Sigma rules for Killnet
218 rules · scoped to actor · back to Killnet
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process
id: c27515df-97a9-4162-8a60-dc0eeb51b775
related:
- id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 # Generic rule for suspicious office application child processes
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Microsoft OneNote application. This may indicate an attempt to execute malicious embedded objects from a .one file.
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-e34e43eb5666427602ddf488b2bf3b545bd9aae81af3e6f6c7949f9652abdf18
- https://micahbabinski.medium.com/detecting-onenote-one-malware-delivery-407e9321ecf0
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-10-21
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
selection_opt_img:
- OriginalFileName:
- 'bitsadmin.exe'
- 'CertOC.exe'
- 'CertUtil.exe'
- 'Cmd.Exe'
- 'CMSTP.EXE'
- 'cscript.exe'
- 'curl.exe'
- 'HH.exe'
- 'IEExec.exe'
- 'InstallUtil.exe'
- 'javaw.exe'
- 'Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- 'msdt.exe'
- 'MSHTA.EXE'
- 'msiexec.exe'
- 'Msxsl.exe'
- 'odbcconf.exe'
- 'pcalua.exe'
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'RegAsm.exe'
- 'RegSvcs.exe'
- 'REGSVR32.exe'
- 'RUNDLL32.exe'
- 'schtasks.exe'
- 'ScriptRunner.exe'
- 'wmic.exe'
- 'WorkFolders.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
- Image|endswith:
- '\AppVLP.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\certoc.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cmstp.exe'
- '\control.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\forfiles.exe'
- '\hh.exe'
- '\ieexec.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\javaw.exe'
- '\mftrace.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe'
- '\msbuild.exe'
- '\msdt.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\msidb.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\msxsl.exe'
- '\odbcconf.exe'
- '\pcalua.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regasm.exe'
- '\regsvcs.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\scrcons.exe'
- '\scriptrunner.exe'
- '\sh.exe'
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\verclsid.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\workfolders.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_opt_explorer:
Image|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '.hta'
- '.vb'
- '.wsh'
- '.js'
- '.ps'
- '.scr'
- '.pif'
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
selection_opt_paths:
Image|contains:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Windows\Tasks\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- '\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
filter_teams:
Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
filter_onedrive:
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
Image|endswith: '\FileCoAuth.exe'
CommandLine|endswith: '-Embedding'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_opt_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- File located in the AppData folder with trusted signature
level: high
title: HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process
id: 52cad028-0ff0-4854-8f67-d25dfcbc78b4
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1218
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1218.010
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\hh.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\CertReq.exe'
- '\CertUtil.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\installutil.exe'
- '\MSbuild.exe'
- '\MSHTA.EXE'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious External WebDAV Execution
id: 1ae64f96-72b6-48b3-ad3d-e71dff6c6398
related:
- id: 4c55738d-72d8-490e-a2db-7969654e375f
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects executables launched from external WebDAV shares using the WebDAV Explorer integration, commonly seen in initial access campaigns.
references:
- https://dear-territory-023.notion.site/WebDav-Share-Testing-e4950fa0c00149c3aa430d779b9b1d0f?pvs=4
- https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_no/research/24/b/cve202421412-water-hydra-targets-traders-with-windows-defender-s.html
- https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method.html
author: Ahmed Farouk
date: 2024-05-10
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1584
- attack.t1566
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_webdav:
c-useragent|startswith: 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/'
cs-method: 'GET'
selection_execution:
c-uri|endswith:
- '.7z'
- '.bat'
- '.dat'
- '.cmd'
- '.exe'
- '.js'
- '.lnk'
- '.ps1'
- '.rar'
- '.url'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.zip'
filter_main_local_ips:
dst_ip|cidr:
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
- '::1/128' # IPv6 loopback
- 'fe80::/10' # IPv6 link-local addresses
- 'fc00::/7' # IPv6 private addresses
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: ISO File Created Within Temp Folders
id: 2f9356ae-bf43-41b8-b858-4496d83b2acb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.
references:
- https://twitter.com/Sam0x90/status/1552011547974696960
- https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133680/malware/dll-sideloading-spread-qakbot.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image
author: '@sam0x90'
date: 2022-07-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '.zip\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
selection_2:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.iso'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Potential FP by sysadmin opening a zip file containing a legitimate ISO file
level: high
title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory
id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3
related:
- id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments.
