title: Sdiagnhost Calling Suspicious Child Process
id: f3d39c45-de1a-4486-a687-ab126124f744
status: test
description: Detects sdiagnhost.exe calling a suspicious child process (e.g. used in exploits for Follina / CVE-2022-30190)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c4117d9a-f463-461a-b90f-4cd258746798/
author: Nextron Systems, @Kostastsale
date: 2022-06-01
modified: 2024-08-23
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\sdiagnhost.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBins
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            # - '\csc.exe'   # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
            - '\calc.exe'  # https://app.any.run/tasks/f420d295-0457-4e9b-9b9e-6732be227583/
    filter_main_cmd_bits:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'bits'
    filter_main_powershell_noprofile:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|endswith:
            - '-noprofile -'
            - '-noprofile'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Parents
id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df
status: test
description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program
references:
    - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12
    - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-03-21
modified: 2022-09-08
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\minesweeper.exe'
            - '\winver.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_special:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
         # - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_special:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\WerFault.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\conhost.exe' # csrss.exe, certutil.exe
            - '\mmc.exe'     # eventvwr.exe
            - '\win32calc.exe' # calc.exe
            - '\notepad.exe'
    filter_null:
        Image: null
    condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Plink Execution
id: 1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the Plink binary
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
    - https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-06
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'Plink'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' -l forward'
              - ' -P '
              - ' -R '
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\plink.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - MacOS
id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
related:
    - id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
      type: similar
    - id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9
      type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
    RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
    However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_meshagent:
        - CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
    filter_main_legitimate:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/meshagent'
            - '/meshagent_osx64'
    condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Schtasks Execution
id: f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks.
    One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe.
    Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks.
references:
    - https://x.com/JangPr0/status/1932034543026065833
    - https://ss64.com/nt/schtasks.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmd_operation:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /create '
            - ' /delete '
            - ' /query '
            - ' /change '
            - ' /run '
            - ' /end '
    selection_cmd_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' /tn '
            - ' /tr '
            - ' /sc '
            - ' /st '
            - ' /ru '
            - ' /fo '
    selection_pe:
        OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: 'schtasks'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    condition: (all of selection_cmd_* and not filter_main_cmd) or (selection_pe and not filter_main_img)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: LOL-Binary Copied From System Directory
id: f5d19838-41b5-476c-98d8-ba8af4929ee2
related:
    - id: fff9d2b7-e11c-4a69-93d3-40ef66189767
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a known LOLBIN from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk in order to bypass detections based on locations.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14e722855605ba78dc1d21153f0e1be90e7528149f2cd2d7d6eba8ef27534bdc/behavior
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-29
modified: 2025-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'copy '
    selection_tools_pwsh:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy-item'
            - ' copy '
            - 'cpi '
            - ' cp '
    selection_tools_other:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\robocopy.exe'
              - '\xcopy.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'robocopy.exe'
              - 'XCOPY.EXE'
    selection_target_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\System32'
            - '\SysWOW64'
            - '\WinSxS'
    selection_target_lolbin:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: add more binaries to increase coverage
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\calc.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmdl32.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\ie4uinit.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_tools_* and all of selection_target_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: File Download Via Bitsadmin To A Suspicious Target Folder
id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac
related:
    - id: 6e30c82f-a9f8-4aab-b79c-7c12bce6f248
      type: obsolete
    - id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file to a suspicious target folder
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/breaking-the-silence-recent-truebot-activity/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_folder:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - ':\ProgramData\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\'
            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Contacts\'
            - '\Desktop\'
            - '\Favorites\'
            - '\Favourites\'
            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
            - '\Music\'
            - '\Pictures\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Users\Default\'
            - '\Videos\'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%public%'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_targetfolder/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries
id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e
related:
    - id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142
      type: similar
    - id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed # Renamed Rundll32 Specific
      type: derived
    - id: a7a7e0e5-1d57-49df-9c58-9fe5bc0346a2 # Renamed PsExec
      type: obsolete
    - id: d178a2d7-129a-4ba4-8ee6-d6e1fecd5d20 # Renamed PowerShell
      type: obsolete
    - id: d4d2574f-ac17-4d9e-b986-aeeae0dc8fe2 # Renamed Rundll32
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint.
