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Sigma

Sigma rules for Pearl Sleet

500 rules · scoped to actor · back to Pearl Sleet
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.

Detection rules

50 of 500
related high
Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
status test author Jason Lynch id aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Binary In User Directory Spawned From Office Application
id: aa3a6f94-890e-4e22-b634-ffdfd54792cc
status: test
description: Detects an executable in the users directory started from one of the Microsoft Office suite applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio)
references:
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/fin7-not-finished-morphisec-spots-new-campaign
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/23160972c6ae07f740800fa28e421a81d7c0ca5d5cab95bc082b4a986fbac57
author: Jason Lynch
date: 2019-04-02
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.g0046
    - car.2013-05-002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\EQNEDT32.exe'
            # - '\OUTLOOK.EXE' too many FPs
        Image|startswith: 'C:\users\'
        Image|endswith: '.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Outlook Child Process
Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
status test author Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team id 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process
id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Office Child Processes
      type: derived
    - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 # Outlook Remote Child Process
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2022-02-28
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\AppVLP.exe'
            - '\bash.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\forfiles.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\mftrace.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'        # https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
            - '\msdt.exe'           # CVE-2022-30190
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\scrcons.exe'
            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
            - '\sh.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'        # https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
            - '\wmic.exe'           # https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
            - '\wscript.exe'
            # Several FPs with rundll32.exe
            # We started excluding specific use cases and ended up commenting out the rundll32.exe sub processes completely
            # - '\rundll32.exe'
            # filter_outlook_photoviewer:  # https://twitter.com/Luke_Hamp/status/1495919717760237568
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains: '\PhotoViewer.dll'
            # filter_outlook_printattachments:  # https://twitter.com/KickaKamil/status/1496238278659485696
            #   ParentImage|endswith: '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            #   Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
            #   CommandLine|contains|all:
            #     - 'shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL'
            #     - '\SYSTEM32\SPOOL\DRIVERS\'
    condition: selection # and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D). Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary. The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks. This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters
id: dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D).
    Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary.
    The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks.
    This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.
references:
    - https://syedhasan010.medium.com/forensics-analysis-of-an-lnk-file-da68a98b8415
    - https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/unpatched-windows-zero-day-flaw.html
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/windows-shortcut-zero-day-exploit.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-03-19
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
        - ParentCommandLine|contains: '.lnk'
    selection_cmd:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '                 '  # Padding of SPACE (0x20)
            # - '	'  # Horizontal Tab (0x9)
              - '\u0009'
              - '\u000A' # Line Feed
              - '\u0011'
              - '\u0012'
              - '\u0013'
              - '\u000B' # Vertical Tab
              - '\u000C'  # \x0C
              - '\u000D'  # \x0D
        - CommandLine|re: '\n\n\n\n\n\n' # In some cases \u000[ABCD] are represented as a newline in the eventlog
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
status test author Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng id e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
      type: derived
    - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0
      type: obsolete
    - id: c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5
      type: obsolete
    - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    selection_wmic_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbem\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_wmic_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process'
            - 'create'
            - 'call'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBINs as you see fit
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'msiexec'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'verclsid'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
MMC Executing Files with Reversed Extensions Using RTLO Abuse
Detects malicious behavior where the MMC utility (`mmc.exe`) executes files with reversed extensions caused by Right-to-Left Override (RLO) abuse, disguising them as document formats.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 9cfe4b27-1e56-48b4-b7a8-d46851c91a44 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: MMC Executing Files with Reversed Extensions Using RTLO Abuse
id: 9cfe4b27-1e56-48b4-b7a8-d46851c91a44
status: experimental
description: Detects malicious behavior where the MMC utility (`mmc.exe`) executes files with reversed extensions caused by Right-to-Left Override (RLO) abuse, disguising them as document formats.
references:
    - https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-to-left_override
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.014
    - attack.t1036.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        - Image|endswith: '\mmc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MMC.exe'
    selection_commandline:
        CommandLine|contains: # While looking at these files the prefix of their name will look something like csm.pdf, but in reality it is msc file
            - 'cod.msc'  # Reversed `.doc`
            - 'fdp.msc'  # Reversed `.pdf`
            - 'ftr.msc'  # Reversed `.rtf`
            - 'lmth.msc'  # Reversed `.html`
            - 'slx.msc'  # Reversed `.xls`
            - 'tdo.msc'  # Reversed `.odt`
            - 'xcod.msc'  # Reversed `.docx`
            - 'xslx.msc'  # Reversed `.xlsx`
            - 'xtpp.msc'  # Reversed `.pptx`
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions using MMC to execute misnamed `.msc` files.
