title: HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe
id: 0adc67e0-a68f-4ffd-9c43-28905aad5d6a
status: test
description: Detects creation of default named pipes used by the Koh tool
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Koh/blob/0283d9f3f91cf74732ad377821986cfcb088e20a/Clients/BOF/KohClient.c#L12
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\imposecost'
            - '\imposingcost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: Anomalous Token
id: 6555754e-5e7f-4a67-ad1c-4041c413a007
status: test
description: Indicates that there are abnormal characteristics in the token such as an unusual token lifetime or a token that is played from an unfamiliar location.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anomalous-token
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anomalousToken'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user.
level: high

title: Anonymous IP Address
id: 53acd925-2003-440d-a1f3-71a5253fe237
status: test
description: Indicates sign-ins from an anonymous IP address, for example, using an anonymous browser or VPN.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/riskdetection?view=graph-rest-1.0
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#anonymous-ip-address
author: Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-08-22
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'anonymizedIPAddress'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins
level: high

title: App Granted Microsoft Permissions
id: c1d147ae-a951-48e5-8b41-dcd0170c7213
status: test
description: Detects when an application is granted delegated or app role permissions for Microsoft Graph, Exchange, Sharepoint, or Azure AD
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - Add delegated permission grant
            - Add app role assignment to service principal
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: high

title: Application URI Configuration Changes
id: 0055ad1f-be85-4798-83cf-a6da17c993b3
status: test
description: |
    Detects when a configuration change is made to an applications URI.
    URIs for domain names that no longer exist (dangling URIs), not using HTTPS, wildcards at the end of the domain, URIs that are no unique to that app, or URIs that point to domains you do not control should be investigated.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-configuration-changes
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik'
date: 2022-06-02
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Update Application Sucess- Property Name AppAddress
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When and administrator is making legitimate URI configuration changes to an application. This should be a planned event.
level: high

title: Delegated Permissions Granted For All Users
id: a6355fbe-f36f-45d8-8efc-ab42465cbc52
status: test
description: Detects when highly privileged delegated permissions are granted on behalf of all users
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message: Add delegated permission grant
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app
level: high

title: Primary Refresh Token Access Attempt
id: a84fc3b1-c9ce-4125-8e74-bdcdb24021f1
status: test
description: Indicates access attempt to the PRT resource which can be used to move laterally into an organization or perform credential theft
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#possible-attempt-to-access-primary-refresh-token-prt
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo'
date: 2023-09-07
tags:
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.credential-access
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: riskdetection
detection:
    selection:
        riskEventType: 'attemptedPrtAccess'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - This detection is low-volume and is seen infrequently in most organizations. When this detection appears it's high risk, and users should be remediated.
level: high

title: Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution
id: 8a4519e8-e64a-40b6-ae85-ba8ad2177559
status: test
description: Detects process creation with a renamed BrowserCore.exe (used to extract Azure tokens)
references:
    - https://twitter.com/mariuszbit/status/1531631015139102720
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-06-02
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1036.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: BrowserCore.exe
    filter_realbrowsercore:
        Image|endswith: '\BrowserCore.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event
id: 25cde13e-8e20-4c29-b949-4e795b76f16f
status: test
description: Detects an access to authentication tokens and accounts of Microsoft Teams desktop application.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4663
        ObjectName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter:
        ProcessName|contains: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: End User Consent Blocked
id: 7091372f-623c-4293-bc37-20c32b3492be
status: test
description: Detects when end user consent is blocked due to risk-based consent.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-10
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        failure_status_reason: 'Microsoft.online.Security.userConsentBlockedForRiskyAppsExceptions'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Microsoft Teams Sensitive File Access By Uncommon Applications
id: 65744385-8541-44a6-8630-ffc824d7d4cc
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access attempts to sensitive Microsoft teams files (leveldb, cookies) by an uncommon process.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blog/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2024-07-22
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_access
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_location:
        # Note: its best to filter the full path to avoid false negatives
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious Command Targeting Teams Sensitive Files
id: d2eb17db-1d39-41dc-b57f-301f6512fa75
status: test
description: |
    Detects a commandline containing references to the Microsoft Teams database or cookies files from a process other than Teams.
    The database might contain authentication tokens and other sensitive information about the logged in accounts.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
    - https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
author: '@SerkinValery'
date: 2022-09-16
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies'
            - '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb'
    filter_main_legit_locations:
        Image|endswith: '\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potentially Suspicious JWT Token Search Via CLI
id: 6d3a3952-6530-44a3-8554-cf17c116c615
status: test
description: |
    Detects potentially suspicious search for JWT tokens via CLI by looking for the string "eyJ0eX" or "eyJhbG".
    JWT tokens are often used for access-tokens across various applications and services like Microsoft 365, Azure, AWS, Google Cloud, and others.
    Threat actors may search for these tokens to steal them for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://mrd0x.com/stealing-tokens-from-office-applications/
    - https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20240523
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), kagebunsher
date: 2022-10-25
modified: 2025-10-21
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1552.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_tools:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'find '
            - 'find.exe'
            - 'findstr'
            - 'select-string '
            - 'strings'
    selection_jwt_string:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'eyJ0eXAiOi' # {"typ":
            - 'eyJhbGciOi' # {"alg":
            - ' eyJ0eX'
            - ' "eyJ0eX"'
            - " 'eyJ0eX'"
            - ' eyJhbG'
            - ' "eyJhbG"'
            - " 'eyJhbG'"
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: End User Consent
id: 9b2cc4c4-2ad4-416d-8e8e-ee6aa6f5035a
status: test
description: Detects when an end user consents to an application
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-consent
author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow'
date: 2022-07-28
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        ConsentContext.IsAdminConsent: 'false'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: low