Palo Alto Cortex XDR detection rules

high Moderate High FP

HackTool - SharpChisel Execution

Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\SharpChisel.exe" or 
 action_process_signature_product = "SharpChisel"))

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution

Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS. Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.

status test author @Kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains " -Inject " and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -PayloadArgs *", "* -PayloadFile *"))) or 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("* approve *", "* create *", "* check *", "* delete *")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* /payload:*", "* /payload=*", "* /updateid:*", "* /updateid=*")))))

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution
id: b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS.
    Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations.
references:
    - https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-sharpwsus/
    - https://github.com/nettitude/SharpWSUS
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20210512154016/https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu/blob/master/WSUSpendu.ps1
author: '@Kostastsale, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2022-10-07
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_wsuspendu_inject:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -Inject '
    selection_wsuspendu_payload:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -PayloadArgs '
            - ' -PayloadFile '
    selection_sharpwsus_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' approve '
            - ' create '
            - ' check '
            - ' delete '
    selection_sharpwsus_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /payload:'
            - ' /payload='
            - ' /updateid:'
            - ' /updateid='
    condition: all of selection_wsuspendu_* or all of selection_sharpwsus_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong High FP

HackTool - Typical HiveNightmare SAM File Export

Detects files written by the different tools that exploit HiveNightmare

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 6ea858a8-ba71-4a12-b2cc-5d83312404c7

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_file_name in ("*\hive_sam_*", "*\SAM-2021-*", "*\SAM-2022-*", "*\SAM-2023-*", "*\SAM-haxx*", "*\Sam.save*")) or 
 action_file_name = "C:\windows\temp\sam"))

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - Typical HiveNightmare SAM File Export
id: 6ea858a8-ba71-4a12-b2cc-5d83312404c7
status: test
description: Detects files written by the different tools that exploit HiveNightmare
references:
    - https://github.com/GossiTheDog/HiveNightmare
    - https://github.com/FireFart/hivenightmare/
    - https://github.com/WiredPulse/Invoke-HiveNightmare
    - https://twitter.com/cube0x0/status/1418920190759378944
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-23
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552.001
    - cve.2021-36934
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|contains:
              - '\hive_sam_'  # Go version
              - '\SAM-2021-'  # C++ version
              - '\SAM-2022-'  # C++ version
              - '\SAM-2023-'  # C++ version
              - '\SAM-haxx'   # Early C++ versions
              - '\Sam.save'   # PowerShell version
        - TargetFilename: 'C:\windows\temp\sam'  # C# version of HiveNightmare
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Files that accidentally contain these strings
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

HackTool - WinPwn Execution

Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*Offline_Winpwn*", "*WinPwn *", "*WinPwn.exe*", "*WinPwn.ps1*")))

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
    - id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

HackTool - Wmiexec Default Powershell Command

Detects the execution of PowerShell with a specific flag sequence that is used by the Wmiexec script

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 022eaba8-f0bf-4dd9-9217-4604b0bb3bb0

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-NoP -NoL -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc")

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - Wmiexec Default Powershell Command
id: 022eaba8-f0bf-4dd9-9217-4604b0bb3bb0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of PowerShell with a specific flag sequence that is used by the Wmiexec script
references:
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/f4b848fa27654ca95bc0f4c73dbba8b9c2c9f30a/examples/wmiexec.py
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-NoP -NoL -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

HackTool - XORDump Execution

Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\xordump.exe" or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -process lsass.exe *", "* -m comsvcs *", "* -m dbghelp *", "* -m dbgcore *"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: HackTool - XORDump Execution
id: 66e563f9-1cbd-4a22-a957-d8b7c0f44372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious use of XORDump process memory dumping utility
references:
    - https://github.com/audibleblink/xordump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-28
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\xordump.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' -process lsass.exe '
              - ' -m comsvcs '
              - ' -m dbghelp '
              - ' -m dbgcore '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of XORdump
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata

Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_signature_vendor = "Cube0x0")

view Sigma YAML

title: Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata
id: 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed
references:
    - https://github.com/cube0x0
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/metadata%253ACube0x0/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Company: 'Cube0x0' # Detects the use of tools created by a well-known hacktool producer named "Cube0x0", which includes his handle in all binaries as company information in the PE headers (SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, SharpMapExec, etc.)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Hermetic Wiper TG Process Patterns

Detects process execution patterns found in intrusions related to the Hermetic Wiper malware attacks against Ukraine in February 2022

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2f974656-6d83-4059-bbdf-68ac5403422f

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe" or 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp*", "* 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__16*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "powershell -c " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\comsvcs.dll MiniDump " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\winupd.log full"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Hermetic Wiper TG Process Patterns
id: 2f974656-6d83-4059-bbdf-68ac5403422f
status: test
description: Detects process execution patterns found in intrusions related to the Hermetic Wiper malware attacks against Ukraine in February 2022
references:
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe'
    selection2:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp'
              - ' 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__16'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'powershell -c '
              - '\comsvcs.dll MiniDump '
              - '\winupd.log full'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Hide Schedule Task Via Index Value Tamper

Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is modified from the registry Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 5b16df71-8615-4f7f-ac9b-6c43c0509e61

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\" and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "Index") and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000000)")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Hide Schedule Task Via Index Value Tamper
id: 5b16df71-8615-4f7f-ac9b-6c43c0509e61
related:
    - id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2
      type: similar
    - id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
  Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is modified from the registry
  Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" (Read the referenced link for more information about the effects of this technique)
references:
    - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-26
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\'
            - 'Index'
        Details: DWORD (0x00000000)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key

Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 ATT&CK sub-technique id f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000000)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000000)")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key
id: f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd
related:
    - id: 8a58209c-7ae6-4027-afb0-307a78e4589a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 9ec9fb1b-e059-4489-9642-f270c207923d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md#atomic-test-3---create-hidden-user-in-registry
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-01-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_special_accounts/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Create Hidden User in Registry
      technique: T1564.002
      atomic_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Hijack Legit RDP Session to Move Laterally

Detects the usage of tsclient share to place a backdoor on the RDP source machine's startup folder

status test author Samir Bousseaden ATT&CK sub-technique id 52753ea4-b3a0-4365-910d-36cff487b789

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\mstsc.exe" and 
 action_file_name contains "\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Hijack Legit RDP Session to Move Laterally
id: 52753ea4-b3a0-4365-910d-36cff487b789
status: test
description: Detects the usage of tsclient share to place a backdoor on the RDP source machine's startup folder
author: Samir Bousseaden
references:
    - Internal Research
date: 2019-02-21
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\mstsc.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong High FP

History File Deletion

Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*/rm", "*/unlink", "*/shred")) and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*/.bash_history*", "*/.zsh_history*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*_history", "*.history", "*zhistory")))))

view Sigma YAML

title: History File Deletion
id: 1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f
status: test
description: Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity
references:
    - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2022-09-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/rm'
            - '/unlink'
            - '/shred'
    selection_history:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '/.bash_history'
              - '/.zsh_history'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '_history'
              - '.history'
              - 'zhistory'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Hypervisor Enforced Paging Translation Disabled

Detects changes to the "DisableHypervisorEnforcedPagingTranslation" registry value. Where the it is set to "1" in order to disable the Hypervisor Enforced Paging Translation feature.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 7f2954d2-99c2-4d42-a065-ca36740f187b

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\DisableHypervisorEnforcedPagingTranslation" and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)" or 
 action_registry_data = "DWORD (0x00000001)")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Hypervisor Enforced Paging Translation Disabled
id: 7f2954d2-99c2-4d42-a065-ca36740f187b
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the "DisableHypervisorEnforcedPagingTranslation" registry value. Where the it is set to "1" in order to disable the Hypervisor Enforced Paging Translation feature.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/standa_t/status/1808868985678803222
    - https://github.com/AaLl86/WindowsInternals/blob/070dc4f317726dfb6ffd2b7a7c121a33a8659b5e/Slides/Hypervisor-enforced%20Paging%20Translation%20-%20The%20end%20of%20non%20data-driven%20Kernel%20Exploits%20(Recon2024).pdf
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\DisableHypervisorEnforcedPagingTranslation'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols

Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (idea) ATT&CK tactic-only id 3fd4c8d7-8362-4557-a8e6-83b29cc0d724

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\http", "*\https")) and 
 (action_registry_value_name contains "DWORD (0x00000000)" or 
 action_registry_data contains "DWORD (0x00000000)")))

view Sigma YAML

title: IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols
id: 3fd4c8d7-8362-4557-a8e6-83b29cc0d724
related:
    - id: 10344bb3-7f65-46c2-b915-2d00d47be5b0
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1699056847154725107
    - https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1699042827261391247
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/developer/browsers/security-privacy/ie-security-zones-registry-entries
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/339ff720c74dc44265b917b6d3e3ba0411d61f3cd3c328e9a2bae81592c8a6e5/content
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (idea)
date: 2023-09-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\http'
            - '\https'
        Details|contains: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols Via CLI

Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 10344bb3-7f65-46c2-b915-2d00d47be5b0

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "http" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " 0"))

view Sigma YAML

title: IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols Via CLI
id: 10344bb3-7f65-46c2-b915-2d00d47be5b0
related:
    - id: 3fd4c8d7-8362-4557-a8e6-83b29cc0d724
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1699056847154725107
    - https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1699042827261391247
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/developer/browsers/security-privacy/ie-security-zones-registry-entries
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/339ff720c74dc44265b917b6d3e3ba0411d61f3cd3c328e9a2bae81592c8a6e5/content
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults'
            - 'http'
            - ' 0'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

ISO File Created Within Temp Folders

Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.

status test author @sam0x90 ATT&CK sub-technique id 2f9356ae-bf43-41b8-b858-4496d83b2acb

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_file_name contains "\AppData\Local\Temp\" and 
 action_file_name contains ".zip\") and 
 action_file_name contains ".iso") or 
 (action_file_name contains "\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\" and 
 action_file_name contains ".iso")))

view Sigma YAML

title: ISO File Created Within Temp Folders
id: 2f9356ae-bf43-41b8-b858-4496d83b2acb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Sam0x90/status/1552011547974696960
    - https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133680/malware/dll-sideloading-spread-qakbot.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
author: '@sam0x90'
date: 2022-07-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '.zip\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Potential FP by sysadmin opening a zip file containing a legitimate ISO file
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32

Detects RunDLL32.exe executing a single digit DLL named "1.dll" with the export function "DllRegisterServer". This behaviour was often seen used by malware and especially IcedID

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2bd8e100-5b3b-4b6a-bbb5-b129d3ddddc5

