Home/ATT&CK Technique/Process Doppelgänging
ATT&CK Technique

Process Doppelgänging

T1186 · stealth
▤ Generate a SIEM detection for T1186 ◈ Deployable detections for T1186 ⚠ CVEs mapped to T1186 ♛ Hunt package for T1186

Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened.

To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. Although deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. Adversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging.

Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. Process Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps: * Transact - Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code.

These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction. Load - Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable. Rollback - Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system. * Animate - Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.

Windows
▸ How to use this page - the detection-engineering loop
Attackers have goals (tactics - “get credentials”, “move laterally”) and techniques are the concrete methods they use to reach them. This page is one method - T1186 - broken into everything you need to catch it.
The loop this page is built for (this is the job):
  1. Understand the behaviour - read the description and the Atomic Tests to see exactly what the attacker does on a host or network.
  2. Find the telemetry - what data source would reveal it (process creation, registry, network flow, auth logs). Detection Coverage shows which surfaces already have a rule and which are blind.
  3. Get or write the detection - adapt ready logic (CAR Analytics, SIEM Detections, Falco, or Sigma via Generate a SIEM detection), or author your own.
  4. Test it - run an Atomic Test in a lab and confirm your rule actually fires. A detection you have not tested is a hope, not coverage.
  5. Deploy and tune - push it, then watch for false positives and adjust.
What each panel is for:
Atomic Testssafely reproduce the technique in a lab to validate that a detection fires. Detection Coveragewhich detection surfaces have a rule for this technique; none is a blind spot to close, or simply not applicable (YARA matches files, not network behaviour). CAR / SIEM / Falcoready-made detection logic (Splunk SPL, Elastic EQL, Sentinel KQL, Falco) you adapt to your own SIEM. Mitigationsreduce exposure so the technique is harder to use at all - prevent, not just detect. Actors / Attributionwho actually uses this, so you prioritise by your own threat model. Attack Path / LOTLwhat attackers do before and after this step, and the legitimate tools they abuse to do it.
Where this fits: you usually arrive here from a CVE (“which techniques does it enable”) and leave with a tested detection deployed. The buttons above jump straight to building one, the deployable rules, the CVEs that use T1186, and a hunt package.
◈

Detection Coverage

0/9 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none
SIEM (Splunk ESCU) none
SIEM (Elastic) none
SIEM (Azure Sentinel) none
External lookups - second-class, for what we don’t hold ourselves
MITRE ATT&CKAtomic Red Teamcar (MITRE)
SOC and Response
CVE triage
Stack monitoring
Am I affected
IOC triage
KEV catalog
Recently exploited
Daily brief
Change tracking
Detection Engineering
Coverage workspace
Detection coverage
Coverage check
Telemetry ceiling
SIEM query builder
Sigma rules
SIEM rules
YARA rules
Network rules
D3FEND
Threat Hunting
Threat actors
ATT&CK techniques
Attack paths
Indicators
Atomic tests
Red Team and Pentest
Exploitability triage
Recon pack
Attack paths
CAPEC patterns
Adversary emulation
Compliance and GRC
Framework mapping
Control assessment
Audit view
Atlas Search Threat actors Techniques Tools & malware CWE CAPEC KEV catalog Package vulns
About All capabilities Pricing API docs Privacy policy Terms of service
threatengine.sh