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Palo Alto Cortex XDR

763 rules · Sigma detections in Palo Alto Cortex XDR syntax
The same Sigma detection corpus, machine-rendered into Palo Alto Cortex XDR query syntax and ready to paste. Switch platforms above for identical coverage in another language, or choose Sigma (generic) for the portable YAML.
Download all 1,524 rules (.zip, 675 KB) Every Palo Alto Cortex XDR query in this view, packaged to deploy.
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Filter by techniquepick techniques from the ATT&CK matrix
Reconnaissance4
Resource Development5
Initial Access7
Execution25
Persistence31
Privilege Escalation17
Stealth63
Defense Impairment16
Credential Access26
Discovery24
Lateral Movement10
Collection11
Command and Control18
Exfiltration7
Impact10
Using these Sigma rules
Deploy. Pick your SIEM above and paste the rendered query straight into a saved search or detection rule, or expand any rule to convert its generic YAML inline to the language you run.
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Judge. Each rule shows a quality tier (Strong / Moderate / Basic) and an estimated alert-volume tier (Low / Medium / High FP), both scored deterministically from the rule's shape - status, detection depth, match breadth, log source, documented false positives and references. A rule existing is not the same as a rule being good, or being quiet; hover either tier for the breakdown. The FP estimate reads rule shape, not a measured rate, so use it to pick what to tune first before you deploy.
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Detection rules

50 shown of 763
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) ATT&CK sub-technique id 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_MAC and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*Microsoft Word*", "*Microsoft Excel*", "*Microsoft PowerPoint*", "*Microsoft OneNote*")) and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*/bash", "*/curl", "*/dash", "*/fish", "*/osacompile", "*/osascript", "*/sh", "*/zsh", "*/python", "*/python3", "*/wget"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
    - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.t1137.002
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Microsoft Word'
            - 'Microsoft Excel'
            - 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
            - 'Microsoft OneNote'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bash'
            - '/curl'
            - '/dash'
            - '/fish'
            - '/osacompile'
            - '/osascript'
            - '/sh'
            - '/zsh'
            - '/python'
            - '/python3'
            - '/wget'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\schtasks.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " /Change " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /TN ")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*\AppData\Local\Temp*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*", "*\Users\Public\*", "*\WINDOWS\Temp\*", "*\Desktop\*", "*\Downloads\*", "*\Temporary Internet*", "*C:\ProgramData\*", "*C:\Perflogs\*", "*%ProgramData%*", "*%appdata%*", "*%comspec%*", "*%localappdata%*")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*regsvr32*", "*rundll32*", "*cmd /c *", "*cmd /k *", "*cmd /r *", "*cmd.exe /c *", "*cmd.exe /k *", "*cmd.exe /r *", "*powershell*", "*mshta*", "*wscript*", "*cscript*", "*certutil*", "*bitsadmin*", "*bash.exe*", "*bash *", "*scrcons*", "*wmic *", "*wmic.exe*", "*forfiles*", "*scriptrunner*", "*hh.exe*", "*hh *"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b
related:
    - id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4 # Security-Audting Eventlog
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
    Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
    Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-28
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /Change '
            - ' /TN '
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    selection_susp_images:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'bash.exe'
            - 'bash '
            - 'scrcons'
            - 'wmic '
            - 'wmic.exe'
            - 'forfiles'
            - 'scriptrunner'
            - 'hh.exe'
            - 'hh '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious New Service Creation
Detects creation of a new service via "sc" command or the powershell "new-service" cmdlet with suspicious binary paths
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 17a1be64-8d88-40bf-b5ff-a4f7a50ebcc8
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_process_image_path contains "\sc.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "create" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "binPath=")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "New-Service" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-BinaryPathName")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*powershell*", "*mshta*", "*wscript*", "*cscript*", "*svchost*", "*dllhost*", "*cmd *", "*cmd.exe /c*", "*cmd.exe /k*", "*cmd.exe /r*", "*rundll32*", "*C:\Users\Public*", "*\Downloads\*", "*\Desktop\*", "*\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*", "*C:\Windows\TEMP\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious New Service Creation
id: 17a1be64-8d88-40bf-b5ff-a4f7a50ebcc8
related:
    - id: 7fe71fc9-de3b-432a-8d57-8c809efc10ab
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects creation of a new service via "sc" command or the powershell "new-service" cmdlet with suspicious binary paths
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-14
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_sc:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'binPath='
    selection_posh:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'New-Service'
            - '-BinaryPathName'
    susp_binpath:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious commands or binaries
            - 'powershell'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'svchost'
            - 'dllhost'
            - 'cmd '
            - 'cmd.exe /c'
            - 'cmd.exe /k'
            - 'cmd.exe /r'
            - 'rundll32'
            # Add more suspicious paths
            - 'C:\Users\Public'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: 1 of selection* and susp_binpath
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Nohup Execution
Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"
status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk ATT&CK tactic-only id 457df417-8b9d-4912-85f3-9dbda39c3645
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_LINUX and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "/nohup" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/tmp/"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Nohup Execution
id: 457df417-8b9d-4912-85f3-9dbda39c3645
related:
    - id: e4ffe466-6ff8-48d4-94bd-e32d1a6061e2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of binaries located in potentially suspicious locations via "nohup"
references:
    - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html
    - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-06-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/nohup'
        CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Obfuscated PowerShell Code
Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA*", "*AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A*", "*gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA*", "*AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg*", "*AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQAgAHwAI*", "*ALgBJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAoACkAIAB8AC*", "*AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg*", "*AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAiACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg*", "*AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg*", "*AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg*", "*AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAnACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg*", "*AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg*")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Obfuscated PowerShell Code
id: 8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35
status: test
description: Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/fcadca91-3580-4ede-aff4-4d2bf809bf99/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            #  -bxor 0x
            - 'IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA'
            - 'AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A'
            - 'gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA'
            # .Invoke() |
            - 'AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg'
            - 'AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQAgAHwAI'
            - 'ALgBJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAoACkAIAB8AC'
            # {1}{0}" -f
            # {0}{3}" -f
            # {2}{0}" -f
            - 'AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg'
            - 'AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAiACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg'
            - 'AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg'
            # {1}{0}' -f
            # {0}{3}' -f
            # {2}{0}' -f
            - 'AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg'
            - 'AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAnACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg'
            - 'AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI'
            - 'B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC'
            - 'AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
status test author Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team ATT&CK sub-technique id 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\OUTLOOK.EXE" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\AppVLP.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\mftrace.exe", "*\msbuild.exe", "*\msdt.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\msiexec.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\scrcons.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\svchost.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\wscript.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Office Child Processes
