Sigma rules for Pearl Sleet
500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Pearl Sleet
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate
id: a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'maliciousIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Suspicious
id: 36440e1c-5c22-467a-889b-593e66498472
status: test
description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address known to be malicious at time of sign-in.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'suspiciousIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Sign-In From Malware Infected IP
id: 821b4dc3-1295-41e7-b157-39ab212dd6bd
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from IP addresses infected with malware that is known to actively communicate with a bot server.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malware-linked-ip-address-deprecated
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.t1090
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'malwareInfectedIPAddress'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Using an IP address that is shared by many users
level: high
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux
id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
- https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: linux
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.localto.net'
- '.localtonet.com'
Initiated: 'true'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service - Linux
id: 19bf6fdb-7721-4f3d-867f-53467f6a5db6
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing an ngrok tunneling endpoint, which could be a sign of forbidden exfiltration of data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
- https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
- https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1568.002
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
- attack.s0508
logsource:
product: linux
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of ngrok
level: high
title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
references:
- https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications
author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
date: 2024-06-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.localto.net'
- '.localtonet.com'
Initiated: 'true'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service.
level: high
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
- id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
- https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
- https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1568.002
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
- attack.s0508
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high
title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' i'
- ' p'
- '=3389'
- ' c'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activity
level: high
title: PUA - NPS Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 68d37776-61db-42f5-bf54-27e87072d17e
status: test
description: Detects the use of NPS, a port forwarding and intranet penetration proxy server
references:
- https://github.com/ehang-io/nps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\npc.exe'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -server='
- ' -vkey='
- ' -password='
selection_cli_2:
CommandLine|contains: ' -config=npc'
selection_hashes:
# v0.26.10
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=AE8ACF66BFE3A44148964048B826D005"
- "SHA1=CEA49E9B9B67F3A13AD0BE1C2655293EA3C18181"
- "SHA256=5A456283392FFCEEEACA3D3426C306EB470304637520D72FED1CC1FEBBBD6856"
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution
id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e
status: test
description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass)
references:
- https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran
- https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
- attack.s0040
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\htran.exe'
- '\lcx.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.exe -tran '
- '.exe -slave '
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Execution
id: 32410e29-5f94-4568-b6a3-d91a8adad863
status: test
description: Detects the use of Fast Reverse Proxy. frp is a fast reverse proxy to help you expose a local server behind a NAT or firewall to the Internet.
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/38156/
- https://github.com/fatedier/frp
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\frpc.exe'
- '\frps.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '\frpc.ini'
selection_hashes:
# v0.44.0
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=7D9C233B8C9E3F0EA290D2B84593C842"
- "SHA1=06DDC9280E1F1810677935A2477012960905942F"
- "SHA256=57B0936B8D336D8E981C169466A15A5FD21A7D5A2C7DAF62D5E142EE860E387C"
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: PUA- IOX Tunneling Tool Execution
id: d7654f02-e04b-4934-9838-65c46f187ebc
status: test
description: Detects the use of IOX - a tool for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes
references:
- https://github.com/EddieIvan01/iox
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-08
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\iox.exe'
selection_commandline:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.exe fwd -l '
- '.exe fwd -r '
- '.exe proxy -l '
- '.exe proxy -r '
selection_hashes:
# v0.4
Hashes|contains:
- "MD5=9DB2D314DD3F704A02051EF5EA210993"
- "SHA1=039130337E28A6623ECF9A0A3DA7D92C5964D8DD"
- "SHA256=C6CF82919B809967D9D90EA73772A8AA1C1EB3BC59252D977500F64F1A0D6731"
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use
level: high
title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
- https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
- https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
logsource:
product: windows
service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
selection:
EventID: 21
Address|contains: '16777216'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
- id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
- https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
- Product: 'SharpChisel'
# See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
- https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
- https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cleanup:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' tunnel '
