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ATT&CK Technique

Email Spoofing

T1672 · stealth
▤ Generate a SIEM detection for T1672 ◈ Deployable detections for T1672 ⚠ CVEs mapped to T1672 ♛ Hunt package for T1672

Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modifying the value of relevant email headers in order to establish contact with victims under false pretenses. In addition to actual email content, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains the email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email clients display these headers when emails appear in a victim's inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if they were from the spoofed entity. This behavior may succeed when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce identity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). Even if SPF and DKIM are configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a domain sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1.

p=none.

fo=1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, email servers are not instructed to take any filtering action when emails fail authentication checks. Adversaries may abuse Microsoft 365’s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal users by using internal devices like printers to send emails without authentication. Adversaries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempts such as Phishing. They may also leverage email spoofing for Impersonation of legitimate external individuals and organizations, such as journalists and academics.

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▸ How to use this page - the detection-engineering loop
Attackers have goals (tactics - “get credentials”, “move laterally”) and techniques are the concrete methods they use to reach them. This page is one method - T1672 - broken into everything you need to catch it.
The loop this page is built for (this is the job):
  1. Understand the behaviour - read the description and the Atomic Tests to see exactly what the attacker does on a host or network.
  2. Find the telemetry - what data source would reveal it (process creation, registry, network flow, auth logs). Detection Coverage shows which surfaces already have a rule and which are blind.
  3. Get or write the detection - adapt ready logic (CAR Analytics, SIEM Detections, Falco, or Sigma via Generate a SIEM detection), or author your own.
  4. Test it - run an Atomic Test in a lab and confirm your rule actually fires. A detection you have not tested is a hope, not coverage.
  5. Deploy and tune - push it, then watch for false positives and adjust.
What each panel is for:
Atomic Testssafely reproduce the technique in a lab to validate that a detection fires. Detection Coveragewhich detection surfaces have a rule for this technique; none is a blind spot to close, or simply not applicable (YARA matches files, not network behaviour). CAR / SIEM / Falcoready-made detection logic (Splunk SPL, Elastic EQL, Sentinel KQL, Falco) you adapt to your own SIEM. Mitigationsreduce exposure so the technique is harder to use at all - prevent, not just detect. Actors / Attributionwho actually uses this, so you prioritise by your own threat model. Attack Path / LOTLwhat attackers do before and after this step, and the legitimate tools they abuse to do it.
Where this fits: you usually arrive here from a CVE (“which techniques does it enable”) and leave with a tested detection deployed. The buttons above jump straight to building one, the deployable rules, the CVEs that use T1672, and a hunt package.
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Detection Coverage

0/9 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
SIEM (Splunk ESCU) none
SIEM (Elastic) none
SIEM (Azure Sentinel) none
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
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