    - Unconventional but non-malicious usage of RLO or reversed extensions.
level: high
related high
HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.
status test author Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) id 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection
id: 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac
status: test
description: Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.
references:
    - https://github.com/connormcgarr/LittleCorporal
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1055.003
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        SourceImage|endswith: '\winword.exe'
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.'
            - 'UNKNOWN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
status test author Antonlovesdnb id e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
status: test
description: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
references:
    - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\VBE7.DLL'
            - '\VBEUI.DLL'
            - '\VBE7INTL.DLL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high
related high
GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
status test author Antonlovesdnb id 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac
status: test
description: Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
    - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\mspub.exe'
            - '\onenote.exe'
            - '\onenoteim.exe' # Just in case
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high
related high
OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
status test author Security Onion Solutions id 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenCanary - GIT Clone Request
id: 4fe17521-aef3-4e6a-9d6b-4a7c8de155a8
status: test
description: Detects instances where a GIT service on an OpenCanary node has had Git Clone request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 16001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
status test author frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse
id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25
related:
    - id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 # ProcCreation
      type: similar
    - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 # PS Module
      type: similar
    - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 # PS ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of  the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: powershell-classic
    definition: fields have to be extract from event
detection:
    selection:
        Data|contains: 'ModuleContents=function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter {'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse - PowerShell Module
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 id 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse - PowerShell Module
id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4
related:
    - id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 # ProcCreation
      type: similar
    - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 # PS Classic
      type: similar
    - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 # PS ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        Payload|contains: 'ModuleContents=function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter {'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse - PowerShell ScriptBlock
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.EXE Abuse - PowerShell ScriptBlock
id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5
related:
    - id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 # ProcCreation
      type: similar
    - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 # PS Classic
      type: similar
    - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 # PS Module
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|startswith: 'function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter {'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Network Connection Initiated By AddinUtil.EXE
Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe". This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn't usually initiate network activity.
status test author Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri) id 5205613d-2a63-4412-a895-3a2458b587b3 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Network Connection Initiated By AddinUtil.EXE
id: 5205613d-2a63-4412-a895-3a2458b587b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe".
    This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn't usually initiate network activity.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
modified: 2024-07-16
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Legitimate Application Dropped Script
Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Legitimate Application Dropped Script
id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.scf'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk
status test author frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Legitimate Application Dropped Executable
id: f0540f7e-2db3-4432-b9e0-3965486744bc
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write executables to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.ocx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious DotNET CLR Usage Log Artifact
Detects the creation of Usage Log files by the CLR (clr.dll). These files are named after the executing process once the assembly is finished executing for the first time in the (user) session context.
status test author frack113, omkar72, oscd.community, Wojciech Lesicki id e0b06658-7d1d-4cd3-bf15-03467507ff7c license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious DotNET CLR Usage Log Artifact
id: e0b06658-7d1d-4cd3-bf15-03467507ff7c
related:
    - id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
      type: derived
    - id: e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the creation of Usage Log files by the CLR (clr.dll). These files are named after the executing process once the assembly is finished executing for the first time in the (user) session context.
references:
    - https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
    - https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular/blob/fa1ae53132403d262be2bbd7f17ceea7e15e8c78/11_file_create/include_dotnet.xml
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20221026202428/https://gist.github.com/code-scrap/d7f152ffcdb3e0b02f7f394f5187f008
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
author: frack113, omkar72, oscd.community, Wojciech Lesicki
date: 2022-11-18
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: UsageLogs folder must be monitored by the sysmon configuration'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\UsageLogs\cmstp.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\cscript.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\mshta.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\msxsl.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\regsvr32.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\rundll32.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\svchost.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\wscript.exe.log'
            - '\UsageLogs\wmic.exe.log'
    filter_main_rundll32:
        # This filter requires the event to be enriched by additional information such as ParentImage and CommandLine activity
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MsiExec.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: ' -Embedding'
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Temp'
            - 'zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675
level: high
related high
Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution. Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
related:
    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\replace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\ftp.exe'
            - '\Ldifde.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
    selection_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml
related high
Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
status test author frack113, Florian Roth id 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth
date: 2022-08-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables
            - \winword.exe
            - \excel.exe
            - \powerpnt.exe
            - \msaccess.exe
            - \mspub.exe
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \visio.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - \finger.exe
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - \notepad.exe
            - \AcroRd32.exe
            - \RdrCEF.exe
            - \mshta.exe
            - \hh.exe
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.diagcab'
            - '.appx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process
Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes. Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking.