- 'cleanup '
CommandLine|contains:
- '-config '
- '-connector-id '
selection_tunnel:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' tunnel '
- ' run '
CommandLine|contains:
- '-config '
- '-credentials-contents '
- '-credentials-file '
- '-token '
selection_accountless:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-url'
- 'tunnel'
selection_hashes:
Hashes|contains:
- 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
- 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
- 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
- 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
- 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
- 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
- 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
- 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
- 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
- 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
- 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
- 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
- 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
- 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
- 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
- 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
- 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
- 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
- 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
- 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
- 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
- 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
- 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
- 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
- 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
- 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
- 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
- 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
- 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
- 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
- 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
- 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
- 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
- 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
- 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
- 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
- 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
- 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
filter_main_known_names:
Image|endswith:
- '\cloudflared.exe'
- '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
- '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
- id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
- https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
- https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
- https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
selection_param1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'exe client '
- 'exe server '
selection_param2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-socks5'
- '-reverse'
- ' r:'
- ':127.0.0.1:'
- '-tls-skip-verify '
- ':socks'
condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
- Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high
title: DNS Query Tor .Onion Address - Sysmon
id: b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544
related:
- id: 8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2
type: similar
- id: a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries to an ".onion" address related to Tor routing networks
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-09-12
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith:
- '.hiddenservice.net'
- '.onion.ca'
- '.onion.cab'
- '.onion.casa'
- '.onion.city'
- '.onion.direct'
- '.onion.dog'
- '.onion.glass'
- '.onion.gq'
- '.onion.ink'
- '.onion.it'
- '.onion.link'
- '.onion.lt'
- '.onion.lu'
- '.onion.nu'
- '.onion.pet'
- '.onion.plus'
- '.onion.rip'
- '.onion.sh'
- '.onion.to'
- '.onion.top'
- '.onion'
- '.s1.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s2.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s3.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s4.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s5.tor-gateways.de'
- '.t2w.pw'
- '.tor2web.ae.org'
- '.tor2web.blutmagie.de'
- '.tor2web.com'
- '.tor2web.fi'
- '.tor2web.io'
- '.tor2web.org'
- '.tor2web.xyz'
- '.torlink.co'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Tor Client/Browser Execution
id: 62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c
status: test
description: Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-10-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Description: 'Tor Browser'
- Product: 'Tor Browser'
- Image|endswith:
- '\tor.exe'
- '\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_tor_execution/info.yml
title: Query Tor Onion Address - DNS Client
id: 8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2
related:
- id: b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544
type: similar
- id: a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects DNS resolution of an .onion address related to Tor routing networks
references:
- https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-09-12
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: dns-client
definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 3008
QueryName|endswith:
- '.hiddenservice.net'
- '.onion.ca'
- '.onion.cab'
- '.onion.casa'
- '.onion.city'
- '.onion.direct'
- '.onion.dog'
- '.onion.glass'
- '.onion.gq'
- '.onion.guide'
- '.onion.in.net'
- '.onion.ink'
- '.onion.it'
- '.onion.link'
- '.onion.lt'
- '.onion.lu'
- '.onion.ly'
- '.onion.mn'
- '.onion.network'
- '.onion.nu'
- '.onion.pet'
- '.onion.plus'
- '.onion.pt'
- '.onion.pw'
- '.onion.rip'
- '.onion.sh'
- '.onion.si'
- '.onion.to'
- '.onion.top'
- '.onion.ws'
- '.onion'
- '.s1.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s2.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s3.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s4.tor-gateways.de'
- '.s5.tor-gateways.de'
- '.t2w.pw'
- '.tor2web.ae.org'
- '.tor2web.blutmagie.de'
- '.tor2web.com'
- '.tor2web.fi'
- '.tor2web.io'
- '.tor2web.org'
- '.tor2web.xyz'
- '.torlink.co'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
status: test
description: |
Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users.
