title: AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
related:
    - id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
    - https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
    - https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
        # Note:
        #   - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
        #   - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
        #       - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
        #       - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
        #   - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
            - ' -remediationScript'
    filter_main_intune:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use via Intune management. You exclude script paths and names to reduce FP rate
level: medium

title: Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature
id: 37b437cf-3fc5-4c8e-9c94-1d7c9aff842b
status: test
description: Detect enable rdp feature to allow specific user to rdp connect on the targeted machine
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: 'System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\fAllowToGetHelp'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000001)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the feature (alerts should be investigated either way)
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_allow_rdp_remote_assistance_feature/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Allow RDP Remote Assistance Feature
      technique: T1112
      atomic_guid: 86677d0e-0b5e-4a2b-b302-454175f9aa9e

title: Alternate PowerShell Hosts - PowerShell Module
id: 64e8e417-c19a-475a-8d19-98ea705394cc
status: test
description: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2019-08-11
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        ContextInfo|contains: '*'
    filter_powershell:
        # This filter covers the following use cases
        #   - When powershell is called directly from commandline via keyword powershell or powershell.exe
        #   - Or called via path but not with full "".exe". Example: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell
        ContextInfo|contains:
            - '= powershell' # Host Application=...powershell.exe or Application hote=...powershell.exe in French Win10 event
            - '= C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            - '= C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            # In some cases powershell was invoked with inverted slashes
            - '= C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
            - '= C:/Windows/SysWOW64/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell'
            # In some cases \??\C:.. is used
            - '= \\\?\?\C:Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
            - '= \\\?\?\C:Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell'
    filter_sdiagnhost:
        ContextInfo|contains: '= C:\WINDOWS\System32\sdiagnhost.exe -Embedding' # When MSDT is launched for example
    filter_citrix:
        ContextInfo|contains: 'ConfigSyncRun.exe'
    filter_adace:  # Active Directory Administrative Center Enhancements
        ContextInfo|contains: 'C:\Windows\system32\dsac.exe'
    filter_winrm:
        ContextInfo|contains: 'C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding'
    filter_help_update:
        Payload|contains:
            - 'Update-Help'
            - 'Failed to update Help for the module'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter
    - MSP Detection Searcher
    - Citrix ConfigSync.ps1
level: medium

title: Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe
id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a
related:
    - id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|startswith: '\PSHost'
    filter_main_generic:
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe' # Powershell 7
              - ':\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe' # Powershell 7
              - ':\Windows\system32\dsac.exe'
              - ':\Windows\system32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe'   # this is sad :,( but it triggers FPs on Exchange servers
              - ':\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe'
              - ':\Windows\system32\ServerManager.exe'
              - ':\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
              - ':\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
              - ':\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
              - ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
              - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe'
              - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
    filter_optional_sqlserver: # Microsoft SQL Server\130\Tools\
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
        Image|contains: '\Microsoft SQL Server\'
        Image|endswith: '\Tools\Binn\SQLPS.exe'
    filter_optional_azure_connected_machine_agent:
        # Azure Connected Machine Agent (https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/azure-policy-guest-configuration-client/)
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\GCArcService'
        Image|endswith: '\GC\gc_worker.exe'
    filter_optional_citrix:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Citrix\'
    filter_optional_exchange:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
    filter_main_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Programs using PowerShell directly without invocation of a dedicated interpreter.
level: medium

title: Always Install Elevated MSI Spawned Cmd And Powershell
id: 1e53dd56-8d83-4eb4-a43e-b790a05510aa
status: test
description: Detects Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) spawning "cmd" or "powershell"
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-50-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-10-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\Windows\Installer\'
            - 'msi'
        ParentImage|endswith: 'tmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Always Install Elevated Windows Installer
id: cd951fdc-4b2f-47f5-ba99-a33bf61e3770
status: test
description: Detects Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) trying to install MSI packages with SYSTEM privilege
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-48-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Mangatas Tondang (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_user:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_image_1:
        Image|contains|all:
            - '\Windows\Installer\'
            - 'msi'
        Image|endswith: 'tmp'
    selection_image_2:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    filter_installer:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
    filter_repair:
        - CommandLine|endswith: '\system32\msiexec.exe /V' # ignore "repair option"
        - ParentCommandLine|endswith: '\system32\msiexec.exe /V' # ignore "repair option"
    filter_sophos:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Sophos\'
    filter_avira:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Avira\'
    filter_avast:
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Avast Software\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\'
    filter_google_update:
        ParentImage|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Google\Update\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\'
    condition: 1 of selection_image_* and selection_user and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - System administrator usage
    - Anti virus products
    - WindowsApps located in "C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\"
level: medium

