title: Creation Exe for Service with Unquoted Path
id: 8c3c76ca-8f8b-4b1d-aaf3-81aebcd367c9
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references.
    Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.009/T1574.009.md
author: frack113
date: 2021-12-30
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        # Feel free to add more
        TargetFilename: 'C:\program.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Desktop.INI Created by Uncommon Process
id: 81315b50-6b60-4d8f-9928-3466e1022515
status: test
description: Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/
author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut), Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
date: 2020-03-19
modified: 2025-12-09
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\desktop.ini'
    filter_main_generic:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    filter_main_upgrade:
        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\NewOS\'
    filter_optional_jetbrains:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|endswith: '\AppData\Local\JetBrains\Toolbox\bin\7z.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\JetBrains\apps\'
    filter_optional_onedrive:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
        Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent
    - Read only access list authority
level: medium

title: New Custom Shim Database Created
id: ee63c85c-6d51-4d12-ad09-04e25877a947
status: test
description: |
    Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims.
    The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-2---new-shim-database-files-created-in-the-default-shim-database-directory
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence
    - https://liberty-shell.com/sec/2020/02/25/shim-persistence/
    - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-12-29
modified: 2023-12-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\Custom\'
            - ':\Windows\apppatch\CustomSDB\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database/info.yml

title: Windows Network Access Suspicious desktop.ini Action
id: 35bc7e28-ee6b-492f-ab04-da58fcf6402e
status: test
description: Detects unusual processes accessing desktop.ini remotely over network share, which can be leveraged to alter how Explorer displays a folder's content (i.e. renaming files) without changing them on disk.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Desktopini+as+a+postexploitation+tool/25912/
author: Tim Shelton (HAWK.IO)
date: 2021-12-06
modified: 2022-01-16
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.009
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        ObjectType: File
        RelativeTargetName|endswith: '\desktop.ini'
        AccessList|contains:
            - 'WriteData'
            - 'DELETE'
            - 'WriteDAC'
            - 'AppendData'
            - 'AddSubdirectory'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Read only access list authority
level: medium