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*\1.dll, DllRegisterServer", "* 1.dll, DllRegisterServer"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32
id: 2bd8e100-5b3b-4b6a-bbb5-b129d3ddddc5
status: test
description: Detects RunDLL32.exe executing a single digit DLL named "1.dll" with the export function "DllRegisterServer". This behaviour was often seen used by malware and especially IcedID
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-31
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '\1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of full path exec
            - ' 1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of direct exec
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

ImagingDevices Unusual Parent/Child Processes

Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebee activity

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id f11f2808-adb4-46c0-802a-8660db50fa99

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((actor_process_image_path in ("*\WmiPrvSE.exe", "*\svchost.exe", "*\dllhost.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\ImagingDevices.exe") or 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\ImagingDevices.exe"))

view Sigma YAML

title: ImagingDevices Unusual Parent/Child Processes
id: f11f2808-adb4-46c0-802a-8660db50fa99
status: test
description: Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebee activity
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2022-12-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            # Add more if known
            - \WmiPrvSE.exe
            - \svchost.exe
            - \dllhost.exe
        Image|endswith: '\ImagingDevices.exe'
    selection_child:
        # You can add specific suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell...) to increase the accuracy
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ImagingDevices.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Injected Browser Process Spawning Rundll32 - GuLoader Activity

Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host. GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process.

status test author @kostastsale ATT&CK technique id 89e1490f-1a3e-452a-bbb8-b68a5f58072f

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\chrome.exe", "*\firefox.exe", "*\msedge.exe")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\rundll32.exe"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Injected Browser Process Spawning Rundll32 - GuLoader Activity
id: 89e1490f-1a3e-452a-bbb8-b68a5f58072f
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host.
    GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library

Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.

status test author Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.) ATT&CK technique id 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 (((action_process_image_path in ("*/python", "*/python2", "*/python3")) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*/python2.*", "*/python3.*"))) and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains " -c " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "os.system(") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*/bin/bash*", "*/bin/dash*", "*/bin/fish*", "*/bin/sh*", "*/bin/zsh*")))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Inline Python Execution - Spawn Shell Via OS System Library
id: 2d2f44ff-4611-4778-a8fc-323a0e9850cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of inline Python code via the "-c" in order to call the "system" function from the "os" library, and spawn a shell.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/python/#shell
author: Li Ling, Andy Parkidomo, Robert Rakowski, Blake Hartstein (Bloomberg L.P.)
date: 2024-09-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/python'
              - '/python2'
              - '/python3'
        - Image|contains:
              - '/python2.'  # python image is always of the form ../python3.10; ../python is just a symlink
              - '/python3.'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -c '
            - 'os.system('
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/bin/bash'
            - '/bin/dash'
            - '/bin/fish'
            - '/bin/sh'
            - '/bin/zsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Interactive AT Job

Detects an interactive AT job, which may be used as a form of privilege escalation.

status test author E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 60fc936d-2eb0-4543-8a13-911c750a1dfc

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\at.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "interactive"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Interactive AT Job
id: 60fc936d-2eb0-4543-8a13-911c750a1dfc
status: test
description: Detects an interactive AT job, which may be used as a form of privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.md
    - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/d8db43cf-ed52-4f5c-9fb3-c9a4b95a0b56.html
author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1053.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\at.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'interactive'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely (at.exe deprecated as of Windows 8)
level: high
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: At.exe Scheduled task
      technique: T1053.002
      atomic_guid: 4a6c0dc4-0f2a-4203-9298-a5a9bdc21ed8

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher

Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "cmd" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "&&" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "clipboard]::" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-f") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*/c*", "*/r*"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
id: b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 26)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\\"\{\d\}.+\-f.+\"'
        # Example 1: Cmd /c" echo/Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString |cLiP&& POWerSheLl -Nolog -sT . (\"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'pe','Ad',(\"{1}{0}\" -f'Ty','d-' ) ) -Assemb ( \"{5}{1}{3}{0}{2}{4}\" -f'ows','y','.F',(\"{0}{1}{2}\" -f'stem.W','i','nd'),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'o','rms' ),'S' ) ; ([SySTEM.wiNDows.FoRmS.CLiPbOArd]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\" -f'T','TTeX' ),'gE' ).\"invO`Ke\"( ) ) ^| ^&( \"{5}{1}{2}{4}{3}{0}\" -f 'n',( \"{1}{0}\"-f'KE-','o' ),(\"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'pRESS','x','e' ),'o','i','iNV') ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{0}{1}\" -f( \"{1}{0}\"-f'e','SetT' ),'xt').\"InV`oKe\"( ' ')"
        # Example 2: CMD/c " ECho Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|c:\WiNDowS\SySteM32\cLip && powershElL -noPRO -sTa ^& (\"{2}{0}{1}\" -f 'dd',(\"{1}{0}\"-f 'ype','-T' ),'A' ) -AssemblyN (\"{0}{3}{2}{1}{4}\"-f'Pr','nCo',(\"{0}{1}\"-f'e','ntatio'),'es','re' ) ; ^& ( ( [StRinG]${ve`RB`OSE`pr`e`FeReNCE} )[1,3] + 'x'-JoiN'') ( ( [sySTem.WInDOWs.ClipbOaRD]::( \"{1}{0}\" -f(\"{0}{1}\" -f'tTe','xt' ),'ge' ).\"IN`Vo`Ke\"( ) ) ) ; [System.Windows.Clipboard]::( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f't',( \"{0}{1}\" -f 'tT','ex' ),'Se' ).\"In`V`oKe\"( ' ' )"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd'
            - '&&'
            - 'clipboard]::'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/c'
            - '/r'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation

Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block

status test author Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line ~= "\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\$env:ComSpec\[(?:\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\(" or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "\[String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
id: 4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block
references:
    - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888
author: 'Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community'
date: 2019-11-08
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|re: '\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\['
        - CommandLine|re: '\$env:ComSpec\[(?:\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}'
        - CommandLine|re: '\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name'
        - CommandLine|re: '\$VerbosePreference\.ToString\('
        - CommandLine|re: '\[String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher

Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"")

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher
id: 6c96fc76-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 25)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: c:\windows\sYstEm32\CmD.eXE /C"echO\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -NoEXiT -"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOws\sysTEm32\cmd.EXe /C " ECHo Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString | POwersHELl -nol ${EXEcUtIONCONTeXT}.INvOkEComMANd.InvOKEScRIPt( $InpUt )"
        CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher

Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell

status test author Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 27aec9c9-dbb0-4939-8422-1742242471d0

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"")

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
id: 27aec9c9-dbb0-4939-8422-1742242471d0
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009  # (Task 24)
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024-04-15
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: C:\winDoWs\SySTeM32\cmd.Exe /C"SET NOtI=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& PowERshElL -NOl SET-iteM ( 'VAR' + 'i'+ 'A' + 'blE:Ao6' + 'I0') ( [TYpe](\"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-F 'iRoN','mENT','e','nv') ) ; ${exECUtIONCOnTEXT}.\"IN`VO`KecOmMaND\".\"inVo`KES`crIPt\"( ( ( GEt-VAriAble ( 'a' + 'o6I0') -vaLU )::(\"{1}{4}{2}{3}{0}\" -f'e','gETenvIR','NtvaRIa','BL','ONme' ).Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'n','oti' ),( \"{0}{1}\" -f'pRoC','esS') )) )"
        # Example 2: cMD.exe /C "seT SlDb=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&& pOWErShell .(( ^&(\"{1}{0}{2}{3}\" -f 'eT-vaR','G','iab','lE' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f '*m','DR*' ) ).\"na`ME\"[3,11,2]-JOIN'' ) ( ( ^&(\"{0}{1}\" -f'g','CI' ) (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'ENV',':SlDb' ) ).\"VA`luE\" ) "
        CommandLine|re: 'cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER

status test author Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "&&set" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "cmd" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/c" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-f") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*{0}*", "*{1}*", "*{2}*", "*{3}*", "*{4}*", "*{5}*"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
id: e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task27)
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # CommandLine|re: '(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\\"\s+?\-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c' # FPs with |\/r
        # Example 1: CMD /C"sET KUR=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&Set MxI=C:\wINDowS\sYsWow64\winDOWspoWERSheLl\V1.0\PowerShelL.EXe ${ExEcut`IoN`cON`TExT}.\"invo`kEcoMm`A`ND\".( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'pt','EscRi','INvOk' ).Invoke( ( .( \"{0}{1}\" -f'D','IR' ) ( \"{0}{1}\"-f'ENV:kU','R')).\"vAl`Ue\" )&& CMD /C%mXI%"
        # Example 2: c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C "sEt DeJLz=Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString&&set yBKM=PoWERShelL -noeX ^^^&(\"{2}{0}{1}\"-f '-ItE','m','seT') ( 'V' + 'a'+ 'RiAblE:z8J' +'U2' + 'l' ) ([TYpE]( \"{2}{3}{0}{1}\"-f 'e','NT','e','NViRONM' ) ) ; ^^^& ( ( [sTrIng]${VE`Rbo`SepReFER`Ence})[1,3] + 'X'-joIN'')( ( (.('gI') ('V' + 'a' + 'RIAbLe:z8j' + 'u2' +'l' ) ).vALUe::( \"{2}{5}{0}{1}{6}{4}{3}\" -f 'IRo','Nm','GETE','ABlE','I','nv','enTVAr').Invoke(( \"{0}{1}\"-f'd','ejLz' ),( \"{1}{2}{0}\"-f'cEss','P','RO') )) )&& c:\WiNDOWS\sYSTEm32\CmD.exE /C %ybkm%"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '&&set'
            - 'cmd'
            - '/c'
            - '-f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '{0}'
            - '{1}'
            - '{2}'
            - '{3}'
            - '{4}'
            - '{5}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id 9c14c9fa-1a63-4a64-8e57-d19280559490

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "(?i)(?:set).*&&\s?set.*(?:environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"")

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin
id: 9c14c9fa-1a63-4a64-8e57-d19280559490
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task28)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)(?:set).*&&\s?set.*(?:environment|invoke|\$\{?input).*&&.*"'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(?:Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)")