An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
references:
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
author: toffeebr33k
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'
filter_main_user_identity:
userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user account administration
level: high
title: Anomalous User Activity
id: 258b6593-215d-4a26-a141-c8e31c1299a6
status: test
description: Indicates that there are anomalous patterns of behavior like suspicious changes to the directory.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-user-activity
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
- attack.persistence
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'anomalousUserActivity'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high
title: Bulk Deletion Changes To Privileged Account Permissions
id: 102e11e3-2db5-4c9e-bc26-357d42585d21
status: test
description: Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role. Bulk changes should be investigated.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- Remove eligible member (permanent)
- Remove eligible member (eligible)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legtimate administrator actions of removing members from a role
level: high
title: ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
id: 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
references:
- https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1059.012
- attack.t1098
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
CommandLine|contains: 'system'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' permission '
- ' set'
- 'Admin'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
level: high
title: Privileged User Has Been Created
id: 0ac15ec3-d24f-4246-aa2a-3077bb1cf90e
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new user to a privileged group such as "root" or "sudo"
references:
- https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2018/cc-2825
- https://linux.die.net/man/8/useradd
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/25acadc0b43a07125a8a5b599b28bbc1a91ffb06/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md#atomic-test-5---create-a-new-user-in-linux-with-root-uid-and-gid
author: Pawel Mazur
date: 2022-12-21
modified: 2025-01-21
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.001
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: linux
definition: '/var/log/secure on REHL systems or /var/log/auth.log on debian like Systems needs to be collected in order for this detection to work'
detection:
# Example of the events that could be observed when matching these would be as follow
# Dec 21 16:42:19 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter1, UID=1000, GID=0, home=/root, shell=/bin/bash
# Dec 21 17:13:54 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=john, UID=0, GID=0, home=/home/john, shell=/bin/bash
# Dec 21 17:24:40 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter3, UID=1000, GID=10, home=/home/butter3, shell=/bin/bash
# Dec 21 17:30:22 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter4, UID=1000, GID=27, home=/home/butter4, shell=/bin/bash
selection_new_user:
- 'new user'
selection_uids_gids:
- 'GID=0,' # root group
- 'UID=0,' # root UID
- 'GID=10,' # wheel group
- 'GID=27,' # sudo group
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity
level: high
title: Cisco Local Accounts
id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
status: test
description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1136.001
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: cisco
service: aaa
detection:
keywords:
- 'username'
- 'aaa'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often
level: high
title: User Added To Highly Privileged Group
id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09 # Privileged groups
related:
- id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e # Remote Desktop groups
type: similar
- id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5 # Admin groups
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects addition of users to highly privileged groups via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_main:
- CommandLine|contains|all:
# net.exe
- 'localgroup '
- ' /add'
- CommandLine|contains|all:
# powershell.exe
- 'Add-LocalGroupMember '
- ' -Group '
selection_group:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Group Policy Creator Owners'
- 'Schema Admins'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative activity that must be investigated
level: high
title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f
status: test
description: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
references:
- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
author: Samir Bousseaden, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Maxence Fossat
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'ntSecurityDescriptor'
AttributeValue|contains:
- '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
- '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
- '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
filter_main_dns_object_class:
ObjectClass:
- 'dnsNode'
- 'dnsZoneScope'
- 'dnsZone'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
level: high
title: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
related:
- id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
type: similar
status: stable
description: |
Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4794
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2020-08-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4794
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Initial installation of a domain controller.
level: high
title: Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
id: 311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd
status: test
description: Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-07-30
modified: 2021-12-02
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy Change'
detection:
selection_base:
EventID: 4704
selection_keywords:
PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Active Directory User Backdoors
id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
references:
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-04-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1098
- attack.persistence
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
selection1:
EventID: 4738
filter_empty:
AllowedToDelegateTo:
- ''
- '-'
filter_null:
AllowedToDelegateTo: null
selection_5136_1:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
selection_5136_2:
EventID: 5136
ObjectClass: 'user'
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'
selection_5136_3:
EventID: 5136
AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: New Connection Initiated To Potential Dead Drop Resolver Domain
id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
related:
- id: d7b09985-95a3-44be-8450-b6eadf49833e
type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable, which is not an internet browser or known application, initiating network connections to legit popular websites, which were seen to be used as dead drop resolvers in previous attacks.
