Home/ATT&CK Technique/Code Signing Policy Modification
ATT&CK Technique

Code Signing Policy Modification

T1553.006 · defense-impairment

Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system.

Some of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS. Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.

Adversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, Modify Registry, rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory. Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON Windows and csrutil disable on macOS. Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system.

Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts. To gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying g_CiOptions to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation using a signed, but vulnerable driver.

macOSWindows

Actors Using This

2
commercial_cybercrime_uefi_bootkitBlackLotus
russiaTurla

Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptelevatedwindowsCode Signing Policy Modification
Allows adversaries to subvert trust controls by modifying the code signing policy, enabling the execution of unsigned drivers.
bcdedit /set testsigning on

Mitigations

3
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1024Restrict Registry Permissions

Restricting registry permissions involves configuring access control settings for sensitive registry keys and hives to ensure that only authorized users or processes can make modifications. By limiting access, organizations can prevent unauthorized changes that adversaries might use for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.

Review and Adjust Permissions on Critical Keys
  • Regularly review permissions on keys such as Run, RunOnce, and Services to ensure only authorized users have write access.
  • Use tools like icacls or PowerShell to automate permission adjustments. Enable Registry Auditing.
  • Enable auditing on sensitive keys to log access attempts.
  • Use Event Viewer or SIEM solutions to analyze logs and detect suspicious activity.
  • Example Audit Policy: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Registry" /success:enable /failure:enable Protect Credential-Related Hives.
  • Limit access to hives like SAM,SECURITY, and SYSTEM to prevent credential dumping or other unauthorized access.
  • Use LSA Protection to add an additional security layer for credential storage. Restrict Registry Editor Usage.
  • Use Group Policy to restrict access to regedit.exe for non-administrative users.
  • Block execution of registry editing tools on endpoints where they are unnecessary. Deploy Baseline Configuration Tools.
  • Use tools like Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit or CIS Benchmarks to apply and maintain secure registry configurations.
Tools for Implementation Registry Permission Tools
  • Registry Editor (regedit): Built-in tool to manage registry permissions.
  • PowerShell: Automate permissions and manage keys. Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "KeyName" -Value "Value".
  • icacls: Command-line tool to modify ACLs.
Monitoring Tools
  • Sysmon: Monitor and log registry events.
  • Event Viewer: View registry access logs.
Policy Management Tools
  • Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce registry permissions via GPOs.
  • Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Deploy configuration baselines for registry permissions.
M1026Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.

Account Permissions and Roles
  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security
  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring
  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
Tools for Implementation Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management
  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management
  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
M1046Boot Integrity

Boot Integrity ensures that a system starts securely by verifying the integrity of its boot process, operating system, and associated components. This mitigation focuses on leveraging secure boot mechanisms, hardware-rooted trust, and runtime integrity checks to prevent tampering during the boot sequence. It is designed to thwart adversaries attempting to modify system firmware, bootloaders, or critical OS components.

Implementation of Secure Boot
  • Implementation: Enable UEFI Secure Boot on all systems and configure it to allow only signed bootloaders and operating systems.
  • Use Case: An adversary attempts to replace the system’s bootloader with a malicious version to gain persistence. Secure Boot prevents the untrusted bootloader from executing, halting the attack.
Utilization of TPMs
  • Implementation: Configure systems to use TPM-based attestation for boot integrity, ensuring that any modification to the firmware, bootloader, or OS is detected.
  • Use Case: A compromised firmware component alters the boot sequence. The TPM detects the change and triggers an alert, allowing the organization to respond before further damage.
Enable Bootloader Passwords
  • Implementation: Protect BIOS/UEFI settings with a strong password and limit physical access to devices.
  • Use Case: An attacker with physical access attempts to disable Secure Boot or modify the boot sequence. The password prevents unauthorized changes.
Runtime Integrity Monitoring
  • Implementation: Deploy solutions to verify the integrity of critical files and processes after boot.
  • Use Case: A malware infection modifies kernel modules post-boot. Runtime integrity monitoring detects the modification and prevents the malicious module from loading.

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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