status experimental author andrewdanis id 78f10490-f2f4-4d19-a75b-4e0683bf3b8d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process
id: 78f10490-f2f4-4d19-a75b-4e0683bf3b8d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes.
    Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/SpeechRuntimeMove
author: andrewdanis
date: 2025-10-23
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.t1218
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\SpeechRuntime.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely.
level: high
related high
Execution via WorkFolders.exe
Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe
status test author Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut) id 0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Execution via WorkFolders.exe
id: 0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173
status: test
description: Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/elliotkillick/status/1449812843772227588
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\control.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WorkFolders.exe'
    filter:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\control.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the uncommon Windows Work Folders feature.
level: high
related high
Execute Pcwrun.EXE To Leverage Follina
Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant "pcwrun.exe" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6004abd0-afa4-4557-ba90-49d172e0a299 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Execute Pcwrun.EXE To Leverage Follina
id: 6004abd0-afa4-4557-ba90-49d172e0a299
status: test
description: Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant "pcwrun.exe" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535663791362519040
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '../'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
status test author Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative id 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage
id: 0b4ae027-2a2d-4b93-8c7e-962caaba5b2a
related:
    - id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\tttracer.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high
related high
Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious Provlaunch.EXE Child Process
id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "provlaunch.exe" which might indicate potential abuse to proxy execution.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\provlaunch.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\notepad.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - Image|contains:
              - ':\PerfLogs\'
              - ':\Temp\'
              - ':\Users\Public\'
              - '\AppData\Temp\'
              - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Tasks\'
              - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Renamed MegaSync Execution
Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe as seen used by ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.
status test author Sittikorn S id 643bdcac-8b82-49f4-9fd9-25a90b929f3b license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Renamed MegaSync Execution
id: 643bdcac-8b82-49f4-9fd9-25a90b929f3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed MegaSync.exe as seen used by ransomware families like Nefilim, Sodinokibi, Pysa, and Conti.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-22
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'megasync.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\megasync.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Software that illegally integrates MegaSync in a renamed form
    - Administrators that have renamed MegaSync
level: high
related high
Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE
Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE. Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution. It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.
status test author @gott_cyber, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 835e75bf-4bfd-47a4-b8a6-b766cac8bcb7 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Uncommon Child Process Of Setres.EXE
id: 835e75bf-4bfd-47a4-b8a6-b766cac8bcb7
status: test
description: |
    Detects uncommon child process of Setres.EXE.
    Setres.EXE is a Windows server only process and tool that can be used to set the screen resolution.
    It can potentially be abused in order to launch any arbitrary file with a name containing the word "choice" from the current execution path.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Setres/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1583356502340870144
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setres.exe-0E30E4C09637D7A128A37B59A3BC4D09.html
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11)
author: '@gott_cyber, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)'
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1202
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\setres.exe'
        Image|contains: '\choice'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        Image|endswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\choice.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\choice.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri) id 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious AddinUtil.EXE CommandLine Execution
id: 631b22a4-70f4-4e2f-9ea8-42f84d9df6d8
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the Add-In deployment cache updating utility (AddInutil.exe) with suspicious Addinroot or Pipelineroot paths. An adversary may execute AddinUtil.exe with uncommon Addinroot/Pipelineroot paths that point to the adversaries Addins.Store payload.
references:
    - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri)
date: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\addinutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AddInUtil.exe'
    selection_susp_1_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:'
            - '-PipelineRoot:'
    selection_susp_1_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-AddInRoot:.'
            - '-AddInRoot:"."'
            - '-PipelineRoot:.'
            - '-PipelineRoot:"."'
