title: Potential SMB Relay Attack Tool Execution
id: 5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1
status: test
description: Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
references:
    - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/13/hot-potato/
    - https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato
    - https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/other/war-stories/domain-admin-in-30-minutes
    - https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/execution/responder-with-ntlm-relay-and-empire
    - https://www.localpotato.com/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_pe:
        Image|contains:
            - 'PetitPotam'
            - 'RottenPotato'
            - 'HotPotato'
            - 'JuicyPotato'
            - '\just_dce_'
            - 'Juicy Potato'
            - '\temp\rot.exe'
            - '\Potato.exe'
            - '\SpoolSample.exe'
            - '\Responder.exe'
            - '\smbrelayx'
            - '\ntlmrelayx'
            - '\LocalPotato'
    selection_script:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Invoke-Tater'
            - ' smbrelay'
            - ' ntlmrelay'
            - 'cme smb '
            - ' /ntlm:NTLMhash '
            - 'Invoke-PetitPotam'
            - '.exe -t * -p '  # JuicyPotatoNG pattern https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG
    selection_juicypotato_enum:  # appears when JuicyPotatoNG is used with -b
        CommandLine|contains: '.exe -c "{'
        CommandLine|endswith: '}" -z'
    filter_hotpotatoes:  # known goodware https://hotpot.uvic.ca/
        Image|contains:
            - 'HotPotatoes6'
            - 'HotPotatoes7'
            - 'HotPotatoes ' # Covers the following: 'HotPotatoes 6', 'HotPotatoes 7', 'HotPotatoes Help', 'HotPotatoes Tutorial'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate files with these rare hacktool names
level: critical

title: Attempts of Kerberos Coercion Via DNS SPN Spoofing
id: 0ed99dda-6a35-11ef-8c99-0242ac120002
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the presence of "UWhRC....AAYBAAAA" pattern in command line.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like in CVE-2025-33073.
    If you see this pattern in the command line, it is likely an attempt to add spoofed Service Principal Names (SPNs) to DNS records,
    or checking for the presence of such records through the `nslookup` command.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA'
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - ADCSPwn Execution
id: cd8c163e-a19b-402e-bdd5-419ff5859f12
status: test
description: Detects command line parameters used by ADCSPwn, a tool to escalate privileges in an active directory network by coercing authenticate from machine accounts and relaying to the certificate service
references:
    - https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-31
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' --adcs '
            - ' --port '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - Impacket Tools Execution
id: 4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19
status: test
description: Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
references:
    - https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-24
modified: 2023-02-07
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|contains:
              - '\goldenPac'
              - '\karmaSMB'
              - '\kintercept'
              - '\ntlmrelayx'
              - '\rpcdump'
              - '\samrdump'
              - '\secretsdump'
              - '\smbexec'
              - '\smbrelayx'
              - '\wmiexec'
              - '\wmipersist'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\atexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dcomexec_windows.exe'
              - '\dpapi_windows.exe'
              - '\findDelegation_windows.exe'
              - '\GetADUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\GetNPUsers_windows.exe'
              - '\getPac_windows.exe'
              - '\getST_windows.exe'
              - '\getTGT_windows.exe'
              - '\GetUserSPNs_windows.exe'
              - '\ifmap_windows.exe'
              - '\mimikatz_windows.exe'
              - '\netview_windows.exe'
              - '\nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe'
              - '\opdump_windows.exe'
              - '\psexec_windows.exe'
              - '\rdp_check_windows.exe'
              - '\sambaPipe_windows.exe'
              - '\smbclient_windows.exe'
              - '\smbserver_windows.exe'
              - '\sniff_windows.exe'
              - '\sniffer_windows.exe'
              - '\split_windows.exe'
              - '\ticketer_windows.exe'
              # - '\addcomputer_windows.exe'
              # - '\esentutl_windows.exe'
              # - '\getArch_windows.exe'
              # - '\lookupsid_windows.exe'
              # - '\mqtt_check_windows.exe'
              # - '\mssqlclient_windows.exe'
              # - '\mssqlinstance_windows.exe'
              # - '\ntfs-read_windows.exe'
              # - '\ping_windows.exe'
              # - '\ping6_windows.exe'
              # - '\raiseChild_windows.exe'
              # - '\reg_windows.exe'
              # - '\registry-read_windows.exe'
              # - '\services_windows.exe'
              # - '\wmiquery_windows.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of the impacket tools
level: high