This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code.
references:
- https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/
- https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-22
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_extension:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.cpl'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.rdp'
- '.svg'
- '.vba'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
selection_location:
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\'
- '\Content.Outlook\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments
level: high
title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data'
detection:
selection_cmd:
- Image|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
# Note: ParentImage is a custom field and is not available by default on Sysmon EID 11
- ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
selection_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docm'
- '.dotm'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xltm'
- '.potm'
- '.pptm'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious HWP Sub Processes
id: 023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation
references:
- https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2016/11/23/technical-teardown-exploit-malware-hwp-files/
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=context:74940dcc5b38f9f9b1a0fea760d344735d7d91b610e6d5bd34533dd0153402c5&from_sample=5db135000388385a7644131f&block_redirect=1
- https://twitter.com/cyberwar_15/status/1187287262054076416
- https://blog.alyac.co.kr/1901
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor)
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.g0032
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\Hwp.exe'
Image|endswith: '\gbb.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder
id: a018fdc3-46a3-44e5-9afb-2cd4af1d4b39
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
references:
- Internal Research
date: 2019-10-01
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
related:
- id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c # ParentImage/ParentCommandLine
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns
references:
- https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html
- https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-06-26
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- ' .exe'
- '______.exe'
- '.doc.exe'
- '.doc.js'
- '.docx.exe'
- '.docx.js'
- '.gif.exe'
- '.jpeg.exe'
- '.jpg.exe'
- '.mkv.exe'
- '.mov.exe'
- '.mp3.exe'
- '.mp4.exe'
- '.pdf.exe'
- '.pdf.js'
- '.png.exe'
- '.ppt.exe'
- '.ppt.js'
- '.pptx.exe'
- '.pptx.js'
- '.rtf.exe'
- '.rtf.js'
- '.svg.exe'
- '.txt.exe'
- '.txt.js'
- '.xls.exe'
- '.xls.js'
- '.xlsx.exe'
- '.xlsx.js'
- '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
CommandLine|contains:
- ' .exe'
- '______.exe'
- '.doc.exe'
- '.doc.js'
- '.docx.exe'
- '.docx.js'
- '.gif.exe'
- '.jpeg.exe'
- '.jpg.exe'
- '.mkv.exe'
- '.mov.exe'
- '.mp3.exe'
- '.mp4.exe'
- '.pdf.exe'
- '.pdf.js'
- '.png.exe'
- '.ppt.exe'
- '.ppt.js'
- '.pptx.exe'
- '.pptx.js'
- '.rtf.exe'
- '.rtf.js'
- '.svg.exe'
- '.txt.exe'
- '.txt.js'
- '.xls.exe'
- '.xls.js'
- '.xlsx.exe'
- '.xlsx.js'
- '⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe' # Unicode Space Character: Braille Pattern Blank (Unicode: U+2800)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment)
id: 571498c8-908e-40b4-910b-d2369159a3da
status: test
description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5379
TargetName|contains|all:
- 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename'
- '\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files
level: high
title: Linux HackTool Execution
id: a015e032-146d-4717-8944-7a1884122111
status: test
description: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.
references:
- https://github.com/Gui774ume/ebpfkit
- https://github.com/pathtofile/bad-bpf
- https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng
- https://github.com/t3l3machus/hoaxshell
- https://github.com/t3l3machus/Villain
- https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc
- https://github.com/1N3/Sn1per
- https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin
- https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
date: 2023-01-03
modified: 2024-09-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_c2_frameworks:
Image|endswith:
- '/crackmapexec'
- '/havoc'
- '/merlin-agent'
- '/merlinServer-Linux-x64'
- '/msfconsole'
- '/msfvenom'
- '/ps-empire server'
- '/ps-empire'
- '/sliver-client'
- '/sliver-server'
- '/Villain.py'
selection_c2_framework_cobaltstrike:
Image|contains:
- '/cobaltstrike'
- '/teamserver'
selection_scanners:
Image|endswith:
- '/autorecon'
- '/httpx'
- '/legion'
- '/naabu'
- '/netdiscover'
