title: Ngrok Usage with Remote Desktop Service
id: 64d51a51-32a6-49f0-9f3d-17e34d640272
status: test
description: Detects cases in which ngrok, a reverse proxy tool, forwards events to the local RDP port, which could be a sign of malicious behaviour
references:
    - https://twitter.com/tekdefense/status/1519711183162556416?s=12&t=OTsHCBkQOTNs1k3USz65Zg
    - https://ngrok.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: terminalservices-localsessionmanager
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 21
        Address|contains: '16777216'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpChisel Execution
id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
related:
    - id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Sharp Chisel via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/shantanu561993/SharpChisel
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-05
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpChisel.exe'
        - Product: 'SharpChisel'
    # See rule 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5 for Chisel.exe coverage
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution
id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.
references:
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cleanup:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - 'cleanup '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-connector-id '
    selection_tunnel:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - ' run '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-credentials-contents '
            - '-credentials-file '
            - '-token '
    selection_accountless:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-url'
            - 'tunnel'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29'
            - 'SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8'
            - 'SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039'
            - 'SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28'
            - 'SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7'
            - 'SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373'
            - 'SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670'
            - 'SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a'
            - 'SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0'
            - 'SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1'
            - 'SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2'
            - 'SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac'
            - 'SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f'
            - 'SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d'
            - 'SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499'
            - 'SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b'
            - 'SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f'
            - 'SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032'
            - 'SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534bee234'
            - 'SHA256=b3f9c06151e30ee43d39e788a79cd918a314f24e04fe87f3de8272a2057b624f'
            - 'SHA256=cd81b2792f0739f473c31c9cb7cf2313154bfa28b839975802b90e8790bb5058'
            - 'SHA256=9ec7e6c8e1bfd883663d8d9d62c9e4f9ae373b731407181e32491b27a7218a2c'
            - 'SHA256=c2cfd23fdc6c0e1b1ffa0e545cbe556f18d11b362b4a89ba0713f6ab01c4827f'
            - 'SHA256=53f8adbd76c0eb16f5e43cadde422474d8a06f9c8f959389c1930042ad8beaa5'
            - 'SHA256=648c8d2f8001c113d2986dd00b7bbd181593d462bef73522cee212c4f71f95b3'
            - 'SHA256=ae047e2095e46c3f9c518b2be67ec753f4f0aad23b261a361fcb6144dcdb63b4'
            - 'SHA256=3153d2baa462978dd22ab33d1c2274ecc88c200225d6a3327f98d5b752d08f5c'
            - 'SHA256=f49cde976e628012c9db73e1c8d76081944ecf2297cdafeb78bb13290da274c4'
            - 'SHA256=d2513e58bb03ccc83affde685c6ef987924c37ce6707d8e9857e2524b0d7e90f'
            - 'SHA256=bb67c7623ba92fe64ffd9816b8d5b3b1ea3013960a30bd4cf6e295b3eb5b1bad'
            - 'SHA256=b34b3c3a91e3165d1481f0b3ec23eab93a1cfba94345a6cbfe5b18ddbd48eac7'
            - 'SHA256=f7848034e010d55f15e474ca998f96391e320ff29b00cfcc4c5e536529703e75'
            - 'SHA256=b6fc9493778cbe3bfc062d73f5cc604bc0ff058bc5e5dc6aac87f3a4008b54b6'
            - 'SHA256=f5c5e962577e2293c4ad10603816dce7cc273585969615fbf4e4bfa9eaff1688'
            - 'SHA256=d14c52d9220b606f428a8fe9f7c108b0d6f14cf71e7384749e98e6a95962e68f'
            - 'SHA256=d3a0e1a79158f3985cd49607ebe0cdfcc49cb9af96b8f43aefd0cdfe2f22e663'
            - 'SHA256=2fbbfc8299537ff80cadf9d0e27c223fe0ccb9052bf9d8763ad717bbfa521c77'
            - 'SHA256=19074674c6fbdaa573b3081745e5e26144fdf7a086d14e0e220d1814f1f13078'
    filter_main_known_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cloudflared.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-386.exe'
            - '\cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool Execution
id: 8b0e12da-d3c3-49db-bb4f-256703f380e5
related:
    - id: cf93e05e-d798-4d9e-b522-b0248dc61eaf
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the Chisel tunneling tool via the commandline arguments
references:
    - https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/lorenz-ransomware-chiseling-in/
    - https://blog.sekoia.io/lucky-mouse-incident-response-to-detection-engineering/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-13
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\chisel.exe'
    selection_param1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'exe client '
            - 'exe server '
    selection_param2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-socks5'
            - '-reverse'
            - ' r:'
            - ':127.0.0.1:'
            - '-tls-skip-verify '
            - ':socks'
    condition: selection_img or all of selection_param*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with other tools with similar commandlines
level: high

