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Palo Alto Cortex XDR

1,524 rules · Sigma detections in Palo Alto Cortex XDR syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into Palo Alto Cortex XDR query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Download all 1,524 rules (.zip, 675 KB) Every Palo Alto Cortex XDR query in this view, packaged to deploy.
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Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance4
Resource Development5
Initial Access7
Execution25
Persistence31
Privilege Escalation17
Stealth63
Defense Impairment16
Credential Access26
Discovery24
Lateral Movement10
Collection11
Command and Control18
Exfiltration7
Impact10
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
Adapt. Map the field names to your log schema - Sigma assumes a normalised taxonomy - and tune thresholds and timeframes to your own baseline before you trust the alert.
Validate. Every rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so run the matching Atomic Red Team test on /atomic to confirm the rule actually fires before you rely on it.
Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.
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Detection rules

50 shown of 1,524
high Moderate High FP
OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts. When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
status test author @kostastsale ATT&CK sub-technique id 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\onenote.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*\exported\*", "*\onenoteofflinecache_files\*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_file_name contains ":\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe")
view Sigma YAML 
title: Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea) ATT&CK technique id cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\OpenWith.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/c"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
status: test
description: The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml
    - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\OpenWith.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Operation Wocao Activity
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*checkadmin.exe 127.0.0.1 -all*", "*netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=powershell dir=in*", "*cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\s.ps1*", "*/tn win32times /f*", "*create win32times binPath=*", "*\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll*", "* -exec bypass -enc JgAg*", "*type *keepass\KeePass.config.xml*", "*iie.exe iie.txt*", "*reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\*\PuTTY\Sessions\*")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Operation Wocao Activity
id: 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
related:
    - id: 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
references:
    - https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-12-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'checkadmin.exe 127.0.0.1 -all'
            - 'netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=powershell dir=in'
            - 'cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\s.ps1'
            - '/tn win32times /f'
            - 'create win32times binPath='
            - '\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll'
            - ' -exec bypass -enc JgAg'
            - 'type *keepass\KeePass.config.xml'
            - 'iie.exe iie.txt'
            - 'reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\\*\PuTTY\Sessions\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled
Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
status test author Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules")
view Sigma YAML 
title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled
id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # Registry variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000001)")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
status test author @ScoubiMtl ATT&CK technique id e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\Outlook\Security\Level" and 
 (action_registry_value_name contains "0x00000001" or 
 action_registry_data contains "0x00000001")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
id: e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\Level'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001' # Enable all Macros
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
PCRE.NET Package Image Load
Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK technique id 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_module_path contains "\AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\")
view Sigma YAML 
title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load
id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
status: test
description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) ATT&CK technique id 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_file_name contains "\AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\")
view Sigma YAML 
title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE
Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process. This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 145095eb-e273-443b-83d0-f9b519b7867b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\regedit.exe" and 
 action_file_name contains ".pdf"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE
id: 145095eb-e273-443b-83d0-f9b519b7867b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process.
    This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses.
references:
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2024/dumping-lsa-secrets-a-story-about-task-decorrelation/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pdf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact
Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 304afd73-55a5-4bb9-8c21-0b1fc84ea9e4
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "C:\Windows\PSEXEC-" and 
 action_file_name contains ".key"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact
id: 304afd73-55a5-4bb9-8c21-0b1fc84ea9e4
status: test
description: Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system
references:
    - https://aboutdfir.com/the-key-to-identify-psexec/
    - https://twitter.com/davisrichardg/status/1616518800584704028
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-21
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PSEXEC-'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.key'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
status test author Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*domainlist*", "*trustdmp*", "*dcmodes*", "*adinfo*", "*-sc dclist*", "*computer_pwdnotreqd*", "*objectcategory=*", "*-subnets -f*", "*name=\"Domain Admins\"*", "*-sc u:*", "*domainncs*", "*dompol*", "* oudmp *", "*subnetdmp*", "*gpodmp*", "*fspdmp*", "*users_noexpire*", "*computers_active*", "*computers_pwdnotreqd*")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
      type: similar
    - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2025-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - '-sc dclist'
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*/EXEFilename*", "*/CommandLine*")) and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("* /RunAs 8 *", "* /RunAs 4 *", "* /RunAs 10 *", "* /RunAs 11 *")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*/RunAs 8", "*/RunAs 4", "*/RunAs 10", "*/RunAs 11")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
    - id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/EXEFilename'
            - '/CommandLine'
    selection_runas:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' /RunAs 8 '
              - ' /RunAs 4 '
              - ' /RunAs 10 '
              - ' /RunAs 11 '
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '/RunAs 8'
              - '/RunAs 4'
              - '/RunAs 10'
              - '/RunAs 11'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\chisel.exe" or 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*exe client *", "*exe server *")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*-socks5*", "*-reverse*", "* r:*", "*:127.0.0.1:*", "*-tls-skip-verify *", "*:socks*")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
PUA - CleanWipe Execution
Detects the use of CleanWipe a tool usually used to delete Symantec antivirus.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id f44800ac-38ec-471f-936e-3fa7d9c53100
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\SepRemovalToolNative_x64.exe" or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\CATClean.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "--uninstall") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\NetInstaller.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-r") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\WFPUnins.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "/uninstall" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/enterprise"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - CleanWipe Execution
id: f44800ac-38ec-471f-936e-3fa7d9c53100
status: test
description: Detects the use of CleanWipe a tool usually used to delete Symantec antivirus.
