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ATT&CK Technique

Windows Permissions

T1222.001 · defense-impairment

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).

Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order.

If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied. Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as icacls, cacls, takeown, and attrib, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.

Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.

Windows
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Atomic Tests

6
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
command_promptwindowsTake ownership using takeown utility
Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified file or folder to take ownership of the object. Upon execution, "SUCCESS" will be displayed for the folder and each file inside of it. 
takeown.exe /f #{file_folder_to_own} /r
command_promptwindowscacls - Grant permission to specified user or group recursively
Modifies the filesystem permissions of the specified folder and contents to allow the specified user or group Full Control. If "Access is denied" is displayed it may be because the file or folder doesn't exit. Run the prereq command to create it. Upon successfull execution, "Successfully processed 3 files" will be displayed. 
icacls.exe #{file_or_folder} /grant #{user_or_group}:F
command_promptwindowsattrib - Remove read-only attribute
Removes the read-only attribute from a file or folder using the attrib.exe command. Upon execution, no output will be displayed. Open the file in File Explorer > Right Click - Prperties and observe that the Read Only checkbox is empty. 
attrib.exe -r #{file_or_folder}\*.* /s
command_promptwindowsattrib - hide file
Attackers leverage an existing Windows binary, attrib.exe, to mark specific files or folder as hidden by using specific flags so that the victim does not see the file. 
mkdir #{file_or_folder} >nul 2>&1
echo T1222.001_attrib1 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
echo T1222.001_attrib2 >> #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib1.txt
attrib.exe +h #{file_or_folder}\T1222.001_attrib2.txt
command_promptelevatedwindowsGrant Full Access to folder for Everyone - Ryuk Ransomware Style
Invokes the command line similar to that used by Ryuk Ransomware to grant full access to the entire C:\ drive for Everyone. **icacls "C:\*" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q** However, for this atomic we set the permission on C:\Users\Public so it completes faster and doesn't irreversibly affect the host. You can set your own path variable to "C:\*" if you prefer. 
icacls "#{path}" /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
command_promptelevatedwindowsSubInAcl Execution
This test simulates an adversary executing the Windows Resource kit utility SubInAcl. This utility was abused by adversaries in the past in order to modify access permissions. Upon execution, a process creation log should be generated indicating successful execution.
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Resource Kits\Tools\subinacl.exe"
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Mitigations

2
MITRE ATT&CK mitigations - vendor-agnostic guidance for reducing exposure to this technique.
M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions
  • Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories.
  • Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder.
  • Properties.
  • Security tab.
  • Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.
Harden File Shares
  • Disable anonymous access to shared folders.
  • Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., /bin or /sbin on Linux). Use tools like chown and chmod to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.
conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
  • Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.
Audit File System Access
  • Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts.
  • Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.
Restrict Startup Directories
  • Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like /etc/, /usr/local/, and Windows directories such as C:\Windows\System32.
  • On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F.
  • On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like lsattr or auditd.
M1026Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.

Account Permissions and Roles
  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security
  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring
  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
Tools for Implementation Privileged Access Management (PAM)
  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management
  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management
  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access
  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
◈

Detection Coverage

2/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) 3
Analytics (MITRE CAR) 1
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
◈

CAR Analytics

1
MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository - field-tested detection logic for this technique, written as pseudocode/queries you adapt to your own SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, EQL). Each is a ready starting point for a detection rule, not just a description.
CAR-2019-07-001Moderate coverageAccess Permission Modification

Adversaries sometimes modify object access rights at the operating system level.

There are varying motivations behind this action
  • they may not want some files/objects to be changed on systems for persistence reasons and therefore provide admin only rights; also, they may want files to be accessible with lower levels of permissions. Note.
  • this analytic references file permissions, which are not currently in the CAR data model.
Pseudocode - Windows - Pseudocode
log_name == "Security" AND
event_code == "4670" AND
object_type == "File" AND
subject_security_id != "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM"
Splunk - Windows - Splunk
index=__your_windows_security_log_index__ EventCode=4670 Object_Type="File" Security_ID!="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
Pseudocode - Linux - Pseudocode
processes = search Process:Create
chmod_processes = filter processes where command_line == "chmod *"
output chmod_processes
LogPoint
norm_id=WindowsSysmon channel="Security" event_id=4670 object_type="File" -user_id="S-1-5-18"
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