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip
id: e1561947-b4e3-4a74-9bdd-83baed21bdb5
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 # (Task29)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-09
modified: 2026-03-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example 1: C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c " ECho\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString|Clip.Exe&&C:\WINdoWS\sySteM32\CMd /c pOWerSheLl -STa . ( \"{2}{0}{1}\"-f'dd-',(\"{0}{1}\" -f 'T','ype' ),'A' ) -Assembly ( \"{4}{1}{3}{0}{2}\"-f (\"{0}{1}\" -f 'nd','ow'),( \"{1}{0}\"-f'.W','stem' ),( \"{2}{1}{0}\" -f 'rms','Fo','s.'),'i','Sy') ; ${exeCUtIOnCONTeXT}.\"INV`oKECOM`m`ANd\".\"INV`ok`ESCriPT\"( ( [sYSteM.wiNDoWS.forMs.ClIPboaRD]::( \"{2}{0}{1}\" -f'Ex','t',(\"{0}{1}\" -f'Get','t' ) ).\"iNvo`Ke\"( )) ) ; [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::(\"{1}{0}\" -f 'ar','Cle' ).\"in`V`oKE\"( )"
        # Example 2: C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C" echo\Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString| C:\WIndOWs\SYSteM32\CLip &&C:\WINDowS\sYsTEM32\CmD.eXE /C POWERSHeLL -sT -noL [Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::( \"{0}{3}{4}{1}{2}\" -f( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Lo','adW' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f 'Par','t'),( \"{0}{1}{2}\"-f 'ial','N','ame'),'it','h' ).\"in`VO`KE\"( ( \"{3}{1}{4}{5}{2}{0}\"-f'rms','ystem.Windo','Fo','S','w','s.' )) ; ( [wIndows.fOrms.cLIPBOArD]::( \"{1}{0}\"-f'T',( \"{1}{0}\" -f'tEX','gET' )).\"i`Nvoke\"( ) ) ^^^| ^^^& ( ( ^^^& ( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f 'e',( \"{2}{1}{0}\"-f'IABl','aR','v' ),( \"{0}{1}\"-f'Get','-' ) ) ( \"{1}{0}\"-f'*','*MDr' )).\"n`Ame\"[3,11,2]-jOin'') ; [Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::( \"{0}{1}\" -f (\"{1}{0}\"-f'tT','Se' ),'ext').\"in`VoKe\"(' ' )"
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(?:Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA

Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts

status test author Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community ATT&CK sub-technique id ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "set" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "&&" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "mshta" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "vbscript:createobject" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".run" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "(window.close)"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA
id: ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009   # (Task31)
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-08
modified: 2022-03-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'set'
            - '&&'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'vbscript:createobject'
            - '.run'
            - '(window.close)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

JXA In-memory Execution Via OSAScript

Detects possible malicious execution of JXA in-memory via OSAScript

status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id f1408a58-0e94-4165-b80a-da9f96cf6fc3

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_MAC and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "osascript" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -e " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "eval" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "NSData.dataWithContentsOfURL") and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains " -l " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "JavaScript") or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".js")))

view Sigma YAML

title: JXA In-memory Execution Via OSAScript
id: f1408a58-0e94-4165-b80a-da9f96cf6fc3
related:
    - id: 1bc2e6c5-0885-472b-bed6-be5ea8eace55
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects possible malicious execution of JXA in-memory via OSAScript
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_main:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osascript'
            - ' -e '
            - 'eval'
            - 'NSData.dataWithContentsOfURL'
    selection_js:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -l '
              - 'JavaScript'
        - CommandLine|contains: '.js'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Kalambur Backdoor Curl TOR SOCKS Proxy Execution

Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.

status experimental author Arda Buyukkaya (EclecticIQ) ATT&CK sub-technique id e99375eb-3ee0-407a-9f90-79569cc6a01c

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\curl.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*socks5h://*", "*socks5://*", "*socks4a://*")) and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".onion"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Kalambur Backdoor Curl TOR SOCKS Proxy Execution
id: e99375eb-3ee0-407a-9f90-79569cc6a01c
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of the "curl.exe" command, referencing "SOCKS" and ".onion" domains, which could be indicative of Kalambur backdoor activity.
references:
    - https://blog.eclecticiq.com/sandworm-apt-targets-ukrainian-users-with-trojanized-microsoft-kms-activation-tools-in-cyber-espionage-campaigns
author: Arda Buyukkaya (EclecticIQ)
date: 2025-02-11
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1573
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0183
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
    selection_socks:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'socks5h://'
            - 'socks5://'
            - 'socks4a://'
    selection_onion:
        CommandLine|contains: '.onion'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Kapeka Backdoor Autorun Persistence

Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id c0c67b21-eb8a-4c84-a395-40473ec3b482

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\Sens Api", "*\OneDrive")) and 
 ((action_registry_value_name contains ":\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe" and 
 action_registry_value_name contains ".wll" and 
 action_registry_value_name contains "#1") or 
 (action_registry_data contains ":\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe" and 
 action_registry_data contains ".wll" and 
 action_registry_data contains "#1"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Kapeka Backdoor Autorun Persistence
id: c0c67b21-eb8a-4c84-a395-40473ec3b482
related:
    - id: 64a871dd-83f6-4e5f-80fc-5a7ca3a8a819
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the setting of a new value in the Autorun key that is used by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Sens Api'
            - '\OneDrive'
        Details|contains|all:
            - ':\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe'
            - '.wll'
            - '#1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Kapeka Backdoor Loaded Via Rundll32.EXE

Detects the Kapeka Backdoor binary being loaded by rundll32.exe. The Kapeka loader drops a backdoor, which is a DLL with the '.wll' extension masquerading as a Microsoft Word Add-In.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id a7e6b1f9-8d2c-4f1e-9a7d-63e4c8a2bf4c