title: Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process
id: 6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9
status: test
description: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/stopping-powershell-without-powershell/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\amsi.dll'
        Image|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more interesting processes
            - '\ExtExport.exe'
            - '\odbcconf.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe' # legitimately calls amsi.dll
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation
id: 530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5
status: test
description: Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you the software isn't already used.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-11
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_provider:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_service:
        - ServiceName|contains|all:
              - 'AnyDesk' # Covers both AnyDesk Service and AnyDesk MSI Service
              - 'Service'
        - ImagePath|contains: 'AnyDesk'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the anydesk tool
level: medium

title: Anydesk Temporary Artefact
id: 0b9ad457-2554-44c1-82c2-d56a99c42377
status: test
description: |
    An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
    These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
    Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2024-07-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\user.conf'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\AnyDesk\system.conf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_anydesk_artefact/info.yml

title: Apache Threading Error
id: e9a2b582-3f6a-48ac-b4a1-6849cdc50b3c
status: test
description: Detects an issue in apache logs that reports threading related errors
references:
    - https://github.com/hannob/apache-uaf/blob/da40f2be3684c8095ec6066fa68eb5c07a086233/README.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1210
logsource:
    service: apache
    definition: 'Requirements: Must be able to collect the error.log file'
detection:
    keywords:
        - '__pthread_tpp_change_priority: Assertion `new_prio == -1 || (new_prio >= fifo_min_prio && new_prio <= fifo_max_prio)'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - 3rd party apache modules - https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
level: medium

title: App Assigned To Azure RBAC/Microsoft Entra Role
id: b04934b2-0a68-4845-8a19-bdfed3a68a7a
status: test
description: Detects when an app is assigned Azure AD roles, such as global administrator, or Azure RBAC roles, such as subscription owner.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#service-principal-assigned-to-a-role
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-19
modified: 2024-11-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098.003
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        targetResources.type: 'Service Principal'
        properties.message:
            - Add member to role
            - Add eligible member to role
            - Add scoped member to role
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: medium

title: AppLocker Prevented Application or Script from Running
id: 401e5d00-b944-11ea-8f9a-00163ecd60ae
status: test
description: |
    Detects when AppLocker prevents the execution of an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App from running.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker
    - https://nxlog.co/documentation/nxlog-user-guide/applocker.html
author: Pushkarev Dmitry
date: 2020-06-28
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: applocker
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 8004 # EXE and DLL
            - 8007 # MSI and Script
            - 8022 # Packaged app execution
            - 8025 # Packaged app deployment
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, since this event notifies about blocked application execution. Tune your applocker rules to avoid blocking legitimate applications.
level: medium