- '/nuclei'
- '/recon-ng'
selection_scanners_sniper:
Image|contains: '/sniper'
selection_web_enum:
Image|endswith:
- '/dirb'
- '/dirbuster'
- '/eyewitness'
- '/feroxbuster'
- '/ffuf'
- '/gobuster'
- '/wfuzz'
- '/whatweb'
selection_web_vuln:
Image|endswith:
- '/joomscan'
- '/nikto'
- '/wpscan'
selection_exploit_tools:
Image|endswith:
- '/aircrack-ng'
- '/bloodhound-python'
- '/bpfdos'
- '/ebpfki'
- '/evil-winrm'
- '/hashcat'
- '/hoaxshell.py'
- '/hydra'
- '/john'
- '/ncrack'
# default binary: https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/releases/download/v1.0.0/nxc-ubuntu-latest
- '/nxc-ubuntu-latest'
- '/pidhide'
- '/pspy32'
- '/pspy32s'
- '/pspy64'
- '/pspy64s'
- '/setoolkit'
- '/sqlmap'
- '/writeblocker'
selection_linpeas:
# covers: all linux versions listed here: https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases
Image|contains: '/linpeas'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder
id: a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/
- http://addbalance.com/word/startup.htm
- https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/document-in-word-startup-folder-doesnt-open-when/44ab0932-2917-4150-8cdc-2f2cf39e86f3
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Microsoft_Office_filename_extensions
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-05
modified: 2023-12-13
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_word_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\STARTUP'
filter_exclude_word_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.docb' # Word binary document introduced in Microsoft Office 2007
- '.docm' # Word macro-enabled document; same as docx, but may contain macros and scripts
- '.docx' # Word document
- '.dotm' # Word macro-enabled template; same as dotx, but may contain macros and scripts
- '.mdb' # MS Access DB
- '.mdw' # MS Access DB
- '.pdf' # PDF documents
- '.wll' # Word add-in
- '.wwl' # Word add-in
selection_excel_paths:
- TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\Office'
- '\Program Files'
- '\XLSTART'
filter_exclude_excel_ext:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.xll'
- '.xls'
- '.xlsm'
- '.xlsx'
- '.xlt'
- '.xltm'
- '.xlw'
filter_main_office_click_to_run:
Image|contains: ':\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\'
Image|endswith: '\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
filter_main_office_apps:
Image|contains:
- ':\Program Files\Microsoft Office\'
- ':\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\'
Image|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
condition: ((selection_word_paths and not filter_exclude_word_ext) or (selection_excel_paths and not filter_exclude_excel_ext)) and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- False positive might stem from rare extensions used by other Office utilities.
level: high
title: Potential PsExec Remote Execution
id: ea011323-7045-460b-b2d7-0f7442ea6b38
status: test
description: Detects potential psexec command that initiate execution on a remote systems via common commandline flags used by the utility
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-28
modified: 2025-09-01
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# Accepting EULA in commandline - often used in automated attacks
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'accepteula'
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
- ' \\\\'
filter_main_localhost:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\\\\localhost'
- '\\\\127.'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM
id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
related:
- id: 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99 # Generic rule based on similar cli flags
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious commandline flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-23
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_sys: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
CommandLine|contains|windash:
# Note that you don't need to add the ".exe" part when using psexec/paexec
# The "-" can also be replaced with "/"
# The order of args isn't important
# "cmd" can be replaced by "powershell", "pwsh" or any other console like software
- ' -s cmd'
- ' -s -i cmd'
- ' -i -s cmd'
# Pwsh (For PowerShell 7)
- ' -s pwsh'
- ' -s -i pwsh'
- ' -i -s pwsh'
# PowerShell (For PowerShell 5)
- ' -s powershell'
- ' -s -i powershell'
- ' -i -s powershell'
selection_other:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'psexec'
- 'paexec'
- 'accepteula'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Admins that use PsExec or PAExec to escalate to the SYSTEM account for maintenance purposes (rare)
- Users that debug Microsoft Intune issues using the commands mentioned in the official documentation; see https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension
level: high
title: Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM
id: 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99
related:
- id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23 # PsExec specific rule
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-05-22
modified: 2024-03-05
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
# Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
CommandLine|contains|windash:
# Note that you don't need to add the ".exe" part when using psexec/paexec
# The "-" can also be replaced with "/"
# The order of args isn't important
# "cmd" can be replaced by "powershell", "pwsh" or any other console like software
- ' -s cmd'
- ' -s -i cmd'
- ' -i -s cmd'
# Pwsh (For PowerShell 7)
- ' -s pwsh'
- ' -s -i pwsh'
- ' -i -s pwsh'
# PowerShell (For PowerShell 5)
- ' -s powershell'
- ' -s -i powershell'
- ' -i -s powershell'
filter_main_exclude_coverage:
# This filter exclude strings covered by 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
CommandLine|contains:
- 'paexec'
- 'PsExec'
- 'accepteula'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Weird admins that rename their tools
- Software companies that bundle PsExec/PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing
level: high
title: PUA - CsExec Execution
id: d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31
status: test
description: Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative
references:
- https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-22
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1587.001
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\csexec.exe'
selection_pe:
Description: 'csexec'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Antivirus Relevant File Paths Alerts
id: c9a88268-0047-4824-ba6e-4d81ce0b907c
status: test
description: |
Detects an Antivirus alert in a highly relevant file path or with a relevant file name.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection_path:
Filename|contains:
- ':\PerfLogs\'
- ':\Temp\'
- ':\Users\Default\'
- ':\Users\Public\'
- ':\Windows\'
- '/www/'
# - '\Client\'
- '\inetpub\'
- '\tsclient\'
- 'apache'
- 'nginx'
- 'tomcat'
- 'weblogic'
selection_ext:
Filename|endswith:
- '.asax'
- '.ashx'
- '.asmx'
- '.asp'
- '.aspx'
- '.bat'
- '.cfm'
- '.cgi'
- '.chm'
- '.cmd'
- '.dat'
- '.ear'
- '.gif'
- '.hta'
- '.jpeg'
- '.jpg'
- '.jsp'
- '.jspx'
- '.lnk'
- '.msc'
- '.php'
- '.pl'
- '.png'
- '.ps1'
- '.psm1'
- '.py'
- '.pyc'
- '.rb'
- '.scf'
- '.sct'
- '.sh'
- '.svg'
- '.txt'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
- '.war'
- '.wll'
- '.wsf'
- '.wsh'
- '.xll'
- '.xml'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Relevant Anti-Virus Signature Keywords In Application Log
id: 78bc5783-81d9-4d73-ac97-59f6db4f72a8
status: test
description: |
Detects potentially highly relevant antivirus events in the application log based on known virus signature names and malware keywords.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13828b390d5f58b002e808c2c4f02fdd920e236cc8015480fa33b6c1a9300e31
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/15b57c1b68cd6ce3c161042e0f3be9f32d78151fe95461eedc59a79fc222c7ed
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5092b2672b4cb87a8dd1c2e6047b487b95995ad8ed5e9fc217f46b8bfb1b8c01
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2024-12-25
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588
logsource:
product: windows
service: application
detection:
keywords:
- 'Adfind'
- 'ASP/BackDoor '
- 'ATK/'
- 'Backdoor.ASP'
- 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
- 'Backdoor.JSP'
- 'Backdoor.PHP'
- 'Blackworm'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'Chopper'
- 'Cobalt'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'CRYPTES'
- 'Cryptor'
- 'Destructor'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'FastReverseProxy'
- 'Filecoder'
- 'GrandCrab '
- 'HackTool'
- 'HKTL'
- 'HTool-'
- '/HTool'
- '.HTool'
- 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
- 'Impacket'
- 'JSP/BackDoor '
- 'Keylogger'
- 'Koadic'
- 'Krypt'
- 'Lazagne'
- 'Metasploit'
- 'Meterpreter'
- 'MeteTool'
- 'mikatz'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'Mpreter'
- 'MsfShell'
- 'Nighthawk'
- 'Packed.Generic.347'
- 'PentestPowerShell'
- 'Phobos'
- 'PHP/BackDoor '
- 'Potato'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'PowerSSH'
- 'PshlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'Ransom'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Ryzerlo'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'SecurityTool '
- 'SharpDump'
- 'Shellcode'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Splinter'
- 'Swrort'
- 'Tescrypt'
- 'TeslaCrypt'
- 'TurtleLoader'
- 'Valyria'
- 'Webshell'
