title: Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec
id: 6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442
related:
    - id: 1a17ce75-ff0d-4f02-9709-2b7bb5618cf0
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-21
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4697
        ServiceFileName|re: '^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$'
        ServiceName|re: '(^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$)'
        ServiceStartType: 3  # on-demand start, see https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4697
        ServiceType: '0x10'
    filter:
        ServiceName: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character service name
level: high

title: PSEXEC Remote Execution File Artefact
id: 304afd73-55a5-4bb9-8c21-0b1fc84ea9e4
status: test
description: Detects creation of the PSEXEC key file. Which is created anytime a PsExec command is executed. It gets written to the file system and will be recorded in the USN Journal on the target system
references:
    - https://aboutdfir.com/the-key-to-identify-psexec/
    - https://twitter.com/davisrichardg/status/1616518800584704028
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-01-21
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.execution
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1136.002
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.s0029
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\PSEXEC-'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.key'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Rundll32 Execution Without Parameters
id: 5bb68627-3198-40ca-b458-49f973db8752
status: test
description: Detects rundll32 execution without parameters as observed when running Metasploit windows/smb/psexec exploit module
references:
    - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html
author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity
date: 2021-01-31
modified: 2023-02-28
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'rundll32'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur if a user called rundll32 from CLI with no options
level: high

title: Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService
id: 9e4b7d3a-6f2c-4e9a-8d1b-3c5e7a9f2b4d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process.
    The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features.
    While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2026-02-19
references:
    - https://kostas-ts.medium.com/detecting-abuse-of-openedrs-permissive-edr-trial-a-security-researcher-s-perspective-fc55bf53972c
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.t1219
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith: '\COMODO\Endpoint Manager\ITSMService.exe'
    selection_suspicious_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.7z'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.pif'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scr'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate OpenEDR file management operations
    - Authorized remote file uploads by IT administrators
    - Software deployment through OpenEDR console
level: medium