title: AppX Located in Uncommon Directory Added to Deployment Pipeline
id: c977cb50-3dff-4a9f-b873-9290f56132f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects an appx package that was added to the pipeline of the "to be processed" packages that is located in uncommon locations.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: appxdeployment-server
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 854
    filter_main_generic:
        Path|contains:
            # Paths can be written using forward slash if the "file://" protocol is used
            - ':/Program%20Files' # Also covers 'file:///C:/Program%20Files%20(x86)/'
            - ':/Windows/System32/'
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\'
            - ':\Program Files\'
            - ':\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\'
            - ':\Windows\PrintDialog\'
            - ':\Windows\SystemApps\'
            - 'AppData/Local/Temp/WinGet/Microsoft.Winget.Source'
            - 'x-windowsupdate://'
    filter_main_specific:
        Path|contains:
            - 'https://installer.teams.static.microsoft/'
            - 'https://res.cdn.office.net' # Example https://res.cdn.office.net/nativehost/5mttl/installer/v2/1.2025.617.100/Microsoft.OutlookForWindows_x64.msix
            - 'https://statics.teams.cdn.live.net/'
            - 'https://statics.teams.cdn.office.net/'
            - 'microsoft.com' # Example: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=2160968
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Path|contains: 'AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
    filter_optional_winget:
        Path|contains:
            - 'AppData/Local/Temp/WinGet/Microsoft.Winget.Source'
            - 'AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet\Microsoft.Winget.Source'
    filter_optional_x_windowsupdate:
        Path|contains: 'x-windowsupdate://'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: AppX Package Deployment Failed Due to Signing Requirements
id: 898d5fc9-fbc3-43de-93ad-38e97237c344
status: test
description: |
    Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the package didn't meet the signing requirements.
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-11
modified: 2025-12-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: appxdeployment-server
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 401
        ErrorCode: '0x80073cff' # Check ref section to learn more about this error code
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AppX packages not signed by MS used part of an enterprise.
level: medium

title: AppX Package Installation Attempts Via AppInstaller.EXE
id: 7cff77e1-9663-46a3-8260-17f2e1aa9d0a
related:
    - id: 180c7c5c-d64b-4a63-86e9-68910451bc8b
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects DNS queries made by "AppInstaller.EXE". The AppInstaller is the default handler for the "ms-appinstaller" URI. It attempts to load/install a package from the referenced URL
references:
    - https://twitter.com/notwhickey/status/1333900137232523264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/AppInstaller/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_'
        Image|endswith: '\AppInstaller.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Application Removed Via Wmic.EXE
id: b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96
related:
    - id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 # Uninstall Security Products
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE".
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-10---application-uninstall-using-wmic
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2024-07-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'call'
            - 'uninstall'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Application Terminated Via Wmic.EXE
id: 49d9671b-0a0a-4c09-8280-d215bfd30662
related:
    - id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 # Uninstall Security Products
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects calls to the "terminate" function via wmic in order to kill an application
references:
    - https://cyble.com/blog/lockfile-ransomware-using-proxyshell-attack-to-deploy-ransomware/
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/377/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-WMI-creat4871-en-EN-GenericUse.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'call'
            - 'terminate'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Application Using Device Code Authentication Flow
id: 248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5
status: test
description: |
    Device code flow is an OAuth 2.0 protocol flow specifically for input constrained devices and is not used in all environments.
    If this type of flow is seen in the environment and not being used in an input constrained device scenario, further investigation is warranted.
    This can be a misconfigured application or potentially something malicious.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Device Code
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Applications that are input constrained will need to use device code flow and are valid authentications.
level: medium

title: Applications That Are Using ROPC Authentication Flow
id: 55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854
status: test
description: |
    Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly.
    The application then uses those credentials to authenticate the user against the identity provider.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: ROPC
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Applications that are being used as part of automated testing or a legacy application that cannot use any other modern authentication flow
level: medium

title: Arbitrary Binary Execution Using GUP Utility
id: d65aee4d-2292-4cea-b832-83accd6cfa43
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) to launch other commands or executables
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322445439180803
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-10
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\gup.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\Notepad++\notepad++.exe'
    filter_parent:
        ParentImage|contains: '\Notepad++\updater\'
    filter_null:
        CommandLine: null
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Other parent binaries using GUP not currently identified
level: medium