      type: derived
    - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 # Outlook Remote Child Process
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'        # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\msdt.exe'           # CVE-2022-30190
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'        # https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
            - '\wmic.exe'           # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # Several FPs with rundll32.exe
            # We started excluding specific use cases and ended up commenting out the rundll32.exe sub processes completely
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # filter_outlook_photoviewer:  # https://twitter.com/Luke_Hamp/status/1495919717760237568
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains: '\PhotoViewer.dll'
            # filter_outlook_printattachments:  # https://twitter.com/KickaKamil/status/1496238278659485696
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains|all:
            #     - 'shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            #     - '\SYSTEM32\SPOOL\DRIVERS\'
    condition: selection # and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Outlook Macro Created
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM" and 
 (not 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\outlook.exe")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Outlook Macro Created
id: 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
related:
    - id: 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
references:
    - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=53
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1137
    - attack.t1008
    - attack.t1546
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\Outlook\VbaProject.OTM'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Parent Double Extension File Execution
Detect execution of suspicious double extension files in ParentCommandLine
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*.doc.lnk", "*.docx.lnk", "*.xls.lnk", "*.xlsx.lnk", "*.ppt.lnk", "*.pptx.lnk", "*.rtf.lnk", "*.pdf.lnk", "*.txt.lnk", "*.doc.js", "*.docx.js", "*.xls.js", "*.xlsx.js", "*.ppt.js", "*.pptx.js", "*.rtf.js", "*.pdf.js", "*.txt.js")) or 
 (actor_process_command_line in ("*.doc.lnk*", "*.docx.lnk*", "*.xls.lnk*", "*.xlsx.lnk*", "*.ppt.lnk*", "*.pptx.lnk*", "*.rtf.lnk*", "*.pdf.lnk*", "*.txt.lnk*", "*.doc.js*", "*.docx.js*", "*.xls.js*", "*.xlsx.js*", "*.ppt.js*", "*.pptx.js*", "*.rtf.js*", "*.pdf.js*", "*.txt.js*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Parent Double Extension File Execution
id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c
related:
    - id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8 # Image/CommandLine
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detect execution of suspicious double extension files in ParentCommandLine
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7872d8845a332dce517adae9c3389fde5313ff2fed38c2577f3b498da786db68/behavior
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bluebottle-banks-targeted-africa
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-06
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '.doc.lnk'
              - '.docx.lnk'
              - '.xls.lnk'
              - '.xlsx.lnk'
              - '.ppt.lnk'
              - '.pptx.lnk'
              - '.rtf.lnk'
              - '.pdf.lnk'
              - '.txt.lnk'
              - '.doc.js'
              - '.docx.js'
              - '.xls.js'
              - '.xlsx.js'
              - '.ppt.js'
              - '.pptx.js'
              - '.rtf.js'
              - '.pdf.js'
              - '.txt.js'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - '.doc.lnk'
              - '.docx.lnk'
              - '.xls.lnk'
              - '.xlsx.lnk'
              - '.ppt.lnk'
              - '.pptx.lnk'
              - '.rtf.lnk'
              - '.pdf.lnk'
              - '.txt.lnk'
              - '.doc.js'
              - '.docx.js'
              - '.xls.js'
              - '.xlsx.js'
              - '.ppt.js'
              - '.pptx.js'
              - '.rtf.js'
              - '.pdf.js'
              - '.txt.js'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Path In Keyboard Layout IME File Registry Value
Detects usage of Windows Input Method Editor (IME) keyboard layout feature, which allows an attacker to load a DLL into the process after sending the WM_INPUTLANGCHANGEREQUEST message. Before doing this, the client needs to register the DLL in a special registry key that is assumed to implement this keyboard layout. This registry key should store a value named "Ime File" with a DLL path. IMEs are essential for languages that have more characters than can be represented on a standard keyboard, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 9d8f9bb8-01af-4e15-a3a2-349071530530
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\Control\Keyboard Layouts\" and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "Ime File") and 
 (((action_registry_value_name in ("*:\Perflogs\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*:\Windows\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*", "*\Temporary Internet*")) or 
 (action_registry_data in ("*:\Perflogs\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*:\Windows\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\*", "*\Temporary Internet*"))) or 
 (((action_registry_value_name contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_value_name contains "\Favorites\") or 
 (action_registry_data contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_data contains "\Favorites\")) or 
 ((action_registry_value_name contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_value_name contains "\Favourites\") or 
 (action_registry_data contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_data contains "\Favourites\")) or 
 ((action_registry_value_name contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_value_name contains "\Contacts\") or 
 (action_registry_data contains ":\Users\" and 
 action_registry_data contains "\Contacts\"))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Path In Keyboard Layout IME File Registry Value
id: 9d8f9bb8-01af-4e15-a3a2-349071530530
related:
    - id: b888e3f2-224d-4435-b00b-9dd66e9ea1f1
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of Windows Input Method Editor (IME) keyboard layout feature, which allows an attacker to load a DLL into the process after sending the WM_INPUTLANGCHANGEREQUEST message.
    Before doing this, the client needs to register the DLL in a special registry key that is assumed to implement this keyboard layout. This registry key should store a value named "Ime File" with a DLL path.
    IMEs are essential for languages that have more characters than can be represented on a standard keyboard, such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
references:
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/guntior-story-advanced-bootkit-doesnt-rely-windows-disk-baranov-wue8e/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-11-21
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection_registry:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Control\Keyboard Layouts\'
            - 'Ime File'
    selection_folders_1:
        Details|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Details|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    condition: selection_registry and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Ping/Del Command Combination
Detects a method often used by ransomware. Which combines the "ping" to wait a couple of seconds and then "del" to delete the file in question. Its used to hide the file responsible for the initial infection for example
status test author Ilya Krestinichev ATT&CK sub-technique id 54786ddc-5b8a-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains " -n " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /n " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " –n " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " —n " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " ―n ") and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "Nul" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " -f " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /f " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " –f " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " —f " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " ―f " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -q " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /q " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " –q " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " —q " or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " ―q ") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "ping" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "del ")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Ping/Del Command Combination
id: 54786ddc-5b8a-11ed-9b6a-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects a method often used by ransomware. Which combines the "ping" to wait a couple of seconds and then "del" to delete the file in question. Its used to hide the file responsible for the initial infection for example
references:
    - https://blog.sygnia.co/kaseya-ransomware-supply-chain-attack
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2022/06/23093553/Common-TTPs-of-the-modern-ransomware_low-res.pdf
    - https://www.acronis.com/en-us/blog/posts/lockbit-ransomware/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
author: Ilya Krestinichev
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # Note: In the case of sysmon and similar logging utilities, see this discussion https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/discussions/4277
    # Example: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"  /C ping 127.0.0.7 -n 3 > Nul & fsutil file setZeroData offset=0 length=524288 "C:\Users\User\Desktop\lockbit\lockbit.exe" & Del /f /q "C:\Users\User\Desktop\lockbit\lockbit.exe".
