title: Azure Kubernetes Admission Controller
id: a61a3c56-4ce2-4351-a079-88ae4cbd2b58
status: test
description: |
  Identifies when an admission controller is executed in Azure Kubernetes.
  A Kubernetes Admission controller intercepts, and possibly modifies, requests to the Kubernetes API server.
  The behavior of this admission controller is determined by an admission webhook (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) that the user deploys in the cluster.
  An adversary can use such webhooks as the MutatingAdmissionWebhook for obtaining persistence in the cluster.
  For example, attackers can intercept and modify the pod creation operations in the cluster and add their malicious container to every created pod.
  An adversary can use the webhook ValidatingAdmissionWebhook, which could be used to obtain access credentials.
  An adversary could use the webhook to intercept the requests to the API server, record secrets, and other sensitive information.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1552.007
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: activitylogs
detection:
    selection:
        operationName|startswith:
            - 'MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO'
            - 'MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO'
        operationName|endswith:
            - '/MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE'
            - '/VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Azure Kubernetes Admissions Controller may be done by a system administrator.
    - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Microsoft 365 - Impossible Travel Activity
id: d7eab125-5f94-43df-8710-795b80fa1189
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a risky sign-in attempt due to a login associated with an impossible travel.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2020-07-06
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Impossible travel activity'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Logon from a Risky IP Address
id: c191e2fa-f9d6-4ccf-82af-4f2aba08359f
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user signs into your sanctioned apps from a risky IP address.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    service: threat_management
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter
        eventName: 'Log on from a risky IP address'
        status: success
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Google Workspace Government Attack Warning
id: eafe6f2b-cfec-4612-aec2-49563c33a087
status: experimental
description: Detects a login attempt in Google Workspace flagged as a potential attack by a government-backed threat actor
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging
    - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/understanding-audit-logs
    - https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/login#gov_attack_warning
author: Tom Kluter
date: 2026-04-28
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.impact
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: google_workspace.login
detection:
    selection:
        protoPayload.serviceName: 'login.googleapis.com'
        protoPayload.metadata.event.eventName: 'gov_attack_warning'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Google Cloud Kubernetes Admission Controller
id: 6ad91e31-53df-4826-bd27-0166171c8040
status: test
description: |
  Identifies when an admission controller is executed in GCP Kubernetes.
  A Kubernetes Admission controller intercepts, and possibly modifies, requests to the Kubernetes API server.
  The behavior of this admission controller is determined by an admission webhook (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) that the user deploys in the cluster.
  An adversary can use such webhooks as the MutatingAdmissionWebhook for obtaining persistence in the cluster.
  For example, attackers can intercept and modify the pod creation operations in the cluster and add their malicious container to every created pod. An adversary can use the webhook ValidatingAdmissionWebhook, which could be used to obtain access credentials.
  An adversary could use the webhook to intercept the requests to the API server, record secrets, and other sensitive information.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-25
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1552.007
logsource:
    product: gcp
    service: gcp.audit
detection:
    selection:
        gcp.audit.method_name|startswith: 'admissionregistration.k8s.io.v'
        gcp.audit.method_name|contains:
            - '.mutatingwebhookconfigurations.'
            - '.validatingwebhookconfigurations.'
        gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
            - 'create'
            - 'patch'
            - 'replace'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Google Cloud Kubernetes Admission Controller may be done by a system administrator.
    - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Computer Machine Password by PowerShell
id: e3818659-5016-4811-a73c-dde4679169d2
status: test
description: |
    The Reset-ComputerMachinePassword cmdlet changes the computer account password that the computers use to authenticate to the domain controllers in the domain.
    You can use it to reset the password of the local computer.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/reset-computermachinepassword?view=powershell-5.1
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_module
    definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
    selection:
        ContextInfo|contains: 'Reset-ComputerMachinePassword'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator PowerShell scripts
level: medium