title: Arbitrary Command Execution Using WSL
id: dec44ca7-61ad-493c-bfd7-8819c5faa09b
related:
    - id: 2267fe65-0681-42ad-9a6d-46553d3f3480 # Generic susp child processes rules
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential abuse of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) binary as a Living of the Land binary in order to execute arbitrary Linux or Windows commands.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl/
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535431474429808642
author: oscd.community, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wsl.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -e '
            - ' --exec'
            - ' --system'
            - ' --shell-type '
            - ' /mnt/c' # Path to mounted "C:\" partition (Indication of running Windows binaries via WSL)
            - ' --user root'
            - ' -u root'
            - '--debug-shell'
    filter_main_kill:
        # This filter is to handle a FP that occurs when a process is spawned from WSL and then closed by the user
        # Example would be to open VsCode through it's server extension from WSL
            # GrandparentCommandLine: "C:\Users\XXX\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe" --ms-enable-electron-run-as-node c:\Users\XXX\.vscode\extensions\ms-vscode-remote.remote-wsl-0.72.0\dist\wslDaemon.js
            # ParentCommandLine: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /d /s /c "C:\WINDOWS\System32\wsl.exe -d Ubuntu-20.04 -e kill 1366"
            # CommandLine: C:\WINDOWS\System32\wsl.exe -d Ubuntu-20.04 -e kill 1366
        ParentImage|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -d '
            - ' -e kill '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Automation and orchestration scripts may use this method to execute scripts etc.
    - Legitimate use by Windows to kill processes opened via WSL (example VsCode WSL server)
level: medium

title: Arbitrary DLL or Csproj Code Execution Via Dotnet.EXE
id: d80d5c81-04ba-45b4-84e4-92eba40e0ad3
status: test
description: Detects execution of arbitrary DLLs or unsigned code via a ".csproj" files via Dotnet.EXE.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1204705548668555264
    - https://bohops.com/2019/08/19/dotnet-core-a-vector-for-awl-bypass-defense-evasion/
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2025-10-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\dotnet.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '.NET Host'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.csproj'
            - '.csproj"'
            - '.dll'
            - '.dll"'
            - ".csproj'"
            - ".dll'"
    filter_optional_notepadplus_plus:
        ParentImage:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\CSScriptNpp\'
            - '-cscs_path:'
            - '\cs-script\cscs.dll'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator usage
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via ConfigSecurityPolicy.EXE
id: 1f0f6176-6482-4027-b151-00071af39d7e
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of "ConfigSecurityPolicy.EXE", a binary part of Windows Defender used to manage settings in Windows Defender.
    Users can configure different pilot collections for each of the co-management workloads.
    It can be abused by attackers in order to upload or download files.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/ConfigSecurityPolicy/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-05-16
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - CommandLine|contains: ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe
        - Image|endswith: '\ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe'
    selection_url:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ftp://'
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via GfxDownloadWrapper.EXE
id: eee00933-a761-4cd0-be70-c42fe91731e7
status: test
description: Detects execution of GfxDownloadWrapper.exe with a URL as an argument to download file.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/HonorableMentions/GfxDownloadWrapper/
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\GfxDownloadWrapper.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    filter_main_known_urls:
        CommandLine|contains: 'https://gameplayapi.intel.com/'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via MSEDGE_PROXY.EXE
id: e84d89c4-f544-41ca-a6af-4b92fd38b023
status: test
description: Detects usage of "msedge_proxy.exe" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedge_proxy/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\msedge_proxy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'msedge_proxy.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via MSOHTMED.EXE
id: 459f2f98-397b-4a4a-9f47-6a5ec2f1c69d
status: test
description: Detects usage of "MSOHTMED" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MSOHTMED.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MsoHtmEd.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ftp://'
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via MSPUB.EXE
id: 3b3c7f55-f771-4dd6-8a6e-08d057a17caf
status: test
description: Detects usage of "MSPUB" (Microsoft Publisher) to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\MSPUB.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSPUB.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ftp://'
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via PresentationHost.EXE
id: b124ddf4-778d-418e-907f-6dd3fc0d31cd
status: test
description: Detects usage of "PresentationHost" which is a utility that runs ".xbap" (Browser Applications) files to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/239/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\presentationhost.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'PresentationHost.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - 'ftp://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary File Download Via Squirrel.EXE
id: 1e75c1cc-c5d4-42aa-ac3d-91b0b68b3b4c
related:
    - id: 45239e6a-b035-4aaf-b339-8ad379fcb67e
      type: similar
    - id: fa4b21c9-0057-4493-b289-2556416ae4d7
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.)
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel/
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/03/30/sqirrel-packages-manager-as-a-lolbin-a-k-a-many-electron-apps-are-lolbins-by-default/
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/16/squirrel-as-a-lolbin/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Karneades / Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2022-06-09
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\squirrel.exe'
            - '\update.exe'
    selection_download_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --download '
            - ' --update '
            - ' --updateRollback='
    selection_download_http_keyword:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Expected FP with some Electron based applications such as (1Clipboard, Beaker Browser, Caret, Discord, GitHub Desktop, etc.)
level: medium