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_module_path in ("*:\ProgramData*", "*\AppData\Local\*")) and 
 action_module_path ~= "[a-zA-Z]{5,6}\.wll"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Kapeka Backdoor Loaded Via Rundll32.EXE
id: a7e6b1f9-8d2c-4f1e-9a7d-63e4c8a2bf4c
status: test
description: |
    Detects the Kapeka Backdoor binary being loaded by rundll32.exe.
    The Kapeka loader drops a backdoor, which is a DLL with the '.wll' extension masquerading as a Microsoft Word Add-In.
references:
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/kapeka
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/1efb3ed4-cc0f-4690-a0ed-24516809bc72/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-07-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.011
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
        ImageLoaded|re: '[a-zA-Z]{5,6}\.wll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux

Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl. This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.

status experimental author Milad Cheraghi ATT&CK technique id 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*/systemctl", "*/bash", "*/sh")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "stop" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "kesl")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux
id: 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04
status: experimental
description: |
  Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl.
  This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors.
references:
    - https://support.kaspersky.com/KES4Linux/12.0.0/en-US/197929.htm
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Note: Add the list of shells allowed in your environment that can be used to run init.d scripts.
            - '/systemctl'
            - '/bash'
            - '/sh'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'stop'
            - 'kesl'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Basic High FP

Katz Stealer DLL Loaded

Detects loading of DLLs associated with Katz Stealer malware 2025 variants. Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems. The process that loads these DLLs are very likely to be malicious.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e6c7ab7c-c79d-4b84-b913-b2ec3f8e8a98

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_module_path in ("*\katz_ontop.dll", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\received_dll.dll")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Katz Stealer DLL Loaded
id: e6c7ab7c-c79d-4b84-b913-b2ec3f8e8a98
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects loading of DLLs associated with Katz Stealer malware 2025 variants.
    Katz Stealer is a malware variant that is known to be used for stealing sensitive information from compromised systems.
    The process that loads these DLLs are very likely to be malicious.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1129
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\katz_ontop.dll'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\received_dll.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Kavremover Dropped Binary LOLBIN Usage

Detects the execution of a signed binary dropped by Kaspersky Lab Products Remover (kavremover) which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id d047726b-c71c-4048-a99b-2e2f50dc107d

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " run run-cmd " and 
 (not 
 (actor_process_image_path in ("*\cleanapi.exe", "*\kavremover.exe")))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Kavremover Dropped Binary LOLBIN Usage
id: d047726b-c71c-4048-a99b-2e2f50dc107d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a signed binary dropped by Kaspersky Lab Products Remover (kavremover) which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute arbitrary commands and binaries.
references:
    - https://nasbench.medium.com/lolbined-using-kaspersky-endpoint-security-kes-installer-to-execute-arbitrary-commands-1c999f1b7fea
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' run run-cmd '
    filter_main_legit_parents:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cleanapi.exe' # When launched from KES installer
            - '\kavremover.exe' # When launched from kavremover.exe
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine

Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process.

status test author E.M. Anhaus, Tony Lambert, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line in ("*lsass.dmp*", "*lsass.zip*", "*lsass.rar*", "*Andrew.dmp*", "*Coredump.dmp*", "*NotLSASS.zip*", "*lsass_2*", "*lsassdump*", "*lsassdmp*")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "lsass" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".dmp") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "SQLDmpr" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".mdmp") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "nanodump" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains ".dmp")))

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine
id: ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e
related:
    - id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process.
references:
    - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
author: E.M. Anhaus, Tony Lambert, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'lsass.dmp'
              - 'lsass.zip'
              - 'lsass.rar'
              - 'Andrew.dmp'
              - 'Coredump.dmp'
              - 'NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
              - 'lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
              - 'lsassdump'
              - 'lsassdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'lsass'
              - '.dmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'SQLDmpr'
              - '.mdmp'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'nanodump'
              - '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong High FP

LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder

Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.

status test author @pbssubhash ATT&CK sub-technique id 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\" and 
 action_file_name contains "lsass.exe." and 
 action_file_name contains ".dmp"))

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder
id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625
status: test
description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process.
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering
    - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf
author: '@pbssubhash'
date: 2022-12-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\'
        TargetFilename|contains: 'lsass.exe.'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong High FP

LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE

Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe", "*:\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe")) and 
 (action_file_name contains "\AppData\Local\Temp\" and 
 action_file_name contains "\lsass" and 
 action_file_name contains ".DMP")))

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE
id: 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-10-19
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#L1
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\lsass'
            - '.DMP'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump/info.yml

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

LSASS Process Memory Dump Files

Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_file_name in ("*\Andrew.dmp", "*\Coredump.dmp", "*\lsass.dmp", "*\lsass.rar", "*\lsass.zip", "*\NotLSASS.zip", "*\PPLBlade.dmp", "*\rustive.dmp")) or 
 (action_file_name in ("*\lsass_2*", "*\lsassdmp*", "*\lsassdump*")) or 
 (action_file_name contains "\lsass" and 
 action_file_name contains ".dmp") or 
 (action_file_name contains "SQLDmpr" and 
 action_file_name contains ".mdmp") or 
 ((action_file_name in ("*\nanodump*", "*\proc_*")) and 
 action_file_name contains ".dmp")))