        CurrentDirectory|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: selection_img and (all of selection_susp_1_* or selection_susp_2)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Execution via stordiag.exe
Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe
status test author Austin Songer (@austinsonger) id 961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Execution via stordiag.exe
id: 961e0abb-1b1e-4c84-a453-aafe56ad0d34
status: test
description: Detects the use of stordiag.exe to execute schtasks.exe systeminfo.exe and fltmc.exe
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/stordiag.exe-1F08FC87C373673944F6A7E8B18CD845.html
    - https://twitter.com/eral4m/status/1451112385041911809
author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger)
date: 2021-10-21
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\stordiag.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\fltmc.exe'
    filter:
        ParentImage|startswith: # as first is "Copy c:\windows\system32\stordiag.exe to a folder"
            - 'c:\windows\system32\'
            - 'c:\windows\syswow64\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of stordiag.exe.
level: high
related high
Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost
Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potentially Suspicious Child Processes Spawned by ConHost
id: dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407
related:
    - id: 7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious child processes related to Windows Shell utilities spawned by `conhost.exe`, which could indicate malicious activity using trusted system components.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1202
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
    selection_child:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'             # Windows Command Prompt
              - '\cscript.exe'         # Windows Script Host (used for scripting exploits)
              - '\mshta.exe'           # MSHTA (HTML Application Host, often abused)
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'  # PowerShell ISE
              - '\powershell.exe'      # Windows PowerShell
              - '\pwsh.exe'            # PowerShell Core
              - '\regsvr32.exe'        # Windows Registry Server (commonly used for exploits)
              - '\wscript.exe'         # Windows Script Host (for executing scripts)
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'cmd.exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tasks using `conhost.exe` to spawn child processes such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `regsvr32.exe`.
level: high
related high
Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards id c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious AgentExecutor PowerShell Execution
id: c0b40568-b1e9-4b03-8d6c-b096da6da9ab
related:
    - id: 7efd2c8d-8b18-45b7-947d-adfe9ed04f61
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the AgentExecutor.exe binary. Which can be abused as a LOLBIN to execute powershell scripts with the ExecutionPolicy "Bypass" or any binary named "powershell.exe" located in the path provided by 6th positional argument
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), memory-shards
references:
    - https://twitter.com/lefterispan/status/1286259016436514816
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Agentexecutor/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
    - https://twitter.com/jseerden/status/1247985304667066373/photo/1
date: 2022-12-24
modified: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\AgentExecutor.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AgentExecutor.exe'
    selection_cli:
        # Example:
        #   AgentExecutor.exe -powershell [scriptPath] [outputFilePath] [errorFilePath] [timeoutFilePath] [timeoutSeconds] [powershellPath] [enforceSignatureCheck] [runAs32BitOn64]
        # Note:
        #   - If [timeoutSeconds] is NULL then it defaults to 60000
        #   - If [enforceSignatureCheck] is:
        #       - "NULL" or "1" then a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy allsigned -file "
        #       - Else a PowerShell instance is spawned with the args: "-NoProfile -executionPolicy bypass -file "
        #   - [powershellPath] is always concatendated to "powershell.exe"
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -powershell' # Also covers the "-powershellDetection" flag
            - ' -remediationScript'
    filter_main_pwsh:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
    filter_main_intune:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Microsoft.Management.Services.IntuneWindowsAgent.exe'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Winrs Local Command Execution
Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement.
status experimental author Liran Ravich, Nasreddine Bencherchali id bcfece3d-56fe-4545-9931-3b8e92927db1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Winrs Local Command Execution
id: bcfece3d-56fe-4545-9931-3b8e92927db1
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally.
    Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement.
references:
    - https://cardinalops.com/blog/living-off-winrm-abusing-complexity-in-remote-management/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs
author: Liran Ravich, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2025-10-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.006
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        # Note: Example of command to simulate (winrm needs to be enabled): "c:\Windows\System32\winrs.exe" calc.exe
        - Image|endswith: '\winrs.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'winrs.exe'
    selection_local_ip:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - '/r:localhost'
            - '/r:127.0.0.1'
            - '/r:[::1]'
            - '/remote:localhost'
            - '/remote:127.0.0.1'
            - '/remote:[::1]'
    filter_main_remote:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - "/r:"
            - "/remote:"
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not 1 of filter_main_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
related high
Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline. The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository. Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Suspicious Mofcomp Execution
id: 1dd05363-104e-4b4a-b963-196a534b03a1
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "mofcomp" utility as a child of a suspicious shell or script running utility or by having a suspicious path in the commandline.