references:
    - https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/CleanWipe
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-18
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '\SepRemovalToolNative_x64.exe'
    selection2:
        Image|endswith: '\CATClean.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--uninstall'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: '\NetInstaller.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '-r'
    selection4:
        Image|endswith: '\WFPUnins.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/uninstall'
            - '/enterprise'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use (Should be investigated either way)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - DIT Snapshot Viewer
Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit.
status test author Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_) ATT&CK sub-technique id d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\ditsnap.exe" or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "ditsnap.exe"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - DIT Snapshot Viewer
id: d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b
status: test
description: Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20201124182207/https://github.com/yosqueoy/ditsnap
author: Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)
date: 2020-07-04
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\ditsnap.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'ditsnap.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin usage
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\nc.exe", "*\ncat.exe", "*\netcat.exe")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -lvp *", "* -lvnp*", "* -l -v -p *", "* -lv -p *", "* -l --proxy-type http *", "* -vnl --exec *", "* -vnl -e *", "* --lua-exec *", "* --sh-exec *"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
status: test
description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
references:
    - https://nmap.org/ncat/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-21
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1095
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # can not use OriginalFileName as is empty
        Image|endswith:
            - '\nc.exe'
            - '\ncat.exe'
            - '\netcat.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        # Typical command lines
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -lvp '
            - ' -lvnp'
            - ' -l -v -p '
            - ' -lv -p '
            - ' -l --proxy-type http '
            # - ' --exec cmd.exe ' # Not specific enough for netcat
            - ' -vnl --exec '
            - ' -vnl -e '
            - ' --lua-exec '
            - ' --sh-exec '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ncat use
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
PUA - Ngrok Execution
Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available. Involved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("* tcp 139*", "* tcp 445*", "* tcp 3389*", "* tcp 5985*", "* tcp 5986*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " start " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "--all" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "--config" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".yml") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "ngrok.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* tcp *", "* http *", "* authtoken *"))) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*.exe authtoken *", "*.exe start --all*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Ngrok Execution
id: ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31
status: test
description: |
  Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available.
  Involved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/docs
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42442320/ssh-tunnel-to-ngrok-and-initiate-rdp
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/58d21840d915aaf4040ceb89522396124c82f325282f805d1085527e1e2ccfa1/detection
    - https://cybleinc.com/2021/02/15/ngrok-platform-abused-by-hackers-to-deliver-a-new-wave-of-phishing-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/xorJosh/status/1598646907802451969
    - https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/how-to-use-ngrok/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp 139'
            - ' tcp 445'
            - ' tcp 3389'
            - ' tcp 5985'
            - ' tcp 5986'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' start '
            - '--all'
            - '--config'
            - '.yml'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: 'ngrok.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp '
            - ' http '
            - ' authtoken '
    selection4:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe authtoken '
            - '.exe start --all'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of Ngrok
    - Ngrok http 3978 (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bot-service/bot-service-debug-channel-ngrok?view=azure-bot-service-4.0)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM
Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " runassystem ")
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM
id: d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4
status: test
description: Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user
references:
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' runassystem '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration. Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services. If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
status experimental author Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_process_image_command_line contains "--password-file" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "init" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -r ") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "--use-fs-snapshot" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "backup" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -r ")) or 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*sftp:*", "*rest:http*", "*s3:s3.*", "*s3.http*", "*azure:*", "* gs:*", "*rclone:*", "*swift:*", "* b2:*")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " init " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -r "))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
id: 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
    Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
    If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/#exfiltration
    - https://restic.net/
    - https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_repo.html
author: Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--password-file'
              - 'init'
              - ' -r '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--use-fs-snapshot'
              - 'backup'
              - ' -r '
    selection_restic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sftp:'
            - 'rest:http'
            - 's3:s3.'