title: AWS User Login Profile Was Modified
id: 055fb148-60f8-462d-ad16-26926ce050f1
status: test
description: |
    Detects activity when someone is changing passwords on behalf of other users.
    An attacker with the "iam:UpdateLoginProfile" permission on other users can change the password used to login to the AWS console on any user that already has a login profile setup.
references:
    - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/AWS-IAM-Privilege-Escalation
author: toffeebr33k
date: 2021-08-09
modified: 2024-04-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
        eventName: 'UpdateLoginProfile'
    filter_main_user_identity:
        userIdentity.arn|fieldref: requestParameters.userName
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user account administration
level: high

title: Anomalous User Activity
id: 258b6593-215d-4a26-a141-c8e31c1299a6
status: test
description: Indicates that there are anomalous patterns of behavior like suspicious changes to the directory.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-user-activity
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anomalousUserActivity'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Bulk Deletion Changes To Privileged Account Permissions
id: 102e11e3-2db5-4c9e-bc26-357d42585d21
status: test
description: Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role. Bulk changes should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-08-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Remove eligible member (permanent)
            - Remove eligible member (eligible)
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legtimate administrator actions of removing members from a role
level: high

title: ESXi Admin Permission Assigned To Account Via ESXCLI
id: 9691f58d-92c1-4416-8bf3-2edd753ec9cf
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "system" and "permission" flags in order to assign admin permissions to an account.
references:
    - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-09-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1059.012
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '/esxcli'
        CommandLine|contains: 'system'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' permission '
            - ' set'
            - 'Admin'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activities
level: high

title: Privileged User Has Been Created
id: 0ac15ec3-d24f-4246-aa2a-3077bb1cf90e
status: test
description: Detects the addition of a new user to a privileged group such as "root" or "sudo"
references:
    - https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2018/cc-2825
    - https://linux.die.net/man/8/useradd
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/25acadc0b43a07125a8a5b599b28bbc1a91ffb06/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md#atomic-test-5---create-a-new-user-in-linux-with-root-uid-and-gid
author: Pawel Mazur
date: 2022-12-21
modified: 2025-01-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: linux
    definition: '/var/log/secure on REHL systems or /var/log/auth.log on debian like Systems needs to be collected in order for this detection to work'
detection:
    # Example of the events that could be observed when matching these would be as follow
    #   Dec 21 16:42:19 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter1, UID=1000, GID=0, home=/root, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:13:54 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=john, UID=0, GID=0, home=/home/john, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:24:40 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter3, UID=1000, GID=10, home=/home/butter3, shell=/bin/bash
    #   Dec 21 17:30:22 testserver useradd[1337]: new user: name=butter4, UID=1000, GID=27, home=/home/butter4, shell=/bin/bash
    selection_new_user:
        - 'new user'
    selection_uids_gids:
        - 'GID=0,' # root group
        - 'UID=0,' # root UID
        - 'GID=10,' # wheel group
        - 'GID=27,' # sudo group
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
level: high

title: Cisco Local Accounts
id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
status: test
description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-12
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.001
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: cisco
    service: aaa
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'username'
        - 'aaa'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often
level: high

title: User Added To Highly Privileged Group
id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09 # Privileged groups
related:
    - id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e # Remote Desktop groups
      type: similar
    - id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5 # Admin groups
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects addition of users to highly privileged groups via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-02-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_main:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              # net.exe
              - 'localgroup '
              - ' /add'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              # powershell.exe
              - 'Add-LocalGroupMember '
              - ' -Group '
    selection_group:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Group Policy Creator Owners'
            - 'Schema Admins'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity that must be investigated
level: high

title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f
status: test
description: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
references:
    - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
author: Samir Bousseaden, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Maxence Fossat
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2022-08-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'ntSecurityDescriptor'
        AttributeValue|contains:
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter_main_dns_object_class:
        ObjectClass:
            - 'dnsNode'
            - 'dnsZoneScope'
            - 'dnsZone'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
level: high

title: Password Change on Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51
related:
    - id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0
      type: similar
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential attempts made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.
    The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers.
    Attackers may change the password in order to obtain persistence.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4794
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2020-08-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4794
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Initial installation of a domain controller.
level: high