    selection_count:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -n '
    selection_nul:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Nul' # Covers "> Nul" and ">Nul "
    selection_del_param:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -f '
            - ' -q '
    selection_all:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ping' # Covers "ping" and "ping.exe"
            - 'del '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern
Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*IEX ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString*", "*IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString*", "*IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString*", "*IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString*", "* -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(*", "* -c (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(*")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern
id: e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275
related:
    - id: 3b6ab547-8ec2-4991-b9d2-2b06702a48d7
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive)
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/jivoi/c354eaaf3019352ce32522f916c03d70
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2022-03-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: # make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive
            - 'IEX ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - 'IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString'
            - ' -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('
            - ' -c (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software installers that pull packages from remote systems and execute them
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell IEX Execution Patterns
Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 09576804-7a05-458e-a817-eb718ca91f54
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((((action_process_image_path in ("*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* | iex;*", "* | iex *", "* | iex}*", "* | IEX ;*", "* | IEX -Error*", "* | IEX (new*", "*);IEX *"))) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*::FromBase64String*", "*.GetString([System.Convert]::*"))) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*)|iex;$*", "*);iex($*", "*);iex $*", "* | IEX | *", "* | iex\\"*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell IEX Execution Patterns
id: 09576804-7a05-458e-a817-eb718ca91f54
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-expression?view=powershell-7.2
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-24
modified: 2022-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_combined_1:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' | iex;'
            - ' | iex '
            - ' | iex}'
            - ' | IEX ;'
            - ' | IEX -Error'
            - ' | IEX (new'
            - ');IEX '
    selection_combined_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '::FromBase64String'
            - '.GetString([System.Convert]::'
    selection_standalone:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ')|iex;$'
            - ');iex($'
            - ');iex $'
            - ' | IEX | '
            - ' | iex\"'
    condition: all of selection_combined_* or selection_standalone
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts that use IEX
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation with a parameter substring
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Daniel Bohannon (idea), Roberto Rodriguez (Fix) ATT&CK sub-technique id 36210e0d-5b19-485d-a087-c096088885f0
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe")) and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -windowstyle h *", "* -windowstyl h*", "* -windowsty h*", "* -windowst h*", "* -windows h*", "* -windo h*", "* -wind h*", "* -win h*", "* -wi h*", "* -win h *", "* -win hi *", "* -win hid *", "* -win hidd *", "* -win hidde *", "* -NoPr *", "* -NoPro *", "* -NoProf *", "* -NoProfi *", "* -NoProfil *", "* -nonin *", "* -nonint *", "* -noninte *", "* -noninter *", "* -nonintera *", "* -noninterac *", "* -noninteract *", "* -noninteracti *", "* -noninteractiv *", "* -ec *", "* -encodedComman *", "* -encodedComma *", "* -encodedComm *", "* -encodedCom *", "* -encodedCo *", "* -encodedC *", "* -encoded *", "* -encode *", "* -encod *", "* -enco *", "* -en *", "* -executionpolic *", "* -executionpoli *", "* -executionpol *", "* -executionpo *", "* -executionp *", "* -execution bypass*", "* -executio bypass*", "* -executi bypass*", "* -execut bypass*", "* -execu bypass*", "* -exec bypass*", "* -exe bypass*", "* -ex bypass*", "* -ep bypass*", "* /windowstyle h *", "* /windowstyl h*", "* /windowsty h*", "* /windowst h*", "* /windows h*", "* /windo h*", "* /wind h*", "* /win h*", "* /wi h*", "* /win h *", "* /win hi *", "* /win hid *", "* /win hidd *", "* /win hidde *", "* /NoPr *", "* /NoPro *", "* /NoProf *", "* /NoProfi *", "* /NoProfil *", "* /nonin *", "* /nonint *", "* /noninte *", "* /noninter *", "* /nonintera *", "* /noninterac *", "* /noninteract *", "* /noninteracti *", "* /noninteractiv *", "* /ec *", "* /encodedComman *", "* /encodedComma *", "* /encodedComm *", "* /encodedCom *", "* /encodedCo *", "* /encodedC *", "* /encoded *", "* /encode *", "* /encod *", "* /enco *", "* /en *", "* /executionpolic *", "* /executionpoli *", "* /executionpol *", "* /executionpo *", "* /executionp *", "* /execution bypass*", "* /executio bypass*", "* /executi bypass*", "* /execut bypass*", "* /execu bypass*", "* /exec bypass*", "* /exe bypass*", "* /ex bypass*", "* /ep bypass*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
id: 36210e0d-5b19-485d-a087-c096088885f0
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation with a parameter substring
references:
    - http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Daniel Bohannon (idea), Roberto Rodriguez (Fix)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -windowstyle h '
            - ' -windowstyl h'
            - ' -windowsty h'
            - ' -windowst h'
            - ' -windows h'
            - ' -windo h'
            - ' -wind h'
            - ' -win h'
            - ' -wi h'
            - ' -win h '
            - ' -win hi '
            - ' -win hid '
            - ' -win hidd '
            - ' -win hidde '
            - ' -NoPr '
            - ' -NoPro '
            - ' -NoProf '
            - ' -NoProfi '
            - ' -NoProfil '
            - ' -nonin '
            - ' -nonint '
            - ' -noninte '
            - ' -noninter '
            - ' -nonintera '
            - ' -noninterac '
            - ' -noninteract '
            - ' -noninteracti '
            - ' -noninteractiv '
            - ' -ec '
            - ' -encodedComman '
            - ' -encodedComma '
            - ' -encodedComm '
            - ' -encodedCom '
            - ' -encodedCo '
            - ' -encodedC '
            - ' -encoded '
            - ' -encode '
            - ' -encod '
            - ' -enco '
            - ' -en '
            - ' -executionpolic '
            - ' -executionpoli '
            - ' -executionpol '
            - ' -executionpo '
            - ' -executionp '
            - ' -execution bypass'
            - ' -executio bypass'
            - ' -executi bypass'
            - ' -execut bypass'
            - ' -execu bypass'
            - ' -exec bypass'
            - ' -exe bypass'
            - ' -ex bypass'
            - ' -ep bypass'
            - ' /windowstyle h '
            - ' /windowstyl h'
            - ' /windowsty h'
            - ' /windowst h'
            - ' /windows h'
            - ' /windo h'
            - ' /wind h'
            - ' /win h'
            - ' /wi h'
            - ' /win h '
            - ' /win hi '
            - ' /win hid '
            - ' /win hidd '
            - ' /win hidde '
            - ' /NoPr '
            - ' /NoPro '
            - ' /NoProf '
            - ' /NoProfi '
            - ' /NoProfil '
            - ' /nonin '
            - ' /nonint '
            - ' /noninte '
            - ' /noninter '
            - ' /nonintera '
            - ' /noninterac '
            - ' /noninteract '
            - ' /noninteracti '
            - ' /noninteractiv '
            - ' /ec '
            - ' /encodedComman '
            - ' /encodedComma '
            - ' /encodedComm '
            - ' /encodedCom '
            - ' /encodedCo '
            - ' /encodedC '
            - ' /encoded '
            - ' /encode '
            - ' /encod '
            - ' /enco '
            - ' /en '
            - ' /executionpolic '
            - ' /executionpoli '