            - 's3.http'
            - 'azure:'
            - ' gs:'
            - 'rclone:'
            - 'swift:'
            - ' b2:'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' init '
            - ' -r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Restic for backup purposes within the organization.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
PUA - RunXCmd Execution
Detects the use of the RunXCmd tool to execute commands with System or TrustedInstaller accounts
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 93199800-b52a-4dec-b762-75212c196542
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("* /account=system *", "* /account=ti *")) and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/exec="))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - RunXCmd Execution
id: 93199800-b52a-4dec-b762-75212c196542
status: test
description: Detects the use of the RunXCmd tool to execute commands with System or TrustedInstaller accounts
references:
    - https://www.d7xtech.com/free-software/runx/
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_account:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /account=system '
            - ' /account=ti '
    selection_exec:
        CommandLine|contains: '/exec='
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
Detects active directory enumeration activity using known AdFind CLI flags
status test author frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*lockoutduration*", "*lockoutthreshold*", "*lockoutobservationwindow*", "*maxpwdage*", "*minpwdage*", "*minpwdlength*", "*pwdhistorylength*", "*pwdproperties*")) or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-sc admincountdmp" or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-sc exchaddresses"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
related:
    - id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
      type: similar
    - id: 514e7e3e-b3b4-4a67-af60-be20f139198b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects active directory enumeration activity using known AdFind CLI flags
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_password: # Listing password policy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - lockoutduration
            - lockoutthreshold
            - lockoutobservationwindow
            - maxpwdage
            - minpwdage
            - minpwdlength
            - pwdhistorylength
            - pwdproperties
    selection_enum_ad: # Enumerate Active Directory Admins
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc admincountdmp'
    selection_enum_exchange: # Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc exchaddresses'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized administrative activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_enumeration/info.yml
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation Related Indicators
Detects exploitation indicators related to PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id de1bd0b6-6d59-417c-86d9-a44114aede3b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains " /c " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "powershell" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-nop -w hidden" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "Invoke-WebRequest" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "setup.msi" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-OutFile") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "msiexec " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/i " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "setup.msi " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/qn " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "IntegratorLogin=fimaribahundq")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation Related Indicators
id: de1bd0b6-6d59-417c-86d9-a44114aede3b
status: test
description: Detects exploitation indicators related to PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /c '
            - 'powershell'
            - '-nop -w hidden'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'setup.msi'
            - '-OutFile'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'msiexec '
            - '/i '
            - 'setup.msi '
            - '/qn '
            - 'IntegratorLogin=fimaribahundq'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
PaperCut MF/NG Potential Exploitation
Detects suspicious child processes of "pc-app.exe". Which could indicate potential exploitation of PaperCut
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntress DE&TH Team (idea) ATT&CK tactic-only id 0934ac71-a331-4e98-a034-d49c491fbbcb
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\pc-app.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\bash.exe", "*\calc.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\cmd.exe", "*\csc.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dllhost.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\msiexec.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\wsl.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: PaperCut MF/NG Potential Exploitation
id: 0934ac71-a331-4e98-a034-d49c491fbbcb
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "pc-app.exe". Which could indicate potential exploitation of PaperCut
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://github.com/huntresslabs/threat-intel/blob/3bad6b0fadfcca3ff5680923e74e39edd72f32da/2023/2023-04/20-PaperCut/win_susp_papercut_code_execution.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntress DE&TH Team (idea)
date: 2023-04-20
modified: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pc-app.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\csc.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Peach Sandstorm APT Process Activity Indicators
Detects process creation activity related to Peach Sandstorm APT
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 2e7bbd54-2f26-476e-b4a1-ba5f1a012614
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "QP's\*(58vaP!tF4")
view Sigma YAML 
title: Peach Sandstorm APT Process Activity Indicators
id: 2e7bbd54-2f26-476e-b4a1-ba5f1a012614
status: test
description: Detects process creation activity related to Peach Sandstorm APT
references:
    - https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1737895710169628824
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/364275326bbfc4a3b89233dabdaf3230a3d149ab774678342a40644ad9f8d614/details