title: Arbitrary MSI Download Via Devinit.EXE
id: 90d50722-0483-4065-8e35-57efaadd354d
status: test
description: Detects a certain command line flag combination used by "devinit.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to download arbitrary MSI packages on a Windows system
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460815932402679809
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devinit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -t msi-install '
            - ' -i http'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms
id: 24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e
status: test
description: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-03-13
modified: 2022-04-14
tags:
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '.SettingContent-ms'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'immersivecontrolpanel'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: AspNetCompiler Execution
id: a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00 # Exec
related:
    - id: 9ccba514-7cb6-4c5c-b377-700758f2f120 # SuspChild
      type: similar
    - id: 4c7f49ee-2638-43bb-b85b-ce676c30b260 # TMP File
      type: similar
    - id: 9f50fe98-fe5c-4a2d-86c7-fad7f63ed622 # Susp Paths
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "aspnet_compiler.exe" which can be abused to compile and execute C# code.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Aspnet_Compiler/
    - https://ijustwannared.team/2020/08/01/the-curious-case-of-aspnet_compiler-exe/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2025-02-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm\'
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm64\'
        Image|endswith: '\aspnet_compiler.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Assembly DLL Creation Via AspNetCompiler
id: 4c7f49ee-2638-43bb-b85b-ce676c30b260 # TMP File
related:
    - id: 9ccba514-7cb6-4c5c-b377-700758f2f120 # SuspChild
      type: similar
    - id: 9f50fe98-fe5c-4a2d-86c7-fad7f63ed622 # Susp Paths
      type: similar
    - id: a01b8329-5953-4f73-ae2d-aa01e1f35f00 # Exec
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of new DLL assembly files by "aspnet_compiler.exe", which could be a sign of "aspnet_compiler" abuse to proxy execution through a build provider.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\aspnet_compiler.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Temporary ASP.NET Files\'
            - '\assembly\tmp\'
            - '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate assembly compilation using a build provider
level: medium

title: Assembly Loading Via CL_LoadAssembly.ps1
id: c57872c7-614f-4d7f-a40d-b78c8df2d30d
status: test
description: Detects calls to "LoadAssemblyFromPath" or "LoadAssemblyFromNS" that are part of the "CL_LoadAssembly.ps1" script. This can be abused to load different assemblies and bypass App locker controls.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2018/01/07/executing-commands-and-bypassing-applocker-with-powershell-diagnostic-scripts/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_LoadAssembly/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: As this function is usually called from within powershell, classical process creation even would not catch it. This will only catch inline calls via "-Command" or "-ScriptBlock" flags for example.
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'LoadAssemblyFromPath '
            - 'LoadAssemblyFromNS '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Atbroker Registry Change
id: 9577edbb-851f-4243-8c91-1d5b50c1a39b
status: test
description: Detects creation/modification of Assistive Technology applications and persistence with usage of 'at'
references:
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/
author: Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-01-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs'
            - 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Configuration'
    filter_atbroker:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\atbroker.exe'
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Configuration'
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_uninstallers:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Installer\MSI'
        TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Creation of non-default, legitimate at usage
level: medium

title: Audio Capture via PowerShell
id: 932fb0d8-692b-4b0f-a26e-5643a50fe7d6
status: test
description: Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/ab7a6ef4-0983-4275-a4f1-5c6bd3c31c23.html
    - https://github.com/frgnca/AudioDeviceCmdlets
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-04-06
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet'
            - 'Toggle-AudioDevice'
            - 'Get-AudioDevice '
            - 'Set-AudioDevice '
            - 'Write-AudioDevice '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user.
level: medium

title: Audio Capture via SoundRecorder
id: 83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e
status: test
description: Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/f72a98cb-7b3d-4100-99c3-a138b6e9ff6e.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1123
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\SoundRecorder.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/FILE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user.
level: medium

