Home/ATT&CK Technique/Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
ATT&CK Technique

Mark-of-the-Web Bypass

T1553.005 · defense-impairment

Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named Zone.Identifier with a specific value known as the MOTW. Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions.

For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.

Adversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams.

After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.

Windows
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Actors Using This

3
russiaAPT29
commercial_cybercrime_uefi_bootkitBlackLotus
south_koreaDarkhotel
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Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
resource-development same
T1584 · Compromise Infrastructure ×1.27
execution same
T1203 · Exploitation for Client Execution ×1.43T1053 · Scheduled Task/Job ×1.25
persistence same
T1078.003 · Local Accounts ×3.66
privilege-escalation same
T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation ×1.49
credential-access same
T1552 · Unsecured Credentials ×1.65T1555 · Credentials from Password Stores ×1.34
collection same
T1114 · Email Collection ×2.56T1560 · Archive Collected Data ×2.12T1074 · Data Staged ×1.52
command-and-control same
T1568 · Dynamic Resolution ×1.30
other same
T1553 · Subvert Trust Controls ×3.05T1562.001 · Disable or Modify Tools ×1.26T1027.002 · Software Packing ×1.23T1562 · Impair Defenses ×1.23
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Atomic Tests

4
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellwindowsMount ISO image
Mounts ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web. Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, and mount the image. The provided sample ISO simply has a Reports shortcut file in it. Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/ 
Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}"
powershellelevatedwindowsMount an ISO image and run executable from the ISO
Mounts an ISO image downloaded from internet to evade Mark-of-the-Web and run hello.exe executable from the ISO. Upon successful execution, powershell will download the .iso from the Atomic Red Team repo, mount the image, and run the executable from the ISO image that will open command prompt echoing "Hello, World!". ISO provided by:https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1398323532988399620 Reference:https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/, 
Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly
$keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel "TestIso"
$driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
invoke-item "$($driveLetter):\hello.exe"
powershellwindowsRemove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream
Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet. Removing this allows more freedom in executing scripts in PowerShell and avoids opening files in protected view. 
Unblock-File -Path #{file_path}
powershellwindowsExecute LNK file from ISO
Executes LNK file document.lnk from AllTheThings.iso. Link file executes cmd.exe and rundll32 to in order to load and execute AllTheThingsx64.dll from the ISO which spawns calc.exe. 
Mount-DiskImage -ImagePath "#{path_of_iso}" -StorageType ISO -Access ReadOnly
$keep = Get-Volume -FileSystemLabel "AllTheThings"
$driveLetter = ($keep | Get-Volume).DriveLetter
$instance = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"))
$instance.Document.Application.ShellExecute($driveLetter+":\document.lnk","",$driveLetter+":\",$null,0)
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Mitigations

2
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1038Execution Prevention

Prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code on systems by implementing application control, script blocking, and other execution prevention mechanisms. This ensures that only trusted and authorized code is executed, reducing the risk of malware and unauthorized actions.

Application Control
  • Use Case: Use tools like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create whitelists of authorized applications and block unauthorized ones. On Linux, use tools like SELinux or AppArmor to define mandatory access control policies for application execution.
  • Implementation: Allow only digitally signed or pre-approved applications to execute on servers and endpoints. (e.g., `New-AppLockerPolicy -PolicyType Enforced -FilePath "C:\Policies\AppLocker.
xml"`) Script Blocking
  • Use Case: Use script control mechanisms to block unauthorized execution of scripts, such as PowerShell or JavaScript. Web Browsers: Use browser extensions or settings to block JavaScript execution from untrusted sources.
  • Implementation: Configure PowerShell to enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-administrator users. (e.g.
, Set-ExecutionPolicy AllSigned) Executable Blocking
  • Use Case: Prevent execution of binaries from suspicious locations, such as %TEMP% or %APPDATA% directories.
  • Implementation: Block execution of .exe, .bat, or .ps1 files from user-writable directories.
Dynamic Analysis Prevention
  • Use Case: Use behavior-based execution prevention tools to identify and block malicious activity in real time.
  • Implemenation: Employ EDR solutions that analyze runtime behavior and block suspicious code execution.
M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled.

Remove Legacy Software
  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.
Disable Unused Features
  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.
Control Applications Installed by Users
  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.
Remove Unnecessary Services
  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.
Restrict Add-ons and Plugins
  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.
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Detection Coverage

1/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 6
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
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NIST 800-53CM-02, CM-06, CM-07, SI-04, SI-07, SI-10
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