In this context attackers leverage known websites such as "facebook", "youtube", etc. In order to pass through undetected.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220830134315/https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41/
- https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/
- https://blog.bushidotoken.net/2021/04/dead-drop-resolvers-espionage-inspired.html
- https://github.com/kleiton0x00/RedditC2
- https://twitter.com/kleiton0x7e/status/1600567316810551296
- https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kleiton-kurti_github-kleiton0x00redditc2-abusing-reddit-activity-7009939662462984192-5DbI/?originalSubdomain=al
author: Sorina Ionescu, X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-17
modified: 2024-10-21
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1102
- attack.t1102.001
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.t.me'
- '4shared.com'
- 'abuse.ch'
- 'anonfiles.com'
- 'cdn.discordapp.com'
- 'cloudflare.com'
- 'ddns.net'
- 'discord.com'
- 'docs.google.com'
- 'drive.google.com'
- 'dropbox.com'
- 'dropmefiles.com'
- 'facebook.com'
- 'feeds.rapidfeeds.com'
- 'fotolog.com'
- 'ghostbin.co/'
- 'githubusercontent.com'
- 'gofile.io'
- 'hastebin.com'
- 'imgur.com'
- 'livejournal.com'
- 'mediafire.com'
- 'mega.co.nz'
- 'mega.nz'
- 'onedrive.com'
- 'pages.dev'
- 'paste.ee'
- 'pastebin.com'
- 'pastebin.pl'
- 'pastetext.net'
- 'pixeldrain.com'
- 'privatlab.com'
- 'privatlab.net'
- 'reddit.com'
- 'send.exploit.in'
- 'sendspace.com'
- 'steamcommunity.com'
- 'storage.googleapis.com'
- 'technet.microsoft.com'
- 'temp.sh'
- 'transfer.sh'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'twitter.com'
- 'ufile.io'
- 'vimeo.com'
- 'w3spaces.com'
- 'wetransfer.com'
- 'workers.dev'
- 'youtube.com'
# Note: Add/Remove browsers/applications that you don't use or those that have custom install locations
# Note: To avoid complex conditions the filters for some apps are generic by name only. A custom tuning is recommended for best results
filter_main_chrome:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
filter_main_chrome_appdata:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
filter_main_firefox:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
filter_main_firefox_appdata:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe'
filter_main_ie:
Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe'
filter_main_edge_1:
- Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\'
- Image|endswith: '\WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
- Image:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe'
filter_main_edge_2:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
Image|endswith:
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\msedgewebview2.exe'
filter_main_safari:
Image|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Safari\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Safari\'
Image|endswith: '\safari.exe'
filter_main_defender:
Image|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
Image|endswith:
- '\MsMpEng.exe' # Microsoft Defender executable
- '\MsSense.exe' # Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service Executable
filter_main_prtg:
# Paessler's PRTG Network Monitor
Image|endswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\PRTG Network Monitor\PRTG Probe.exe'
filter_main_brave:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\'
Image|endswith: '\brave.exe'
filter_main_maxthon:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Maxthon\'
Image|endswith: '\maxthon.exe'
filter_main_opera:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\'
Image|endswith: '\opera.exe'
filter_main_seamonkey:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\'
Image|endswith: '\seamonkey.exe'
filter_main_vivaldi:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Vivaldi\'
Image|endswith: '\vivaldi.exe'
filter_main_whale:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Naver\Naver Whale\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Naver\Naver Whale\'
Image|endswith: '\whale.exe'