title: Authentications To Important Apps Using Single Factor Authentication
id: f272fb46-25f2-422c-b667-45837994980f
status: test
description: Detect when authentications to important application(s) only required single-factor authentication
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        AppId: 'Insert Application ID use OR for multiple'
        AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium

title: Automated Collection Command PowerShell
id: c1dda054-d638-4c16-afc8-53e007f3fbc5
status: test
description: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-28
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1119
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_ext:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - '.doc'
            - '.docx'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xlsx'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.pptx'
            - '.rtf'
            - '.pdf'
            - '.txt'
    selection_cmd:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'Get-ChildItem'
            - ' -Recurse '
            - ' -Include '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Automated Collection Command Prompt
id: f576a613-2392-4067-9d1a-9345fb58d8d1
status: test
description: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-28
modified: 2022-11-11
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1119
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ext:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.doc'
            - '.docx'
            - '.xls'
            - '.xlsx'
            - '.ppt'
            - '.pptx'
            - '.rtf'
            - '.pdf'
            - '.txt'
    selection_other_dir:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'dir '
            - ' /b '
            - ' /s '
    selection_other_findstr:
        OriginalFileName: 'FINDSTR.EXE'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /e '
            - ' /si '
    condition: selection_ext and 1 of selection_other_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Azure AD Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access
id: ff151c33-45fa-475d-af4f-c2f93571f4fe
status: test
description: |
    This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Azure AD Health monitoring agent.
    This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
    - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectType: 'Key'
        ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent'
    filter:
        ProcessName|contains:
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access
id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8
status: test
description: |
    This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS).
    Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation).
    This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent.
    Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
    - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 4656
            - 4663
        ObjectType: 'Key'
        ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent'
    filter:
        ProcessName|contains:
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
            - 'Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server
id: 288a39fc-4914-4831-9ada-270e9dc12cb4
status: test
description: |
    This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service.
    A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server.
    This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1578
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        CategoryValue: 'Administrative'
        ResourceProviderValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'
        ResourceId|contains: 'AdFederationService'
        OperationNameValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AD FS servers added to an AAD Health AD FS service instance
level: medium

title: Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS Service Delete
id: 48739819-8230-4ee3-a8ea-e0289d1fb0ff
status: test
description: |
    This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service instance in a tenant.
    A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs.
    The health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is not longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure.
references:
    - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-08-26
modified: 2023-10-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1578.003
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        CategoryValue: 'Administrative'
        ResourceProviderValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'
        ResourceId|contains: 'AdFederationService'
        OperationNameValue: 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/delete'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate AAD Health AD FS service instances being deleted in a tenant
level: medium

title: Azure Application Deleted
id: 410d2a41-1e6d-452f-85e5-abdd8257a823
status: test
description: Identifies when a application is deleted in Azure.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#application-proxy
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1489
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Delete application
            - Hard Delete application
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application being deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Application Gateway Modified or Deleted
id: ad87d14e-7599-4633-ba81-aeb60cfe8cd6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application gateway is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONGATEWAYS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONGATEWAYS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application gateway being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application gateway modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted
id: 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6
status: test
description: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName:
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE
            - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure DNS Zone Modified or Deleted
id: af6925b0-8826-47f1-9324-337507a0babd
status: test
description: Identifies when DNS zone is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-08
modified: 2022-08-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName|startswith: 'MICROSOFT.NETWORK/DNSZONES'
        operationName|endswith:
            - '/WRITE'
            - '/DELETE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - DNS zone modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - DNS zone modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Azure Device No Longer Managed or Compliant
id: 542b9912-c01f-4e3f-89a8-014c48cdca7d
status: test
description: Identifies when a device in azure is no longer managed or compliant
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Device no longer compliant
            - Device no longer managed
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator may have forgotten to review the device.
level: medium

title: Azure Device or Configuration Modified or Deleted
id: 46530378-f9db-4af9-a9e5-889c177d3881
status: test
description: Identifies when a device or device configuration in azure is modified or deleted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-09-03
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1485
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Delete device
            - Delete device configuration
            - Update device
            - Update device configuration
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Device or device configuration being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
    - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
    - Device or device configuration modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium