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Palo Alto Cortex XDR

3,750 rules · Sigma detections in Palo Alto Cortex XDR syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into Palo Alto Cortex XDR query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.

Detection rules

50 shown of 3,750
critical
OilRig APT Activity
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "SC Scheduled Scan" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\Windows\Temp\DB\" and 
 action_process_image_path contains ".exe") or 
 (action_process_image_path = "C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*i*", "*u*"))) or 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "nslookup.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-q=TXT"))))
view Sigma YAML
title: OilRig APT Activity
id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - '\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
    selection_temp:
        Image|contains: '\Windows\Temp\DB\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    selection_service:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'i'
            - 'u'
    selection_autoit:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\local\microsoft\Taskbar\autoit3.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nslookup.exe'
            - '-q=TXT'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
OilRig APT Registry Persistence
Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UMe", "*SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UT")))
view Sigma YAML
title: OilRig APT Registry Persistence
id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06 # ProcessCreation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UMe'
            - 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\UT'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security
id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561
related:
    - id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92 # System
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
    - id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06 # ProcessCreation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_service:
        EventID: 4698
        TaskName:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - 'UpdatMachine'
    condition: selection_service
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - System
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community id 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - System
id: 53ba33fd-3a50-4468-a5ef-c583635cfa92
related:
    - id: c0580559-a6bd-4ef6-b9b7-83703d98b561 # Security
      type: similar
    - id: 7bdf2a7c-3acc-4091-9581-0a77dad1c5b5 # Registry
      type: similar
    - id: ce6e34ca-966d-41c9-8d93-5b06c8b97a06 # ProcessCreation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180402134442/https://nyotron.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nyotron-OilRig-Malware-Report-March-2018C.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.g0049
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.s0111
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName:
            - 'SC Scheduled Scan'
            - 'UpdatMachine'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Oracle WebLogic Exploit
Detects access to a webshell dropped into a keystore folder on the WebLogic server
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 37e8369b-43bb-4bf8-83b6-6dd43bda2000
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Oracle WebLogic Exploit
id: 37e8369b-43bb-4bf8-83b6-6dd43bda2000
status: test
description: Detects access to a webshell dropped into a keystore folder on the WebLogic server
references:
    - https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1020620932967223296
    - https://github.com/LandGrey/CVE-2018-2894
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-07-22
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - cve.2018-2894
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query: '*/config/keystore/*.js*'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2021-2109
Detects the exploitation of the WebLogic server vulnerability described in CVE-2021-2109
status test author Bhabesh Raj id 687f6504-7f44-4549-91fc-f07bab065821
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Oracle WebLogic Exploit CVE-2021-2109
id: 687f6504-7f44-4549-91fc-f07bab065821
status: test
description: Detects the exploitation of the WebLogic server vulnerability described in CVE-2021-2109
references:
    - https://twitter.com/pyn3rd/status/1351696768065409026
    - https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wX9TMXl1KVWwB_k6EZOklw
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-01-20
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2021-2109
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'com.bea.console.handles.JndiBindingHandle'
            - 'ldap://'
            - 'AdminServer'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Pandemic Registry Key
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 47e0852a-cf81-4494-a8e6-31864f8c86ed
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\null\Instance")
view Sigma YAML
title: Pandemic Registry Key
id: 47e0852a-cf81-4494-a8e6-31864f8c86ed
status: test
description: Detects Pandemic Windows Implant
references:
    - https://wikileaks.org/vault7/#Pandemic
    - https://twitter.com/MalwareJake/status/870349480356454401
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\null\Instance'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Persistence Via Sticky Key Backdoor
By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system. When the sticky keys are "activated" the privilleged shell is launched.
status test author Sreeman id 1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "copy " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/y " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Persistence Via Sticky Key Backdoor
id: 1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3
status: test
description: |
    By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system.
    When the sticky keys are "activated" the privilleged shell is launched.
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jonathantrull/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.008
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy '
            - '/y '
            - 'C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe C:\windows\system32\sethc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param
Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param
id: 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed
status: test
description: Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners
references:
    - https://xmrig.com/docs/miner/command-line-options
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-09
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    cmd1:
        a1|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd2:
        a2|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd3:
        a3|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd4:
        a4|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd5:
        a5|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd6:
        a6|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    cmd7:
        a7|startswith: '--cpu-priority'
    condition: 1 of cmd*
falsepositives:
    - Other tools that use a --cpu-priority flag
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential CVE-2021-41379 Exploitation Attempt
Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2021-41379 (InstallerFileTakeOver), a local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerability where the attacker spawns a "cmd.exe" process as a child of Microsoft Edge elevation service "elevation_service" with "LOCAL_SYSTEM" rights
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id af8bbce4-f751-46b4-8d91-82a33a736f61
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential CVE-2021-41379 Exploitation Attempt
id: af8bbce4-f751-46b4-8d91-82a33a736f61
status: test
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2021-41379 (InstallerFileTakeOver), a local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerability where the attacker spawns a "cmd.exe" process as a child of Microsoft Edge elevation service "elevation_service" with "LOCAL_SYSTEM" rights
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220421061949/https://github.com/klinix5/InstallerFileTakeOver
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/new-windows-zero-day-with-public-exploit-lets-you-become-an-admin/
    - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-1308/
    - https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-privilege-escalation-zero-day-cve-2021-41379/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-22
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2021-41379
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\elevation_service.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential CVE-2023-36884 Exploitation Pattern
Detects a unique pattern seen being used by RomCom potentially exploiting CVE-2023-36884
status test author X__Junior id 0066d244-c277-4c3e-88ec-9e7b777cc8bc
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential CVE-2023-36884 Exploitation Pattern
id: 0066d244-c277-4c3e-88ec-9e7b777cc8bc
status: test
description: Detects a unique pattern seen being used by RomCom potentially exploiting CVE-2023-36884
references:
    - https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/07/romcom-targets-ukraine-nato-membership-talks-at-nato-summit
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-07-12
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - cve.2023-36884
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        c-uri|contains: '/MSHTML_C7/'
        c-uri|re: '\?d=[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Conti Ransomware Activity
Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
status test author frack113 id 689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "-m " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-net " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-size " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-nomutex " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-p \\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "$"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Conti Ransomware Activity
id: 689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487
status: test
description: Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
references:
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/09/03/conti-affiliates-use-proxyshell-exchange-exploit-in-ransomware-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1447795359900704769?t=Xz7vaLTvaaCZ5kHoZa6gMw&s=19
author: frack113
date: 2021-10-12
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.s0575
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-m '
            - '-net '
            - '-size ' # Size 10 in references
            - '-nomutex '
            - '-p \\\\'
            - '$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone
Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden id c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\Windows\System32\lsass.exe" and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\Windows\System32\lsass.exe"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone
id: c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity
references:
    - https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden
date: 2021-11-27
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\Windows\System32\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\lsass.exe")
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
id: 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597
related:
    - id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process
references:
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/
    - https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-02-26
modified: 2022-12-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\lsass.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack
Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network
status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga id 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path = "System" and 
 action_file_name contains "\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack
id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class over the network
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image: System
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load
Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
status test author Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga id f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" and 
 action_module_path contains "\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack - Image Load
id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
related:
    - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
      type: obsolete
    - id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Dridex Activity
Detects potential Dridex acitvity via specific process patterns
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_process_image_path contains "\svchost.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Users\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\Desktop\")) and 
 (not 
 actor_process_image_path contains "C:\Windows\System32\")) or 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\excel.exe" and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\regsvr32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -s *", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*"))) and 
 (not 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".dll")) or 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\svchost.exe" and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\whoami.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /all") or 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\net.exe", "*\net1.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " view")))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Dridex Activity
id: e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e
status: stable
description: Detects potential Dridex acitvity via specific process patterns
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/993daa5e-112a-4ff6-8b5a-edbcec7c7ba3
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/dridex/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-10
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1135
    - attack.t1033
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_svchost:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\Desktop\'
    filter_svchost:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
    selection_regsvr:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\excel.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -s '
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_regsvr:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
    selection_anomaly_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    selection_anomaly_child_1:
        Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /all'
    selection_anomaly_child_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' view'
    condition: (selection_svchost and not filter_svchost) or (selection_regsvr and not filter_regsvr) or (selection_anomaly_parent and 1 of selection_anomaly_child_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Dtrack RAT Activity
Detects potential Dtrack RAT activity via specific process patterns
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id f1531fa4-5b84-4342-8f68-9cf3fdbd83d4
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line ~= "ping\s+-n.{6,64}echo EEEE\s?>\s?" or 
 (action_process_image_command_line ~= "ipconfig\s+/all" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\temp\res.ip") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "interface ip show config" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\temp\netsh.res")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Dtrack RAT Activity
id: f1531fa4-5b84-4342-8f68-9cf3fdbd83d4
status: stable
description: Detects potential Dtrack RAT activity via specific process patterns
references:
    - https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/
    - https://securelist.com/andariel-deploys-dtrack-and-maui-ransomware/107063/
    - https://www.cyberbit.com/endpoint-security/dtrack-apt-malware-found-in-nuclear-power-plant/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4bc9860d-ab51-4077-9e09-59ad346b92fd/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/ce4deab5-3263-494f-93e3-afb2b9d79f14/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-30
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ping:
        CommandLine|re: 'ping\s+-n.{6,64}echo EEEE\s?>\s?'
    selection_ipconfig:
        CommandLine|re: 'ipconfig\s+/all'
        CommandLine|contains: '\temp\res.ip'
    selection_netsh:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'interface ip show config'
            - '\temp\netsh.res'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Emotet Rundll32 Execution
Detecting Emotet DLL loading by looking for rundll32.exe processes with command lines ending in ,RunDLL or ,Control_RunDLL
status test author FPT.EagleEye id 54e57ce3-0672-46eb-a402-2c0948d5e3e9
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Emotet Rundll32 Execution
id: 54e57ce3-0672-46eb-a402-2c0948d5e3e9
status: test
description: Detecting Emotet DLL loading by looking for rundll32.exe processes with command lines ending in ,RunDLL or ,Control_RunDLL
references:
    - https://paste.cryptolaemus.com/emotet/2020/12/22/emotet-malware-IoCs_12-22-20.html
    - https://cyber.wtf/2021/11/15/guess-whos-back/
author: FPT.EagleEye
date: 2020-12-25
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - ',RunDLL'
            - ',Control_RunDLL'
            # - ',#1'  too generic - function load by ordinal is not Emotet specific
    filter_legitimate_dll:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            - '.dll",Control_RunDLL'
            - '.dll'',Control_RunDLL'
    filter_ide:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\tracker.exe' # When Visual Studio compile NodeJS program, it might use MSBuild to create tracker.exe and then, the tracker.exe fork rundll32.exe
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Maze Ransomware Activity
Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\WINWORD.exe" and 
 action_process_image_path contains ".tmp") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\wmic.exe" and 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\Temp\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "shadowcopy delete") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "shadowcopy delete" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\..\..\system32")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Maze Ransomware Activity
id: 29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052
status: test
description: Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/51e7185c-52d7-4efb-ac0d-e86340053473/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/65a79440-373a-4725-8d74-77db9f2abda4/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-08
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Dropper
    selection1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.exe'
        Image|endswith: '.tmp'
    # Binary Execution
    selection2:
        Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        ParentImage|contains: '\Temp\'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'shadowcopy delete'
    # Specific Pattern
    selection3:
        CommandLine|endswith: 'shadowcopy delete'
        CommandLine|contains: '\..\..\system32'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential QBot Activity
Detects potential QBot activity by looking for process executions used previously by QBot
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 4fcac6eb-0287-4090-8eea-2602e4c20040
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\WinRAR.exe" and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\wscript.exe") or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /c ping.exe -n 6 127.0.0.1 & type " or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "regsvr32.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\ProgramData" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".tmp")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential QBot Activity
id: 4fcac6eb-0287-4090-8eea-2602e4c20040
status: stable
description: Detects potential QBot activity by looking for process executions used previously by QBot
references:
    - https://twitter.com/killamjr/status/1179034907932315648
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/2e0647b7-eb86-4f72-904b-d2d0ecac07d1/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WinRAR.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /c ping.exe -n 6 127.0.0.1 & type '
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'regsvr32.exe'
            - 'C:\ProgramData'
            - '.tmp'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential Russian APT Credential Theft Activity
Detects Russian group activity as described in Global Threat Report 2019 by Crowdstrike
status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id b83f5166-9237-4b5e-9cd4-7b5d52f4d8ee
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "xcopy /S /E /C /Q /H \\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\sysvol\") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "adexplorer -snapshot \"\" c:\users\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\downloads\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".snp")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Russian APT Credential Theft Activity
id: b83f5166-9237-4b5e-9cd4-7b5d52f4d8ee
status: stable
description: Detects Russian group activity as described in Global Threat Report 2019 by Crowdstrike
references:
    - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-21
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1003.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_xcopy:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'xcopy /S /E /C /Q /H \\\\'
            - '\sysvol\'
    selection_adexplorer:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'adexplorer -snapshot "" c:\users\'
            - '\downloads\'
            - '.snp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution
Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_process_image_path in ("*PetitPotam*", "*RottenPotato*", "*HotPotato*", "*JuicyPotato*", "*\just_dce_*", "*Juicy Potato*", "*\temp\rot.exe*", "*\Potato.exe*", "*\SpoolSample.exe*", "*\Responder.exe*", "*\smbrelayx*", "*\ntlmrelayx*", "*\LocalPotato*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*Invoke-Tater*", "* smbrelay*", "* ntlmrelay*", "*cme smb *", "* /ntlm:NTLMhash *", "*Invoke-PetitPotam*", "*.exe -t * -p *")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains ".exe -c \"{" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "}\" -z")) and 
 (not 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*HotPotatoes6*", "*HotPotatoes7*", "*HotPotatoes *")))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution
id: 5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1
status: test
description: Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
references:
    - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/13/hot-potato/
    - https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato
    - https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/other/war-stories/domain-admin-in-30-minutes
    - https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/execution/responder-with-ntlm-relay-and-empire
    - https://www.localpotato.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        Image|contains:
            - 'PetitPotam'
            - 'RottenPotato'
            - 'HotPotato'
            - 'JuicyPotato'
            - '\just_dce_'
            - 'Juicy Potato'
            - '\temp\rot.exe'
            - '\Potato.exe'
            - '\SpoolSample.exe'
            - '\Responder.exe'
            - '\smbrelayx'
            - '\ntlmrelayx'
            - '\LocalPotato'
    selection_script:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - ' smbrelay'
            - ' ntlmrelay'
            - 'cme smb '
            - ' /ntlm:NTLMhash '
            - 'Invoke-PetitPotam'
            - '.exe -t * -p '  # JuicyPotatoNG pattern https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG
    selection_juicypotato_enum:  # appears when JuicyPotatoNG is used with -b
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe -c "{'
        CommandLine|endswith: '}" -z'
    filter_hotpotatoes:  # known goodware https://hotpot.uvic.ca/
        Image|contains:
            - 'HotPotatoes6'
            - 'HotPotatoes7'
            - 'HotPotatoes ' # Covers the following: 'HotPotatoes 6', 'HotPotatoes 7', 'HotPotatoes Help', 'HotPotatoes Tutorial'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate files with these rare hacktool names
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential SharePoint ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation - File Create
Detects the creation of file such as spinstall0.aspx which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2025-53770. CVE-2025-53770 is a zero-day vulnerability in SharePoint that allows remote code execution.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id ba479447-721f-42a9-9af2-6dcd517bbdb3
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_file_name in ("C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\*", "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\*")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*\15\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\*", "*\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\*")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*\spinstall.aspx", "*\spinstall*.aspx", "*\debug_dev.js"))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential SharePoint ToolShell CVE-2025-53770 Exploitation - File Create
id: ba479447-721f-42a9-9af2-6dcd517bbdb3
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of file such as spinstall0.aspx which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2025-53770.
    CVE-2025-53770 is a zero-day vulnerability in SharePoint that allows remote code execution.
references:
    - https://research.eye.security/sharepoint-under-siege/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770/
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-sharepoint-cve-2025-49704-cve-2025-49706-cve-2025-53770/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-21
modified: 2025-07-24
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025-53770
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\15\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\'
            - '\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\spinstall.aspx'
            - '\spinstall?.aspx'
            - '\debug_dev.js'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Potential SystemNightmare Exploitation Attempt
Detects an exploitation attempt of SystemNightmare in order to obtain a shell as LOCAL_SYSTEM
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id c01f7bd6-0c1d-47aa-9c61-187b91273a16
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*printnightmare.gentilkiwi.com*", "* /user:gentilguest *", "*Kiwi Legit Printer*")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential SystemNightmare Exploitation Attempt
id: c01f7bd6-0c1d-47aa-9c61-187b91273a16
status: test
description: Detects an exploitation attempt of SystemNightmare in order to obtain a shell as LOCAL_SYSTEM
references:
    - https://github.com/GossiTheDog/SystemNightmare
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-11
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'printnightmare.gentilkiwi.com'
            - ' /user:gentilguest '
            - 'Kiwi Legit Printer'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
PrinterNightmare Mimikatz Driver Name
Detects static QMS 810 and mimikatz driver name used by Mimikatz as exploited in CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527
status test author Markus Neis, @markus_neis, Florian Roth id ba6b9e43-1d45-4d3c-a504-1043a64c8469
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name in ("*\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers\Version-3\QMS 810\*", "*\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers\Version-3\mimikatz*")) or 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "legitprinter" and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "\Control\Print\Environments\Windows") or 
 ((action_registry_key_name in ("*\Control\Print\Environments*", "*\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers*")) and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*Gentil Kiwi*", "*mimikatz printer*", "*Kiwi Legit Printer*")))))
view Sigma YAML
title: PrinterNightmare Mimikatz Driver Name
id: ba6b9e43-1d45-4d3c-a504-1043a64c8469
status: test
description: Detects static QMS 810 and mimikatz driver name used by Mimikatz as exploited in CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527
references:
    - https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/commit/c21276072b3f2a47a21e215a46962a17d54b3760
    - https://www.lexjansen.com/sesug/1993/SESUG93035.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/4464eaf0-f34f-40d5-b970-736437a21913
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-1675
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-34527
author: Markus Neis, @markus_neis, Florian Roth
date: 2021-07-04
modified: 2023-06-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - cve.2021-1675
    - cve.2021-34527
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers\Version-3\QMS 810\'
            - '\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers\Version-3\mimikatz'
    selection_alt:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - 'legitprinter'
            - '\Control\Print\Environments\Windows'
    selection_print:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Control\Print\Environments'
            - '\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers'
    selection_kiwi:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - 'Gentil Kiwi'
            - 'mimikatz printer'
            - 'Kiwi Legit Printer'
    condition: selection or selection_alt or (selection_print and selection_kiwi)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate installation of printer driver QMS 810, Texas Instruments microLaser printer (unlikely)
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
id: 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
status: test
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
references:
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-01-23
tags:
    - attack.t1587.001
    - attack.resource-development
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: msexchange-management
detection:
    keywords_cmdlet:
        '|all':
            - 'OabVirtualDirectory'
            - ' -ExternalUrl '
    keywords_params:
        - 'eval(request'
        - 'http://f/<script'
        - '"unsafe"};'
        - 'function Page_Load()'
    condition: keywords_cmdlet and keywords_params
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
ProxyLogon Reset Virtual Directories Based On IIS Log
When exploiting this vulnerability with CVE-2021-26858, an SSRF attack is used to manipulate virtual directories
status test author frack113 id effee1f6-a932-4297-a81f-acb44064fa3a
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: ProxyLogon Reset Virtual Directories Based On IIS Log
id: effee1f6-a932-4297-a81f-acb44064fa3a
status: test
description: When exploiting this vulnerability with CVE-2021-26858, an SSRF attack is used to manipulate virtual directories
references:
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c
author: frack113
date: 2021-08-10
modified: 2023-05-08
tags:
    - cve.2021-26858
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
    definition: 'Requirements: The POST request body data must be collected in order to make use of this detection'
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        sc-status: 200
        cs-uri-stem: '/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'schema=Reset'
            - 'VirtualDirectory'
        cs-username|endswith: '$'
    keywords:
        '|all':
            - 'POST'
            - 200
            - '/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject'
            - 'schema=Reset'
            - 'VirtualDirectory'
            - '$'
    condition: selection or keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Pulse Secure Attack CVE-2019-11510
Detects CVE-2019-11510 exploitation attempt - URI contains Guacamole
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 2dbc10d7-a797-49a8-8776-49efa6442e60
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Pulse Secure Attack CVE-2019-11510
id: 2dbc10d7-a797-49a8-8776-49efa6442e60
status: test
description: Detects CVE-2019-11510 exploitation attempt - URI contains Guacamole
references:
    - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-18
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2019-11510
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query: '*?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/*'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
PwnDrp Access
Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: PwnDrp Access
id: 2b1ee7e4-89b6-4739-b7bb-b811b6607e5e
status: test
description: Detects downloads from PwnDrp web servers developed for red team testing and most likely also used for criminal activity
references:
    - https://breakdev.org/pwndrop/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-15
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.t1102.003
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/pwndrop/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Qakbot Rundll32 Exports Execution
Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution with exports linked with Qakbot activity.
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id 339ed3d6-5490-46d0-96a7-8abe33078f58
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((actor_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\curl.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*:\ProgramData\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*"))) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*aslr", "*bind", "*DrawThemeIcon", "*GG10", "*GL70", "*jhbvygftr", "*kjhbhkjvydrt", "*LS88", "*Motd", "*N115", "*next", "*Nikn", "*print", "*qqqb", "*qqqq", "*RS32", "*Test", "*Time", "*Updt", "*vips", "*Wind", "*WW50", "*X555", "*XL55", "*xlAutoOpen", "*XS88"))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Qakbot Rundll32 Exports Execution
id: 339ed3d6-5490-46d0-96a7-8abe33078f58
status: test
description: Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution with exports linked with Qakbot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-24
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_paths:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Only add paths seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    selection_exports:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            # Note: Only add additional exports seen used by Qakbot
            - 'aslr' # https://tria.ge/230524-scgq9add9v/behavioral1#report
            - 'bind'
            - 'DrawThemeIcon'
            - 'GG10'
            - 'GL70'
            - 'jhbvygftr'
            - 'kjhbhkjvydrt'
            - 'LS88'
            - 'Motd'
            - 'N115'
            - 'next' # https://tria.ge/230530-n3rxpahf9w/behavioral2
            - 'Nikn'
            - 'print'
            - 'qqqb'
            - 'qqqq'
            - 'RS32'
            - 'Test'
            - 'Time'
            - 'Updt'
            - 'vips'
            - 'Wind'
            - 'WW50'
            - 'X555'
            - 'XL55'
            - 'xlAutoOpen'
            - 'XS88'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Qakbot Rundll32 Fake DLL Extension Execution
Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution where the DLL doesn't have the ".dll" extension. This is often linked with potential Qakbot activity.
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id bfd34392-c591-4009-b938-9fd985a28b85
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((actor_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\curl.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*:\ProgramData\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*"))) and 
 (not 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".dll")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Qakbot Rundll32 Fake DLL Extension Execution
id: bfd34392-c591-4009-b938-9fd985a28b85
status: test
description: Detects specific process tree behavior of a "rundll32" execution where the DLL doesn't have the ".dll" extension. This is often linked with potential Qakbot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Note: Only add processes seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Only add paths seen used by Qakbot to avoid collision with other strains of malware
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    filter_main_extension:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns
Detects process command line patterns and locations used by REvil group in Kaseya incident (can also match on other malware)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 5de632bc-7fbd-4c8a-944a-fce55c59eae5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*C:\Windows\cert.exe*", "*del /q /f c:\kworking\agent.crt*", "*Kaseya VSA Agent Hot-fix*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\MsMpEng.exe*", "*rmdir /s /q %SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs*", "*del /s /q /f %SystemDrive%\*.log*", "*c:\kworking1\agent.exe*", "*c:\kworking1\agent.crt*")) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("C:\Windows\MsMpEng.exe", "C:\Windows\cert.exe", "C:\kworking\agent.exe", "C:\kworking1\agent.exe")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "del /s /q /f" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "WebPages\Errors\webErrorLog.txt")))
view Sigma YAML
title: REvil Kaseya Incident Malware Patterns
id: 5de632bc-7fbd-4c8a-944a-fce55c59eae5
status: test
description: Detects process command line patterns and locations used by REvil group in Kaseya incident (can also match on other malware)
references:
    - https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers
    - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/443736/0/html
    - https://doublepulsar.com/kaseya-supply-chain-attack-delivers-mass-ransomware-event-to-us-companies-76e4ec6ec64b
    - https://therecord.media/revil-ransomware-executes-supply-chain-attack-via-malicious-kaseya-update/
    - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/07/04/kaseya-supply-chain-attack-targeting-msps-to-deliver-revil-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-03
modified: 2022-05-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.g0115
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\cert.exe'
            - 'del /q /f c:\kworking\agent.crt'
            - 'Kaseya VSA Agent Hot-fix'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\MsMpEng.exe'
            - 'rmdir /s /q %SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs'
            - 'del /s /q /f %SystemDrive%\\*.log'
            - 'c:\kworking1\agent.exe'
            - 'c:\kworking1\agent.crt'
    selection2:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\MsMpEng.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\cert.exe'
            - 'C:\kworking\agent.exe'
            - 'C:\kworking1\agent.exe'
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'del /s /q /f'
            - 'WebPages\Errors\webErrorLog.txt'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
RedSun - Named Pipe Created
Detects the creation of a named pipe with the hardcoded name "REDSUN". The RedSun exploit tool uses a pipe with this name for synchronisation and command communication between its components during the Cloud Files API + oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain. RedSun creates the pipe as \\??\pipe\REDSUN. The pipe server listens for the token-duplicated elevated process to connect and respond, completing the privilege escalation from user to SYSTEM. Presence of this pipe name indicates active or recent RedSun execution.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost id 9b4e7c2a-3f6d-4a8b-b5e9-1c7d3f2e6a4b
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: RedSun - Named Pipe Created
id: 9b4e7c2a-3f6d-4a8b-b5e9-1c7d3f2e6a4b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a named pipe with the hardcoded name "REDSUN".
    The RedSun exploit tool uses a pipe with this name for synchronisation and command communication between its components during the Cloud Files API + oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain.
    RedSun creates the pipe as \\??\pipe\REDSUN.
    The pipe server listens for the token-duplicated elevated process to connect and respond, completing the privilege escalation from user to SYSTEM.
    Presence of this pipe name indicates active or recent RedSun execution.
references:
    - https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun/blob/7456cc8cf066f5e5fc6cdf7d3272a466ebd6b2f6/RedSun.cpp#L591
    - https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/04/public-disclosure-response-for-cve-2026.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
date: 2026-04-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1685
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: pipe_created
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName: '\REDSUN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/RedSun/pipe_created_win_exploit_redsun_named_pipe/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
critical
RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File
Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present. This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based AV bypass/privilege escalation tool. RedSun works as follows: 1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\ 2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger a Defender scan and remediation attempt 3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file 4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open 5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path 6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id a7c3e5f2-8b1d-4e9a-b6c2-3d7f5e8a9b4c
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File
id: a7c3e5f2-8b1d-4e9a-b6c2-3d7f5e8a9b4c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe
    dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present.
    This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based
    AV bypass/privilege escalation tool.

    RedSun works as follows:
      1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\
      2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger
         a Defender scan and remediation attempt
      3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file
      4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open
      5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect
         \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path
      6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges
references:
    - https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun/blob/7456cc8cf066f5e5fc6cdf7d3272a466ebd6b2f6/RedSun.cpp#L605
    - https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/04/public-disclosure-response-for-cve-2026.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-04-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    # EventID 1119: Microsoft Defender Antivirus has encountered an error trying to take action on malware or unwanted software
    # Path field from event: file:_C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\<n>\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe
    # Threat name 'Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File' is expected - RedSun uses EICAR content to reliably trigger a Defender scan/remediation
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 1119
        SourceName: 'Real-Time Protection'
    selection_susp_path:
        Path|endswith: '\TieringEngineService.exe'
        ThreatName|endswith: 'EICAR_Test_File'
    selection_susp_process:
        ProcessName|endswith: '\RedSun.exe'
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/RedSun/win_defender_exploit_redsun_tiering_engine_detected_as_eicar/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
critical
RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Staged in RS-Prefixed Temp Dir
Detects the creation of a file named TieringEngineService.exe inside a directory whose path contains the RS- prefix characteristic of RedSun's staging directory (e.g. %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe). RedSun registers a Cloud Files sync root under this RS-prefixed path and drops a masqueraded placeholder there as part of its oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain. The RS-{GUID} directory name is generated by RedSun itself and has no legitimate system usage, making the combination of this path prefix and the TieringEngineService.exe filename a highly specific indicator of RedSun activity.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost id f2e4b7d9-5c3a-4f8b-9e1d-7a6c2b3f4e5d
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_file_name contains "\Temp" and 
 action_file_name contains "\RS-{") and 
 action_file_name contains "\TieringEngineService.exe"))
view Sigma YAML
title: RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Staged in RS-Prefixed Temp Dir
id: f2e4b7d9-5c3a-4f8b-9e1d-7a6c2b3f4e5d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file named TieringEngineService.exe inside a directory whose path contains the RS- prefix characteristic
    of RedSun's staging directory (e.g. %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\TieringEngineService.exe).