            - ' /executionpol '
            - ' /executionpo '
            - ' /executionp '
            - ' /execution bypass'
            - ' /executio bypass'
            - ' /executi bypass'
            - ' /execut bypass'
            - ' /execu bypass'
            - ' /exec bypass'
            - ' /exe bypass'
            - ' /ex bypass'
            - ' /ep bypass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Printer Driver Empty Manufacturer
Detects a suspicious printer driver installation with an empty Manufacturer value
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e0813366-0407-449a-9869-a2db1119dc41
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_registry_key_name contains "\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers" and 
 action_registry_key_name contains "\Manufacturer") and 
 (action_registry_value_name = "(Empty)" or 
 action_registry_data = "(Empty)")) and 
 (not 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\CutePDF Writer v4.0\" or 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\VNC Printer (PS)\*", "*\VNC Printer (UD)\*")) or 
 action_registry_key_name contains "\Version-3\PDF24\"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Printer Driver Empty Manufacturer
id: e0813366-0407-449a-9869-a2db1119dc41
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious printer driver installation with an empty Manufacturer value
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1410545674773467140
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-01
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1574
    - cve.2021-1675
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains|all:
            - '\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Drivers'
            - '\Manufacturer'
        Details: '(Empty)'
    filter_cutepdf:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CutePDF Writer v4.0\'
    filter_vnc:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\VNC Printer (PS)\'
            - '\VNC Printer (UD)\'
    filter_pdf24:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Version-3\PDF24\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Alerts on legitimate printer drivers that do not set any more details in the Manufacturer value
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
status test author EagleEye Team, Florian Roth ATT&CK sub-technique id cc08d590-8b90-413a-aff6-31d1a99678d7
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "Add-PrinterPort -Name" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*.exe*", "*.dll*", "*.bat*"))) or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "Generic / Text Only"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
id: cc08d590-8b90-413a-aff6-31d1a99678d7
status: test
description: Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
references:
    - https://windows-internals.com/printdemon-cve-2020-1048/
author: EagleEye Team, Florian Roth
date: 2020-05-13
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
    - cve.2020-1048
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Add-PrinterPort -Name'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.bat'
    selection3:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Generic / Text Only'
    condition: (selection1 and selection2) or selection3
falsepositives:
    - New printer port install on host
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Process By Web Server Process
Detects potentially suspicious processes being spawned by a web server process which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or exploitation
status test author Thomas Patzke, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8202070f-edeb-4d31-a010-a26c72ac5600
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((actor_process_image_path in ("*\caddy.exe", "*\httpd.exe", "*\nginx.exe", "*\php-cgi.exe", "*\php.exe", "*\tomcat.exe", "*\UMWorkerProcess.exe", "*\w3wp.exe", "*\ws_TomcatService.exe")) or 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\java.exe", "*\javaw.exe")) and 
 (actor_process_image_path in ("*-tomcat-*", "*\tomcat*"))) or 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\java.exe", "*\javaw.exe")) and 
 (actor_process_command_line in ("*CATALINA_HOME*", "*catalina.home*", "*catalina.jar*")))) and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\arp.exe", "*\at.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\dsget.exe", "*\hostname.exe", "*\nbtstat.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\net1.exe", "*\netdom.exe", "*\netsh.exe", "*\nltest.exe", "*\ntdsutil.exe", "*\powershell_ise.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\qprocess.exe", "*\query.exe", "*\qwinsta.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\sc.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\wusa.exe")) and 
 (not 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\java.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c C:\ManageEngine\ADManager \"Plus\ES\bin\elasticsearch.bat -Enode.name=RMP-NODE1 -pelasticsearch-pid.txt") or 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\java.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "sc query" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "ADManager Plus"))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process By Web Server Process
id: 8202070f-edeb-4d31-a010-a26c72ac5600
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious processes being spawned by a web server process which could be the result of a successfully placed web shell or exploitation
references:
    - https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF
author: Thomas Patzke, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2024-11-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_webserver_image:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\caddy.exe'
            - '\httpd.exe'
            - '\nginx.exe'
            - '\php-cgi.exe'
            - '\php.exe'
            - '\tomcat.exe'
            - '\UMWorkerProcess.exe'  # https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/detection-response-to-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities.html
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\ws_TomcatService.exe'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '-tomcat-'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'CATALINA_HOME'
            - 'catalina.home'
            - 'catalina.jar'
    selection_anomaly_children:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\arp.exe'
            - '\at.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\dsget.exe'
            - '\hostname.exe'
            - '\nbtstat.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\netdom.exe'
            - '\netsh.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\ntdsutil.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\qprocess.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\qwinsta.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\sc.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\wusa.exe'
    filter_main_fp_1:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c C:\ManageEngine\ADManager "Plus\ES\bin\elasticsearch.bat -Enode.name=RMP-NODE1 -pelasticsearch-pid.txt'
    filter_main_fp_2:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'sc query'
            - 'ADManager Plus'
    condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and selection_anomaly_children and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Particular web applications may spawn a shell process legitimately
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "process " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "call " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "create ") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*rundll32*", "*bitsadmin*", "*regsvr32*", "*cmd.exe /c *", "*cmd.exe /k *", "*cmd.exe /r *", "*cmd /c *", "*cmd /k *", "*cmd /r *", "*powershell*", "*pwsh*", "*certutil*", "*cscript*", "*wscript*", "*mshta*", "*\Users\Public\*", "*\Windows\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Local\*", "*%temp%*", "*%tmp%*", "*%ProgramData%*", "*%appdata%*", "*%comspec%*", "*%localappdata%*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
related:
    - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d # Generic
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'call '
            - 'create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more susupicious paths and binaries as you see fit in your env
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Process Execution From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder
Detects process execution from a fake recycle bin folder, often used to avoid security solution.