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'QP''s\*(58vaP!tF4'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Persistence Via Hhctrl.ocx
Detects when an attacker modifies the registry value of the "hhctrl" to point to a custom binary
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id f10ed525-97fe-4fed-be7c-2feecca941b1
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32\(Default)" and 
 (not 
 (action_registry_value_name = "C:\Windows\System32\hhctrl.ocx" or 
 action_registry_data = "C:\Windows\System32\hhctrl.ocx"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Persistence Via Hhctrl.ocx
id: f10ed525-97fe-4fed-be7c-2feecca941b1
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker modifies the registry value of the "hhctrl" to point to a custom binary
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/hhctrl.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/23/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-77/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32\(Default)'
    filter:
        Details: 'C:\Windows\System32\hhctrl.ocx'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive
Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id fcdf69e5-a3d3-452a-9724-26f2308bf2b1
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\Winrar.exe", "*\7zFM.exe", "*\peazip.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\isoburn.exe", "*\PowerISO.exe", "*\ImgBurn.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive
id: fcdf69e5-a3d3-452a-9724-26f2308bf2b1
status: test
description: Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1534259727059787783
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/e1fe6a62-bce8-4323-a49a-63795d9afd5d/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\Winrar.exe'
            - '\7zFM.exe'
            - '\peazip.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\isoburn.exe'
            - '\PowerISO.exe'
            - '\ImgBurn.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which archives contain ISO or IMG files and the user opens the archive and the image via clicking and not extraction
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Pikabot Fake DLL Extension Execution Via Rundll32.EXE
Detects specific process tree behavior linked to "rundll32" executions, wherein the associated DLL lacks a common ".dll" extension, often signaling potential Pikabot activity.
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 1bf0ba65-9a39-42a2-9271-31d31bf2f0bf
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((actor_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*:\ProgramData\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*:\Windows\Installer\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*"))) and 
 (not 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*.cpl *", "*.cpl,*", "*.dll *", "*.dll,*", "*.inf *", "*.inf,*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*.cpl", "*.cpl\"", "*.dll", "*.dll\"", "*.inf", "*.inf\"", "*.cpl'", "*.dll'", "*.inf'"))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Pikabot Fake DLL Extension Execution Via Rundll32.EXE
id: 1bf0ba65-9a39-42a2-9271-31d31bf2f0bf
status: test
description: |
    Detects specific process tree behavior linked to "rundll32" executions, wherein the associated DLL lacks a common ".dll" extension, often signaling potential Pikabot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot
    - https://tria.ge/231004-tp8k6sch9t/behavioral2
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/56db0c4842a63234ab7fe2dda6eeb63aa7bb68f9a456985b519122f74dea37e2/behavior
    - https://tria.ge/231212-r1bpgaefar/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Installer\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    filter_main_known_extension:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.cpl '
              - '.cpl,'
              - '.dll '
              - '.dll,'
              - '.inf '
              - '.inf,'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '.cpl'
              - '.cpl"'
              - '.dll'
              - '.dll"'
              - '.inf'
              - '.inf"'
              - ".cpl'"
              - ".dll'"
              - ".inf'"
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Ping Hex IP
Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 1a0d4aba-7668-4365-9ce4-6d79ab088dfd
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\ping.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "0x[a-fA-F0-9]{8}"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Ping Hex IP
id: 1a0d4aba-7668-4365-9ce4-6d79ab088dfd
status: test
description: Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address
references:
    - https://github.com/vysecurity/Aggressor-VYSEC/blob/0d61c80387b9432dab64b8b8a9fb52d20cfef80e/ping.cna
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/977198418354491392
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ping.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '0x[a-fA-F0-9]{8}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no sane admin pings IP addresses in a hexadecimal form
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Pingback Backdoor Activity
Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK sub-technique id b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\updata.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "config" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "msdtc" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "start" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "auto")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Pingback Backdoor Activity
id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # DLL Load
      type: similar
    - id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78 # File Indicators
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\updata.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'msdtc'
            - 'start'
            - 'auto'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Pingback Backdoor DLL Loading Activity
Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK sub-technique id 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\msdtc.exe" and 
 action_module_path = "C:\Windows\oci.dll"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Pingback Backdoor DLL Loading Activity
id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # File indicators
      type: similar