# - 'FRP.'
# - 'Locker'
# - 'PWS.'
# - 'PWSX'
# - 'Razy'
# - 'Ryuk'
filter_optional_generic:
- 'anti_ransomware_service.exe'
- 'Anti-Ransomware'
- 'Crack'
- 'cyber-protect-service.exe'
- 'encryptor'
- 'Keygen'
filter_optional_information:
Level: 4 # Information level
filter_optional_restartmanager:
Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager'
condition: keywords and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Some software piracy tools (key generators, cracks) are classified as hack tools
level: high
title: Hacktool Execution - PE Metadata
id: 37c1333a-a0db-48be-b64b-7393b2386e3b
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different Windows based hacktools via PE metadata (company, product, etc.) even if the files have been renamed
references:
- https://github.com/cube0x0
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/metadata%253ACube0x0/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-01-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
- attack.t1003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Company: 'Cube0x0' # Detects the use of tools created by a well-known hacktool producer named "Cube0x0", which includes his handle in all binaries as company information in the PE headers (SharpPrintNightmare, KrbRelay, SharpMapExec, etc.)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Renamed SysInternals DebugView Execution
id: cd764533-2e07-40d6-a718-cfeec7f2da7f
status: test
description: Detects suspicious renamed SysInternals DebugView execution
references:
- https://www.epicturla.com/blog/sysinturla
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-05-28
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Product: 'Sysinternals DebugView'
filter:
OriginalFileName: 'Dbgview.exe'
Image|endswith: '\Dbgview.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Execution Of Renamed Sysinternals Tools - Registry
id: f50f3c09-557d-492d-81db-9064a8d4e211
related:
- id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133
type: derived
- id: 8023f872-3f1d-4301-a384-801889917ab4
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the "accepteula" key related to the Sysinternals tools being created from executables with the wrong name (e.g. a renamed Sysinternals tool)
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2025-10-26
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
# Please add new values while respecting the alphabetical order
- '\Active Directory Explorer'
- '\Handle'
- '\LiveKd'
- '\ProcDump'
- '\Process Explorer'
- '\PsExec'
- '\PsLoggedon'
- '\PsLoglist'
- '\PsPasswd'
- '\PsPing'
- '\PsService'
- '\SDelete'
TargetObject|endswith: '\EulaAccepted'
filter:
Image|endswith:
# Please add new values while respecting the alphabetical order
- '\ADExplorer.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64.exe'
- '\handle.exe'
- '\handle64.exe'
- '\livekd.exe'
- '\livekd64.exe'
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\PsExec.exe'
- '\PsExec64.exe'
- '\PsLoggedon.exe'
- '\PsLoggedon64.exe'
- '\psloglist.exe'
- '\psloglist64.exe'
- '\pspasswd.exe'
- '\pspasswd64.exe'
- '\PsPing.exe'
- '\PsPing64.exe'
- '\PsService.exe'
- '\PsService64.exe'
- '\sdelete.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_pua_sysinternals_renamed_execution_via_eula/info.yml
title: Usage of Renamed Sysinternals Tools - RegistrySet
id: 8023f872-3f1d-4301-a384-801889917ab4
related:
- id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133
type: derived
- id: f50f3c09-557d-492d-81db-9064a8d4e211
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects non-sysinternals tools setting the "accepteula" key which normally is set on sysinternals tool execution
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1588.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\PsExec'
- '\ProcDump'
- '\Handle'
- '\LiveKd'
- '\Process Explorer'
- '\PsLoglist'
- '\PsPasswd'
- '\Active Directory Explorer'
TargetObject|endswith: '\EulaAccepted'
filter_main_image_names:
Image|endswith:
- '\PsExec.exe'
- '\PsExec64.exe'
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
- '\handle.exe'
- '\handle64.exe'
- '\livekd.exe'
- '\livekd64.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\psloglist.exe'
- '\psloglist64.exe'
- '\pspasswd.exe'
- '\pspasswd64.exe'
- '\ADExplorer.exe'
- '\ADExplorer64.exe'
filter_optional_null:
Image: null # Race condition with some logging tools
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: Suspicious Installer Package Child Process
id: e0cfaecd-602d-41af-988d-f6ccebb2af26
status: test
description: Detects the execution of suspicious child processes from macOS installer package parent process. This includes osascript, JXA, curl and wget amongst other interpreters
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.execution
- attack.command-and-control
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_installer:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '/package_script_service'
- '/installer'
Image|endswith:
- '/sh'
- '/bash'
- '/dash'
- '/python'
- '/ruby'
- '/perl'
- '/php'
- '/javascript'
- '/osascript'
- '/tclsh'
- '/curl'
- '/wget'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'preinstall'
- 'postinstall'
condition: selection_installer
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software uses the scripts (preinstall, postinstall)
level: medium
title: Potentially Suspicious Rundll32.EXE Execution of UDL File
id: 0ea52357-cd59-4340-9981-c46c7e900428
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe with the oledb32.dll library to open a UDL file.
Threat actors can abuse this technique as a phishing vector to capture authentication credentials or other sensitive data.
references:
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/oops-i-udld-it-again
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2024-08-16
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1071
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'oledb32.dll'
- ',OpenDSLFile '
- '\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\' # Note: You can adjust the path to the download directory or other directories according to your environment.