    The "mofcomp" utility parses a file containing MOF statements and adds the classes and class instances defined in the file to the WMI repository.
    Attackers abuse this utility to install malicious MOF scripts
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/
    - https://github.com/The-DFIR-Report/Sigma-Rules/blob/75260568a7ffe61b2458ca05f6f25914efb44337/win_mofcomp_execution.yml
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/mofcomp
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-12
modified: 2023-04-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mofcomp.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'mofcomp.exe'
    selection_case:
        - ParentImage|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\wsl.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
              - '\Users\Public\'
              - '\WINDOWS\Temp\'
              - '%temp%'
              - '%tmp%'
              - '%appdata%'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
        CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
    filter_optional_null_parent:
        # Sometimes the parent information isn't available from the Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing provider.
        CommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows\TEMP\'
        CommandLine|endswith: '.mof'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
status test author Matthew Matchen id 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
status test author Ayush Anand (Securityinbits) id 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE
id: 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d
status: test
description: |
    Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/credential-theft-expanding-your-reach-pt-2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/
author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits)
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1003.003
    - attack.t1003.002
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\print.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Print.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/D'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\config\SAM'
            - '\config\SECURITY'
            - '\config\SYSTEM'
            - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_print_dump_sensitive_files/info.yml
related high
Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution
Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution
id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 # Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses
Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.
status test author frack113 id a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses
id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5
related:
    - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 # PS Classic
      type: similar
    - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 # PS Module
      type: similar
    - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 # PS ScriptBlock
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1
author: frack113
date: 2021-07-13
modified: 2023-05-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand'
            - 'Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisableme'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations. This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
status test author Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location
id: b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71
status: test
description: |
    Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations.
    This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress
    - https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-05
modified: 2024-06-04
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    # VT Query: behavior_processes:"iexpress.exe" and behavior_processes:"/n /q /m" and behavior_processes:"*.sed*" and p:5+
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\iexpress.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEXPRESS.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /n '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more uncommon paths that fit your organizational needs.
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe
level: high
related high
Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE
Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Arbitrary File Download Via IMEWDBLD.EXE
id: 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af
related:
    - id: 8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of "IMEWDBLD.exe" to download arbitrary files
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IMEWDBLD.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'imewdbld.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: Please reduce this to medium if you find legitimate use case of this utility with a URL
level: high
related high
MSDT Execution Via Answer File
Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: MSDT Execution Via Answer File
id: 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab).
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-13
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml'
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af '
    filter_main_pcwrun:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\pcwrun.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Possible undocumented parents of "msdt" other than "pcwrun".
level: high
related high
Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes. Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
status experimental author andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
    - id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 # BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
    Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: andrewdanis, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\baaupdate.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Suspicious DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE
id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793
related:
    - id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to load the target DLL file.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-15
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL '
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Appdata\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Tasks\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea) id cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6
status: test
description: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/
    - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\devtoolslauncher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'LaunchForDeploy'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user
level: high
related high
MpiExec Lolbin
Detects a certain command line flag combination used by mpiexec.exe LOLBIN from HPC pack that can be used to execute any other binary
status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 729ce0ea-5d8f-4769-9762-e35de441586d license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: MpiExec Lolbin
id: 729ce0ea-5d8f-4769-9762-e35de441586d
status: test
description: Detects a certain command line flag combination used by mpiexec.exe LOLBIN from HPC pack that can be used to execute any other binary
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1465058133303246867
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/high-performance-computing/mpiexec?view=hpc19-ps
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-11
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        - Image|endswith: '\mpiexec.exe'
        - Hashes|contains: 'IMPHASH=d8b52ef6aaa3a81501bdfff9dbb96217'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /n 1 '
            - ' -n 1 '
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential NTLM Coercion Via Certutil.EXE
id: 6c6d9280-e6d0-4b9d-80ac-254701b64916
status: test
description: Detects possible NTLM coercion via certutil using the 'syncwithWU' flag
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/issues/243
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-01
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -syncwithWU '
            - ' \\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_ntlm_coercion/info.yml
related high
OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
status test author Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea) id cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: OpenWith.exe Executes Specified Binary
id: cec8e918-30f7-4e2d-9bfa-a59cc97ae60f
status: test
description: The OpenWith.exe executes other binary
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OSBinaries/Openwith.yml
    - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/991670870384021504
author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @harr0ey (idea)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\OpenWith.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team id af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Proxy Execution Via Wuauclt.EXE
id: af77cf95-c469-471c-b6a0-946c685c4798
related:
    - id: ba1bb0cb-73da-42de-ad3a-de10c643a5d0
      type: obsolete
    - id: d7825193-b70a-48a4-b992-8b5b3015cc11
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the use of the Windows Update Client binary (wuauclt.exe) for proxy execution.
