Home/CVE/In Zephyr's IPv4 IGMP implementation, igmp_send() in subsys/net/ip/igmp.c read the network interface back out of the pac
CVE

CVE-2026-10636

In Zephyr's IPv4 IGMP implementation, igmp_send() in subsys/net/ip/igmp.c read the network interface back out of the pac

In Zephyr's IPv4 IGMP implementation, igmp_send() in subsys/net/ip/igmp.c read the network interface back out of the packet via net_pkt_iface(pkt) after the packet had been handed to net_send_data(). On the successful-send path the packet's last reference may already have been released by the L2 driver or by the network stack's TX handling (synchronously in the default NET_TC_TX_COUNT=0 immediate-transmit configuration), returning the net_pkt slab block to its free list. The subsequent net_pkt_iface(pkt) dereferences the freed packet, a use-after-free read.

with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the resulting dangling interface pointer is further dereferenced for a statistics-counter write. The IGMP send path is reachable without authentication from inbound IPv4 IGMP membership queries addressed to 224.0.0.1 (net_ipv4_igmp_input - send_igmp_report/send_igmp_v3_report - igmp_send), as well as from local multicast join/leave/rejoin operations. Realistic impact is undefined behavior and potential denial of service (sporadic crash or stats corruption)

a controllable write requires the asynchronous TX path plus a concurrent slab reuse. The flaw was introduced with IGMPv2 support and affects releases from v2.6.0 through v4.4.0. The fix caches the interface pointer before sending. Note the analogous IPv6 MLD path (mld_send in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_mld.c) retains the same unfixed pattern.

LOW · CVSS 3.7 EPSS 0.00252
Monitor
  • No active-exploitation, high-EPSS, or public-exploit signals - routine patching cadence
Sigma rules0 YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2026-10636, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked. EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal. CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score. Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits. PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).

ATT&CK techniques

2

Techniques this CVE enables - linked via CWECAPECATT&CK. High◆ = named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei templates.

▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques

Weakness Classification

Scoring & Timeline

3.7
LOW · CVSS v3.1 · [email protected]
View on NVD
Attack Vector
Network Adjacent Local Physical
Attack Complexity
Low High
Privileges Required
None Low High
User Interaction
None Required
Scope
Unchanged Changed
Confidentiality
None Low High
Integrity
None Low High
Availability
None Low High
Published to NVD16 Jun 2026 · 03:16 PM
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
SSVC triage · cisa-vulnrichment
Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial
SSVC asks the questions that actually drive patch urgency: is it being exploited, can attacks be automated, and how total is the impact.
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