status test author X__Junior (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK tactic-only id 5ce0f04e-3efc-42af-839d-5b3a543b76c0
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*RECYCLERS.BIN\*", "*RECYCLER.BIN\*")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process Execution From Fake Recycle.Bin Folder
id: 5ce0f04e-3efc-42af-839d-5b3a543b76c0
related:
    - id: cd8b36ac-8e4a-4c2f-a402-a29b8fbd5bca
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects process execution from a fake recycle bin folder, often used to avoid security solution.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/infected-usb-steal-secrets
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cloaked-ursa-phishing/
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-12
modified: 2023-12-11
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            # e.g. C:\$RECYCLER.BIN
            - 'RECYCLERS.BIN\'
            - 'RECYCLER.BIN\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil
Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8bc64091-6875-4881-aaf9-7bd25b5dda08
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((((action_process_image_path in ("*\NTDSDump.exe", "*\NTDSDumpEx.exe")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "ntds.dit" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "system.hiv") or 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "NTDSgrab.ps1") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "ac i ntds" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "create full") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "/c copy " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\windows\ntds\ntds.dit") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "activate instance ntds" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "create full") or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "powershell" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "ntds.dit")) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "ntds.dit" and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\apache*", "*\tomcat*", "*\AppData\*", "*\Temp\*", "*\Public\*", "*\PerfLogs\*")) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\apache*", "*\tomcat*", "*\AppData\*", "*\Temp\*", "*\Public\*", "*\PerfLogs\*"))))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process Patterns NTDS.DIT Exfil
id: 8bc64091-6875-4881-aaf9-7bd25b5dda08
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process patterns used in NTDS.DIT exfiltration
references:
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
    - https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/ntds-dit/
    - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Gather/Copy-VSS.ps1
    - https://github.com/zcgonvh/NTDSDumpEx
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/d297adcebb5c1df6fe30b12ca79b161deb71571c/data/post/powershell/NTDSgrab.ps1
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/08/recent-cyber-attack.html?m=1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-11
modified: 2022-11-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_tool:
        # https://github.com/zcgonvh/NTDSDumpEx
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\NTDSDump.exe'
              - '\NTDSDumpEx.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              # ntdsdumpex.exe -d ntds.dit -o hash.txt -s system.hiv
              - 'ntds.dit'
              - 'system.hiv'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'NTDSgrab.ps1'
    selection_oneliner_1:
        # powershell "ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp' q q"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ac i ntds'
            - 'create full'
    selection_onliner_2:
        # cmd.exe /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.dit
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c copy '
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    selection_onliner_3:
        # ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\windows\temp\data\" "quit" "quit"
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'activate instance ntds'
            - 'create full'
    selection_powershell:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'ntds.dit'
    set1_selection_ntds_dit:
        CommandLine|contains: 'ntds.dit'
    set1_selection_image_folder:
        - ParentImage|contains:
              - '\apache'
              - '\tomcat'
              - '\AppData\'
              - '\Temp\'
              - '\Public\'
              - '\PerfLogs\'
        - Image|contains:
              - '\apache'
              - '\tomcat'
              - '\AppData\'
              - '\Temp\'
              - '\Public\'
              - '\PerfLogs\'
    condition: 1 of selection* or all of set1*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Process Spawned by CentreStack Portal AppPool
Detects unexpected command shell execution (cmd.exe) from w3wp.exe when tied to CentreStack's portal.config, indicating potential exploitation (e.g., CVE-2025-30406)
status experimental author Jason Rathbun (Blackpoint Cyber) ATT&CK sub-technique id 2d79e371-2a27-42de-87a4-b4213fc72a6a
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\w3wp.exe" and 
 actor_process_command_line contains "\portal\portal.config" and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\cmd.exe"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Process Spawned by CentreStack Portal AppPool
id: 2d79e371-2a27-42de-87a4-b4213fc72a6a
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects unexpected command shell execution (cmd.exe) from w3wp.exe when tied to CentreStack's portal.config, indicating potential exploitation (e.g., CVE-2025-30406)
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30406
    - https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/racing-to-exploit-centrestacks-cve-2025-30406/
    - https://gladinetsupport.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/gladinet/securityadvisory-cve-2005.pdf
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/centrestack-rce-exploited-as-zero-day-to-breach-file-sharing-servers/
author: Jason Rathbun (Blackpoint Cyber)
date: 2025-04-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1505.003
    - cve.2025-30406
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\portal\portal.config'
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Potentially if other portal services run on w3wp with a apppool\portal\portal.config, if you want to increase scope you could add user IIS APPPOOL\portal.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE
Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j)
status test author Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Florian Roth ATT&CK tactic-only id 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\java.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\AppVLP.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\curl.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\mftrace.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\net.exe", "*\net1.exe", "*\query.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\scrcons.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\whoami.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\wscript.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE
id: 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
related:
    - id: dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231230220738/https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Florian Roth
date: 2021-12-17
modified: 2024-01-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\java.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'        # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate calls to system binaries
    - Company specific internal usage
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM
Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process
status test author Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis ATT&CK technique id 5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\wsmprovhost.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wsl.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\whoami.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM
id: 5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis
references:
    - Internal Research
date: 2021-05-20
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wsmprovhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wsl.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate WinRM usage
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
Suspicious Program Names
Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (((action_process_image_path in ("*\CVE-202*", "*\CVE202*")) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\poc.exe", "*\artifact.exe", "*\artifact64.exe", "*\artifact_protected.exe", "*\artifact32.exe", "*\artifact32big.exe", "*obfuscated.exe", "*obfusc.exe", "*\meterpreter"))) or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*inject.ps1*", "*Invoke-CVE*", "*pupy.ps1*", "*payload.ps1*", "*beacon.ps1*", "*PowerView.ps1*", "*bypass.ps1*", "*obfuscated.ps1*", "*obfusc.ps1*", "*obfus.ps1*", "*obfs.ps1*", "*evil.ps1*", "*MiniDogz.ps1*", "*_enc.ps1*", "*\shell.ps1*", "*\rshell.ps1*", "*revshell.ps1*", "*\av.ps1*", "*\av_test.ps1*", "*adrecon.ps1*", "*mimikatz.ps1*", "*\PowerUp_*", "*powerup.ps1*", "*\Temp\a.ps1*", "*\Temp\p.ps1*", "*\Temp\1.ps1*", "*Hound.ps1*", "*encode.ps1*", "*powercat.ps1*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Program Names
id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\CVE-202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
              - '\CVE202' # Update this when we reach the year 2100
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\poc.exe'
              - '\artifact.exe'
              - '\artifact64.exe'
              - '\artifact_protected.exe'
              - '\artifact32.exe'
              - '\artifact32big.exe'
              - 'obfuscated.exe'
              - 'obfusc.exe'
              - '\meterpreter'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'inject.ps1'
            - 'Invoke-CVE'
            - 'pupy.ps1'
            - 'payload.ps1'
            - 'beacon.ps1'
            - 'PowerView.ps1'
            - 'bypass.ps1'
            - 'obfuscated.ps1'
            - 'obfusc.ps1'
            - 'obfus.ps1'
            - 'obfs.ps1'
            - 'evil.ps1'
            - 'MiniDogz.ps1'
            - '_enc.ps1'
            - '\shell.ps1'
            - '\rshell.ps1'
            - 'revshell.ps1'
            - '\av.ps1'
            - '\av_test.ps1'
            - 'adrecon.ps1'
            - 'mimikatz.ps1'
            - '\PowerUp_'
            - 'powerup.ps1'
            - '\Temp\a.ps1'