    - id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9 # Process Creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdtc.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\oci.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Pingback Backdoor File Indicators
Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK sub-technique id 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "updata.exe" and 
 action_file_name = "C:\Windows\oci.dll"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Pingback Backdoor File Indicators
id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # DLL Load
      type: similar
    - id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9 # Process Creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'updata.exe'
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\oci.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions
Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand
status test author Teymur Kheirkhabarov ATT&CK sub-technique id d937b75f-a665-4480-88a5-2f20e9f9b22a
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\sc.exe" and 
 (action_process_integrity_level in ("Medium", "S-1-16-8192"))) and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "config" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "binPath") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "failure" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "command"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions
id: d937b75f-a665-4480-88a5-2f20e9f9b22a
status: test
description: Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/30/weak-service-permissions/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    scbynonadmin:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
    selection_binpath:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'binPath'
    selection_failure:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'failure'
            - 'command'
    condition: scbynonadmin and 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential ACTINIUM Persistence Activity
Detects specific process parameters as used by ACTINIUM scheduled task persistence creation.
status test author Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) ATT&CK sub-technique id e1118a8f-82f5-44b3-bb6b-8a284e5df602
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "schtasks" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "create" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "wscript" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /e:vbscript"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential ACTINIUM Persistence Activity
id: e1118a8f-82f5-44b3-bb6b-8a284e5df602
status: test
description: Detects specific process parameters as used by ACTINIUM scheduled task persistence creation.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2022-02-07
modified: 2023-03-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1053.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'schtasks'
            - 'create'
            - 'wscript'
            - ' /e:vbscript'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential AMSI Bypass Via .NET Reflection
Detects Request to "amsiInitFailed" that can be used to disable AMSI Scanning
status test author Markus Neis, @Kostastsale ATT&CK technique id 30edb182-aa75-42c0-b0a9-e998bb29067c
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "amsiInitFailed") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "[Ref].Assembly.GetType" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "SetValue($null,$true)" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "NonPublic,Static")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential AMSI Bypass Via .NET Reflection
id: 30edb182-aa75-42c0-b0a9-e998bb29067c
related:
    - id: 4f927692-68b5-4267-871b-073c45f4f6fe
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects Request to "amsiInitFailed" that can be used to disable AMSI Scanning
references:
    - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/Bypass_AMSI_by_manual_modification/
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
author: Markus Neis, @Kostastsale
date: 2018-08-17
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils'
              - 'amsiInitFailed'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '[Ref].Assembly.GetType'
              - 'SetValue($null,$true)'
              - 'NonPublic,Static'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential AMSI COM Server Hijacking
Detects changes to the AMSI come server registry key in order disable AMSI scanning functionalities. When AMSI attempts to starts its COM component, it will query its registered CLSID and return a non-existent COM server. This causes a load failure and prevents any scanning methods from being accessed, ultimately rendering AMSI useless
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 160d2780-31f7-4922-8b3a-efce30e63e96
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32\(Default)" and 
 (not 
 (action_registry_value_name = "%windir%\system32\amsi.dll" or 
 action_registry_data = "%windir%\system32\amsi.dll"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential AMSI COM Server Hijacking
id: 160d2780-31f7-4922-8b3a-efce30e63e96
status: test
description: Detects changes to the AMSI come server registry key in order disable AMSI scanning functionalities. When AMSI attempts to starts its COM component, it will query its registered CLSID and return a non-existent COM server. This causes a load failure and prevents any scanning methods from being accessed, ultimately rendering AMSI useless
references:
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/
    - https://github.com/r00t-3xp10it/hacking-material-books/blob/43cb1e1932c16ff1f58b755bc9ab6b096046853f/obfuscation/simple_obfuscation.md#amsi-comreg-bypass
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-04
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\CLSID\{fdb00e52-a214-4aa1-8fba-4357bb0072ec}\InProcServer32\(Default)'
    filter:
        Details: '%windir%\system32\amsi.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential APT FIN7 Reconnaissance/POWERTRASH Related Activity
Detects specific command line execution used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs for reconnaissance and POWERTRASH execution