title: Password Provided In Command Line Of Net.EXE
id: d4498716-1d52-438f-8084-4a603157d131
status: test
description: Detects a when net.exe is called with a password in the command line
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
date: 2021-12-09
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\net.exe'
              - '\net1.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'net.exe'
              - 'net1.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' use '
            - ':*\\'
            - '/USER:* *'
    filter_main_empty:
        CommandLine|endswith: ' '
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: User Added to Local Administrator Group
id: c265cf08-3f99-46c1-8d59-328247057d57
status: stable
description: Detects the addition of a new member to the local administrator group, which could be legitimate activity or a sign of privilege escalation activity
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-14
modified: 2021-01-17
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4732
    selection_group:
        - TargetUserName|startswith: 'Administr'
        - TargetSid: 'S-1-5-32-544'
    filter_main_computer_accounts:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium

title: Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials
id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials
references:
    - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view
author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-10-05
modified: 2022-08-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.lateral-movement
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4648
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\winrs.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
    filter1:
        TargetServerName: 'localhost'
    filter2:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks
level: medium

title: Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
id: 9eb99343-d336-4020-a3cd-67f3819e68ee
status: test
description: This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1101431884540710913
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID:
            - 4625
            - 4776
    selection_status:
        - Status:
              - '0xC0000072'  # User logon to account disabled by administrator
              - '0xC000006F'  # User logon outside authorized hours
              - '0xC0000070'  # User logon from unauthorized workstation
              - '0xC0000413'  # Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine
              - '0xC000018C'  # The logon request failed because the trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed
              - '0xC000015B'  # The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine
        - SubStatus:
              - '0xC0000072'  # User logon to account disabled by administrator
              - '0xC000006F'  # User logon outside authorized hours
              - '0xC0000070'  # User logon from unauthorized workstation
              - '0xC0000413'  # Logon Failure: The machine you are logging onto is protected by an authentication firewall. The specified account is not allowed to authenticate to the machine
              - '0xC000018C'  # The logon request failed because the trust relationship between the primary domain and the trusted domain failed
              - '0xC000015B'  # The user has not been granted the requested logon type (aka logon right) at this machine
    filter:
        SubjectUserSid: 'S-1-0-0'
    condition: all of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - User using a disabled account
level: medium

title: Failed Logon From Public IP
id: f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1
status: test
description: Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
author: NVISO
date: 2020-05-06
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1133
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4625
    filter_main_ip_unknown:
        IpAddress|contains: '-'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate logon attempts over the internet
    - IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs
level: medium

title: External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP
id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
related:
    - id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.
references:
    - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html
    - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752
author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
date: 2023-01-19
modified: 2024-03-11
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1110
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
    filter_main_empty:
        IpAddress: '-'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the RDP port.
level: medium

title: Suspicious TCP Tunnel Via PowerShell Script
id: bd33d2aa-497e-4651-9893-5c5364646595
status: test
description: Detects powershell scripts that creates sockets/listeners which could be indicative of tunneling activity
references:
    - https://github.com/Arno0x/PowerShellScripts/blob/a6b7d5490fbf0b20f91195838f3a11156724b4f7/proxyTunnel.ps1
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - '[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]'
            - 'System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener'
            - 'AcceptTcpClient'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Cloudflared Tunnel Execution
id: 9a019ffc-3580-4c9d-8d87-079f7e8d3fd4
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "cloudflared" tool to connect back to a tunnel. This was seen used by threat actors to maintain persistence and remote access to compromised networks.
references:
    - https://blog.reconinfosec.com/emergence-of-akira-ransomware-group
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-apps
author: Janantha Marasinghe, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-17
modified: 2023-12-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - ' run '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-credentials-contents '
            - '-credentials-file '
            - '-token '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of Cloudflared tunnel.
level: medium

title: Cloudflared Tunnel Connections Cleanup
id: 7050bba1-1aed-454e-8f73-3f46f09ce56a
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "cloudflared" tool with the tunnel "cleanup" flag in order to cleanup tunnel connections.
references:
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-apps
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-17
modified: 2023-12-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' tunnel '
            - 'cleanup '
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-config '
            - '-connector-id '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of Cloudflared.
level: medium