CommandLine|endswith: '.udl'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- UDL files serve as a convenient and flexible tool for managing and testing database connections in various development and administrative scenarios.
level: medium
title: Github Self-Hosted Runner Execution
id: 5bac7a56-da88-4c27-922e-c81e113b20cb
status: test
description: |
Detects GitHub self-hosted runners executing workflows on local infrastructure that could be abused for persistence and code execution.
Shai-Hulud is an npm supply chain worm targeting CI/CD environments.
It installs runners on compromised systems to maintain access after credential theft, leveraging their access to secrets and internal networks.
references:
- https://about.gitlab.com/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack/
- https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/shai-hulud-2.0-npm-worm/
author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)
date: 2025-11-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1102.002
- attack.t1071
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_worker_img: # Example command C:\Users\Lab\actions-runner\bin\Runner.Worker.exe spawnclient 1288 1252
- Image|endswith: '\Runner.Worker.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Runner.Worker.dll'
selection_worker_cli:
CommandLine|contains: 'spawnclient'
selection_listener_img: # Example command C:\Users\Lab\actions-runner\bin\Runner.Listener.exe configure --url https://github.com/ABC/ABC --token 123123
- Image|endswith: '\Runner.Listener.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Runner.Listener.dll'
selection_listener_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'run'
- 'configure'
condition: all of selection_worker_* or all of selection_listener_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate GitHub self-hosted runner installations on designated CI/CD infrastructure
- Authorized runner deployments by DevOps/Platform teams following change management
- Scheduled runner updates or reconfigurations on existing build agents
- Self-hosted runners that follow expected/known naming patterns
- Installation via expected/known configuration management tools (reflected mostly as parent process name)
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_github_self_hosted_runner/info.yml
title: Suspicious Curl Change User Agents - Linux
id: b86d356d-6093-443d-971c-9b07db583c68
related:
- id: 3286d37a-00fd-41c2-a624-a672dcd34e60
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on linux with set useragent options
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-15
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/curl'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -A '
- ' --user-agent '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scripts created by developers and admins
- Administrative activity
level: medium
title: Change User Agents with WebRequest
id: d4488827-73af-4f8d-9244-7b7662ef046e
status: test
description: |
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1071.001/T1071.001.md#t1071001---web-protocols
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-23
modified: 2025-07-18
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_webrequest:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'Invoke-RestMethod'
- ' irm ' # Space before and after to avoid false positives with 'irm' as a variable
- 'iwr '
selection_useragent:
ScriptBlockText|contains: '-UserAgent '
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Cloudflared Tunnels Related DNS Requests
id: a1d9eec5-33b2-4177-8d24-27fe754d0812
related:
- id: 7cd1dcdc-6edf-4896-86dc-d1f19ad64903
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects DNS requests to Cloudflared tunnels domains.
Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-12-20
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1572
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith:
- '.v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'protocol-v2.argotunnel.com'
- 'trycloudflare.com'
- 'update.argotunnel.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of cloudflare tunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium
title: DNS Query To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 # Net Connection DevTunnels
type: similar
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 # Net Connection VsCode
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b # DNS DevTunnels
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects DNS query requests to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2023-11-20
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith: '.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this.
level: medium
title: DNS Query To Devtunnels Domain
id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 # Net Connection DevTunnels
type: similar
- id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 # Net Connection VsCode
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1 # DNS VsCode
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine.
references:
- https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security
- https://cydefops.com/devtunnels-unleashed
author: citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2023-11-20
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1572
logsource:
category: dns_query
product: windows
detection:
selection:
QueryName|endswith: '.devtunnels.ms'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Devtunnels will also trigger this.
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution
id: 90d6bd71-dffb-4989-8d86-a827fedd6624
status: test
description: Detects Visual Studio Code tunnel execution. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), citron_ninja
date: 2023-10-25
modified: 2025-10-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1219
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_only_tunnel:
OriginalFileName: null
CommandLine|endswith: '.exe tunnel'
selection_tunnel_args:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '.exe tunnel'
- '--accept-server-license-terms'
selection_parent_tunnel:
ParentCommandLine|endswith: ' tunnel'
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/d /c '
- '\servers\Stable-'
- 'code-server.cmd'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Shell Execution
id: f4a623c2-4ef5-4c33-b811-0642f702c9f1
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a shell (powershell, bash, wsl...) via Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel and execute arbitrary commands on the system.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|contains: '\servers\Stable-'
ParentImage|endswith: '\server\node.exe'
ParentCommandLine|contains: '.vscode-server' # Technically one can host its own local server instead of using the VsCode one. And that would probably change the name (requires further research)
# Note: Child processes (ie: shells) can be whatever technically (with some efforts)
selection_child_1:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '\terminal\browser\media\shellIntegration.ps1'
selection_child_2:
Image|endswith:
- '\wsl.exe'
- '\bash.exe'
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel and running code from there
level: medium
title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Service Installation
id: 30bf1789-379d-4fdc-900f-55cd0a90a801
status: test
description: Detects the installation of VsCode tunnel (code-tunnel) as a service.