title: Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
id: 311b6ce2-7890-4383-a8c2-663a9f6b43cd
status: test
description: Detects scenario where if a user is assigned the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege right in Active Directory it would allow control of other AD user objects.
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-07-30
modified: 2021-12-02
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change\Audit Authorization Policy Change'
detection:
    selection_base:
        EventID: 4704
    selection_keywords:
        PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Active Directory User Backdoors
id: 300bac00-e041-4ee2-9c36-e262656a6ecc
status: test
description: Detects scenarios where one can control another users or computers account without having to use their credentials.
references:
    - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc220234.aspx
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/
author: '@neu5ron'
date: 2017-04-13
modified: 2024-02-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.persistence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4738
    filter_empty:
        AllowedToDelegateTo:
            - ''
            - '-'
    filter_null:
        AllowedToDelegateTo: null
    selection_5136_1:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
    selection_5136_2:
        EventID: 5136
        ObjectClass: 'user'
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'servicePrincipalName'
    selection_5136_3:
        EventID: 5136
        AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
    condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter_*) or 1 of selection_5136_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder
id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
related:
    - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Temp\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    selection_domains:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high

title: Network Connection Initiated From Process Located In Potentially Suspicious Or Uncommon Location
id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by programs or processes running from suspicious or uncommon files system locations.
references:
    - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    filter_main_domains:
        # Note: We exclude these domains to avoid duplicate filtering from e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'portmap.io'  # https://pro.twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/1795001037746761892/photo/2
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Script Interpreter
id: 992a6cae-db6a-43c8-9cec-76d7195c96fc
related:
    - id: 08249dc0-a28d-4555-8ba5-9255a198e08c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_main_ms_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr: '20.0.0.0/11' # Microsoft range, caused some FPs
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scripts
level: high

title: Uncommon Network Connection Initiated By Certutil.EXE
id: 0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
    Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-02
modified: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 135
            - 443
            - 445
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Dropbox API Usage
id: 25eabf56-22f0-4915-a1ed-056b8dae0a68
status: test
description: Detects an executable that isn't dropbox but communicates with the Dropbox API
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/7e906adc-9d11-447f-8641-5f40375ecebb
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1567.002
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - 'api.dropboxapi.com'
            - 'content.dropboxapi.com'
    filter_main_legit_dropbox:
        # Note: It's better to add a specific path to the exact location(s) where dropbox is installed
        Image|contains: '\Dropbox'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the API with a tool that the author wasn't aware of
level: high

title: Network Connection Initiated By IMEWDBLD.EXE
id: 8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228
related:
    - id: 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a network connection initiated by IMEWDBLD.EXE. This might indicate potential abuse of the utility as a LOLBIN in order to download arbitrary files or additional payloads.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-22
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith: '\IMEWDBLD.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Note: Please reduce this to medium if you find legitimate connections
level: high

title: Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe
id: e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS
    server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable, script file,
    or otherwise unusual.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1127
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ahk'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.au3'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.py'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
related:
    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\certoc.exe'
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
            - '\esentutl.exe'
            - '\expand.exe'
            - '\extrac32.exe'
            - '\replace.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\ftp.exe'
            - '\Ldifde.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
    selection_locations:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml

title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Target File
id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores a file to a suspicious location or contains a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Personalization\LockScreenImage\'
    filter1:
        TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\'
    filter2:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    condition: selection and not filter1 and not filter2
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: File Download with Headless Browser
id: 0e8cfe08-02c9-4815-a2f8-0d157b7ed33e
related:
    - id: ef9dcfed-690c-4c5d-a9d1-482cd422225c
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of chromium based browser in headless mode using the "dump-dom" command line to download files
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1478234484881436672?s=12
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html
author: Sreeman, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-04
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--headless'
            - 'dump-dom'
            - 'http'
    filter_optional_edge_1:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless --disable-gpu --disable-extensions --disable-plugins --mute-audio --no-first-run --incognito --aggressive-cache-discard --dump-dom'
    filter_optional_edge_2:
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
            - '\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '--headless --disable-gpu --disable-extensions --disable-plugins --mute-audio --no-first-run --incognito --aggressive-cache-discard --dump-dom'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_headless_file_download/info.yml