title: New Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
id: 322ed9ec-fcab-4f67-9a34-e7c6aef43614
status: test
description: Detects the execution of netsh commands that configure a new port forwarding (PortProxy) rule
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
    - https://adepts.of0x.cc/netsh-portproxy-code/
    - https://www.dfirnotes.net/portproxy_detection/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2019-01-29
modified: 2023-09-01
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'netsh.exe'
    selection_cli_1:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'interface'
            - 'portproxy'
            - 'add'
            - 'v4tov4'
    selection_cli_2:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            # Example: netsh I p a v l=8001 listena=127.0.0.1 connectp=80 c=192.168.1.1
            - 'i ' # interface
            - 'p ' # portproxy
            - 'a ' # add
            - 'v ' # v4tov4
    selection_cli_3:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'connectp'
            - 'listena'
            - 'c='
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administration activity
    - WSL2 network bridge PowerShell script used for WSL/Kubernetes/Docker (e.g. https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/4150#issuecomment-504209723)
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Usage Of Qemu
id: 5fc297ae-25b6-488a-8f25-cc12ac29b744
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Qemu utility in a Windows environment.
    Threat actors have leveraged this utility and this technique for achieving network access as reported by Kaspersky.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/network-tunneling-with-qemu/111803/
    - https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/invocation.html#hxtool-5
author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf), Hunter Juhan (@threatHNTR)
date: 2024-06-03
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
    - attack.t1572
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-m 1M' # VM with just 1MB of ram is insufficient this is a suspicious flag
            - '-m 2M'
            - '-m 3M'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'restrict=off'
            - '-netdev '
            - 'connect='
            - '-nographic' # This is also a key detection no one invoke without UI from console usually its a flag.
    filter_main_normal_usecase:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -cdrom ' # Normal usage cases
            - ' type=virt '
            - ' -blockdev '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: New PortProxy Registry Entry Added
id: a54f842a-3713-4b45-8c84-5f136fdebd3c
status: test
description: Detects the modification of the PortProxy registry key which is used for port forwarding.
references:
    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
    - https://adepts.of0x.cc/netsh-portproxy-code/
    - https://www.dfirnotes.net/portproxy_detection/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2021-06-22
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Example: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp\0.0.0.0/1337
        TargetObject|contains: '\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\tcp\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - WSL2 network bridge PowerShell script used for WSL/Kubernetes/Docker (e.g. https://github.com/microsoft/WSL/issues/4150#issuecomment-504209723)
    - Synergy Software KVM (https://symless.com/synergy)
level: medium

title: Network Communication Initiated To Portmap.IO Domain
id: 07837ab9-60e1-481f-a74d-c31fb496a94c
status: test
description: Detects an executable accessing the portmap.io domain, which could be a sign of forbidden C2 traffic or data exfiltration by malicious actors
references:
    - https://portmap.io/
    - https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/11337
    - https://pro.twitter.com/JaromirHorejsi/status/1795001037746761892/photo/2
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.portmap.io'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of portmap.io domains
level: medium