references:
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/megacortex-ransomware-spotted-attacking-enterprise-networks
    - https://twitter.com/christophetd/status/1164506034720952320
    - https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/svcready-a-new-loader-reveals-itself/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke
author: Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2019-06-15
modified: 2026-02-12
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Description: 'Execute processes remotely'
        - Product: 'Sysinternals PsExec'
        - Description|startswith:
              - 'Windows PowerShell'
              - 'pwsh'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'certutil.exe'
              - 'cmstp.exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'IE4UINIT.EXE'
              - 'finger.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'msxsl.exe'
              - 'powershell_ise.exe'
              - 'powershell.exe'
              - 'psexec.c'        # old versions of psexec (2016 seen)
              - 'psexec.exe'
              - 'psexesvc.exe'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'reg.exe'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'rundll32.exe'
              - 'WerMgr'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cmstp.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\ie4uinit.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msxsl.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\psexec.exe'
            - '\psexec64.exe'
            - '\PSEXESVC.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wermgr.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist
    - PsExec installed via Windows Store doesn't contain original filename field (False negative)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant/info.yml

title: File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin
id: 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-05-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.7z'
            - '.asax'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.asmx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.aspx'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cfm'
            - '.cgi'
            - '.chm'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.dll'
            - '.gif'
            - '.jpeg'
            - '.jpg'
            - '.jsp'
            - '.jspx'
            - '.log'
            - '.png'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.psm1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scf'
            - '.sct'
            - '.txt'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.war'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
            - '.xll'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_extensions/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780
related:
    - id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582
      type: similar
    - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
      type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent.
    RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management.
    However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access
    - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/
    - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks
author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC)
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1219.002
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_meshagent:
        - CommandLine|contains: '--meshServiceName'
        - OriginalFileName|contains: 'meshagent'
    filter_main_legitimate:
        Image|endswith: '\meshagent.exe'
    condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed Msdt.EXE Execution
id: bd1c6866-65fc-44b2-be51-5588fcff82b9
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "Msdt.exe" binary
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-03
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'msdt.exe'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\msdt.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msdt/info.yml

title: Renamed Jusched.EXE Execution
id: edd8a48c-1b9f-4ba1-83aa-490338cd1ccb
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "jusched.exe" as seen used by the cobalt group
references:
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/262/Bitdefender-WhitePaper-An-APT-Blueprint-Gaining-New-Visibility-into-Financial-Threats-interactive.pdf
author: Markus Neis, Swisscom
date: 2019-06-04
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Description:
            - Java Update Scheduler
            - Java(TM) Update Scheduler
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\jusched.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Download From File-Sharing Website Via Bitsadmin
id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2025-12-10
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_domain:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com' # bitsadmin /transfer n https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1047/bin/calc.dll %PUBLIC%\calc.dll
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some legitimate apps use this, but limited.
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_file_sharing_domains/info.yml
simulation:
    - type: atomic-red-team
      name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download
      technique: T1105
      atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b

title: Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution
id: 8a4519e8-e64a-40b6-ae85-ba8ad2177559
status: test
description: Detects process creation with a renamed BrowserCore.exe (used to extract Azure tokens)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mariuszbit/status/1531631015139102720
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: BrowserCore.exe
    filter_realbrowsercore:
        Image|endswith: '\BrowserCore.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Renamed ProcDump Execution
id: 4a0b2c7e-7cb2-495d-8b63-5f268e7bfd67
related:
    - id: 03795938-1387-481b-9f4c-3f6241e604fe
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable.