title: File Download And Execution Via IEExec.EXE
id: 9801abb8-e297-4dbf-9fbd-57dde0e830ad
status: test
description: Detects execution of the IEExec utility to download and execute files
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ieexec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-16
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\IEExec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'IEExec.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE
id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5
status: test
description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/
author: Matthew Matchen
date: 2020-09-04
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun.exe'
        - Description: 'Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'DownloadFile'
            - 'url'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Finger.EXE Execution
id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc
related:
    - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074
      type: similar
    - id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of the "finger.exe" utility.
    Finger.EXE or "TCPIP Finger Command" is an old utility that is still present on modern Windows installation. It Displays information about users on a specified remote computer (typically a UNIX computer) that is running the finger service or daemon.
    Due to the old nature of this utility and the rareness of machines having the finger service. Any execution of "finger.exe" can be considered "suspicious" and worth investigating.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/bigmacjpg/status/1349727699863011328?s=12
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/40115012-a919-4208-bfed-41e82cb3dadf/
    - http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/Windows_TCPIP_Finger_Command_C2_Channel_and_Bypassing_Security_Software.txt
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community
date: 2021-02-24
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'finger.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\finger.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity (unclear what they do nowadays with finger.exe)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_finger_execution/info.yml

title: File Download From IP Based URL Via CertOC.EXE
id: b86f6dea-0b2f-41f5-bdcc-a057bd19cd6a
related:
    - id: 70ad0861-d1fe-491c-a45f-fa48148a300d
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certoc.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertOC.exe'
    selection_ip:
        CommandLine|re: '://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '-GetCACAPS'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Download from Office Domain
id: 00d49ed5-4491-4271-a8db-650a4ef6f8c1
status: test
description: Detects suspicious ways to download files from Microsoft domains that are used to store attachments in Emails or OneNote documents
references:
    - https://twitter.com/an0n_r0/status/1474698356635193346?s=12
    - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1475085452784844803?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-27
modified: 2022-08-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1608
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_download:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\wget.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
              - 'iwr '
              - 'curl '
              - 'wget '
              - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
              - '.DownloadFile('
              - '.DownloadString('
    selection_domains:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'https://attachment.outlook.live.net/owa/'
            - 'https://onenoteonlinesync.onenote.com/onenoteonlinesync/'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Scripts or tools that download attachments from these domains (OneNote, Outlook 365)
level: high

title: File Download Using Notepad++ GUP Utility
id: 44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-10
modified: 2023-03-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\GUP.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'gup.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -unzipTo '
            - 'http'
    filter:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\notepad++.exe'
    condition: all of selection* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Other parent processes other than notepad++ using GUP that are not currently identified
level: high

title: Suspicious CertReq Command to Download
id: 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file.
    This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files.
    Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\certreq.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'CertReq.exe'
    selection_cli_flag_post:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-Post'
    selection_cli_flag_config:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '-config'
    selection_cli_http:
        CommandLine|contains: 'http'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Command
id: bb58aa4a-b80b-415a-a2c0-2f65a4c81009
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr execution with parameters used to download files from the Internet
references:
    - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection1:
        CommandLine|contains: ' /lockscreenurl:'
    selection1_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.png'
    selection_reg:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg delete'
            - '\PersonalizationCSP'
    condition: ( selection1 and not selection1_filter ) or selection_reg
falsepositives:
    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
level: high

title: PUA - Nimgrab Execution
id: 74a12f18-505c-4114-8d0b-8448dd5485c6
status: test
description: Detects the usage of nimgrab, a tool bundled with the Nim programming framework and used for downloading files.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md
author: frack113
date: 2022-08-28
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_name:
        Image|endswith: '\nimgrab.exe'
    selection_hashes:
        Hashes|contains:
            - MD5=2DD44C3C29D667F5C0EF5F9D7C7FFB8B
            - SHA256=F266609E91985F0FE3E31C5E8FAEEEC4FFA5E0322D8B6F15FE69F4C5165B9559
            - IMPHASH=C07FDDD21D123EA9B3A08EEF44AAAC45
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Nim on a developer systems
level: high

