frack113 ATT&CK tactic-only id 55c925c1-7195-426b-a136-a9396800e29b

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Windows Feature Enabled
id: 55c925c1-7195-426b-a136-a9396800e29b
related:
    - id: c740d4cf-a1e9-41de-bb16-8a46a4f57918
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the built-in PowerShell cmdlet "Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature" used as a Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
    Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/enable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/projfs/enabling-windows-projected-file-system
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install-on-server
author: frack113
date: 2022-09-10
modified: 2022-12-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature'
            - '-Online'
            - '-FeatureName'
    selection_feature:
        # Add any insecure/unusual windows features to your env
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'TelnetServer'
            - 'Internet-Explorer-Optional-amd64'
            - 'TFTP'
            - 'SMB1Protocol'
            - 'Client-ProjFS'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Subsystem-Linux'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the features listed in the rule.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong High FP

Potential Suspicious Windows Feature Enabled - ProcCreation

Detects usage of the built-in PowerShell cmdlet "Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature" used as a Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool. Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id c740d4cf-a1e9-41de-bb16-8a46a4f57918

view Sigma YAML

title: Potential Suspicious Windows Feature Enabled - ProcCreation
id: c740d4cf-a1e9-41de-bb16-8a46a4f57918
related:
    - id: 55c925c1-7195-426b-a136-a9396800e29b
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the built-in PowerShell cmdlet "Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature" used as a Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool.
    Similar to DISM.exe, this cmdlet is used to enumerate, install, uninstall, configure, and update features and packages in Windows images
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/dism/enable-windowsoptionalfeature?view=windowsserver2022-ps
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/projfs/enabling-windows-projected-file-system
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install-on-server
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature'
            - '-Online'
            - '-FeatureName'
    selection_feature:
        # Add any insecure/unusual windows features that you don't use in your environment
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'TelnetServer'
            - 'Internet-Explorer-Optional-amd64'
            - 'TFTP'
            - 'SMB1Protocol'
            - 'Client-ProjFS'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Subsystem-Linux'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the features listed in the rule.
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential UAC Bypass Via Sdclt.EXE

A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK sub-technique id 40f9af16-589d-4984-b78d-8c2aec023197

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title: Potential UAC Bypass Via Sdclt.EXE
id: 40f9af16-589d-4984-b78d-8c2aec023197
status: test
description: A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques.
references:
    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/6
    - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/3.B.2_C36B49B5-DF58-4A34-9FE9-56189B9DEFEA.md
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-05-02
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'sdclt.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'High'
            - 'S-1-16-12288' # High
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock

Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation.

status experimental author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5

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title: Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock
id: cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/03/21/unconstrained-delegation/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adcomputer?view=windowsserver2022-ps
author: frack113
date: 2025-03-05
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1558
    - attack.t1589.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '-Properties*TrustedForDelegation'
            - '-Properties*TrustedToAuthForDelegation'
            - '-Properties*msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
            - '-Properties*PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount'
            - '-LDAPFilter*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate High FP

Potential Unquoted Service Path Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE

Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths using wmic. Often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 68bcd73b-37ef-49cb-95fc-edc809730be6

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title: Potential Unquoted Service Path Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
id: 68bcd73b-37ef-49cb-95fc-edc809730be6
related:
    - id: 09658312-bc27-4a3b-91c5-e49ab9046d1b # PowerShell Variant
      type: similar
    - id: 76f55eaa-d27f-4213-9d45-7b0e4b60bbae
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects known WMI recon method to look for unquoted service paths using wmic. Often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf/blob/35949b30106ae543dc6f2bc3f1be10c6d9a8d40e/redsnarf.py
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/blob/eac23d67f7f90c7fc8e3130587d86158c22aa398/PowershellScripts/jaws-enum.ps1
    - https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2023-09-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' service get '
            - 'name,displayname,pathname,startmode'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Moderate Medium FP

Potential Vivaldi_elf.DLL Sideloading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of "vivaldi_elf.dll"

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2092cacb-d77b-4f98-ab0d-32b32f99a054

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title: Potential Vivaldi_elf.DLL Sideloading
id: 2092cacb-d77b-4f98-ab0d-32b32f99a054
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "vivaldi_elf.dll"
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-03
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vivaldi_elf.dll'
    filter_main_legit_path:
        Image|endswith: '\Vivaldi\Application\vivaldi.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains: '\Vivaldi\Application\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong High FP

Potential WMI Lateral Movement WmiPrvSE Spawned PowerShell

Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Which could be a sign of lateral movement via WMI.

status stable author Markus Neis @Karneades ATT&CK sub-technique id 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6

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title: Potential WMI Lateral Movement WmiPrvSE Spawned PowerShell
id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
related:
    - id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
      type: similar
    - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects Powershell as a child of the WmiPrvSE process. Which could be a sign of lateral movement via WMI.
references:
    - https://any.run/report/68bc255f9b0db6a0d30a8f2dadfbee3256acfe12497bf93943bc1eab0735e45e/a2385d6f-34f7-403c-90d3-b1f9d2a90a5e
author: Markus Neis @Karneades
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - AppvClient
    - CCM
    - WinRM
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

medium Strong Medium FP

Potential WWlib.DLL Sideloading

Detects potential DLL sideloading of "wwlib.dll"

status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id e2e01011-5910-4267-9c3b-4149ed5479cf

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title: Potential WWlib.DLL Sideloading
id: e2e01011-5910-4267-9c3b-4149ed5479cf
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "wwlib.dll"
references:
    - https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1658829954182774784
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/03/family-tree-dll-sideloading-cases-may-be-related/
    - https://securelist.com/apt-luminousmoth/103332/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\wwlib.dll'
    filter_main_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
        Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Convert to SIEM query

Sigma (generic) detection rules

Detection rules