    This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defensive mechanisms.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-18
modified: 2024-06-25
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_ofn:
        OriginalFileName: 'procdump'
    selection_cli_dump_flag:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -ma ' # Full Dump
            - ' -mp ' # Mini Plus
    selection_cli_eula_flag:
        # Note: Even though the "accepteula" flag isn't required. We add it to avoid collision with similar utilities.
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /accepteula'
    filter_main_known_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
    condition: (selection_ofn or all of selection_cli_*) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Procdump illegally bundled with legitimate software.
    - Administrators who rename binaries (should be investigated).
level: high

title: Suspicious Download From Direct IP Via Bitsadmin
id: 99c840f2-2012-46fd-9141-c761987550ef
related:
    - id: 90f138c1-f578-4ac3-8c49-eecfd847c8b7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file using an URL that contains an IP
references:
    - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/breaking-the-silence-recent-truebot-activity/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-28
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1197
    - attack.s0190
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\bitsadmin.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'bitsadmin.exe'
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /transfer '
            - ' /create '
            - ' /addfile '
    selection_extension:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://1'
            - '://2'
            - '://3'
            - '://4'
            - '://5'
            - '://6'
            - '://7'
            - '://8'
            - '://9'
    filter_seven_zip:
        CommandLine|contains: '://7-' # For https://7-zip.org/
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_direct_ip/info.yml

title: Renamed Office Binary Execution
id: 0b0cd537-fc77-4e6e-a973-e53495c1083d
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed office binary
references:
    - https://infosec.exchange/@sbousseaden/109542254124022664
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-20
modified: 2025-12-09
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Excel.exe'
              - 'MSACCESS.EXE'
              - 'MSPUB.EXE'
              - 'OneNote.exe'
              - 'OneNoteM.exe'
              - 'OUTLOOK.EXE'
              - 'POWERPNT.EXE'
              - 'WinWord.exe'
              - 'Olk.exe'
        - Description:
              - 'Microsoft Access'
              - 'Microsoft Excel'
              - 'Microsoft OneNote'
              - 'Microsoft Outlook'
              - 'Microsoft PowerPoint'
              - 'Microsoft Publisher'
              - 'Microsoft Word'
              - 'Sent to OneNote Tool'
    filter_main_legit_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\EXCEL.exe'
            - '\excelcnv.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTEM.EXE'
            - '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.EXE'
            - '\WINWORD.exe'
            - '\OLK.EXE'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential WerFault ReflectDebugger Registry Value Abuse
id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad
related:
    - id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects potential WerFault "ReflectDebugger" registry value abuse for persistence.
references:
    - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html
    - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|endswith: '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs\ReflectDebugger'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Scheduled Task Creation Masquerading as System Processes
id: 9f8573c9-22b4-40e3-89c1-72bc2b8d49ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involve system processes, which may indicate malicious actors masquerading as or abusing these processes to execute payloads or maintain persistence.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1036.004
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' audiodg'
            - ' conhost'
            - ' dwm.exe'
            - ' explorer'
            - ' lsass'
            - ' lsm'
            - ' mmc'
            - ' msiexec'
            - ' regsvr32'
            - ' rundll32'
            - ' services'
            - ' spoolsv'
            - ' svchost'
            - ' taskeng'
            - ' taskhost'
            - ' wininit'
            - ' winlogon'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration tasks scheduling trusted system processes.
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE
id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
related:
    - id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
      type: similar
    - id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location.
    Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection.
references:
    - https://tria.ge/240731-jh4crsycnb/behavioral2
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/process-masquerading/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-08-07
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_img_location:
        Image:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_ofn:
        OriginalFileName: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution/info.yml

title: Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter
id: f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
    This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.
references:
    - https://cardinalops.com/blog/the-art-of-anomaly-hunting-patterns-detection/
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits/
    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/08064518/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
author: Liran Ravich
date: 2025-11-14
modified: 2026-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.t1055.012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example of command to simulate: "C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" calc.exe
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_main_flags:
        CommandLine|re: '-k\s\w{1,64}(?:\s?(?:-p|-s))?'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine: ''
    filter_main_null:
        CommandLine: null
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'svchost.exe'
    filter_optional_mrt:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\MRT.exe'
        CommandLine: 'svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential MsiExec Masquerading
id: e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144
status: test
description: Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
references:
    - https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-11-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: '\msiexec.exe'
    filter:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location
id: 4922a5dd-6743-4fc2-8e81-144374280997
status: test
description: Detects a flashplayer update from an unofficial location
references:
    - https://gist.github.com/roycewilliams/a723aaf8a6ac3ba4f817847610935cfb
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-10-25
modified: 2022-08-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        - c-uri|contains: '/flash_install.php'
        - c-uri|endswith: '/install_flash_player.exe'
    filter:
        cs-host|endswith: '.adobe.com'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown flash download locations
level: high

title: OpenCanary - TFTP Request
id: b4e6b016-a2ac-4759-ad85-8000b300d61e
status: test
description: Detects instances where a TFTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a request.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Security Onion Solutions
date: 2024-03-08
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 10001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - NMAP NULL Scan
id: 68b8547b-107f-43f3-97fb-900a7d63c190
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP NULL Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5003
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan
id: e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - NMAP FIN Scan
id: eae8c0c8-e5da-450a-9d7d-66aa56cd26b6
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP FIN Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5005
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - NMAP XMAS Scan
id: d7553d7b-f485-479c-b192-cdac6edd83a4
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP XMAS Scan
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5004
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: OpenCanary - Host Port Scan (SYN Scan)
id: 974be8d2-283e-4033-ab08-7505b84204d0
status: experimental
description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a SYN port scan.
references:
    - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration
    - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
date: 2026-01-06
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: application
    product: opencanary
detection:
    selection:
        logtype: 5001
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
related:
    - id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: ps_script
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection.
level: high

title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution
id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
related:
    - id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2023-12-04
references:
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn
    - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841
    - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md
    - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1046
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1106
    - attack.t1518
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1555
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Offline_Winpwn'
            - 'WinPwn '
            - 'WinPwn.exe'
            - 'WinPwn.ps1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - winPEAS Execution
id: 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
status: test
description: WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
references:
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation
author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2022-09-19
modified: 2023-03-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1046
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'winPEAS.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\winPEASany_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASany.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx64.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86_ofs.exe'
              - '\winPEASx86.exe'
    selection_cli_option:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' applicationsinfo' # Search installed applications information
            - ' browserinfo' # Search browser information
            - ' eventsinfo' # Display interesting events information
            - ' fileanalysis' # Search specific files that can contains credentials and for regexes inside files
            - ' filesinfo' # Search generic files that can contains credentials
            - ' processinfo' # Search processes information
            - ' servicesinfo' # Search services information
            - ' windowscreds' # Search windows credentials
    selection_cli_dl:
        CommandLine|contains: 'https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/'
    selection_cli_specific:
        - ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
        - CommandLine|endswith: ' -linpeas'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Remote DCOM/WMI Lateral Movement
id: 68050b10-e477-4377-a99b-3721b422d6ef
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls that performs remote DCOM operations. These could be abused for lateral movement via DCOM or WMI.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9
    - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall
    - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/
author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
date: 2022-01-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1021.003
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    product: rpc_firewall
    category: application
    definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003'
detection:
    selection:
        EventLog: RPCFW
        EventID: 3
        InterfaceUuid:
            - 4d9f4ab8-7d1c-11cf-861e-0020af6e7c57
            - 99fcfec4-5260-101b-bbcb-00aa0021347a
            - 000001a0-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000131-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000143-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
            - 00000000-0000-0000-c000-000000000046
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Some administrative tasks on remote host
level: high

title: WMImplant Hack Tool
id: 8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7
status: test
description: Detects parameters used by WMImplant
references:
    - https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant
author: NVISO
date: 2020-03-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'WMImplant'
            - ' change_user '
            - ' gen_cli '
            - ' command_exec '
            - ' disable_wdigest '
            - ' disable_winrm '
            - ' enable_wdigest '
            - ' enable_winrm '
            - ' registry_mod '
            - ' remote_posh '
            - ' sched_job '
            - ' service_mod '
            - ' process_kill '
            # - ' process_start '
            - ' active_users '
            - ' basic_info '
            # - ' drive_list '
            # - ' installed_programs '
            - ' power_off '
            - ' vacant_system '
            - ' logon_events '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts that use the same keywords.
