Sigma rules for Rubeus
5 rules · scoped to tool · back to Rubeus
Direct rules mention this entity in their title or description. Related rules cover the techniques this entity is known to use.
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution
id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
related:
- id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
- https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-04-20
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Rubeus.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Rubeus.exe'
- Description: 'Rubeus'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'asreproast '
- 'dump /service:krbtgt '
- 'dump /luid:0x'
- 'kerberoast '
- 'createnetonly /program:'
- 'ptt /ticket:'
- '/impersonateuser:'
- 'renew /ticket:'
- 'asktgt /user:'
- 'harvest /interval:'
- 's4u /user:'
- 's4u /ticket:'
- 'hash /password:'
- 'golden /aes256:'
- 'silver /user:'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock
id: 3245cd30-e015-40ff-a31d-5cadd5f377ec
related:
- id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus using specific command line flags
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
- https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-04-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'asreproast '
- 'dump /service:krbtgt '
- 'dump /luid:0x'
- 'kerberoast '
- 'createnetonly /program:'
- 'ptt /ticket:'
- '/impersonateuser:'
- 'renew /ticket:'
- 'asktgt /user:'
- 'harvest /interval:'
- 's4u /user:'
- 's4u /ticket:'
- 'hash /password:'
- 'golden /aes256:'
- 'silver /user:'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
title: User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'
id: 6daac7fc-77d1-449a-a71a-e6b4d59a0e54
status: test
description: The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4673
Service: 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess()'
Keywords: '0x8010000000000000' # failure
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
id: 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5
status: test
description: |
Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests.
Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes.
One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus.
This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment.
This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
references:
- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/88d689fe8a055d8284337b9fad5d9152b42043db/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
date: 2021-09-02
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1187
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: 'The advanced audit policy setting "Account Logon > Kerberos Authentication Service" must be configured for Success/Failure'
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4768
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
CertThumbprint|contains: '*'
filter_local:
IpAddress: '::1'
filter_thumbprint:
CertThumbprint: ''
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts.
level: high
title: Register new Logon Process by Rubeus
id: 12e6d621-194f-4f59-90cc-1959e21e69f7
status: test
description: Detects potential use of Rubeus via registered new trusted logon process
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1
author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Ilyas Ochkov (rule), oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1558.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4611
LogonProcessName: 'User32LogonProcesss'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high