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ATT&CK Technique

Credential API Hooking

T1056.004 · collection, credential-access

Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials.

In Windows, hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via: Hooks procedures, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. Import address table (IAT) hooking, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. * Inline hooking, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. In Linux and macOS, adversaries may hook into system functions via the LD_PRELOAD (Linux) or DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES (macOS) environment variables, which enables loading shared libraries into a program’s address space. For example, an adversary may capture credentials by hooking into the libc read function leveraged by SSH or SCP.

WindowsLinuxmacOS

Actors Using This

9
brazilBanbra
brazilBizarro
us_israel_joint_offensive_cyber_speculationGauss
brazilKrachulka
brazilLokorrito
north_koreaRuby Sleet
russiaTurla
brazilZumanek

Likely Attack Path

Techniques the same actors pair with this one distinctively - those showing up among actors who use this technique noticeably more than across all actors (lift > 1.15), grouped by kill-chain phase. The × is that lift multiplier; the shared-actor count is in the tooltip. A near-universal technique pairs with everything at baseline, so its list is short by design.
initial-access earlier

Atomic Tests

1
Executable Atomic Red Team test cases for exercising this technique in a lab. Copy a command, run it on the listed platform, confirm your detections fire.
powershellelevatedwindowsHook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages
Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications
mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING "#{file_name}"
Invoke-WebRequest #{server_name} -UseBasicParsing

Detection Coverage

0/6 layers
Coverage across standard detection surfaces. Rows marked none have no rule of that type mapped. Some are real blind spots worth closing; others are simply not applicable to this technique (e.g. YARA matches malware files, not network behaviour).
Behavioral / log (Sigma) none
Analytics (MITRE CAR) none
Runtime / container (Falco) none
File / malware (YARA) none
Network (Suricata/Snort) none
Vuln scan (Nuclei) none

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