            - '\Temp\p.ps1'
            - '\Temp\1.ps1'
            - 'Hound.ps1'
            - 'encode.ps1'
            - 'powercat.ps1'
    condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\provlaunch.exe" and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\calc.exe", "*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\notepad.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*:\PerfLogs\*", "*:\Temp\*", "*:\Users\Public\*", "*\AppData\Temp\*", "*\Windows\System32\Tasks\*", "*\Windows\Tasks\*", "*\Windows\Temp\*")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON
Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /dest:rdp-tcp#")
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious RDP Redirect Using TSCON
id: f72aa3e8-49f9-4c7d-bd74-f8ab84ff9bbb
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious RDP session redirect using tscon.exe
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/rdp-session-hijacking-with-tscon/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2023-05-16
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1563.002
    - attack.t1021.001
    - car.2013-07-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /dest:rdp-tcp#'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess
Detects a explorer.exe sub process of the RazerInstaller software which can be invoked from the installer to select a different installation folder but can also be exploited to escalate privileges to LOCAL SYSTEM
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut ATT&CK technique id a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\RazerInstaller.exe" and 
 (action_process_integrity_level in ("System", "S-1-16-16384"))) and 
 (not 
 action_process_image_path contains "C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious RazerInstaller Explorer Subprocess
id: a4eaf250-7dc1-4842-862a-5e71cd59a167
status: test
description: Detects a explorer.exe sub process of the RazerInstaller software which can be invoked from the installer to select a different installation folder but can also be exploited to escalate privileges to LOCAL SYSTEM
references:
    - https://twitter.com/j0nh4t/status/1429049506021138437
    - https://streamable.com/q2dsji
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Maxime Thiebaut
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1553
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\RazerInstaller.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384' # System
    filter_main_razer:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Installer\Razer\Installer\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - User selecting a different installation folder (check for other sub processes of this explorer.exe process)
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS
Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "gatherNetworkInfo.vbs" and 
 (not 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cscript.exe", "*\wscript.exe")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS
id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58
related:
    - id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 # FileCreate
      type: similar
    - id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe # ProcCreation LOLBIN
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine
references:
    - https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1615
    - attack.t1059.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'gatherNetworkInfo.vbs'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share
Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id ab9e3b40-0c85-4ba1-aede-455d226fd124
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains ">" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*\\127.0.0.1\admin$\*", "*\\localhost\admin$\*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share
id: ab9e3b40-0c85-4ba1-aede-455d226fd124
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious output redirection to the local admins share, this technique is often found in malicious scripts or hacktool stagers
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-16
modified: 2023-12-28
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_redirect:
        CommandLine|contains: '>'
    selection_share:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\admin$\\'
            - '\\\\localhost\\admin$\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker
Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
status test author frack113 ATT&CK technique id 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "REG" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "ADD" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/v" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/f") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*EnableBDEWithNoTPM*", "*UseAdvancedStartup*", "*UseTPM*", "*UseTPMKey*", "*UseTPMKeyPIN*", "*RecoveryKeyMessageSource*", "*UseTPMPIN*", "*RecoveryKeyMessage*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker
id: 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
author: frack113
date: 2021-11-15
modified: 2022-09-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'REG'
            - 'ADD'
            - '\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE'
            - '/v'
            - '/f'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'EnableBDEWithNoTPM'
            - 'UseAdvancedStartup'
            - 'UseTPM'
            - 'UseTPMKey'
            - 'UseTPMKeyPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessageSource'
            - 'UseTPMPIN'
            - 'RecoveryKeyMessage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
status test author Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\outlook.exe" and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\\"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Remote Child Process From Outlook
id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723
related:
    - id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d # Outlook Child Processes
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process spawning from Outlook where the image is located in a remote location (SMB/WebDav shares).
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=49
author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-27
modified: 2023-02-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        Image|startswith: '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Run Key from Download
Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_*", "*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\*", "*\Downloads\*", "*\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\*", "*\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\*")) and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*", "*\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*", "*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Run Key from Download
id: 9c5037d1-c568-49b3-88c7-9846a5bdc2be
status: test
description: Detects the suspicious RUN keys created by software located in Download or temporary Outlook/Internet Explorer directories
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c5bef5b7-f484-4c43-9cf3-d5c5c7839def/
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poude (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
            - '\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\'
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software installers downloaded and used by users
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File
Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "rundll32.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*.sys,*", "*.sys *"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File
id: 731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32.exe'
    selection2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.sys,'
            - '.sys '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript
Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "rundll32.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "Execute" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "RegRead" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "window.close"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Rundll32 Invoking Inline VBScript
id: 1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-05
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'Execute'
            - 'RegRead'
            - 'window.close'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) ATT&CK technique id 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((((action_process_integrity_level in ("System", "S-1-16-16384")) and 
 (action_process_username in ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*"))) and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\calc.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\ping.exe", "*\wscript.exe")) or 
 action_process_image_command_line ~= "net\s+user\s+" or 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("* -NoP *", "* -W Hidden *", "* -decode *", "* /decode *", "* /urlcache *", "* -urlcache *", "* -e* JAB*", "* -e* SUVYI*", "* -e* SQBFAFgA*", "* -e* aWV4I*", "* -e* IAB*", "* -e* PAA*", "* -e* aQBlAHgA*", "*vssadmin delete shadows*", "*reg SAVE HKLM*", "* -ma *", "*Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*", "*.downloadstring(*", "*.downloadfile(*", "* /ticket:*", "*dpapi::*", "*event::clear*", "*event::drop*", "*id::modify*", "*kerberos::*", "*lsadump::*", "*misc::*", "*privilege::*", "*rpc::*", "*sekurlsa::*", "*sid::*", "*token::*", "*vault::cred*", "*vault::list*", "* p::d *", "*;iex(*", "*MiniDump*")))) and 
 (not 
 ((action_process_image_command_line contains "ping" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "127.0.0.1" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -n ") or 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\PING.EXE" and 
 actor_process_command_line contains "\DismFoDInstall.cmd") or 
 actor_process_image_path contains ":\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\" or 
 ((actor_process_image_path in ("*:\Program Files (x86)\Java\*", "*:\Program Files\Java\*")) and 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\bin\javaws.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*:\Program Files (x86)\Java\*", "*:\Program Files\Java\*")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\bin\jp2launcher.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " -ma ")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_special:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\ping.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|re: 'net\s+user\s+'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # - 'sc stop ' # stops a system service # causes FPs
              - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -e* JAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SUVYI'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SQBFAFgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aWV4I'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* IAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* PAA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aQBlAHgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - 'vssadmin delete shadows'  # Ransomware
              - 'reg SAVE HKLM'  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
              - ' -ma '  # ProcDump
              - 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'  # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
              - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
              - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
              - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
              - 'dpapi::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'event::clear'        # Mimikatz
              - 'event::drop'     # Mimikatz
              - 'id::modify'      # Mimikatz
              - 'kerberos::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'lsadump::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'misc::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'privilege::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'rpc::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'sekurlsa::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'sid::'        # Mimikatz
              - 'token::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::cred'     # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::list'     # Mimikatz
              - ' p::d '  # Mimikatz
              - ';iex('  # PowerShell IEX
              - 'MiniDump'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
    filter_main_ping:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ping'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - ' -n '
    filter_vs:
        Image|endswith: '\PING.EXE'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
    filter_config_mgr:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
    filter_java:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\bin\javaws.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        Image|endswith: '\bin\jp2launcher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
    - Monitoring activity
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong High FP
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 39019a4e-317f-4ce3-ae63-309a8c6b53c5
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\schtasks.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains " /create " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains " /sc once " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\Temp\")))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder
id: 39019a4e-317f-4ce3-ae63-309a8c6b53c5
status: test
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once
references:
    - https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-11
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' /create '
            - ' /sc once '
            - '\Temp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Software installation
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks
Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "\Windows\System32\Tasks" and 
 (actor_process_image_path in ("*\AppData\*", "*C:\PerfLogs*", "*\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks
id: 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
status: test
description: Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-16
modified: 2022-01-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\System32\Tasks'
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs'
            - '\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder
Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local
status test author pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path contains "\schtasks.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "/Create" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/RU" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/TR" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "C:\Users\" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "\AppData\Local\") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*NT AUT*", "* SYSTEM *"))) and 
 (not 
 ((actor_process_image_path contains "\AppData\Local\Temp\" and 
 actor_process_image_path contains "TeamViewer_.exe") and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\schtasks.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "/TN TVInstallRestore"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder
id: c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967
status: test
description: 'Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local'
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-15
modified: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Create'
            - '/RU'
            - '/TR'
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'NT AUT' # This covers the usual NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
            - ' SYSTEM ' # SYSTEM is a valid value for schtasks hence it gets it's own value with space
    filter:
        # FP from test set in SIGMA
        ParentImage|contains|all:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - 'TeamViewer_.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/TN TVInstallRestore'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern
Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 58f4ea09-0fc2-4520-ba18-b85c540b0eaf
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\Serv-U.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\msiexec.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Serv-U Process Pattern
id: 58f4ea09-0fc2-4520-ba18-b85c540b0eaf
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-14
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555
    - cve.2021-35211
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Serv-U.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate uses in which users or programs use the SSH service of Serv-U for remote command execution
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Service Binary Directory
Detects a service binary running in a suspicious directory
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 883faa95-175a-4e22-8181-e5761aeb373c
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_image_path in ("*\Users\Public\*", "*\$Recycle.bin*", "*\Users\All Users\*", "*\Users\Default\*", "*\Users\Contacts\*", "*\Users\Searches\*", "*C:\Perflogs\*", "*\config\systemprofile\*", "*\Windows\Fonts\*", "*\Windows\IME\*", "*\Windows\addins\*")) and 
 (actor_process_image_path in ("*\services.exe", "*\svchost.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Service Binary Directory
id: 883faa95-175a-4e22-8181-e5761aeb373c
status: test
description: Detects a service binary running in a suspicious directory
references:
    - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-03-09
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\$Recycle.bin'
            - '\Users\All Users\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Users\Contacts\'
            - '\Users\Searches\'
            - 'C:\Perflogs\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Windows\Fonts\'
            - '\Windows\IME\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Service Path Modification
Detects service path modification via the "sc" binary to a suspicious command or path
status test author Victor Sergeev, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 138d3531-8793-4f50-a2cd-f291b2863d78
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\sc.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "config" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "binPath") and 
 (action_process_image_command_line in ("*powershell*", "*cmd *", "*mshta*", "*wscript*", "*cscript*", "*rundll32*", "*svchost*", "*dllhost*", "*cmd.exe /c*", "*cmd.exe /k*", "*cmd.exe /r*", "*cmd /c*", "*cmd /k*", "*cmd /r*", "*C:\Users\Public*", "*\Downloads\*", "*\Desktop\*", "*\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*", "*C:\Windows\TEMP\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp*"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Service Path Modification
id: 138d3531-8793-4f50-a2cd-f291b2863d78
status: test
description: Detects service path modification via the "sc" binary to a suspicious command or path
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html
author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2022-11-18
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'config'
            - 'binPath'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious commands or binaries
            - 'powershell'
            - 'cmd '
            - 'mshta'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'svchost'
            - 'dllhost'
            - 'cmd.exe /c'
            - 'cmd.exe /k'
            - 'cmd.exe /r'
            - 'cmd /c'
            - 'cmd /k'
            - 'cmd /r'
            # Add more suspicious paths
            - 'C:\Users\Public'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious ShellExec_RunDLL Call Via Ordinal
Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch other commands. Adversary might only use the ordinal number in order to bypass existing detection that alert on usage of ShellExec_RunDLL on CommandLine.
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel ATT&CK sub-technique id 8823e85d-31d8-473e-b7f4-92da070f0fc6
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((actor_process_command_line contains "SHELL32.DLL" and 
 (actor_process_command_line in ("*#568*", "*#570*", "*#572*", "*#576*"))) and 
 (((actor_process_command_line in ("*comspec*", "*iex*", "*Invoke-*", "*msiexec*", "*odbcconf*", "*regsvr32*")) or 
 (actor_process_command_line in ("*\Desktop\*", "*\ProgramData\*", "*\Temp\*", "*\Users\Public\*"))) or 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\bash.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe", "*\cmd.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\curl.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\msiexec.exe", "*\msxsl.exe", "*\odbcconf.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\wscript.exe")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious ShellExec_RunDLL Call Via Ordinal
id: 8823e85d-31d8-473e-b7f4-92da070f0fc6
related:
    - id: d87bd452-6da1-456e-8155-7dc988157b7d
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch other commands.