title: Ruby on Rails Framework Exceptions
id: 0d2c3d4c-4b48-4ac3-8f23-ea845746bb1a
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious Ruby on Rails exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
references:
    - http://edgeguides.rubyonrails.org/security.html
    - http://guides.rubyonrails.org/action_controller_overview.html
    - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/25892194/does-rails-come-with-a-not-authorized-exception
    - https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/cd08e6bcc4cd8948fe01e0be1ea0c7ca60373a25/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/exception_wrapper.rb
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-06
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: ruby_on_rails
detection:
    keywords:
        - ActionController::InvalidAuthenticityToken
        - ActionController::InvalidCrossOriginRequest
        - ActionController::MethodNotAllowed
        - ActionController::BadRequest
        - ActionController::ParameterMissing
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: Django Framework Exceptions
id: fd435618-981e-4a7c-81f8-f78ce480d616
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious Django web application framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
references:
    - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/ref/exceptions/
    - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/topics/logging/#django-security
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-05
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: django
detection:
    keywords:
        - SuspiciousOperation
        # Subclasses of SuspiciousOperation
        - DisallowedHost
        - DisallowedModelAdminLookup
        - DisallowedModelAdminToField
        - DisallowedRedirect
        - InvalidSessionKey
        - RequestDataTooBig
        - SuspiciousFileOperation
        - SuspiciousMultipartForm
        - SuspiciousSession
        - TooManyFieldsSent
        # Further security-related exceptions
        - PermissionDenied
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: Python SQL Exceptions
id: 19aefed0-ffd4-47dc-a7fc-f8b1425e84f9
status: stable
description: Generic rule for SQL exceptions in Python according to PEP 249
references:
    - https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0249/#exceptions
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-12
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: python
detection:
    keywords:
        - DataError
        - IntegrityError
        - ProgrammingError
        - OperationalError
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: Spring Framework Exceptions
id: ae48ab93-45f7-4051-9dfe-5d30a3f78e33
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious Spring framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
references:
    - https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/current/api/overview-tree.html
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-08-06
modified: 2020-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: application
    product: spring
detection:
    keywords:
        - AccessDeniedException
        - CsrfException
        - InvalidCsrfTokenException
        - MissingCsrfTokenException
        - CookieTheftException
        - InvalidCookieException
        - RequestRejectedException
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Application bugs
level: medium

title: RDS Database Security Group Modification
id: 14f3f1c8-02d5-43a2-a191-91ffb52d3015
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the security group entries for RDS databases.
    This can indicate that a misconfiguration has occurred which potentially exposes the database to the public internet, a wider audience within the VPC or that removal of valid rules has occurred which could impact the availability of the database to legitimate services and users.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'rds.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AuthorizeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'CreateDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'DeleteDBSecurityGroup'
            - 'RevokeDBSecurityGroupIngress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Creation of a new Database that needs new security group rules
level: medium

title: LoadBalancer Security Group Modification
id: 7a4409fc-f8ca-45f6-8006-127d779eaad9
status: test
description: |
    Detects changes to the security groups associated with an Elastic Load Balancer (ELB) or Application Load Balancer (ALB).
    This can indicate that a misconfiguration allowing more traffic into the system than required, or could indicate that an attacker is attempting to enable new connections into a VPC or subnet controlled by the account.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'elasticloadbalancing.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'ApplySecurityGroupsToLoadBalancer'
            - 'SetSecurityGroups'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Repurposing of an ELB or ALB to serve a different or additional application
    - Changes to security groups to allow for new services to be deployed
level: medium

title: Ingress/Egress Security Group Modification
id: 6fb77778-040f-4015-9440-572aa9b6b580
status: test
description: |
    Detects when an account makes changes to the ingress or egress rules of a security group.
    This can indicate that an attacker is attempting to open up new attack vectors in the account, that they are trying to exfiltrate data over the network, or that they are trying to allow machines in that VPC/Subnet to contact a C&C server.
references:
    - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/
author: jamesc-grafana
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
        eventName:
            - 'AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress'
            - 'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress'
            - 'RevokeSecurityGroupEgress'
            - 'RevokeSecurityGroupIngress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - New VPCs and Subnets being setup requiring a different security profile to those already defined
    - A single port being opened for a new service that is known to be deploying
    - Administrators closing unused ports to reduce the attack surface
level: medium

title: Suspicious SQL Query
id: d84c0ded-edd7-4123-80ed-348bb3ccc4d5
status: test
description: Detects suspicious SQL query keywrods that are often used during recon, exfiltration or destructive activities. Such as dropping tables and selecting wildcard fields
author: '@juju4'
date: 2022-12-27
references:
    - https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1505.001
logsource:
    category: database
    definition: 'Requirements: Must be able to log the SQL queries'
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'drop'
        - 'truncate'
        - 'dump'
        - 'select \*'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Inventory and monitoring activity
    - Vulnerability scanners
    - Legitimate applications
level: medium

title: Suspicious VSFTPD Error Messages
id: 377f33a1-4b36-4ee1-acee-1dbe4b43cfbe
status: test
description: Detects suspicious VSFTPD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
references:
    - https://github.com/dagwieers/vsftpd/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-05
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: vsftpd
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'Connection refused: too many sessions for this address.'
        - 'Connection refused: tcp_wrappers denial.'
        - 'Bad HTTP verb.'
        - 'port and pasv both active'
        - 'pasv and port both active'
        - 'Transfer done (but failed to open directory).'
        - 'Could not set file modification time.'
        - 'bug: pid active in ptrace_sandbox_free'
        - 'PTRACE_SETOPTIONS failure'
        - 'weird status:'
        - 'couldn''t handle sandbox event'
        - 'syscall * out of bounds'
        - 'syscall not permitted:'
        - 'syscall validate failed:'
        - 'Input line too long.'
        - 'poor buffer accounting in str_netfd_alloc'
        - 'vsf_sysutil_read_loop'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error
id: e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc
status: test
description: Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
references:
    - https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca/ssherr.c
    - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/sshd_rules.xml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-06-30
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: sshd
detection:
    keywords:
        - 'unexpected internal error'
        - 'unknown or unsupported key type'
        - 'invalid certificate signing key'
        - 'invalid elliptic curve value'
        - 'incorrect signature'
        - 'error in libcrypto'
        - 'unexpected bytes remain after decoding'
        - 'fatal: buffer_get_string: bad string'
        - 'Local: crc32 compensation attack'
        - 'bad client public DH value'
        - 'Corrupted MAC on input'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious File Write to Webapps Root Directory
id: 89c42960-f244-4dad-9151-ae9b1a3287a2
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious file writes to the root directory of web applications, particularly Apache web servers or Tomcat servers.
    This may indicate an attempt to deploy malicious files such as web shells or other unauthorized scripts.
references:
    - https://labs.watchtowr.com/guess-who-would-be-stupid-enough-to-rob-the-same-vault-twice-pre-auth-rce-chains-in-commvault/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-10-20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    # Add more suspicious processes or paths or extensions as needed
    selection_susp_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dotnet.exe'
            - '\w3wp.exe'
            - '\java.exe'
    selection_servers:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\apache'
            - '\tomcat'
    selection_path:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\webapps\ROOT\'
    selection_susp_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.jsp'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Suspicious File Drop by Exchange
id: 6b269392-9eba-40b5-acb6-55c882b20ba6
related:
    - id: bd1212e5-78da-431e-95fa-c58e3237a8e6
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious file type dropped by an Exchange component in IIS
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/30/analyzing-attacks-using-the-exchange-vulnerabilities-cve-2022-41040-and-cve-2022-41082/
    - https://www.gteltsc.vn/blog/canh-bao-chien-dich-tan-cong-su-dung-lo-hong-zero-day-tren-microsoft-exchange-server-12714.html
    - https://en.gteltsc.vn/blog/cap-nhat-nhe-ve-lo-hong-bao-mat-0day-microsoft-exchange-dang-duoc-su-dung-de-tan-cong-cac-to-chuc-tai-viet-nam-9685.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-04
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1505.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\w3wp.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'MSExchange'
    selection_types:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.aspx'
            - '.asp'
            - '.ashx'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.exe'
            - '.dll'
            - '.vbs'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Apache Threading Error
id: e9a2b582-3f6a-48ac-b4a1-6849cdc50b3c
status: test
description: Detects an issue in apache logs that reports threading related errors
references:
    - https://github.com/hannob/apache-uaf/blob/da40f2be3684c8095ec6066fa68eb5c07a086233/README.md
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1210
logsource:
    service: apache
    definition: 'Requirements: Must be able to collect the error.log file'
detection:
    keywords:
        - '__pthread_tpp_change_priority: Assertion `new_prio == -1 || (new_prio >= fifo_min_prio && new_prio <= fifo_max_prio)'
    condition: keywords
falsepositives:
    - 3rd party apache modules - https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
level: medium

title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy
id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17
related:
    - id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP
references:
    - https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo
date: 2023-11-08
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        c-uri|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes
level: medium

title: Suspicious User-Agents Related To Recon Tools
id: 19aa4f58-94ca-45ff-bc34-92e533c0994a
status: test
description: Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools
references:
    - https://github.com/wpscanteam/wpscan/blob/196fbab5b1ce3870a43515153d4f07878a89d410/lib/wpscan/browser.rb
    - https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz/blob/1b695ee9a87d66a7d7bf6cae70d60a33fae51541/docs/user/basicusage.rst
    - https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng/blob/9e907dfe09fce2997f0301d746796408e01a60b7/recon/core/base.py#L92
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
date: 2022-07-19
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-user-agent|contains:
            # Add more tools as you see fit
            - 'Wfuzz/'
            - 'WPScan v'
            - 'Recon-ng/v'
            - 'GIS - AppSec Team - Project Vision'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Webserver
id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37
related:
    - id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP
references:
    - https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029
    - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo
date: 2023-11-08
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|endswith: '/mgmt/tm/util/bash'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes
level: medium

title: Path Traversal Exploitation Attempts
id: 7745c2ea-24a5-4290-b680-04359cb84b35
status: test
description: Detects path traversal exploitation attempts
references:
    - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates
    - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/file-inclusion
author: Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-09-25
modified: 2023-08-31
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '../../../../../lib/password'
            - '../../../../windows/'
            - '../../../etc/'
            - '..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252f'
            - '..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%afetc%c0%af'
            - '%252e%252e%252fetc%252f'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Expected to be continuously seen on systems exposed to the Internet
    - Internal vulnerability scanners
level: medium

title: Successful IIS Shortname Fuzzing Scan
id: 7cb02516-6d95-4ffc-8eee-162075e111ac
status: test
description: When IIS uses an old .Net Framework it's possible to enumerate folders with the symbol "~"
references:
    - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/9d2889356eebba661c8407038e430759dfd4ec31/fuzzing/iis-shortname.yaml
    - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19525
    - https://github.com/lijiejie/IIS_shortname_Scanner
author: frack113
date: 2021-10-06
modified: 2023-01-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '~1'
        cs-uri-query|endswith: 'a.aspx'
        cs-method:
            - GET
            - OPTIONS
        # Success only
        sc-status:
            - 200
            - 301
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key
id: ea61bb82-a5e0-42e6-8537-91d29500f1b9
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges
    to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes,
    or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Though intended for recovery and debugging, SysRq can be
    misused as a stealthy post-exploitation tool. It is controlled via /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq or permanently through /etc/sysctl.conf.
references:
    - https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.10/_sources/admin-guide/sysrq.txt
    - https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/4/html/reference_guide/s3-proc-sys-kernel
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-awfulshred-script-wiper.html
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-05-23
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1529
    - attack.t1489
    - attack.t1499
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
    definition: |
        Required auditd configuration:
        -w /proc/sysrq-trigger -p wa -k sysrq
        -w /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq -p wa -k sysrq
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'PATH'
        name|endswith:
            # Enable
            - '/sysrq'
            - '/sysctl.conf'
            # Execute
            - '/sysrq-trigger'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium

title: Suspicious Execution via macOS Script Editor
id: 6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4
status: test
description: Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-7f541fbc4a4a28a92970e8bf53effea5bd934604429112c920affb457f5b2685
    - https://wojciechregula.blog/post/macos-red-teaming-initial-access-via-applescript-url/
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2022-12-28
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1059.002
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1553
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/Script Editor'
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '/curl'
              - '/bash'
              - '/sh'
              - '/zsh'
              - '/dash'
              - '/fish'
              - '/osascript'
              - '/mktemp'
              - '/chmod'
              - '/php'
              - '/nohup'
              - '/openssl'
              - '/plutil'
              - '/PlistBuddy'
              - '/xattr'
              - '/sqlite'
              - '/funzip'
              - '/popen'
        - Image|contains:
              - 'python'
              - 'perl'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking
id: dbbd9f66-2ed3-4ca2-98a4-6ea985dd1a1c
status: test
description: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDrive and by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking.
references:
    - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d46dd4ac6866b4337ec126be8cee0e115467b3e8703794ba6f6df6432c806bc
    - https://posts.specterops.io/automating-dll-hijack-discovery-81c4295904b0
author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1574
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # add more processes when you find them
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\MSACCESS.EXE'
            - '\MSPUB.EXE'
            - '\fltldr.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Users\'
            - '\AppData\'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # add more suspicious paths when you find them
            - '\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
            - '\Microsoft OneDrive\'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\'
            - '\Local\slack\app-'
            - '\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\'
    filter:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains|all:
            - '\Users\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
            - '\api-ms-win-core-'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Disk Image Mounting Via Hdiutil - MacOS
id: bf241472-f014-4f01-a869-96f99330ca8c
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to mount disk images.
references:
    - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/hdiutil/
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/from-the-front-linesunsigned-macos-orat-malware-gambles-for-the-win/
    - https://ss64.com/mac/hdiutil.html
author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe)
date: 2024-08-10
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.t1560.001
logsource:
    product: macos
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: /hdiutil
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'attach '
            - 'mount '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of hdiutil by administrators and users.
level: medium

title: Suspicious Email Delivered In Microsoft 365
id: 3569aefd-e535-4391-8c18-24bd01a21eaf
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects instances where an email, identified as malicious or suspicious by the Microsoft Defender for Office 365 (formerly ATP) engine, was delivered to a user's Inbox or Junk folder.
    It might indicate that a potential threat, such as a spearphishing attachment or links, has bypassed initial blocking mechanisms and reached an end-user, requiring further investigation and potential remediation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-office-365/threat-explorer-real-time-detections-about
    - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/605cc93a-70e4-4ee3-9a3d-1a62e8c9b6c2/
    - https://github.com/Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/e7250648cb16d4a497ae8737943bf010ea96d2e6/Defender%20For%20Cloud%20Apps/MaliciousEmailDeliveredInMailbox.md
author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
date: 2026-01-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.t1566.002
logsource:
    service: audit
    product: m365
detection:
    selection:
        Workload: 'ThreatIntelligence'
        Operation: 'TIMailData'
        Directionality: 'Inbound'
    filter_main_blocked:
        DeliveryAction: 'Blocked'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: medium

title: ISO or Image Mount Indicator in Recent Files
id: 4358e5a5-7542-4dcb-b9f3-87667371839b
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of recent element file that points to an .ISO, .IMG, .VHD or .VHDX file as often used in phishing attacks.
    This can be a false positive on server systems but on workstations users should rarely mount .iso or .img files.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore
    - https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/32373/beware-new-wave-of-malware-spreads-via-iso-file-email-attachments/
    - https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/the-dangers-of-vhd-and-vhdx-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-02-11
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.iso.lnk'
            - '.img.lnk'
            - '.vhd.lnk'
            - '.vhdx.lnk'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Cases in which a user mounts an image file for legitimate reasons
level: medium

title: Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms
id: 24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e
status: test
description: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.
references:
    - https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39
author: Sreeman
date: 2020-03-13
modified: 2022-04-14
tags:
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.initial-access
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '.SettingContent-ms'
    filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'immersivecontrolpanel'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: ISO Image Mounted
id: 0248a7bc-8a9a-4cd8-a57e-3ae8e073a073
status: test
description: Detects the mount of an ISO image on an endpoint
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/malicious-spam-campaign-uses-iso-image-files-to-deliver-lokibot-and-nanocore
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/threat-actor-profile-ta2719-uses-colorful-lures-deliver-rats-local-languages
    - https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1257324139515269121
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
author: Syed Hasan (@syedhasan009)
date: 2021-05-29
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Removable Storage" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectServer: 'Security'
        ObjectType: 'File'
        ObjectName|startswith: '\Device\CdRom'
    filter_main_generic:
        ObjectName:
            - '\Device\CdRom0\autorun.ico'
            - '\Device\CdRom0\setup.exe'
            - '\Device\CdRom0\setup64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Software installation ISO files
level: medium

title: Windows Registry Trust Record Modification
id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2
related:
    - id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd
      type: similar
status: test
description: Alerts on trust record modification within the registry, indicating usage of macros
references:
    - https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/01/16/hunting-for-evil-detect-macros-being-executed/
    - http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2016/02/more-on-trust-records-macros-and.html
    - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397
author: Antonlovesdnb, Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-06-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This will alert on legitimate macro usage as well, additional tuning is required
level: medium

title: Program Executions in Suspicious Folders
id: a39d7fa7-3fbd-4dc2-97e1-d87f546b1bbc
status: test
description: Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-01-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.t1587
    - attack.t1584
    - attack.resource-development
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: auditd
detection:
    selection:
        type: 'SYSCALL'
        exe|startswith:
            # Temporary folder
            - '/tmp/'
            # Web server
            - '/var/www/'              # Standard
            - '/home/*/public_html/'   # Per-user
            - '/usr/local/apache2/'    # Classical Apache
            - '/usr/local/httpd/'      # Old SuSE Linux 6.* Apache
            - '/var/apache/'           # Solaris Apache
            - '/srv/www/'              # SuSE Linux 9.*
            - '/home/httpd/html/'      # Redhat 6 or older Apache
            - '/srv/http/'             # ArchLinux standard
            - '/usr/share/nginx/html/' # ArchLinux nginx
            # Data dirs of typically exploited services (incomplete list)
            - '/var/lib/pgsql/data/'
            - '/usr/local/mysql/data/'
            - '/var/lib/mysql/'
            - '/var/vsftpd/'
            - '/etc/bind/'
            - '/var/named/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Admin activity (especially in /tmp folders)
    - Crazy web applications
level: medium

title: VHD Image Download Via Browser
id: 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95
status: test
description: |
    Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes.
    Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls.
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
    - https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/
    - https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/
author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io'
date: 2021-10-25
modified: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1587.001
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\brave.exe'
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\maxthon.exe'
            - '\MicrosoftEdge.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\msedgewebview2.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\safari.exe'
            - '\seamonkey.exe'
            - '\vivaldi.exe'
            - '\whale.exe'
        # We don't use "endswith" to also match with ADS logs and ".vhdx". Example: "TargetFilename: C:\Users\xxx\Downloads\windows.vhd:Zone.Identifier"
        TargetFilename|contains: '.vhd'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate downloads of ".vhd" files would also trigger this
level: medium

title: Suspicious Keyboard Layout Load
id: 34aa0252-6039-40ff-951f-939fd6ce47d8
status: test
description: Detects the keyboard preload installation with a suspicious keyboard layout, e.g. Chinese, Iranian or Vietnamese layout load in user session on systems maintained by US staff only
references:
    - https://renenyffenegger.ch/notes/Windows/registry/tree/HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Keyboard-Layout/Preload/index
    - https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/pull/92/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-12
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon config that monitors \Keyboard Layout\Preload subkey of the HKLU hives - see https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/pull/92/files'
detection:
    selection_registry:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Keyboard Layout\Preload\'
            - '\Keyboard Layout\Substitutes\'
        Details|contains:
            - 00000429  # Persian (Iran)
            - 00050429  # Persian (Iran)
            - 0000042a  # Vietnamese
    condition: selection_registry
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or users that actually use the selected keyboard layouts (heavily depends on the organisation's user base)
level: medium

title: PUA - Sysinternals Tools Execution - Registry
id: c7da8edc-49ae-45a2-9e61-9fd860e4e73d
related:
    - id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133
      type: derived
    - id: 9841b233-8df8-4ad7-9133-b0b4402a9014
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects the execution of some potentially unwanted tools such as PsExec, Procdump, etc. (part of the Sysinternals suite) via the creation of the "accepteula" registry key.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2025-10-26
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1588.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\Active Directory Explorer'
            - '\Handle'
            - '\LiveKd'
            - '\Process Explorer'
            - '\ProcDump'
            - '\PsExec'
            - '\PsLoglist'
            - '\PsPasswd'
            - '\SDelete'
            - '\Sysinternals' # Global level https://twitter.com/leonzandman/status/1561736801953382400
        TargetObject|endswith: '\EulaAccepted'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SysInternals tools. Filter the legitimate paths used in your environment
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_pua_sysinternals_susp_execution_via_eula/info.yml