references:
- https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/
- https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html
- https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'tunnel '
- 'service'
- 'internal-run'
- 'tunnel-service.log'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate installation of code-tunnel as a service
level: medium
title: Suspicious Base64 Encoded User-Agent
id: d443095b-a221-4957-a2c4-cd1756c9b747
related:
- id: 894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious encoded User-Agent strings, as seen used by some malware.
references:
- https://deviceatlas.com/blog/list-of-user-agent-strings#desktop
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|startswith:
- 'Q2hyb21l' # Chrome Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'QXBwbGVXZWJLaX' # AppleWebKit Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'RGFsdmlr' # Dalvik Encoded with offset to not include padding
- 'TW96aWxsY' # Mozilla Encoded with offset to not include padding (as used by YamaBot)
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Windows PowerShell User Agent
id: c8557060-9221-4448-8794-96320e6f3e74
status: test
description: Detects Windows PowerShell Web Access
references:
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/reference/5.1/microsoft.powershell.utility/Invoke-WebRequest
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-13
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|contains: ' WindowsPowerShell/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet
- Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents
level: medium
title: Potential Base64 Encoded User-Agent
id: 894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3
related:
- id: d443095b-a221-4957-a2c4-cd1756c9b747
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects User Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be a sign of base64 encoding.
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2022/07/yamabot.html
- https://deviceatlas.com/blog/list-of-user-agent-strings#desktop
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Brian Ingram (update)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-05-04
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
c-useragent|endswith: '='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: HTTP Request With Empty User Agent
id: 21e44d78-95e7-421b-a464-ffd8395659c4
status: test
description: |
Detects a potentially suspicious empty user agent strings in proxy log.
Could potentially indicate an uncommon request method.
references:
- https://twitter.com/Carlos_Perez/status/883455096645931008
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-07-08
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
# Empty string - as used by Powershell's (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString
c-useragent: ''
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Telegram API Access
id: b494b165-6634-483d-8c47-2026a6c52372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious requests to Telegram API without the usual Telegram User-Agent
references:
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-iranian-users/
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-06-05
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102.002
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
cs-host: 'api.telegram.org' # Often used by Bots
filter:
c-useragent|contains:
# Used https://core.telegram.org/bots/samples for this list
- 'Telegram'
- 'Bot'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Telegram bots in the company
level: medium
title: Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification
id: eed82177-38f5-4299-8a76-098d50d225ab
related:
- id: 6ad91e31-53df-4826-bd27-0166171c8040
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials.
references:
- https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-audit.v1/
- https://security.padok.fr/en/blog/kubernetes-webhook-attackers
author: kelnage
date: 2024-07-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1552
- attack.t1552.007
logsource:
product: kubernetes
service: audit
detection:
selection:
objectRef.apiGroup: 'admissionregistration.k8s.io'
objectRef.resource:
- 'mutatingwebhookconfigurations'
- 'validatingwebhookconfigurations'
verb:
- 'create'
- 'delete'
- 'patch'
- 'replace'
- 'update'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Modifying the Kubernetes Admission Controller may need to be done by a system administrator.
- Automated processes may need to take these actions and may need to be filtered.
level: medium
title: Root Account Enable Via Dsenableroot
id: 821bcf4d-46c7-4b87-bc57-9509d3ba7c11
status: test
description: Detects attempts to enable the root account via "dsenableroot"
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.md
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/persistence_enable_root_account.toml
- https://ss64.com/osx/dsenableroot.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1078.001
- attack.t1078.003
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '/dsenableroot'
filter_main_disable:
CommandLine|contains: ' -d '
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: AWS Suspicious SAML Activity
id: f43f5d2f-3f2a-4cc8-b1af-81fde7dbaf0e
status: test
description: Identifies when suspicious SAML activity has occurred in AWS. An adversary could gain backdoor access via SAML.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoleWithSAML.html
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-22
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1548
- attack.t1550
- attack.t1550.001
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection_sts:
eventSource: 'sts.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'AssumeRoleWithSAML'
selection_iam:
eventSource: 'iam.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'UpdateSAMLProvider'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Automated processes that uses Terraform may lead to false positives.