level: high

title: Suspicious Encoded Scripts in a WMI Consumer
id: 83844185-1c5b-45bc-bcf3-b5bf3084ca5b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded payloads in WMI Event Consumers
references:
    - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/LiquidSnake
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_destination:
        Destination|base64offset|contains:
            - 'WriteProcessMemory'
            - 'This program cannot be run in DOS mode'
            - 'This program must be run under Win32'
    condition: selection_destination
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process
id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937
related:
    - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6
      type: similar
    - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d
      type: similar
    - id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
    - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/
    - https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760
author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-11-10
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    selection_children_1:
        # TODO: Add more LOLBINs or suspicious processes that make sens in your environment
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\verclsid.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_children_2:
        # This is in a separate selection due to the nature of FP generated with CMD
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'wscript'
    filter_main_werfault:
        Image|endswith: '\WerFault.exe'
    filter_main_wmiprvse:
        Image|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe' # In some legitimate case WmiPrvSE was seen spawning itself
    filter_main_msiexec:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/i '
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity
id: 10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2
related:
    - id: e31f89f7-36fb-4697-8ab6-48823708353b
      type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework
references:
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/wmiexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/atexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/smbexec.py
    - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/dcomexec.py
    - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.html
author: Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Tim Rauch
date: 2019-09-03
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_other:
        # *** wmiexec.py
        #    parent is wmiprvse.exe
        #    examples:
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c whoami 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        #       cmd.exe /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567439113.54 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object MMC20
        #   parent is mmc.exe
        #   example:
        #       "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd  1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567442499.05 2>&1
        # *** dcomexec.py -object ShellBrowserWindow
        #  runs %SystemRoot%\System32\rundll32.exe shell32.dll,SHCreateLocalServerRunDll {c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880} but parent command is explorer.exe
        #  example:
        #   "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /Q /c cd \ 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1567520103.71 2>&1
        # *** smbexec.py
        #   parent is services.exe
        #   example:
        #       C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c echo tasklist ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\__output 2^>^&1 > C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /Q /c C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat & del C:\Windows\TEMP\execute.bat
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'        # wmiexec
            - '\mmc.exe'        # dcomexec MMC
            - '\explorer.exe'        # dcomexec ShellBrowserWindow
            - '\services.exe'        # smbexec
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/Q'
            - '/c'
            - '\\\\127.0.0.1\\'
            - '&1'
    selection_atexec:
        ParentCommandLine|contains:
            - 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs'       # atexec on win10 (parent is "C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs")
            - 'taskeng.exe'       # atexec on win7 (parent is "taskeng.exe {AFA79333-694C-4BEE-910E-E57D9A3518F6} S-1-5-18:NT AUTHORITY\System:Service:")
            # cmd.exe /C tasklist /m > C:\Windows\Temp\bAJrYQtL.tmp 2>&1
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - '/C'
            - 'Windows\Temp\'
            - '&1'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_execution_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe' # wmic process call create 'reg.exe add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Desktops /t REG_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\tre\Desktops.exe\" random" /f'
        - ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
    selection_execution_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'reg'
            - ' add '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
            - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
    selection_suspicious_paths_1:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs'
            - :\ProgramData'
            - ':\Windows\Temp'
            - ':\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '\AppData\Roaming'
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Users\Default'
            - ':\Users\public'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%Public%'
            - '%AppData%'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
        CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
    selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Favorites'
            - '\Favourites'
            - '\Contacts'
            - '\Music'
            - '\Pictures'
            - '\Documents'
            - '\Photos'
    condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution
id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
status: test
description: This rule detect common flag combinations used by CrackMapExec in order to detect its use even if the binary has been replaced.