# Note: The TOR browser shouldn't be something you allow in your corporate network.
# filter_main_tor:
# Image|contains: '\Tor Browser\'
filter_main_whaterfox:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Waterfox\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Waterfox\'
Image|endswith: '\Waterfox.exe'
filter_main_midori:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Programs\midori-ng\'
Image|endswith: '\Midori Next Generation.exe'
filter_main_slimbrowser:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\SlimBrowser\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\SlimBrowser\'
Image|endswith: '\slimbrowser.exe'
filter_main_flock:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Flock\'
Image|endswith: '\Flock.exe'
filter_main_phoebe:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Phoebe\'
Image|endswith: '\Phoebe.exe'
filter_main_falkon:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\Falkon\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Falkon\'
Image|endswith: '\falkon.exe'
filter_main_qtweb:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\QtWeb\'
- 'C:\Program Files\QtWeb\'
Image|endswith: '\QtWeb.exe'
filter_main_avant:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Avant Browser\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Avant Browser\'
Image|endswith: '\avant.exe'
filter_main_whatsapp:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\'
- 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\'
Image|endswith: '\WhatsApp.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith: 'facebook.com'
filter_main_telegram:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\Telegram Desktop\'
Image|endswith: '\Telegram.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith: '.t.me'
filter_main_onedrive:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
Image|endswith: '\OneDrive.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith: 'onedrive.com'
filter_main_dropbox:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\'
Image|endswith:
- '\Dropbox.exe'
- '\DropboxInstaller.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith: 'dropbox.com'
filter_main_mega:
Image|endswith:
# Note: This is a basic/best effort filter in order to avoid FP with the MEGA installer and executable.
# In practice please apply exact path to avoid basic path bypass techniques.
- '\MEGAsync.exe'
- '\MEGAsyncSetup32_*RC.exe' # Beta versions
- '\MEGAsyncSetup32.exe' # Installers 32bit
- '\MEGAsyncSetup64.exe' # Installers 64bit
- '\MEGAupdater.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- 'mega.co.nz'
- 'mega.nz'
filter_main_googledrive:
Image|contains:
- 'C:\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Drive File Stream\'
Image|endswith: 'GoogleDriveFS.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith: 'drive.google.com'
filter_main_discord:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Discord\'
Image|endswith: '\Discord.exe'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- 'discord.com'
- 'cdn.discordapp.com'
filter_main_null:
Image: null
filter_main_empty:
Image: ''
# filter_optional_qlik:
# Image|endswith: '\Engine.exe' # Process from qlik.com app
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- One might need to exclude other internet browsers found in it's network or other applications like ones mentioned above from Microsoft Defender.
- Ninite contacting githubusercontent.com
level: high
title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain
id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
related:
- id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
- https://ngrok.com/
- https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/
- https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-16
modified: 2025-07-30
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.ngrok-free.app'
- '.ngrok-free.dev'
- '.ngrok.app'
- '.ngrok.dev'
- '.ngrok.io'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
# Note: The level of this rule is related to your internal policy.
level: high
title: Suspicious Child Process Of Manage Engine ServiceDesk
id: cea2b7ea-792b-405f-95a1-b903ea06458f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the "Manage Engine ServiceDesk Plus" Java web service
references:
- https://www.horizon3.ai/manageengine-cve-2022-47966-technical-deep-dive/
- https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2022-47966/blob/3a51c6b72ebbd87392babd955a8fbeaee2090b35/CVE-2022-47966.py
- https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/saml-show-stopper/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-18
modified: 2023-08-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains|all:
- '\ManageEngine\ServiceDesk\'
- '\java.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\AppVLP.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\calc.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\mftrace.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
- '\notepad.exe' # Often used in POCs
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\query.exe'
- '\reg.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scrcons.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\systeminfo.exe'
- '\whoami.exe' # Often used in POCs
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# - '\hh.exe'
# - '\regsvr32.exe'
# - '\rundll32.exe'
# - '\scriptrunner.exe'
filter_main_net:
Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
CommandLine|contains: ' stop'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate sub processes started by Manage Engine ServiceDesk Pro
level: high
title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
