title: Hacktool Ruler
id: 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
status: test
description: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
references:
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler
    - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47
    - https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/cd032d41aa8ce5751c07cb7945400c0f5c81e2eb/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-05-31
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.execution
    - attack.collection
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.t1114
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID: 4776
        Workstation: 'RULER'
    selection2:
        EventID:
            - 4624
            - 4625
        WorkstationName: 'RULER'
    condition: (1 of selection*)
falsepositives:
    - Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library
level: high

title: Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt
id: 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87
status: test
description: Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220419045003/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/04/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
date: 2018-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.s0002
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: seclogo
        AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Runas command-line tool using /netonly parameter
level: high

title: NTLMv1 Logon Between Client and Server
id: e9d4ab66-a532-4ef7-a502-66a9e4a34f5d
status: test
description: Detects the reporting of NTLMv1 being used between a client and server. NTLMv1 is insecure as the underlying encryption algorithms can be brute-forced by modern hardware.
references:
    - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/f1b010ce0ee1b71e3024180de1a3e67f99701fe4/ETWProvidersManifests/Windows10/22H2/W10_22H2_Pro_20230321_19045.2728/WEPExplorer/LsaSrv.xml
author: Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-26
modified: 2023-06-06
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name: "LsaSrv"
        EventID:
            - 6038
            - 6039
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Environments that use NTLMv1
level: medium

title: Pass the Hash Activity 2
id: 8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b
status: stable
description: Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network
references:
    - https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20170909091934/https://blog.binarydefense.com/reliably-detecting-pass-the-hash-through-event-log-analysis
    - https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-to-detect-pass-the-hash-attacks/
author: Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)
date: 2019-06-14
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The successful use of PtH for lateral movement between workstations would trigger event ID 4624
detection:
    selection_logon3:
        EventID: 4624
        SubjectUserSid: 'S-1-0-0'
        LogonType: 3
        LogonProcessName: 'NtLmSsp'
        KeyLength: 0
    selection_logon9:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: 'seclogo'
    filter:
        TargetUserName: 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'
    condition: 1 of selection_* and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Administrator activity
level: medium

title: NTLM Logon
id: 98c3bcf1-56f2-49dc-9d8d-c66cf190238b
status: test
description: Detects logons using NTLM, which could be caused by a legacy source or attackers
references:
    - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1004895028995477505
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-06-08
modified: 2024-07-22
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: ntlm
    definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 8002
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legacy hosts
level: low