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 911389c7-5ae3-43ea-bab3-a947ebdeb85e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "-noni -nop -exe bypass -f \\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "ADMIN$") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "-ex bypass -noprof -nolog -nonint -f" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Windows\Temp\")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential APT FIN7 Reconnaissance/POWERTRASH Related Activity
id: 911389c7-5ae3-43ea-bab3-a947ebdeb85e
status: test
description: Detects specific command line execution used by FIN7 as reported by WithSecureLabs for reconnaissance and POWERTRASH execution
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers/jcr:content/root/responsivegrid/responsivegrid/responsivegrid/image_253944286.img.png/1682500394900.png
    - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0046
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-noni -nop -exe bypass -f \\\\'
            - 'ADMIN$'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-ex bypass -noprof -nolog -nonint -f'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential APT FIN7 Related PowerShell Script Created
Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific name or suffix which was seen being used often by FIN7 PowerShell scripts
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id a88d9f45-ec8a-4b0e-85ee-c9f6a65e9128
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name in ("*_64refl.ps1", "host_ip.ps1")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential APT FIN7 Related PowerShell Script Created
id: a88d9f45-ec8a-4b0e-85ee-c9f6a65e9128
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific name or suffix which was seen being used often by FIN7 PowerShell scripts
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0046
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith: '_64refl.ps1'
        - TargetFilename: 'host_ip.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential APT Mustang Panda Activity Against Australian Gov
Detects specific command line execution used by Mustang Panda in a targeted attack against the Australian government as reported by Lab52
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 7806bb49-f653-48d3-a915-5115c1a85234
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "copy SolidPDFCreator.dll" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Users\Public\Libraries\PhotoTvRHD\SolidPDFCreator.dll") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "reg " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "SolidPDF" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Users\Public\Libraries\PhotoTvRHD\")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential APT Mustang Panda Activity Against Australian Gov
id: 7806bb49-f653-48d3-a915-5115c1a85234
status: test
description: Detects specific command line execution used by Mustang Panda in a targeted attack against the Australian government as reported by Lab52
references:
    - https://lab52.io/blog/new-mustang-pandas-campaing-against-australia/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0129
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'copy SolidPDFCreator.dll'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\Libraries\PhotoTvRHD\SolidPDFCreator.dll'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg '
            - '\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - 'SolidPDF'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\Libraries\PhotoTvRHD\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential APT10 Cloud Hopper Activity
Detects potential process and execution activity related to APT10 Cloud Hopper operation
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 966e4016-627f-44f7-8341-f394905c361f
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\cscript.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".vbs /shell ") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "csvde -f C:\windows\web\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".log")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential APT10 Cloud Hopper Activity
id: 966e4016-627f-44f7-8341-f394905c361f
status: test
description: Detects potential process and execution activity related to APT10 Cloud Hopper operation
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180725233601/https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-04-07
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.g0045
    - attack.t1059.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cscript:
        Image|endswith: '\cscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '.vbs /shell '
    selection_csvde:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'csvde -f C:\windows\web\'
            - '.log'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Potential Arbitrary Code Execution Via Node.EXE
Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 6640f31c-01ad-49b5-beb5-83498a5cd8bd
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\node.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -e *", "* --eval *"))) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains ".exec(" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "net.socket" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".connect" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "child_process")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Arbitrary Code Execution Via Node.EXE
id: 6640f31c-01ad-49b5-beb5-83498a5cd8bd
status: test
description: Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/resources/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/01/18/active-exploitation-of-vmware-horizon-servers/
    - https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        Image|endswith: '\node.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -e '
            - ' --eval '
    # Add more pattern of abuse as actions
    selection_action_reverse_shell:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '.exec('
            - 'net.socket'
            - '.connect'
            - 'child_process'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_action_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential Atlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084 Exploitation Attempt
Detects spawning of suspicious child processes by Atlassian Confluence server which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2021-26084
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK technique id 245f92e3-c4da-45f1-9070-bc552e06db11