title: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution
id: 5e3cc4d8-3e68-43db-8656-eaaeefdec9cc
related:
    - id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location
references:
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-02
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell_ise.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'powershell_ise.EXE'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    selection_commands:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # These are all aliases of Invoke-WebRequest
            - 'curl '
            - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
            - 'iwr '
            - 'wget '
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -ur'
            - ' -o'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - ':\Windows\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PrintBrm ZIP Creation of Extraction
id: cafeeba3-01da-4ab4-b6c4-a31b1d9730c7
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/PrintBrm/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.t1564.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\PrintBrm.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' -f'
            - '.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Curl Download And Execute Combination
id: 21dd6d38-2b18-4453-9404-a0fe4a0cc288
status: test
description: Adversaries can use curl to download payloads remotely and execute them. Curl is included by default in Windows 10 build 17063 and later.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@reegun/curl-exe-is-the-new-rundll32-exe-lolbin-3f79c5f35983 # Dead Link
author: Sreeman, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-01-13
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -c '
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl '
            - 'http'
            - '-o'
            - '&'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Curl.EXE Download
id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468
related:
    - id: bbeaed61-1990-4773-bf57-b81dbad7db2d # Basic curl execution
      type: derived
    - id: 9a517fca-4ba3-4629-9278-a68694697b81 # Curl download
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on Windows and outputs the requested document to a local file
references:
    - https://twitter.com/max_mal_/status/1542461200797163522
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200128160046/https://twitter.com/reegun21/status/1222093798009790464
    - https://github.com/pr0xylife/Qakbot/blob/4f0795d79dabee5bc9dd69f17a626b48852e7869/Qakbot_AA_23.06.2022.txt
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-18---curl-download-file
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-07-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_curl:
        - Image|endswith: '\curl.exe'
        - Product: 'The curl executable'
    selection_susp_locations:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '%AppData%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%Temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.png'
            - '.temp'
            - '.tmp'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
    filter_optional_git_windows:
        # Example FP
        #   CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe" --silent --show-error --output C:/Users/test/AppData/Local/Temp/gfw-httpget-jVOEoxbS.txt --write-out %{http_code} https://gitforwindows.org/latest-tag.txt
        ParentImage: 'C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\sh.exe'
        Image: 'C:\Program Files\Git\mingw64\bin\curl.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '--silent --show-error --output '
            - 'gfw-httpget-'
            - 'AppData'
    condition: selection_curl and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_susp_download/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Curl Download File
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: 2b080b99-0deb-4d51-af0f-833d37c4ca6a

title: Lolbas OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe Proxy Download
id: 3aff0be0-7802-4a7e-a4fa-c60c74bc5e1d
status: test
description: |
    Detects setting a custom URL for OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe to download a file from the Internet without executing any
    anomalous executables with suspicious arguments. The downloaded file will be in C:\Users\redacted\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\StandaloneUpdaterreSignInSettingsConfig.json
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OneDriveStandaloneUpdater/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-28
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OneDrive\UpdateOfficeConfig\UpdateRingSettingURLFromOC'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702
related:
    - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
references:
    - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-06
modified: 2025-03-06
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AddSecurityPackage'
            - 'AdjustTokenPrivileges'
            - 'Advapi32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
            - 'CreateProcessWithToken'
            - 'CreatePseudoConsole'
            - 'CreateRemoteThread'
            - 'CreateThread'
            - 'CreateUserThread'
            - 'DangerousGetHandle'
            - 'DuplicateTokenEx'
            - 'EnumerateSecurityPackages'
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'FreeLibrary'
            - 'GetDelegateForFunctionPointer'
            - 'GetLogonSessionData'
            - 'GetModuleHandle'
            - 'GetProcAddress'
            - 'GetProcessHandle'
            - 'GetTokenInformation'
            - 'ImpersonateLoggedOnUser'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'LoadLibrary'
            - 'memcpy'
            - 'MiniDumpWriteDump'
            # - 'msvcrt'
            - 'ntdll'
            - 'OpenDesktop'
            - 'OpenProcess'
            - 'OpenProcessToken'
            - 'OpenThreadToken'
            - 'OpenWindowStation'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'QueueUserApc'
            - 'ReadProcessMemory'
            - 'RevertToSelf'
            - 'RtlCreateUserThread'
            - 'secur32'
            - 'SetThreadToken'
            # - 'user32'
            - 'VirtualAlloc'
            - 'VirtualFree'
            - 'VirtualProtect'
            - 'WaitForSingleObject'
            - 'WriteInt32'
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode'
    filter_optional_mpcmdrun:
        Image|endswith: '\MpCmdRun.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'GetLoadLibraryWAddress32'
    filter_optional_compatTelRunner:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\CompatTelRunner.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'FreeHGlobal'
            - 'PtrToString'
            - 'kernel32'
            - 'CloseHandle'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity.
level: high