- SAML Provider could be updated by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- SAML Provider being updated from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium
title: AWS Key Pair Import Activity
id: 92f84194-8d9a-4ee0-8699-c30bfac59780
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the import of SSH key pairs into AWS EC2, which may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access to instances. This activity could lead to initial access, persistence, or privilege escalation, potentially compromising sensitive data and operations.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ImportKeyPair.html
author: Ivan Saakov
date: 2024-12-19
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
eventName: 'ImportKeyPair'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative actions by authorized users importing keys for valid purposes.
- Automated processes for infrastructure setup may trigger this alert.
- Verify the user identity, user agent, and source IP address to ensure they are expected.
level: medium
title: Increased Failed Authentications Of Any Type
id: e1d02b53-c03c-4948-b11d-4d00cca49d03
status: test
description: Detects when sign-ins increased by 10% or greater.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-08-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
Status: failure
Count: "<10%"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: medium
title: Azure Unusual Authentication Interruption
id: 8366030e-7216-476b-9927-271d79f13cf3
status: test
description: Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection_50097:
ResultType: 50097
ResultDescription: 'Device authentication is required'
selection_50155:
ResultType: 50155
ResultDescription: 'DeviceAuthenticationFailed'
selection_50158:
ResultType: 50158
ResultDescription: 'ExternalSecurityChallenge - External security challenge was not satisfied'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
title: Application Using Device Code Authentication Flow
id: 248649b7-d64f-46f0-9fb2-a52774166fb5
status: test
description: |
Device code flow is an OAuth 2.0 protocol flow specifically for input constrained devices and is not used in all environments.
If this type of flow is seen in the environment and not being used in an input constrained device scenario, further investigation is warranted.
This can be a misconfigured application or potentially something malicious.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: Device Code
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Applications that are input constrained will need to use device code flow and are valid authentications.
level: medium
title: Authentications To Important Apps Using Single Factor Authentication
id: f272fb46-25f2-422c-b667-45837994980f
status: test
description: Detect when authentications to important application(s) only required single-factor authentication
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
Status: 'Success'
AppId: 'Insert Application ID use OR for multiple'
AuthenticationRequirement: 'singleFactorAuthentication'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium
title: Applications That Are Using ROPC Authentication Flow
id: 55695bc0-c8cf-461f-a379-2535f563c854
status: test
description: |
Resource owner password credentials (ROPC) should be avoided if at all possible as this requires the user to expose their current password credentials to the application directly.
The application then uses those credentials to authenticate the user against the identity provider.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-authentication-flows
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-01
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
logsource:
product: azure
service: signinlogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message: ROPC
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Applications that are being used as part of automated testing or a legacy application that cannot use any other modern authentication flow
level: medium
title: Azure Domain Federation Settings Modified
id: 352a54e1-74ba-4929-9d47-8193d67aba1e
status: test
description: Identifies when an user or application modified the federation settings on the domain.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-monitor-federation-changes
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-06
modified: 2022-06-08
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
ActivityDisplayName: Set federation settings on domain
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Federation Settings being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- Federation Settings modified from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: medium
title: Guest Users Invited To Tenant By Non Approved Inviters
id: 4ad97bf5-a514-41a4-abd3-4f3455ad4865
status: test
description: Detects guest users being invited to tenant by non-approved inviters
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins
author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
Category: 'UserManagement'
OperationName: 'Invite external user'
filter:
InitiatedBy|contains: '<approved guest inviter use OR for multiple>'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: medium
title: User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role
id: ebbeb024-5b1d-4e16-9c0c-917f86c708a7
status: test
description: User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role
references:
- https://m365internals.com/2021/07/13/what-ive-learned-from-doing-a-year-of-cloud-forensics-in-azure-ad/
author: Raphaël CALVET, @MetallicHack
date: 2021-10-04
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1098.003
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
Operation: 'Add member to role.'
Workload: 'AzureActiveDirectory'
ModifiedProperties{}.NewValue|endswith:
- 'Admins'
- 'Administrator'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- PIM (Privileged Identity Management) generates this event each time 'eligible role' is enabled.
level: medium