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ATT&CK Technique

Cloud Administration Command

T1651 · execution

Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines.

Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a Trusted Relationship to execute commands in connected virtual machines.

IaaS
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Actors Using This

1
russiaAPT29
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Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershelliaas:awsAWS Run Command (and Control)
This test simulates an adversary using the AWS Run Command service to execute commands on EC2 instances. 
Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder/T1651/src/T1651-1/AWSSSMAttack.ps1" -Force
$access_key = "#{access_key}"
$secret_key = "#{secret_key}"
$session_token = "#{session_token}"
$aws_profile = "#{profile}"
$region = "#{region}"
Set-AWSAuthentication -AccessKey $access_key -SecretKey $secret_key -SessionToken $session_token -AWSProfile $aws_profile -AWSRegion $region
Invoke-Terraform -TerraformCommand init -TerraformDirectory "PathToAtomicsFolder/T1651/src/T1651-1"
Invoke-Terraform -TerraformCommand apply -TerraformDirectory "PathToAtomicsFolder/T1651/src/T1651-1" -TerraformVariables @("profile=T1651-1", "region=$region")
Invoke-SSMAttack -AWSProfile "T1651-1" -TerraformDirectory "PathToAtomicsFolder/T1651/src/T1651-1"
Invoke-Terraform -TerraformCommand destroy -TerraformDirectory "PathToAtomicsFolder/T1651/src/T1651-1" -TerraformVariables @("profile=T1651-1", "region=$region")
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Mitigations

1
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1026Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.

Account Permissions and Roles
  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security
  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring
  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
Tools for Implementation Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management
  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management
  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
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Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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NIST 800-53AC-02, AC-03, AC-06, AC-17, IA-02, SI-04
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