Home/CVE/Microsoft w3wp (aka w3wp.exe) does not properly handle when the AspCompat directive is not used when referencing COM com
CVE
CVE-2006-1364
Microsoft w3wp (aka w3wp.exe) does not properly handle when the AspCompat directive is not used when referencing COM com
Microsoft w3wp (aka w3wp.exe) does not properly handle when the AspCompat directive is not used when referencing COM components in ASP.NET, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource consumption or crash) by repeatedly requesting each of several documents that refer to COM components, or are restricted documents located under the ASP.NET application path.
HIGH · CVSS 7.5
EPSS 0.58743
Act now
- EPSS ≥ 0.50 - high probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
- EPSS percentile: top 1% of all CVEs by exploitation likelihood
- Public exploit or PoC is available
- CVSS base score ≥ 7.0
Sigma rules1
YARA rules0
Look this up elsewhere - one-click external pivots
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How to read a CVE - triage first, then detect and patch
This page is every public fact about CVE-2006-1364, cross-linked. Its job is to answer one question fast - does this need my attention now? - and then hand you the two things you do about it. Here is how an analyst reads it.
Triage: should I act now? Four signals, and they are not interchangeable:
CVSSseverity - how bad it is IF exploited, 0-10. A high CVSS alone is not urgency; a flaw can be a perfect 10 and never actually be attacked.
EPSSprobability - a model’s estimate of the chance it is exploited in the next 30 days, 0-1. This is the “will it actually happen” signal.
CISA KEVconfirmed - it is being exploited in the wild right now. The strongest signal on the page; KEV beats any score.
Weaponisedavailability - public exploits / PoCs, and especially Metasploit modules rated Excellent / Great. Reliable, packaged exploit code means low-skill attackers can use it today.
How they combine: KEV, or a dependable Metasploit module, means patch now regardless of CVSS. High CVSS + low EPSS + no exploit is real but not an emergency - schedule it. Low CVSS but KEV-listed still gets patched now. The verdict above already weighed these for you; this is how it got there.
Then what - two workflows:
Detectwhen you cannot patch today, follow this CVE to the ATT&CK techniques it enables, then Build a SIEM detection (the green button) - author a rule, test it in Atomic, deploy it. That buys visibility while the patch waits.
PatchAffected products / packages tell you if you are exposed; Fixed versions by distribution and Vendor advisories give the exact version that closes it.
Reading order for the panels below: verdict + badges, then Public exploits / Metasploit (is it weaponised), then ATT&CK techniques + Sigma / IDS rules (can I detect it), then Affected products / packages + Fixed versions (am I exposed, what patches it), then Threat actors / IOCs (who uses it), then Scoring & timeline / references (the evidence).
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ATT&CK techniques
1Techniques this CVE enables - linked via CWECAPECATT&CK. High◆ = named directly in ATT&CK or Nuclei templates.
▤ Build a SIEM detection for these techniques▤
CAPEC attack patterns
3Attack patterns this CVE enables - the bridge from weakness to ATT&CK technique.
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Weakness Classification
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Affected Products & Versions
2microsoft asp.net<= 1.1
microsoft asp.netall versions
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Public Exploits & PoCs
7These PoC and exploit links come from public sources and are not verified to be safe or functional. Review the code before running anything, and treat unverified entries as untrusted.
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Sigma Hunt Rules
1Exact rules name this CVE ID. Product rules name an affected product in their title. Related rules cover techniques used by actors who exploited this CVE. Showing the most relevant matches; the complete related set is on the full drill-down.
producthighPotentially Suspicious ASP.NET Compilation Via AspNetCompiler
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Scoring & Timeline
7.5
HIGH · CVSS v3.0 · [email protected]
Attack Vector
Network
Adjacent
Local
Physical
Attack Complexity
Low
High
Privileges Required
None
Low
High
User Interaction
None
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Low
High
Integrity
None
Low
High
Availability
None
Low
High
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References & Sources
6Source URLs (vendor pages, mailing lists, write-ups). Exploit/PoC links are in their own section above to avoid duplication.
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2006-March/044291.htmlThird Party Advisory
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2006-March/044292.htmlThird Party Advisory