title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62
related:
    - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-12
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_generic:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\smss.exe'
            - '\wininit.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.bat'
            - '.hta'
            - '.iso'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - ':\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    filter_main_script_gpo_machine:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\'
            - '\sysvol\'
            - '\Policies\'
            - '\Machine\Scripts\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
    filter_main_clipchamp:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp'
            - '.ps1'
    filter_main_powershell_preview:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Credential Guard Disabled - Registry
id: 73921b9c-cafd-4446-b0c6-fdb0ace42bc0
related:
    - id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by setting registry values to 0. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
    Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://woshub.com/disable-credential-guard-windows/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DeviceGuard\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
            - '\DeviceGuard\LsaCfgFlags'
            - '\Lsa\LsaCfgFlags'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_credential_guard_disabled/info.yml

title: Windows Credential Guard Related Registry Value Deleted - Registry
id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
related:
    - id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
    Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://github.com/DambergC/SaveFolder/blob/90e945eba80fae85f2d54b4616e05a44ec90c500/Cygate%20Installation%20tool%206.22/Script/OSD/OSDeployment-CredentialGuardDisable.ps1#L50
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_delete
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\DeviceGuard\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity'
            - '\DeviceGuard\LsaCfgFlags'
            - '\DeviceGuard\RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures'
            - '\Lsa\LsaCfgFlags'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_disable_credential_guard/info.yml

title: Windows Defender Service Disabled - Registry
id: e1aa95de-610a-427d-b9e7-9b46cfafbe6a
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker or tool disables the  Windows Defender service (WinDefend) via the registry
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
    - https://gist.github.com/anadr/7465a9fde63d41341136949f14c21105
author: Ján Trenčanský, frack113, AlertIQ, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2022-08-01
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Services\WinDefend\Start'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000004)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator actions
level: high

title: Windows Defender Threat Severity Default Action Modified
id: 5a9e1b2c-8f7d-4a1e-9b3c-0f6d7e5a4b1f
related:
    - id: 1e8a9b4d-3c2a-4f9b-8d1e-7c6a5b4f3d2e
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender's default threat action settings based on severity to 'allow' or take 'no action'.
    This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender's ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level,
    allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/security-malware-windows-defender-threatseveritydefaultaction
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/7215831c-8252-4ae3-8d43-db588e82f952
    - https://gist.github.com/Dump-GUY/8daef859f382b895ac6fd0cf094555d2
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
author: 'Matt Anderson (Huntress)'
date: 2025-07-11
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Threats\ThreatSeverityDefaultAction\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\1' # Low severity
            - '\2' # Moderate severity
            - '\4' # High severity
            - '\5' # Severe severity
        Details:
            - 'DWORD (0x00000006)' # Allow
            - 'DWORD (0x00000009)' # NoAction
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration via scripts or tools (e.g., SCCM, Intune, GPO enforcement). Correlate with administrative activity.
    - Software installations that legitimately modify Defender settings (less common for these specific keys).
level: high

title: Windows Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity Disabled
id: 8b7273a4-ba5d-4d8a-b04f-11f2900d043a
related:
    - id: 6225c53a-a96e-4235-b28f-8d7997cd96eb
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity registry key and the "Enabled" value being set to 0 in order to disable the Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity feature. This allows an attacker to load unsigned and untrusted code to be run in the kernel
references:
    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/04e487c1828d76df3e834621f4f893ea756d5232/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md#atomic-test-43---disable-hypervisor-enforced-code-integrity-hvci
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati
date: 2023-03-14
modified: 2024-07-05
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith:
            - '\Control\DeviceGuard\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'
            - '\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks that require disabling HVCI for troubleshooting purposes when certain drivers or applications are incompatible with it.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_deviceguard_hypervisorenforcedcodeintegrity_disabled/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Disable Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI)
      technique: T1562.001
      atomic_guid: 70bd71e6-eba4-4e00-92f7-617911dbe020

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder
id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43
status: test
description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-20
modified: 2023-03-29
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'  # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
    selection_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # - '\rundll32.exe' # Potential FP
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning Suspicious Programs
id: 3a6586ad-127a-4d3b-a677-1e6eacdf8fde
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of a Windows shell and scripting processes such as wscript, rundll32, powershell, mshta...etc.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-05-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            # - '\cmd.exe'  # too many false positives
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    filter_ccmcache:
        CurrentDirectory|contains: '\ccmcache\'
    filter_amazon:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # FP - Amazon Workspaces
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\setup-scheduledtask.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\set-selfhealing.ps1'
            - '\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\check-workspacehealth.ps1'
            - '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_nessus:
        CommandLine|contains: '\nessus_' # Tenable/Nessus VA Scanner
    filter_sccm_install:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\splash.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\MEM_Configmgr_'
            - '\SMSSETUP\BIN\'
            - '\autorun.hta'
            - '{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
    - Microsoft SCCM
level: high