references:
    - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
    - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1201
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_binary:
        Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
    selection_special:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -M pe_inject '
    selection_execute:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -x '
    selection_hash:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - " -H 'NTHASH'"
    selection_module_mssql:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' mssql '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -d '
    selection_module_smb1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -H '
            - ' -M '
            - ' -o '
    selection_module_smb2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' smb '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
            - ' --local-auth'
    part_localauth_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --local-auth'
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
    part_localauth_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' 10.'
            - ' 192.168.'
            - '/24 '
    condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious HH.EXE Execution
id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'HH.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.application'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\Content.Outlook\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp?_'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\7z'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\wz'
            # - '\AppData\Local\Temp\peazip-tmp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE
id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
related:
    - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d # Generic
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process '
            - 'call '
            - 'create '
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more susupicious paths and binaries as you see fit in your env
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'bitsadmin'
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'cmd.exe /c '
            - 'cmd.exe /k '
            - 'cmd.exe /r '
            - 'cmd /c '
            - 'cmd /k '
            - 'cmd /r '
            - 'powershell'
            - 'pwsh'
            - 'certutil'
            - 'cscript'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'mshta'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\'
            - '%temp%'
            - '%tmp%'
            - '%ProgramData%'
            - '%appdata%'
            - '%comspec%'
            - '%localappdata%'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
related:
    - id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775 # Speicifc OneNote rule due to its recent usage in phishing attacks
      type: derived
    - id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
      type: derived
    - id: 23daeb52-e6eb-493c-8607-c4f0246cb7d8
      type: obsolete
    - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from one of the Microsoft Office suite products (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Publisher, Visio, etc.)
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100
    - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://doublepulsar.com/follina-a-microsoft-office-code-execution-vulnerability-1a47fce5629e
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
    - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/300af51b88ad5d5b27ce4f5f54e4d6e6a3a2c06d/detections/endpoint/office_spawning_control.yml
    - https://twitter.com/andythevariable/status/1576953781581144064?s=20&t=QiJILvK4ZiBdR8RJe24u-A
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_msbuild_started_by_office_app.toml
    - https://www.vmray.com/analyses/2d2fa29185ad/report/overview.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/c903e9c8-0350-440c-8688-3881b556b8e0/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, FPT.EagleEye Team, Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng, Michael Haag, Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, @scythe_io
date: 2018-04-06
modified: 2023-04-24
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    selection_child_processes:
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'bitsadmin.exe'
              - 'CertOC.exe'
              - 'CertUtil.exe'
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'CMSTP.EXE'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'curl.exe'
              - 'HH.exe'
              - 'IEExec.exe'
              - 'InstallUtil.exe'
              - 'javaw.exe'
              - 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - 'msdt.exe'
              - 'MSHTA.EXE'
              - 'msiexec.exe'
              - 'Msxsl.exe'
              - 'odbcconf.exe'
              - 'pcalua.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'RegAsm.exe'
              - 'RegSvcs.exe'
              - 'REGSVR32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.exe'
              - 'schtasks.exe'
              - 'ScriptRunner.exe'
              - 'wmic.exe'
              - 'WorkFolders.exe'
              - 'wscript.exe'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\AppVLP.exe'
              - '\bash.exe'
              - '\bitsadmin.exe'
              - '\certoc.exe'
              - '\certutil.exe'
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cmstp.exe'
              - '\control.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\curl.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\ieexec.exe'
              - '\installutil.exe'
              - '\javaw.exe'
              - '\mftrace.exe'
              - '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
              - '\msbuild.exe'
              - '\msdt.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\msidb.exe'
              - '\msiexec.exe'
              - '\msxsl.exe'
              - '\odbcconf.exe'
              - '\pcalua.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regasm.exe'
              - '\regsvcs.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\schtasks.exe'
              - '\scrcons.exe'
              - '\scriptrunner.exe'
              - '\sh.exe'
              - '\svchost.exe'
              - '\verclsid.exe'
              - '\wmic.exe'