    Adversary might only use the ordinal number in order to bypass existing detection that alert on usage of ShellExec_RunDLL on CommandLine.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/shell32.dll-65DA072F25DE83D9F83653E3FEA3644D.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent_img:
        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'SHELL32.DLL'
    selection_parent_ordinal:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            # Note: The ordinal number may differ depending on the DLL version
            # Example: rundll32 SHELL32.DLL,#572 "cmd.exe" "/c calc.exe"
            - '#568'
            - '#570'
            - '#572'
            - '#576'
    selection_susp_cli_parent:
        # Note: Add additional binaries and suspicious paths to increase coverage
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - 'comspec'
              - 'iex'
              - 'Invoke-'
              - 'msiexec'
              - 'odbcconf'
              - 'regsvr32'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains:
              - '\Desktop\'
              - '\ProgramData\'
              - '\Temp\'
              - '\Users\Public\'
    selection_susp_child_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msxsl.exe'
            - '\odbcconf.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_parent_* and 1 of selection_susp_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool
Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation)
status test author Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) ATT&CK tactic-only id 90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (actor_process_image_path contains "\keytool.exe" and 
 (action_process_image_path in ("*\cmd.exe", "*\sh.exe", "*\bash.exe", "*\powershell.exe", "*\pwsh.exe", "*\schtasks.exe", "*\certutil.exe", "*\whoami.exe", "*\bitsadmin.exe", "*\wscript.exe", "*\cscript.exe", "*\scrcons.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe", "*\hh.exe", "*\wmic.exe", "*\mshta.exe", "*\rundll32.exe", "*\forfiles.exe", "*\scriptrunner.exe", "*\mftrace.exe", "*\AppVLP.exe", "*\systeminfo.exe", "*\reg.exe", "*\query.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool
id: 90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation)
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/how-to-exploit-cve-2021-40539-on-manageengine-adselfservice-plus.html
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-12-22
modified: 2023-01-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\keytool.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Shim Database Patching Activity
Detects installation of new shim databases that try to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id bf344fea-d947-4ef4-9192-34d008315d3a
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_registry_key_name contains "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\" and 
 (action_registry_key_name in ("*\csrss.exe", "*\dllhost.exe", "*\explorer.exe", "*\RuntimeBroker.exe", "*\services.exe", "*\sihost.exe", "*\svchost.exe", "*\taskhostw.exe", "*\winlogon.exe", "*\WmiPrvSe.exe"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Shim Database Patching Activity
id: bf344fea-d947-4ef4-9192-34d008315d3a
status: test
description: Detects installation of new shim databases that try to patch sections of known processes for potential process injection or persistence.
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/pillowmint-fin7s-monkey-thief/
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-01
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.011
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\'
        TargetObject|endswith:
            # Note: add other application to increase coverage
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\explorer.exe'
            - '\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - '\services.exe'
            - '\sihost.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\taskhostw.exe'
            - '\winlogon.exe'
            - '\WmiPrvSe.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix
Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\" and 
 (action_registry_value_name contains "#" or 
 action_registry_data contains "#")) and 
 ((action_registry_value_name in ("*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *")) or 
 (action_registry_data in ("*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix
id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
related:
    - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\'
        Details|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        Details|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Space Characters in TypedPaths Registry Path - FileFix
Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in TypedPaths registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using file-fix techniques to hide malicious commands.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_registry | filter (event_type = ENUM.REGISTRY and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.REGISTRY_SET_VALUE) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_registry_key_name contains "\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\url1" and 
 (action_registry_value_name contains "#" or 
 action_registry_data contains "#")) and 
 ((action_registry_value_name in ("*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *")) or 
 (action_registry_data in ("*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *", "*            *")))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Space Characters in TypedPaths Registry Path - FileFix
id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
related:
    - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in TypedPaths registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using file-fix techniques to hide malicious commands.
references:
    - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
    - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_key:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\url1'
        Details|contains: '#'
    selection_space_variation:
        Details|contains:
            - '            ' # En Quad (U+2000)
            - '            ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
            - '            ' # En Space (U+2002)
            - '            ' # Em Space (U+2003)
            - '            ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
            - '            ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
            - '            ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
            - '            ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
            - '            ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
            - '            ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
            - '            ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
            - '            ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
            - '            ' # Normal space
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process
Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes. Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking.
status experimental author andrewdanis ATT&CK sub-technique id 78f10490-f2f4-4d19-a75b-4e0683bf3b8d
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 actor_process_image_path contains "\SpeechRuntime.exe")
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process
id: 78f10490-f2f4-4d19-a75b-4e0683bf3b8d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes.
    Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/SpeechRuntimeMove
author: andrewdanis
date: 2025-10-23
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.t1218
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\SpeechRuntime.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely.
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params
Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK technique id 1f1a8509-2cbb-44f5-8751-8e1571518ce2
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_path contains "\splwow64.exe" and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "splwow64.exe"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params
id: 1f1a8509-2cbb-44f5-8751-8e1571518ce2
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1429401053229891590?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\splwow64.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith: 'splwow64.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Strong Medium FP
Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors. These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers. This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_file | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_file_name contains "\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\" and 
 (action_file_name in ("*.bat", "*.cmd", "*.dll", "*.hta", "*.jar", "*.js", "*.jse", "*.msi", "*.ps1", "*.psd1", "*.psm1", "*.scr", "*.url", "*.vba", "*.vbe", "*.vbs", "*.wsf"))))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
id: 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
related:
    - id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
    These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
    This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
references:
    - https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5ede8f21e42ebe37e0a6eff757dba60bcfa85859/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2025-10-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Add or remove suspicious extensions according to your env needs
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.hta'
            - '.jar'
            - '.js'
            - '.jse'
            - '.msi'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psd1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.scr'
            - '.url'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare legitimate usage of some of the extensions mentioned in the rule
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate Medium FP
Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM
Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) ATT&CK sub-technique id 9847f263-4a81-424f-970c-875dab15b79b
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 ((action_process_username in ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*")) and 
 action_process_image_path contains "\tscon.exe"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM
id: 9847f263-4a81-424f-970c-875dab15b79b
status: test
description: Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM
references:
    - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html
    - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1076-rdp-hijacking-for-lateral-movement
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-03-17
modified: 2022-05-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        Image|endswith: '\tscon.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
high Moderate High FP
Suspicious UltraVNC Execution
Detects suspicious UltraVNC command line flag combination that indicate a auto reconnect upon execution, e.g. startup (as seen being used by Gamaredon threat group)
status test author Bhabesh Raj ATT&CK sub-technique id 871b9555-69ca-4993-99d3-35a59f9f3599
cortex_xdr query
config case_sensitive = false | preset=xdr_process | filter (event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and 
 event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START) and 
 (agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS and 
 (action_process_image_command_line contains "-autoreconnect " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-connect " and 
 action_process_image_command_line contains "-id:"))
view Sigma YAML 
title: Suspicious UltraVNC Execution
id: 871b9555-69ca-4993-99d3-35a59f9f3599
status: test
description: Detects suspicious UltraVNC command line flag combination that indicate a auto reconnect upon execution, e.g. startup (as seen being used by Gamaredon threat group)
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220224045756/https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/tale_of_gamaredon_infection.pdf
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution
    - https://uvnc.com/docs/uvnc-viewer/52-ultravnc-viewer-commandline-parameters.html
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022-03-04
modified: 2022-03-09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.g0047
    - attack.t1021.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-autoreconnect '
            - '-connect '
            - '-id:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
Convert to SIEM query
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