title: Windows Suspicious Child Process from Node.js - React2Shell
id: 271de298-cc0e-4842-acd8-079a0a99ea65
related:
    - id: c70834fa-fb9d-4aa0-9e7d-45ceed36f3f7
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious child processes started by Node.js server processes on Windows, which may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell).
    Attackers can abuse the Node.js 'child_process' module to run system commands or scripts using methods such as spawn(), exec(), execFile(), fork(), or execSync().
    If execSync() or exec() is used in the exploit, the command line often shows a shell (e.g., cmd.exe /d /s /c ...) running a suspicious command unless other shells are explicitly invoked.
    For other methods, the spawned process appears directly in the Image field unless a shell is explicitly used.
references:
    - https://github.com/msanft/CVE-2025-55182
    - https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#class-childprocess
    - https://gist.github.com/swachchhanda000/a0228130f86a2dedfbcebb415b47f870
    - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/2f651ede832ab34027a7ba005b63bb78f1ade378/Other/React-Next-Child-Processes-Notes.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-12-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - detection.emerging-threats
    - cve.2025-55182
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\node.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - '--experimental-https'
            - '--experimental-next-config-strip-types'
            - '\node_modules\next'
            - 'next dev'
            - 'next start'
            - 'next" start'
            - 'node_modules\\.bin\\\\..\\next' # We escape every backslash to avoid confusion
            - 'react-scripts start'
            - 'start-server.js'
    selection_generic_child_img:
        # Observed when child_process.spawn(), child_process.exec(), child_process.execFile(), or child_process.fork() method  is used to spawn suspicious processes
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\ipconfig.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
              - '\netsh.exe'
              - '\nslookup.exe'
              - '\OpenConsole.exe'
              - '\perl.exe'
              - '\ping.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\py.exe'
              - '\python.exe'
              - '\pythonw.exe'
              - '\pyw.exe'
              - '\reg.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\sc.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\systeminfo.exe'
              - '\wget.exe'
              - '\whoami.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\wt.exe'
        - Image|contains: '\python'
    selection_generic_child_cli_susp_pattern:
        # Observed when child_process.execSync() is used to spawn suspicious processes
        # Reference: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecsynccommand-options
        # In default, the cli will look something like `C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe /d /s /c "...susp..cli...."`
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\net'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'certutil '
            - 'conhost --headless'
            - 'cscript '
            - 'curl'
            - 'ipconfig'
            - 'java'
            - 'lua'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'netsh'
            - 'nslookup '
            - 'perl'
            - 'ping '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'python'
            - 'reg '
            - 'reg.exe'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'ruby'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'sc.exe'
            - 'systeminfo'
            - 'wget'
            - 'whoami'
            - 'wmic'
            - 'wscript'
    selection_specific_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    selection_specific_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '/d /s /c '
    filter_main_default_shell_flag:
        CommandLine|contains: '/d /s /c '
    filter_main_cli_git:
        CommandLine|contains: 'git config --local --get remote.origin.url'
    filter_main_cli_netstat:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'netstat -ano | findstr /C:'
            - ' | findstr LISTENING'
    filter_main_cli_mkcert_install:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\mkcert\'
            - ' -install '
    filter_main_cli_mkcert_caroot:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\mkcert\'
            - ' -CAROOT'
    condition:
        selection_parent and
        (
            1 of selection_generic_*
            or
            (selection_specific_cmd and not filter_main_default_shell_flag)
            or
            (all of selection_specific_* and not 1 of filter_main_cli_*)
        )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-55182/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_55182_susp_nodejs_server_child_process/info.yml

title: Windows Vulnerable Driver Blocklist Disabled
id: d526c60a-e236-4011-b165-831ffa52ab70
related:
    - id: 22154f0e-5132-4a54-aa78-cc62f6def531
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects when the Windows Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is set to disabled. This setting is crucial for preventing the loading of known vulnerable drivers,
    and its modification may indicate an attempt to bypass security controls. It is often targeted by threat actors to facilitate the installation of malicious or vulnerable drivers,
    particularly in scenarios involving Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) bypass techniques.
    This rule applies to systems that support the Vulnerable Driver Blocklist feature, including Windows 10 version 1903 and later, and Windows Server 2022 and later.
    Note that this change will require a reboot to take effect, and this rule only detects the registry modification action.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
    - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/sharpening-the-knife-gold-blades-strategic-evolution
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-26
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Control\CI\Config\VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable'
        Details: 'DWORD (0x00000000)'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely and should be investigated immediately.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_vulnerable_driver_blocklist_disable/info.yml

title: Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence
id: bbf59793-6efb-4fa1-95ca-a7d288e52c88
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in.
    Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.md#atomic-test-3---winlogon-notify-key-logon-persistence---powershell
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-30
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.004
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\logon'
        Details|endswith: '.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack
id: 7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa
status: test
description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
references:
    - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\wbem\wbemcomn.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Wusa.EXE Executed By Parent Process Located In Suspicious Location
id: ef64fc9c-a45e-43cc-8fd8-7d75d73b4c99
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility by a parent process that is located in a suspicious location.
    Attackers could instantiate an instance of "wusa.exe" in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC). They can duplicate the access token from "wusa.exe" to gain elevated privileges.
references:
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/konni-campaign-distributed-via-malicious-document
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-26
modified: 2024-08-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\wusa.exe'
    selection_paths_1:
        ParentImage|contains:
            # Note: Add additional suspicious locations to increase coverage
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Appdata\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_paths_2:
        - ParentImage|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - ParentImage|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - ParentImage|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
        - ParentImage|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Pictures\'
    filter_main_msu:
        # Note: We exclude MSU extension files. A better approach is to baseline installation of updates in your env to avoid false negatives.
        CommandLine|contains: '.msu'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_paths_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high