Home/CVE/Observable Response Discrepancy vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows an authenticated SFTP user to
CVE

CVE-2026-53422

Observable Response Discrepancy vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows an authenticated SFTP user to

Observable Response Discrepancy vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows an authenticated SFTP user to enumerate the existence of files and directories outside the configured root directory. The SSH_FXP_REALPATH handler in ssh_sftpd calls relate_file_name/3 with Canonicalize=false, unlike every other SFTP operation handler. This allows .. components in the requested path to bypass the is_within_root/2 check without being resolved.

The un-canonicalized path then enters resolve_symlinks/2, which walks up the directory tree above the configured root and issues read_link() syscalls on arbitrary filesystem paths. An authenticated SFTP client can exploit this by sending a REALPATH request with a crafted traversal path. The server response differs depending on whether the target path exists on the host filesystem (SSH_FXP_NAME when the path resolves successfully, SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE when it does not).

This creates a path-existence oracle that an attacker can use to enumerate the filesystem structure outside the configured root, including the existence of sensitive files, directories, and mount points. The vulnerability leaks only the existence of paths. No file contents, credentials, or write access are obtainable through this issue alone.

The information gained may assist further attacks when combined with other vulnerabilities. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl and program routine ssh_sftpd:handle_op/4. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 until OTP 29.0.3, 28.5.0.3, and 27.3.4.14 corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 until 6.0.2, 5.5.2.2, and 5.2.11.9.

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  • ⚠ NVD has not scored this CVE yet - manual triage required (common for recent CVEs)
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-53422, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

ATT&CK techniques

2

Techniques this CVE enables. Pills with a solid outline are high confidence - named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei, or human-curated by CTID; the rest are inferred from the weakness type using MITRE's CVE Mapping Methodology and the CWE → CAPEC chain. Broad, generic-weakness guesses are filtered out. A small marks a technique that N independent sources agree on.

▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques

Weakness Classification