title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
    - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-17
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'MSHTA.EXE'
    selection_susp:
        # Suspicious parents
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        # Suspicious folders
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - 'C:\ProgramData\'
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
    filter_img:
        # Filter legit Locations
        - Image|startswith:
              - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
              - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
        # Suspicious extensions
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - '.htm'
              - '.hta'
        # Filter simple execution
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'mshta'
    condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not filter_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern
id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d
status: test
description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes
references:
    - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass
    - https://github.com/boku7/spawn
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-04
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CallTrace|re: '^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$'
        GrantedAccess:
            - '0x1028'
            - '0x1fffff'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - HandleKatz Duplicating LSASS Handle
id: b1bd3a59-c1fd-4860-9f40-4dd161a7d1f5
status: test
description: Detects HandleKatz opening LSASS to duplicate its handle to later dump the memory without opening any new handles
references:
    - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
author: Bhabesh Raj (rule), @thefLinkk
date: 2022-06-27
modified: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe' # Theoretically, can be any benign process holding handle to LSASS
        GrantedAccess: '0x1440' # Only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
        # Example: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+9d234\|UNKNOWN(00000000001C119B)
        CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll+'
        CallTrace|contains: '|UNKNOWN('
        CallTrace|endswith: ')'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Password Spray Activity
id: 28ecba0a-c743-4690-ad29-9a8f6f25a6f9
status: test
description: Indicates that a password spray attack has been successfully performed.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#password-spray
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-03
tags:
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'passwordSpray'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication
id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc
status: test
description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/
author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t'
date: 2023-03-20
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        Status: 'Success'
        userAgent|contains:
            - 'BAV2ROPC'
            - 'CBAinPROD'
            - 'CBAinTAR'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Known Legacy Accounts
level: high

title: Sign-in Failure Due to Conditional Access Requirements Not Met
id: b4a6d707-9430-4f5f-af68-0337f52d5c42
status: test
description: Define a baseline threshold for failed sign-ins due to Conditional Access failures
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ResultType: 53003
        Resultdescription: Blocked by Conditional Access
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Service Account misconfigured
    - Misconfigured Systems
    - Vulnerability Scanners
level: high

title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols
id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e
status: test
description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H'
date: 2022-06-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ActivityDetails: Sign-ins
        ClientApp:
            - Other client
            - IMAP
            - POP3
            - MAPI
            - SMTP
            - Exchange ActiveSync
            - Exchange Web Services
        Username: 'UPN'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication
level: high

title: HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution
id: aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool
references:
    - https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
author: Vasiliy Burov
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-u '
            - '-p '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '^USER^'
            - '^PASS^'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line
level: high

title: External Remote SMB Logon from Public IP
id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
related:
    - id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the SMB port.
level: high

title: Hack Tool User Agent
id: c42a3073-30fb-48ae-8c99-c23ada84b103
status: test
description: Detects suspicious user agent strings user by hack tools in proxy logs
references:
    - https://github.com/fastly/waf_testbed/blob/8bfc406551f3045e418cbaad7596cff8da331dfc/templates/default/scanners-user-agents.data.erb
    - http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/snort-2.9.0/rules/emerging-user_agents.rules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-useragent|contains:
            # Vulnerability scanner and brute force tools
            - '(hydra)'
            - ' arachni/'
            - ' BFAC '
            - ' brutus '
            - ' cgichk '
            - 'core-project/1.0'
            - ' crimscanner/'
            - 'datacha0s'
            - 'dirbuster'
            - 'domino hunter'
            - 'dotdotpwn'
            - 'FHScan Core'
            - 'floodgate'
            - 'get-minimal'
            - 'gootkit auto-rooter scanner'
            - 'grendel-scan'
            - ' inspath '
            - 'internet ninja'
            - 'jaascois'
            - ' zmeu '
            - 'masscan'
            - ' metis '
            - 'morfeus fucking scanner'
            - 'n-stealth'
            - 'nsauditor'
            - 'pmafind'
            - 'security scan'
            - 'springenwerk'
            - 'teh forest lobster'
            - 'toata dragostea'
            - ' vega/'
            - 'voideye'
            - 'webshag'
            - 'webvulnscan'
            - ' whcc/'
            # SQL Injection
            - ' Havij'
            - 'absinthe'
            - 'bsqlbf'
            - 'mysqloit'
            - 'pangolin'
            - 'sql power injector'
            - 'sqlmap'
            - 'sqlninja'
            - 'uil2pn'
            # Hack tool
            - 'ruler'  # https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/using-outlook-forms-lateral-movement-persistence/
            - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; pt-PT; rv:1.9.1.2) Gecko/20090729 Firefox/3.5.2 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)'  # SQLi Dumper
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high