- id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
- https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'AddSecurityPackage'
- 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
- 'Advapi32'
- 'CloseHandle'
- 'CreateProcessWithToken'
- 'CreatePseudoConsole'
- 'CreateRemoteThread'
- 'CreateThread'
- 'CreateUserThread'
- 'DangerousGetHandle'
- 'DuplicateTokenEx'
- 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
- 'FreeHGlobal'
- 'FreeLibrary'
- 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
- 'GetLogonSessionData'
- 'GetModuleHandle'
- 'GetProcAddress'
- 'GetProcessHandle'
- 'GetTokenInformation'
- 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
- 'kernel32'
- 'LoadLibrary'
- 'memcpy'
- 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
# - 'msvcrt'
- 'ntdll'
- 'OpenDesktop'
- 'OpenProcess'
- 'OpenProcessToken'
- 'OpenThreadToken'
- 'OpenWindowStation'
- 'PtrToString'
- 'QueueUserApc'
- 'ReadProcessMemory'
- 'RevertToSelf'
- 'RtlCreateUserThread'
- 'secur32'
- 'SetThreadToken'
# - 'user32'
- 'VirtualAlloc'
- 'VirtualFree'
- 'VirtualProtect'
- 'WaitForSingleObject'
- 'WriteInt32'
- 'WriteProcessMemory'
- 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FreeHGlobal'
- 'PtrToString'
- 'kernel32'
- 'CloseHandle'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high
title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
- https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
- https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
selection_susp:
# Suspicious parents
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# Suspicious folders
CommandLine|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\'
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
filter_img:
# Filter legit Locations
- Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
# Suspicious extensions
- CommandLine|contains:
- '.htm'
- '.hta'
# Filter simple execution
- CommandLine|endswith:
- 'mshta.exe'
- 'mshta'
condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
- https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
- https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
GrantedAccess:
- '0x1028'
- '0x1fffff'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
- https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
# Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
CallTrace|endswith: ')'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: File Explorer Folder Opened Using Explorer Folder Shortcut Via Shell
id: c3d76afc-93df-461e-8e67-9b2bad3f2ac4
status: test
description: |
Detects the initial execution of "cmd.exe" which spawns "explorer.exe" with the appropriate command line arguments for opening the "My Computer" folder.
author: '@Kostastsale'
references:
- https://ss64.com/nt/shell.html
date: 2022-12-22
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1135
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'shell:mycomputerfolder'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_explorer_folder_shortcut_via_shell_binary/info.yml
title: Potential Base64 Decoded From Images
id: 09a910bf-f71f-4737-9c40-88880ba5913d
status: test
description: |
Detects the use of tail to extract bytes at an offset from an image and then decode the base64 value to create a new file with the decoded content. The detected execution is a bash one-liner.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/16bafdf741e7a13137c489f3c8db1334f171c7cb13b62617d691b0a64783cc48/behavior
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/483fafc64a2b84197e1ef6a3f51e443f84dc5742602e08b9e8ec6ad690b34ed0/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
# Example: /bin/bash sh -c tail -c +21453 '/Volumes/Installer/Installer.app/Contents/Resources/workout-logo.jpeg' | base64 --decode > /tmp/54A0A2CD-FAD1-4D4D-AAF5-5266F6344ABE.zip
# VT Query: 'behavior_processes:"tail" (behavior_processes:"jpeg" or behavior_processes:"jpg" or behavior_processes:"png" or behavior_processes:"gif") behavior_processes:"base64" behavior_processes:"--decode >" and tag:dmg'
selection_image:
Image|endswith: '/bash'
selection_view:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'tail'
- '-c'
selection_b64:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'base64'
- '-d' # Also covers "--decode"
- '>'
selection_files:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.avif'
- '.gif'
- '.jfif'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpg'
- '.pjp'
- '.pjpeg'
- '.png'
- '.svg'
- '.webp'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Inbox Manipulation Rules
id: ceb55fd0-726e-4656-bf4e-b585b7f7d572
status: test
description: Detects suspicious rules that delete or move messages or folders are set on a user's inbox.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-inbox-manipulation-rules
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1140
logsource:
product: azure
service: riskdetection
detection:
selection:
riskEventType: 'mcasSuspiciousInboxManipulationRules'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Actual mailbox rules that are moving items based on their workflow.
level: high
title: Antivirus Hacktool Detection
id: fa0c05b6-8ad3-468d-8231-c1cbccb64fba
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports a hack tool or other attack tool.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2021/08/16/antivirus-event-analysis-cheat-sheet-v1-8-2/
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2021-08-16
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|startswith:
- 'ATK/' # Sophos
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'HKTL'
- 'HTOOL'
- 'PWS.'