title: Local Privilege Escalation Indicator TabTip
id: bc2e25ed-b92b-4daa-b074-b502bdd1982b
status: test
description: Detects the invocation of TabTip via CLSID as seen when JuicyPotatoNG is used on a system in brute force mode
references:
    - https://github.com/antonioCoco/JuicyPotatoNG
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-07
modified: 2023-04-14
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: 'Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM'
        EventID: 10001
        param1: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip.exe'  # Binary starting/started
        param2: 2147943140                                                       # ERROR id
        param3: '{054AAE20-4BEA-4347-8A35-64A533254A9D}'                         # DCOM Server
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern
id: 16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12f
status: test
description: Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like
references:
    - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665
author: '@SBousseaden, Florian Roth'
date: 2019-11-15
modified: 2022-12-22
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
        TargetUserName: 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'
        WorkstationName: '-'
        IpAddress:
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - '::1'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing
id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing - Network
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection:
        QueryName|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA'
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing - Network
id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43
related:
    - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
    - id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
    The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
    Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
    It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
    to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
    - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
    - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: dns
detection:
    selection:
        query|contains|all:
            - 'UWhRCA' # Follows this pattern UWhRCAAAAA..BAAA
            - 'BAAAA'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: WinDivert Driver Load
id: 679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426d
status: test
description: Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection package for Windows
references:
    - https://reqrypt.org/windivert-doc.html
    - https://rastamouse.me/ntlm-relaying-via-cobalt-strike/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1599.001
    - attack.t1557.001
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - ImageLoaded|contains:
              - '\WinDivert.sys'
              - '\WinDivert64.sys'
              # Other used names
              - '\NordDivert.sys'
              - '\lingtiwfp.sys'
              - '\eswfp.sys'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=0604bb7cb4bb851e2168d5c7d9399087'
              - 'IMPHASH=2e5f0e649d97f32b03c09e4686d0574f'
              - 'IMPHASH=52f8aa269f69f0edad9e8fcdaedce276'
              - 'IMPHASH=c0e5d314da39dbf65a2dbff409cc2c76'
              - 'IMPHASH=58623490691babe8330adc81cd04a663'
              - 'IMPHASH=8ee39b48656e4d6b8459d7ba7da7438b'
              - 'IMPHASH=45ee545ae77e8d43fc70ede9efcd4c96'
              - 'IMPHASH=a1b2e245acd47e4a348e1a552a02859a'
              - 'IMPHASH=2a5f85fe4609461c6339637594fa9b0a'
              - 'IMPHASH=6b2c6f95233c2914d1d488ee27531acc'
              - 'IMPHASH=9f2fdd3f9ab922bbb0560a7df46f4342'
              - 'IMPHASH=d8a719865c448b1bd2ec241e46ac1c88'
              - 'IMPHASH=0ea54f8c9af4a2fe8367fa457f48ed38'
              - 'IMPHASH=9d519ae0a0864d6d6ae3f8b6c9c70af6'
              - 'IMPHASH=a74929edfc3289895e3f2885278947ae'
              - 'IMPHASH=a66b476c2d06c370f0a53b5537f2f11e'
              - 'IMPHASH=bdcd836a46bc2415773f6b5ea77a46e4'
              - 'IMPHASH=c28cd6ccd83179e79dac132a553693d9'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate WinDivert driver usage
level: high

title: Potential PetitPotam Attack Via EFS RPC Calls
id: 4096842a-8f9f-4d36-92b4-d0b2a62f9b2a
status: test
description: |
    Detects usage of the windows RPC library Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC). Variations of this RPC are used within the attack refereed to as PetitPotam.
    The usage of this RPC function should be rare if ever used at all.
    Thus usage of this function is uncommon enough that any usage of this RPC function should warrant further investigation to determine if it is legitimate.
     View surrounding logs (within a few minutes before and after) from the Source IP to. Logs from from the Source IP would include dce_rpc, smb_mapping, smb_files, rdp, ntlm, kerberos, etc..'
references:
    - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/blob/d83ac8f2dd34654628c17490f99106eb128e7d1e/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.cpp
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV210003
    - https://vx-underground.org/archive/Symantec/windows-vista-network-attack-07-en.pdf
    - https://threatpost.com/microsoft-petitpotam-poc/168163/
author: '@neu5ron, @Antonlovesdnb, Mike Remen'
date: 2021-08-17
modified: 2022-11-28
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557.001
    - attack.t1187
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: dce_rpc
detection:
    selection:
        operation|startswith: 'efs'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Uncommon but legitimate windows administrator or software tasks that make use of the Encrypting File System RPC Calls. Verify if this is common activity (see description).
level: medium