view Sigma YAML

title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Files
id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391
related:
    - id: db2110f3-479d-42a6-94fb-d35bc1e46492
      type: obsolete
    - id: 5e3d3601-0662-4af0-b1d2-36a05e90c40a
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects creation of files with names used by different memory dumping tools to create a memory dump of the LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials.
references:
    - https://www.google.com/search?q=procdump+lsass
    - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
    - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/
    - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
    - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
    - https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/1a9b026b477587becfb62df9677cede619d42030/src/main.rs#L35
    - https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2024-10-08
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_1:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\Andrew.dmp'
            - '\Coredump.dmp'
            - '\lsass.dmp'
            - '\lsass.rar'
            - '\lsass.zip'
            - '\NotLSASS.zip'  # https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump
            - '\PPLBlade.dmp'  # https://github.com/tastypepperoni/PPLBlade
            - '\rustive.dmp' # https://github.com/safedv/RustiveDump/blob/main/src/main.rs#L35
    selection_2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\lsass_2'  # default format of procdump v9.0 is lsass_YYMMDD_HHmmss.dmp
            - '\lsassdmp'
            - '\lsassdump'
    selection_3:
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\lsass'
            - '.dmp'
    selection_4:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'SQLDmpr'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.mdmp'
    selection_5:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\nanodump'
            - '\proc_' # NativeDump pattern https://github.com/ricardojoserf/NativeDump/blob/01d8cd17f31f51f5955a38e85cd3c83a17596175/NativeDump/Program.cs#L258
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dmp'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Lace Tempest Cobalt Strike Download

Detects specific command line execution used by Lace Tempest to download Cobalt Strike as reported by SysAid Team

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id aa5b0a40-ed88-46aa-9fdc-0337b379ca9d

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "-nop -w hidden -c IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/a')"))

view Sigma YAML

title: Lace Tempest Cobalt Strike Download
id: aa5b0a40-ed88-46aa-9fdc-0337b379ca9d
status: test
description: Detects specific command line execution used by Lace Tempest to download Cobalt Strike as reported by SysAid Team
references:
    - https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - -nop -w hidden -c IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(
            - /a')
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Lace Tempest File Indicators

Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific names or suffixes which was seen being used often in PowerShell scripts by FIN7

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id e94486ea-2650-4548-bf25-88cbd0bb32d7

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_file_name in ("*:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles\user.exe", "*:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles.war", "*:\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\leave")) or 
 action_file_name contains ":\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\user."))

view Sigma YAML

title: Lace Tempest File Indicators
id: e94486ea-2650-4548-bf25-88cbd0bb32d7
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell script file creation with specific names or suffixes which was seen being used often in PowerShell scripts by FIN7
references:
    - https://www.sysaid.com/blog/service-desk/on-premise-software-security-vulnerability-notification
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - TargetFilename|endswith:
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles\user.exe'
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\usersfiles.war'
              - ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\leave'
        - TargetFilename|contains: ':\Program Files\SysAidServer\tomcat\webapps\user.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Lazarus APT DLL Sideloading Activity

Detects sideloading of trojanized DLLs used in Lazarus APT campaign in the case of a Spanish aerospace company

status test author Thurein Oo, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 24007168-a26b-4049-90d0-ce138e13a5cf

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_image_load | filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path = "C:\ProgramShared\PresentationHost.exe" and 
 action_module_path = ":\ProgramShared\mscoree.dll") or 
 (actor_process_image_path = "C:\ProgramData\Adobe\colorcpl.exe" and 
 action_module_path = "C:\ProgramData\Adobe\colorui.dll") or 
 (actor_process_image_path = "C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\fixmapi.exe" and 
 action_module_path = "C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\mapistub.dll") or 
 (actor_process_image_path = "C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\tabcal.exe" and 
 action_module_path = "C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\HID.dll")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Lazarus APT DLL Sideloading Activity
id: 24007168-a26b-4049-90d0-ce138e13a5cf
status: test
description: Detects sideloading of trojanized DLLs used in Lazarus APT campaign in the case of a Spanish aerospace company
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lazarus-hackers-breach-aerospace-firm-with-new-lightlesscan-malware/
author: Thurein Oo, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.g0032
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection_mscoree:
        Image: 'C:\ProgramShared\PresentationHost.exe'
        ImageLoaded: ':\ProgramShared\mscoree.dll'
    selection_colorui:
        Image: 'C:\ProgramData\Adobe\colorcpl.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\ProgramData\Adobe\colorui.dll'
    selection_mapistub:
        Image: 'C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\fixmapi.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\ProgramData\Oracle\Java\mapistub.dll'
    selection_hid:
        Image: 'C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\tabcal.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\ProgramData\Adobe\ARM\HID.dll'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Lazarus System Binary Masquerading

Detects binaries used by the Lazarus group which use system names but are executed and launched from non-default location

status test author Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1) ATT&CK sub-technique id 3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\msdtc.exe", "*\gpsvc.exe")) and 
 (not 
 (action_process_image_path in ("C:\Windows\System32\*", "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\*")))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Lazarus System Binary Masquerading
id: 3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b
status: test
description: Detects binaries used by the Lazarus group which use system names but are executed and launched from non-default location
references:
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1)
date: 2020-06-03
modified: 2023-03-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msdtc.exe'
            - '\gpsvc.exe'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Legitimate Application Dropped Archive

Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk

status test author frack113, Florian Roth ATT&CK technique id 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\winword.exe", "*\excel.exe", "*\powerpnt.exe", "*\msaccess.exe", "*\mspub.exe", "*\eqnedt32.exe", "*\visio.exe", "*\wordpad.exe", "*\wordview.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\certoc.exe", "*\CertReq.exe", "*\Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "*\esentutl.exe", "*\finger.exe", "*\notepad.exe", "*\AcroRd32.exe", "*\RdrCEF.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\hh.exe")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*.zip", "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.diagcab", "*.appx"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables
            - \winword.exe
            - \excel.exe
            - \powerpnt.exe
            - \msaccess.exe
            - \mspub.exe
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \visio.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - \finger.exe
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - \notepad.exe
            - \AcroRd32.exe
            - \RdrCEF.exe
            - \mshta.exe
            - \hh.exe
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.diagcab'
            - '.appx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Legitimate Application Dropped Executable

Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk

status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\eqnedt32.exe", "*\wordpad.exe", "*\wordview.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\certoc.exe", "*\CertReq.exe", "*\Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "*\esentutl.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\AcroRd32.exe", "*\RdrCEF.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\finger.exe")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*.exe", "*.dll", "*.ocx"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
id: f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ocx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate Medium FP

Legitimate Application Dropped Script

Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk

status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\eqnedt32.exe", "*\wordpad.exe", "*\wordview.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\certoc.exe", "*\CertReq.exe", "*\Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "*\esentutl.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\AcroRd32.exe", "*\RdrCEF.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\finger.exe")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*.ps1", "*.bat", "*.vbs", "*.scf", "*.wsf", "*.wsh"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Script
id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.scf'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location

Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution. Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.

status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\eqnedt32.exe", "*\wordpad.exe", "*\wordview.exe", "*\cmdl32.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\certoc.exe", "*\CertReq.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe", "*\Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "*\esentutl.exe", "*\expand.exe", "*\extrac32.exe", "*\replace.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\ftp.exe", "*\Ldifde.exe", "*\RdrCEF.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\finger.exe", "*\findstr.exe")) and 
 (action_file_name in ("*:\Perflogs*", "*:\ProgramData\*", "*:\Temp\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*:\Windows\*", "*\$Recycle.Bin\*", "*\AppData\Local\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*", "*\Contacts\*", "*\Desktop\*", "*\Favorites\*", "*\Favourites\*", "*\inetpub\wwwroot\*", "*\Music\*", "*\Pictures\*", "*\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*", "*\Users\Default\*", "*\Videos\*"))))

view Sigma YAML

title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
related:
    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\replace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\ftp.exe'
            - '\Ldifde.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
    selection_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml

Convert to SIEM query

high Moderate High FP

Linux Crypto Mining Indicators

Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* --cpu-priority=*", "*--donate-level=0*", "* -o pool.*", "* --nicehash*", "* --algo=rx/0 *", "*stratum+tcp://*", "*stratum+udp://*", "*sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on*", "*LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9*", "*0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP*", "*tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD*", "*c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly*", "*N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v*", "*zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL*", "*c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly*", "*N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v*", "*zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL*")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Linux Crypto Mining Indicators
id: 9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' --cpu-priority='
            - '--donate-level=0'
            - ' -o pool.'
            - ' --nicehash'
            - ' --algo=rx/0 '
            - 'stratum+tcp://'
            - 'stratum+udp://'
            # Sub process started by xmrig - the most popular Monero crypto miner - unknown if this causes any false positives
            - 'sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on'
            # base64 encoded: --donate-level=
            - 'LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9'
            - '0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP'
            - 'tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD'
            # base64 encoded: stratum+tcp:// and stratum+udp://
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL'
            - 'c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly'
            - 'N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v'
            - 'zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

high Strong Medium FP

Linux Crypto Mining Pool Connections

Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id a46c93b7-55ed-4d27-a41b-c259456c4746

cortex_xdr query

config case_sensitive = false | preset=network_story | filter event_type = ENUM.NETWORK and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 (action_external_hostname in ("pool.minexmr.com", "fr.minexmr.com", "de.minexmr.com", "sg.minexmr.com", "ca.minexmr.com", "us-west.minexmr.com", "pool.supportxmr.com", "mine.c3pool.com", "xmr-eu1.nanopool.org", "xmr-eu2.nanopool.org", "xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org", "xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org", "xmr-asia1.nanopool.org", "xmr-jp1.nanopool.org", "xmr-au1.nanopool.org", "xmr.2miners.com", "xmr.hashcity.org", "xmr.f2pool.com", "xmrpool.eu", "pool.hashvault.pro", "moneroocean.stream", "monerocean.stream")))

view Sigma YAML

title: Linux Crypto Mining Pool Connections
id: a46c93b7-55ed-4d27-a41b-c259456c4746
status: stable
description: Detects process connections to a Monero crypto mining pool
references:
    - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-10-26
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname:
            - 'pool.minexmr.com'
            - 'fr.minexmr.com'
            - 'de.minexmr.com'
            - 'sg.minexmr.com'
            - 'ca.minexmr.com'
            - 'us-west.minexmr.com'
            - 'pool.supportxmr.com'
            - 'mine.c3pool.com'
            - 'xmr-eu1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-eu2.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-asia1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-jp1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr-au1.nanopool.org'
            - 'xmr.2miners.com'
            - 'xmr.hashcity.org'
            - 'xmr.f2pool.com'
            - 'xmrpool.eu'
            - 'pool.hashvault.pro'
            - 'moneroocean.stream'
            - 'monerocean.stream'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of crypto miners
level: high

Convert to SIEM query

Palo Alto Cortex XDR

Detection rules