- 'PWSX'
- 'SecurityTool'
# - 'FRP.'
- Signature|contains:
- 'Adfind'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'Cobalt'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'FastReverseProxy'
- 'Hacktool'
- 'Havoc'
- 'Impacket'
- 'Keylogger'
- 'Koadic'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'Nighthawk'
- 'PentestPowerShell'
- 'Potato'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'PowerSSH'
- 'PshlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Rusthound'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'SecurityTool'
- 'SharpDump'
- 'SharpHound'
- 'Shellcode'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Snaffler'
- 'SOAPHound'
- 'Splinter'
- 'Swrort'
- 'TurtleLoader'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder
id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity.
references:
- https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032 # Private Report
- https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70 # Private Report
- https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/
author: 'The DFIR Report'
date: 2025-01-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.js'
- '.ps1'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml
title: Symlink Etc Passwd
id: c67fc22a-0be5-4b4f-aad5-2b32c4b69523
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command lines that look as if they would create symbolic links to /etc/passwd
references:
- https://www.qualys.com/2021/05/04/21nails/21nails.txt
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-04-05
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: linux
detection:
keywords:
- 'ln -s -f /etc/passwd'
- 'ln -s /etc/passwd'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious ClickFix/FileFix Execution Pattern
id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
related:
- id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands via clipboard manipulation, either through the Windows Run dialog (ClickFix) or File Explorer address bar (FileFix).
Attackers leverage social engineering campaigns—such as fake CAPTCHA challenges or urgent alerts—encouraging victims to paste clipboard contents, often executing mshta.exe, powershell.exe, or similar commands to infect systems.
references:
- https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
- https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
- https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ # filefix variant
author: montysecurity, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
- attack.t1204.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '#'
selection_cli_captcha:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'account'
- 'anti-bot'
- 'botcheck'
- 'captcha'
- 'challenge'
- 'confirmation'
- 'fraud'
- 'human'
- 'identification'
- 'identificator'
- 'identity'
- 'robot'
- 'validation'
- 'verification'
- 'verify'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Potential ClickFix Execution Pattern - Registry
id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb
related:
- id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTTP/HTTPS links.
ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages.
Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content,
such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts.
references:
- https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware
- https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2
- https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution
- https://medium.com/@boutnaru/the-windows-foreniscs-journey-run-mru-run-dialog-box-most-recently-used-57375a02d724
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/preventing-clickfix-attack-vector/
- https://medium.com/@poudelswachchhanda123/preventing-lnk-and-fakecaptcha-threats-a-system-hardening-approach-2f7b7ed2e493
- https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-03-25
modified: 2025-11-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_registry:
TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\'
selection_details:
Details|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
selection_susp_pattern:
- Details|contains:
# Add more suspicious keywords
- 'account'
- 'anti-bot'
- 'botcheck'
- 'captcha'
- 'challenge'
- 'confirmation'
- 'fraud'
- 'human'
- 'identification'
- 'identificator'
- 'identity'
- 'robot'
- 'validation'
- 'verification'
- 'verify'
- Details|contains:
- '%comspec%'
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'certutil'
- 'cmd'
- 'cscript'
- 'curl'
- 'finger'
- 'mshta'
- 'powershell'
- 'pwsh'
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'schtasks'
- 'wget'
- 'wscript'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate applications using RunMRU with HTTP links
level: high
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS
id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/
- https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-01-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.t1137.002
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: macos
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|contains:
- 'Microsoft Word'
- 'Microsoft Excel'
- 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
- 'Microsoft OneNote'
Image|endswith:
- '/bash'
- '/curl'
- '/dash'
- '/fish'
- '/osacompile'
- '/osascript'
- '/sh'
- '/zsh'
- '/python'
- '/python3'
- '/wget'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
id: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of files with an executable or script extension by an Office application.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng (Rule), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