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\Atlassian\Confluence\jre\bin\java.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*certutil*", "*cmd /c*", "*cmd /k*", "*cscript*", "*curl*", "*ipconfig*", "*powershell*", "*pwsh*", "*regsvr32*", "*rundll32*", "*whoami*", "*wscript*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Atlassian Confluence CVE-2021-26084 Exploitation Attempt
id: 245f92e3-c4da-45f1-9070-bc552e06db11
status: test
description: Detects spawning of suspicious child processes by Atlassian Confluence server which may indicate successful exploitation of CVE-2021-26084
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084
    - https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html
    - https://github.com/h3v0x/CVE-2021-26084_Confluence
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-09-08
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1059
    - cve.2021-26084
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Monitor suspicious child processes spawned by Confluence
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Atlassian\Confluence\jre\bin\java.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cmd /c'
            - 'cmd /k'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'curl'
            - 'ipconfig'
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'whoami'
            - 'wscript'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Potential Attachment Manager Settings Associations Tamper
Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See reference for more information)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id a9b6c011-ab69-4ddb-bc0a-c4f21c80ec47
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Associations\" and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\DefaultFileTypeRisk" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00006152)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00006152)")) or 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\LowRiskFileTypes" and 
 ((action_registry_value_name in ("*.zip;*", "*.rar;*", "*.exe;*", "*.bat;*", "*.com;*", "*.cmd;*", "*.reg;*", "*.msi;*", "*.htm;*", "*.html;*")) or 
 (action_registry_data in ("*.zip;*", "*.rar;*", "*.exe;*", "*.bat;*", "*.com;*", "*.cmd;*", "*.reg;*", "*.msi;*", "*.htm;*", "*.html;*")))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Attachment Manager Settings Associations Tamper
id: a9b6c011-ab69-4ddb-bc0a-c4f21c80ec47
status: test
description: Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See reference for more information)
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/information-about-the-attachment-manager-in-microsoft-windows-c48a4dcd-8de5-2af5-ee9b-cd795ae42738
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Associations\'
    selection_value_default_file_type_rsik:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\DefaultFileTypeRisk'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00006152)'
    selection_value_low_risk_filetypes:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\LowRiskFileTypes'
        Details|contains: # Add more as you see fit
            - '.zip;'
            - '.rar;'
            - '.exe;'
            - '.bat;'
            - '.com;'
            - '.cmd;'
            - '.reg;'
            - '.msi;'
            - '.htm;'
            - '.html;'
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Potential Attachment Manager Settings Attachments Tamper
Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies attachments (See reference for more information)
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id ee77a5db-b0f3-4be2-bfd4-b58be1c6b15a
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Attachments\" and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\HideZoneInfoOnProperties" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000001)")) or 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SaveZoneInformation" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000002)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000002)")) or 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\ScanWithAntiVirus" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000001)")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Attachment Manager Settings Attachments Tamper
id: ee77a5db-b0f3-4be2-bfd4-b58be1c6b15a
status: test
description: Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies attachments (See reference for more information)
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/information-about-the-attachment-manager-in-microsoft-windows-c48a4dcd-8de5-2af5-ee9b-cd795ae42738
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Attachments\'
    selection_value_hide_zone_info:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\HideZoneInfoOnProperties'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # On
    selection_value_save_zone_info:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SaveZoneInformation'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000002)' # Off
    selection_value_scan_with_av:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\ScanWithAntiVirus'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)' # Disabled
    condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering
Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging. The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process. Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source. Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\Control\WMI\Autologger\" and 
 ((action_registry_key_name in ("*\EventLog-*", "*\Defender*")) and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\Enabled", "*\Start")) and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000000)"))) and 
 (not 
 (actor_process_image_path = "C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe" or 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\*", "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\*", "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\*")) and 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\MsMpEng.exe" and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\DefenderApiLogger\*", "*\DefenderAuditLogger\*")))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential AutoLogger Sessions Tampering
id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316
related:
    - id: d7b81144-b866-48a4-9bcc-275dc69d870e
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging.
    The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process.
    Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source.
    Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Control\WMI\Autologger\'
    selection_values:
        TargetObject|contains: # We only care about some autologger to avoid FP. Add more if you need
            - '\EventLog-'
            - '\Defender'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Enabled'
            - '\Start'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    filter_main_wevtutil:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe'
    filter_main_defender:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\'
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\DefenderApiLogger\'
            - '\DefenderAuditLogger\'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_disable_autologger_sessions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 653c6e17-14a2-4849-851d-f1c0cc8ea9ab
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application Auto Logger Session Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: da86f239-9bd3-4e85-92ed-4a94ef111a1c
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - Cmd
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 1cac9b54-810e-495c-8aac-989e0076583b
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable EventLog-Application ETW Provider Via Registry - PowerShell
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 8f907648-1ebf-4276-b0f0-e2678ca474f0
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Potential Baby Shark Malware Activity
Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2b30fa36-3a18-402f-a22d-bf4ce2189f35
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "powershell.exe mshta.exe http" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".hta") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*reg query \"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default\"*", "*cmd.exe /c taskkill /im cmd.exe*", "*(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).UploadFile('http*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Baby Shark Malware Activity
id: 2b30fa36-3a18-402f-a22d-bf4ce2189f35
status: test
description: Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-02-24
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'powershell.exe mshta.exe http'
              - '.hta'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'reg query "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"'
              - 'cmd.exe /c taskkill /im cmd.exe'
              - "(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).UploadFile('http"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk ATT&CK technique id 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_MAC and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "/bash" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "tail" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-c") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "base64" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-d" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ">") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*.avif*", "*.gif*", "*.jfif*", "*.jpeg*", "*.jpg*", "*.pjp*", "*.pjpeg*", "*.png*", "*.svg*", "*.webp*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    # Example:  /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
    # VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith: '/bash'
    selection_view:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'tail'
            - '-c'
    selection_b64:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'base64'
            - '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
            - '>'
    selection_files:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.avif'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jfif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.pjp'
            - '.pjpeg'
            - '.png'
            - '.svg'
            - '.webp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential BlackByte Ransomware Activity
Detects command line patterns used by BlackByte ransomware in different operations
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 999e8307-a775-4d5f-addc-4855632335be
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "C:\Users\Public\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -single ") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*del C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe*", "*;Set-Service -StartupType Disabled $*", "*powershell -command \"$x =[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(*", "* do start wordpad.exe /p *"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential BlackByte Ransomware Activity
id: 999e8307-a775-4d5f-addc-4855632335be
status: test
description: Detects command line patterns used by BlackByte ransomware in different operations
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blackbyte-ransomware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1485
    - attack.t1498
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1140
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\Public\'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -single '
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'del C:\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe'
            - ';Set-Service -StartupType Disabled $'
            - 'powershell -command "$x =[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('
            - ' do start wordpad.exe /p '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential COLDSTEEL Persistence Service DLL Creation
Detects the creation of a file in a specific location and with a specific name related to COLDSTEEL RAT
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 1fea93a2-1524-4a3c-9828-3aa0c2414e27
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "C:\Users\" and 
 action_file_name contains "\AppData\Roaming\newdev.dll"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential COLDSTEEL Persistence Service DLL Creation
id: 1fea93a2-1524-4a3c-9828-3aa0c2414e27
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file in a specific location and with a specific name related to COLDSTEEL RAT
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/cold-steel/NCSC-MAR-Cold-Steel.pdf
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Roaming\newdev.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Potential COLDSTEEL Persistence Service DLL Load
Detects a suspicious DLL load by an "svchost" process based on location and name that might be related to ColdSteel RAT. This DLL location and name has been seen used by ColdSteel as the service DLL for its persistence mechanism
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 1d7a57da-02e0-4f7f-92b1-c7b486ccfed5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\svchost.exe" and 
 action_module_path contains "\AppData\Roaming\newdev.dll"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Potential COLDSTEEL Persistence Service DLL Load
id: 1d7a57da-02e0-4f7f-92b1-c7b486ccfed5
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious DLL load by an "svchost" process based on location and name that might be related to ColdSteel RAT. This DLL location and name has been seen used by ColdSteel as the service DLL for its persistence mechanism
references:
    - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/cold-steel/NCSC-MAR-Cold-Steel.pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\AppData\Roaming\newdev.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
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