    RedSun registers a Cloud Files sync root under this RS-prefixed path and drops a masqueraded placeholder there as part of its oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain.

    The RS-{GUID} directory name is generated by RedSun itself and has no legitimate system usage,
    making the combination of this path prefix and the TieringEngineService.exe filename a highly
    specific indicator of RedSun activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun/blob/7456cc8cf066f5e5fc6cdf7d3272a466ebd6b2f6/RedSun.cpp#L591
    - https://deadeclipse666.blogspot.com/2026/04/public-disclosure-response-for-cve-2026.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
date: 2026-04-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Temp'
            - '\RS-{'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\TieringEngineService.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Exploits/RedSun/file_event_win_exploit_redsun_indicators/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Registry Entries For Azorult Malware
Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
status test author Trent Liffick id f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Registry Entries For Azorult Malware
id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a
author: Trent Liffick
date: 2020-05-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_event
detection:
    selection:
        EventID:
            - 12
            - 13
        TargetObject|contains: 'SYSTEM\'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\localNETService'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Renamed Whoami Execution
Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Renamed Whoami Execution
id: f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection
references:
    - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1033
    - car.2016-03-001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'whoami.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Rorschach Ransomware Execution Activity
Detects Rorschach ransomware execution activity
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) id 0e9e6c63-1350-48c4-9fa1-7ccb235edc68
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\bcdedit.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\net1.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\wevtutil.exe", "*\vssadmin.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "11111111"))
view Sigma YAML
title: Rorschach Ransomware Execution Activity
id: 0e9e6c63-1350-48c4-9fa1-7ccb235edc68
status: test
description: Detects Rorschach ransomware execution activity
references:
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/rorschach-a-new-sophisticated-and-fast-ransomware/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-04
modified: 2023-04-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netsh.exe'
            - '\wevtutil.exe'
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '11111111'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
SNAKE Malware Kernel Driver File Indicator
Detects SNAKE malware kernel driver file indicator
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id d6d9d23f-69c1-41b5-8305-fa8250bd027f
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_file_name = "C:\Windows\System32\Com\Comadmin.dat")
view Sigma YAML
title: SNAKE Malware Kernel Driver File Indicator
id: d6d9d23f-69c1-41b5-8305-fa8250bd027f
status: test
description: Detects SNAKE malware kernel driver file indicator
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\System32\Com\Comadmin.dat'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
SNAKE Malware Service Persistence
Detects the creation of a service named "WerFaultSvc" which seems to be used by the SNAKE malware as a persistence mechanism as described by CISA in their report
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b2e60816-96b2-45bd-ba91-b63578c03ef6
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: SNAKE Malware Service Persistence
id: b2e60816-96b2-45bd-ba91-b63578c03ef6
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a service named "WerFaultSvc" which seems to be used by the SNAKE malware as a persistence mechanism as described by CISA in their report
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/09/2003218554/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_HUNTING_RU_INTEL_SNAKE_MALWARE_20230509.PDF
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName|contains: 'WerFaultSvc' # Note: The report contains a "," in the name ("WerFaultSvc,"). Since we can't confirm if its a typo or not we don't use it
        ImagePath|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
        ImagePath|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Serv-U Exploitation CVE-2021-35211 by DEV-0322
Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Serv-U CVE-2021-35211 vulnerability by threat group DEV-0322
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 75578840-9526-4b2a-9462-af469a45e767
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "whoami" and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*./Client/Common/*", "*.\Client\Common\*")) or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Windows\Temp\Serv-U.bat")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Serv-U Exploitation CVE-2021-35211 by DEV-0322
id: 75578840-9526-4b2a-9462-af469a45e767
status: test
description: Detects patterns as noticed in exploitation of Serv-U CVE-2021-35211 vulnerability by threat group DEV-0322
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-14
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - cve.2021-35211
    - detection.emerging-threats
    # - threat_group.DEV-0322
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_whoami:
        CommandLine|contains: 'whoami'
    selection_cmd_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - './Client/Common/'
            - '.\Client\Common\'
    selection_cmd_2:
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\Temp\Serv-U.bat'
    condition: selection_whoami and 1 of selection_cmd*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Silence.EDA Detection
Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
status test author Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community id 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Silence.EDA Detection
id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973
status: test
description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf
author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community
date: 2019-11-01
modified: 2023-04-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1529
    - attack.g0091
    - attack.s0363
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    empire:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'System.Diagnostics.Process'
            - 'Stop-Computer'
            - 'Restart-Computer'
            - 'Exception in execution'
            - '$cmdargs'
            - 'Close-Dnscat2Tunnel'
    dnscat:
        # better to randomise the order
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'set type=$LookupType`nserver'
            - '$Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String'
            - 'New-RandomDNSField'
            - '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)'
            - '$Session.Dead = $True'
            - '$Session["Driver"] -eq'
    condition: empire and dnscat
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Small Sieve Malware Potential C2 Communication
Detects potential C2 communication related to Small Sieve malware