# Note: Please add more file extensions to the logic of your choice.
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
- '\msaccess.exe'
- '\mspub.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\visio.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
selection2:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.com'
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
- '.hta'
- '.ocx'
- '.proj'
- '.ps1'
- '.scf'
- '.scr'
- '.sys'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
- '.wsh'
filter_main_localassembly:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\assembly\tmp\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
filter_optional_webservicecache: # matches e.g. directory with name *.microsoft.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\WebServiceCache\AllUsers'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
filter_optional_webex:
Image|endswith: '\winword.exe'
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\webexdelta\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.dll'
- '.exe'
filter_optional_backstageinappnavcache: # matches e.g. C:\Users\xxxxx\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\BackstageInAppNavCache\ODB-user@domain.com
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\'
- '\BackstageInAppNavCache\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.com'
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence
id: 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e
related:
- id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors.
These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers.
This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
references:
- https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5ede8f21e42ebe37e0a6eff757dba60bcfa85859/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-10
modified: 2025-10-12
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
TargetFilename|endswith:
# Add or remove suspicious extensions according to your env needs
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.dll'
- '.hta'
- '.jar'
- '.js'
- '.jse'
- '.msi'
- '.ps1'
- '.psd1'
- '.psm1'
- '.scr'
- '.url'
- '.vba'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.wsf'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare legitimate usage of some of the extensions mentioned in the rule
level: high
title: Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process
id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
related:
- id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
type: similar
- id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
type: similar
- id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
- https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
- https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
selection_children_1:
# TODO: Add more LOLBINs or suspicious processes that make sens in your environment
Image|endswith:
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\verclsid.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_children_2:
# This is in a separate selection due to the nature of FP generated with CMD
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cscript'
- 'mshta'
- 'powershell'
- 'pwsh'
- 'regsvr32'
- 'rundll32'
- 'wscript'
filter_main_werfault:
Image|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
filter_main_wmiprvse:
Image|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe' # In some legitimate case WmiPrvSE was seen spawning itself
filter_main_msiexec:
Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/i '
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
related:
- id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775 # Speicifc OneNote rule due to its recent usage in phishing attacks
type: derived
- id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
type: derived
- id: 23daeb52-e6eb-493c-8607-c4f0246cb7d8
type: obsolete
- id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
type: obsolete
- id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
references:
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
- https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
- https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/300af51b88ad5d5b27ce4f5f54e4d6e6a3a2c06d/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
- https://twitter.com/andythevariable/status/1576953781581144064?s=20&t=QiJILvK4ZiBdR8RJe24u-A
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
- https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
- https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-04-24
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1218.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
- '\EXCEL.EXE'
- '\MSACCESS.EXE'
- '\MSPUB.exe'
- '\ONENOTE.EXE'
- '\POWERPNT.exe'
- '\VISIO.exe'
- '\WINWORD.EXE'
- '\wordpad.exe'
- '\wordview.exe'
selection_child_processes:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'bitsadmin.exe'
- 'CertOC.exe'
- 'CertUtil.exe'
- 'Cmd.Exe'
- 'CMSTP.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'curl.exe'
- 'HH.exe'
- 'IEExec.exe'
- 'InstallUtil.exe'
- 'javaw.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- 'msdt.exe'
- 'MSHTA.EXE'
- 'msiexec.exe'
- 'Msxsl.exe'
- 'odbcconf.exe'
- 'pcalua.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'RegAsm.exe'
- 'RegSvcs.exe'
- 'REGSVR32.exe'
- 'RUNDLL32.exe'
- 'schtasks.exe'
- 'ScriptRunner.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'WorkFolders.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\AppVLP.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\certoc.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cmstp.exe'
- '\control.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\ieexec.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
- '\mftrace.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\msdt.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msidb.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\msxsl.exe'
- '\odbcconf.exe'
- '\pcalua.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regasm.exe'
- '\regsvcs.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scrcons.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\verclsid.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\workfolders.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_child_susp_paths: # Idea: Laiali Kazalbach, Mohamed Elsayed (#4142)
Image|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Windows\Tasks\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high