references:
    - https://dtm.uk/wuauclt/
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Sreeman, FPT.EagleEye Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-11-11
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wuauclt.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wuauclt.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'UpdateDeploymentProvider'
            - 'RunHandlerComServer'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' /UpdateDeploymentProvider UpdateDeploymentProvider.dll '
    filter_main_wuaueng:
        # Note: Please enhance this if you find the full path
        CommandLine|contains: ' wuaueng.dll '
    filter_main_uus:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\amd64\updatedeploy.dll /ClassId'
            - ':\Windows\UUS\amd64\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId'
    filter_main_winsxs:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - '\UpdateDeploy.dll /ClassId '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Curl Download And Execute Combination
Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
status test author Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Curl Download And Execute Combination
id: 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288
status: test
description: Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983 # Dead Link
author: Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -c '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl '
            - 'http'
            - '-o'
            - '&'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
status test author Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative id e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Time Travel Debugging Utility Usage - Image
id: e76c8240-d68f-4773-8880-5c6f63595aaf
status: test
description: Detects usage of Time Travel Debugging Utility. Adversaries can execute malicious processes and dump processes, such as lsass.exe, via tttracer.exe.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Tttracer/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1196390321783025666
    - https://twitter.com/oulusoyum/status/1191329746069655553
author: 'Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, @oscd_initiative'
date: 2020-10-06
modified: 2022-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\ttdrecord.dll'
            - '\ttdwriter.dll'
            - '\ttdloader.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage by software developers/testers
level: high
related high
BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking. This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94) which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.
status experimental author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) id 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984
related:
    - id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512 # Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
    This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of the logged-on user's session. Specifically, it targets the BDEUILauncher Class (CLSID ab93b6f1-be76-4185-a488-a9001b105b94)
    which can launch BaaUpdate.exe, which is vulnerable to COM Hijacking when started with input parameters. This allows attackers to execute code in the user's context without needing to steal credentials or use additional techniques to compromise the account.
references:
    - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\BaaUpdate.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '.dll'
        ImageLoaded|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\Links\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE
This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
status test author oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova id fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Execution DLL of Choice Using WAB.EXE
id: fc014922-5def-4da9-a0fc-28c973f41bfb
status: test
description: This rule detects that the path to the DLL written in the registry is different from the default one. Launched WAB.exe tries to load the DLL from Registry.
references:
    - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OSBinaries/Wab.yml
    - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/991447379864932352
    - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/05/01/wab-exe-as-a-lolbin/
author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Software\Microsoft\WAB\DLLPath'
    filter:
        Details: '%CommonProgramFiles%\System\wab32.dll'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
related high
Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution - REG
Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69 license Sigma · DRL-1.1
view Sigma YAML
title: Potential Provisioning Registry Key Abuse For Binary Proxy Execution - REG
id: 7021255e-5db3-4946-a8b9-0ba7a4644a69
related:
    - id: 7f5d1c9a-3e83-48df-95a7-2b98aae6c13c # CLI Generic
      type: similar
    - id: f9999590-1f94-4a34-a91e-951e47bedefd # CLI Abuse
      type: similar
    - id: 2a4b3e61-9d22-4e4a-b60f-6e8f0cde6f25 # CLI Registry
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potential abuse of the provisioning registry key for indirect command execution through "Provlaunch.exe".
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Provlaunch/
    - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1674399582162153472
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-08-02
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: The registry key "\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\" and its subkey must be monitored'
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\Commands\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
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