              - '\workfolders.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_child_susp_paths: # Idea: Laiali Kazalbach, Mohamed Elsayed (#4142)
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '\ProgramData\'
            - '\Windows\Tasks\'
            - '\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
    condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Script Event Consumer Spawning Process
id: f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/
    - https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/scrcons-exe-rare-child-process.html
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-21
modified: 2022-07-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\scrcons.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\msbuild.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Windows Defender Tampering Via Wmic.EXE
id: 51cbac1e-eee3-4a90-b1b7-358efb81fa0a
status: test
description: Detects potential tampering with Windows Defender settings such as adding exclusion using wmic
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iobit-forums-hacked-to-spread-ransomware-to-its-members/
author: frack113
date: 2022-12-11
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Namespace:\\\\root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process
id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738
related:
    - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50
      type: derived
    - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a
      type: obsolete
    - id: 9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0
      type: obsolete
    - id: c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5
      type: obsolete
    - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin).
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml
author: Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
            - '\MSPUB.exe'
            - '\VISIO.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
            - '\ONENOTE.EXE'
            - '\wordpad.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
    selection_wmic_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wbem\WMIC.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_wmic_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'process'
            - 'create'
            - 'call'
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Add more suspicious LOLBINs as you see fit
            - 'regsvr32'
            - 'rundll32'
            - 'msiexec'
            - 'mshta'
            - 'verclsid'
            - 'wscript'
            - 'cscript'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
    - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
    - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1218
    - attack.t1218.001
    - attack.t1218.010
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\hh.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\CertReq.exe'
            - '\CertUtil.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\installutil.exe'
            - '\MSbuild.exe'
            - '\MSHTA.EXE'
            - '\msiexec.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
            - 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Potential Remote SquiblyTwo Technique Execution
id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
related:
    - id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
      type: similar
    - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
    Detects potential execution of the SquiblyTwo technique that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
    to execute malicious code remotely. This technique bypasses application whitelisting by using wmic.exe to process
    malicious XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) scripts that can contain embedded JScript or VBScript.
    The attack typically works by fetching XSL content from a remote source (using HTTP/HTTPS) and executing it
    with full trust privileges directly in memory, avoiding disk-based detection mechanisms. This is a common
    LOLBin (Living Off The Land Binary) technique used for defense evasion and code execution.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20190209154607/https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/986280382042595328 # Deleted
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1220/
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/
    - https://x.com/byrne_emmy12099/status/1932346420226658668
author: Markus Neis, Florian Roth, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1220
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
        - Hashes|contains:  # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
              - 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
              - 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
              - 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
              - 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
              - 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|windash: '/format:'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '://'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block
id: 97b9ce1e-c5ab-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
status: test
description: Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands
    - https://twitter.com/duff22b/status/1280166329660497920
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2020-07-14
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
    definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c)'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1121
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\wmiprvse.exe'
            - '\psexesvc.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Powershell DNSExfiltration
id: d59d7842-9a21-4bc6-ba98-64bfe0091355
status: test
description: DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048/T1048.md#atomic-test-3---dnsexfiltration-doh
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-07
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        - ScriptBlockText|contains: 'Invoke-DNSExfiltrator'
        - ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
              - ' -i '
              - ' -d '
              - ' -p '
              - ' -doh '
              - ' -t '
    condition: selection_cmdlet
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate script
level: high