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b0422664-37a4-4e78-949a-4a139309eaf0
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Small Sieve Malware Potential C2 Communication
id: b0422664-37a4-4e78-949a-4a139309eaf0
status: test
description: Detects potential C2 communication related to Small Sieve malware
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/goofy-guineapig/NCSC-MAR-Goofy-Guineapig.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-host: 'api.telegram.org'
        cs-uri|contains|all:
            - 'chat_id=2090761833'
            - 'text=com/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Solarwinds SUPERNOVA Webshell Access
Detects access to SUPERNOVA webshell as described in Guidepoint report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id a2cee20b-eacc-459f-861d-c02e5d12f1db
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Solarwinds SUPERNOVA Webshell Access
id: a2cee20b-eacc-459f-861d-c02e5d12f1db
status: test
description: Detects access to SUPERNOVA webshell as described in Guidepoint report
references:
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/supernova-solarwinds-net-webshell-analysis/
    - https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/226029
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-12-17
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection1:
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'logoimagehandler.ashx'
            - 'clazz'
    selection2:
        cs-uri-query|contains: 'logoimagehandler.ashx'
        sc-status: 500
    condition: selection1 or selection2
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Execution
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community id 2fdefcb3-dbda-401e-ae23-f0db027628bc
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\winlogon.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\wt.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*sethc.exe*", "*utilman.exe*", "*osk.exe*", "*Magnify.exe*", "*Narrator.exe*", "*DisplaySwitch.exe*"))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Sticky Key Like Backdoor Execution
id: 2fdefcb3-dbda-401e-ae23-f0db027628bc
related:
    - id: baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jonathantrull/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-15
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.008
    - car.2014-11-003
    - car.2014-11-008
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\winlogon.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sethc.exe'
            - 'utilman.exe'
            - 'osk.exe'
            - 'Magnify.exe'
            - 'Narrator.exe'
            - 'DisplaySwitch.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage - Registry
Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community id baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\atbroker.exe\Debugger", "*\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\HelpPane.exe\Debugger")))
view Sigma YAML
title: Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage - Registry
id: baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542
status: test
description: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen
references:
    - https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
date: 2018-03-15
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.008
    - car.2014-11-003
    - car.2014-11-008
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_registry:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\atbroker.exe\Debugger'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\HelpPane.exe\Debugger'
    condition: selection_registry
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Successful Exchange ProxyShell Attack
Detects URP patterns and status codes that indicate a successful ProxyShell exploitation attack against Exchange servers
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Rich Warren id 992be1eb-e5da-437e-9a54-6d13b57bb4d8
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Successful Exchange ProxyShell Attack
id: 992be1eb-e5da-437e-9a54-6d13b57bb4d8
status: test
description: Detects URP patterns and status codes that indicate a successful ProxyShell exploitation attack against Exchange servers
references:
    - https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2231
    - https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html
    - https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Rich Warren
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_auto:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/autodiscover.json'
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '/powershell'
            - '/mapi/nspi'
            - '/EWS'
            - 'X-Rps-CAT'
    selection_success:
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 301
    condition: selection_auto and selection_uri and selection_success
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287 - Builtin
Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 7fcc54cb-f27d-4684-84b7-436af096f858
No stored cortex_xdr translation for this rule. Expand the YAML below to convert it inline.
view Sigma YAML
title: Sudo Privilege Escalation CVE-2019-14287 - Builtin
id: 7fcc54cb-f27d-4684-84b7-436af096f858
related:
    - id: f74107df-b6c6-4e80-bf00-4170b658162b
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects users trying to exploit sudo vulnerability reported in CVE-2019-14287
references:
    - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/14/1
    - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-14287
    - https://twitter.com/matthieugarin/status/1183970598210412546
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-15
modified: 2022-11-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1548.003
    - cve.2019-14287
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: sudo
detection:
    selection_user:
        USER:
            - '#-*'
            - '#*4294967295'
    condition: selection_user
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
critical
Suspicious Child Process Of Veeam Dabatase
Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id d55b793d-f847-4eea-b59a-5ab09908ac90
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\sqlservr.exe" and 
 actor_process_command_line contains "VEEAMSQL") and 
 (((action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wsl.exe", "*\wt.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*-ex *", "*bypass*", "*cscript*", "*DownloadString*", "*http://*", "*https://*", "*mshta*", "*regsvr32*", "*rundll32*", "*wscript*", "*copy *"))) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\net.exe", "*\net1.exe", "*\netstat.exe", "*\nltest.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\tasklist.exe", "*\whoami.exe")))))
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Child Process Of Veeam Dabatase
id: d55b793d-f847-4eea-b59a-5ab09908ac90
related:
    - id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sqlservr.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'VEEAMSQL'
    selection_child_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\wt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-ex '
            - 'bypass'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'copy '
    selection_child_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netstat.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\ping.exe'
            - '\tasklist.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
level: critical
Convert to SIEM query
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