Sigma detection rules

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Sigma

17 rules indexed · SIEM-agnostic detection content

Sigma is the open generic signature format for SIEM systems. Each rule below converts to native syntax for Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, and other SIEMs. Expand any rule to see its raw YAML.

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Detection rules

17 shown of 17

critical

Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection

Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework. This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.

status stable author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp id 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864

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title: Antivirus Exploitation Framework Detection
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2024-11-02
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
            - 'Brutel'
            - 'BruteR'
            - 'CobaltStr'
            - 'CobaltStrike'
            - 'COBEACON'
            - 'Cometer'
            - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
            - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
            - 'Metasploit'
            - 'Meterpreter'
            - 'MeteTool'
            - 'Mpreter'
            - 'MsfShell'
            - 'PowerSploit'
            - 'Razy'
            - 'Rozena'
            - 'Sbelt'
            - 'Seatbelt'
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Swrort'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

critical

Audit CVE Event

Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited. MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability. Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis id 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2

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title: Audit CVE Event
id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2
status: test
description: |
    Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited.
    MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability.
    Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232
    - https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676
    - https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800
    - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI # "CVEs in Windows Event Logs? What You Need to Know" by 13Cubed.
    - https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis
date: 2020-01-15
modified: 2022-10-22
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1211
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1212
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: application
detection:
    selection:
        Provider_Name:
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE'
            - 'Audit-CVE'
        EventID: 1
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

high

Network Connection Initiated By Eqnedt32.EXE

Detects network connections from the Equation Editor process "eqnedt32.exe".

status test author Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) id a66bc059-c370-472c-a0d7-f8fd1bf9d583

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title: Network Connection Initiated By Eqnedt32.EXE
id: a66bc059-c370-472c-a0d7-f8fd1bf9d583
status: test
description: Detects network connections from the Equation Editor process "eqnedt32.exe".
references:
    - https://twitter.com/forensicitguy/status/1513538712986079238
    - https://forensicitguy.github.io/xloader-formbook-velvetsweatshop-spreadsheet/
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/07/18/a-new-equation-editor-exploit-goes-commercial-as-maldoc-attacks-using-it-spike/
author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-04-14
modified: 2024-05-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\eqnedt32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

high

OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript

Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell. Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix. Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/. The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC id 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db

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title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript
id: 6eea1bf6-f8d2-488a-a742-e6ef6c1b67db
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript to execute any UNIX/Linux script using the /bin/sh shell.
    Script being executed gets created as a temp file in /tmp folder with a scx* prefix.
    Then it is invoked from the following directory /etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/.
    The file in that directory has the same prefix scx*. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/opt/microsoft/scx/conf/tmpdir/scx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteScript.
level: high

high

OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand

Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell. SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.

status test author Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC id 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a

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title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
id: 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
status: test
description: |
    Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.
    SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
    Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite.
references:
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
    - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC
date: 2021-10-15
modified: 2022-10-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        User: root
        LogonId: 0
        CurrentDirectory: '/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp'
        CommandLine|contains: '/bin/sh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand.
level: high

high

Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process

Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.

status experimental author Micah Babinski id 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
    ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
    Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding
    service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
references:
    - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
    - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
author: Micah Babinski
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\regsvr32.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    filter_main_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c "ver"'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

high

Suspicious Download and Execute Pattern via Curl/Wget

Detects suspicious use of command-line tools such as curl or wget to download remote content - particularly scripts - into temporary directories (e.g., /dev/shm, /tmp), followed by immediate execution, indicating potential malicious activity. This pattern is commonly used by malicious scripts, stagers, or downloaders in fileless or multi-stage Linux attacks.

status experimental author Aayush Gupta id a2d9e2f3-0f43-4c7a-bcd9-9acfc0d723aa

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title: Suspicious Download and Execute Pattern via Curl/Wget
id: a2d9e2f3-0f43-4c7a-bcd9-9acfc0d723aa
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects suspicious use of command-line tools such as curl or wget to download remote
    content - particularly scripts - into temporary directories (e.g., /dev/shm, /tmp), followed by
    immediate execution, indicating potential malicious activity. This pattern is commonly used
    by malicious scripts, stagers, or downloaders in fileless or multi-stage Linux attacks.
references:
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/wget/
    - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/curl/
author: Aayush Gupta
date: 2025-06-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_downloader:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/curl'
            - '/wget'
    selection_tmp:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/tmp/'
            - '/dev/shm/'
    selection_executor:
        CommandLine|contains: 'sh -c'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - System update scripts using temporary files
    - Installer scripts or automated provisioning tools
level: high

high

Suspicious HWP Sub Processes

Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious HWP Sub Processes
id: 023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation
references:
    - https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2016/11/23/technical-teardown-exploit-malware-hwp-files/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/search?query=context:74940dcc5b38f9f9b1a0fea760d344735d7d91b610e6d5bd34533dd0153402c5&from_sample=5db135000388385a7644131f&block_redirect=1
    - https://twitter.com/cyberwar_15/status/1187287262054076416
    - https://blog.alyac.co.kr/1901
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hangul_(word_processor)
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.g0032
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Hwp.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\gbb.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

high

Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync

Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.

status experimental author Florian Roth id 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Invocation of Shell via Rsync
id: 297241f3-8108-4b3a-8c15-2dda9f844594
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the execution of a shell as sub process of "rsync" without the expected command line flag "-e" being used, which could be an indication of exploitation as described in CVE-2024-12084. This behavior is commonly associated with attempts to execute arbitrary commands or escalate privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
references:
    - https://sysdig.com/blog/detecting-and-mitigating-cve-2024-12084-rsync-remote-code-execution/
    - https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a20436375a1e26524931dd8ea1a3af10
author: Florian Roth
date: 2025-01-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/rsync'
            - '/rsyncd'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/ash'
            - '/bash'
            - '/csh'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_expected:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -e '
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

high

Suspicious Spool Service Child Process

Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.

status test author Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule) id dcdbc940-0bff-46b2-95f3-2d73f848e33b

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title: Suspicious Spool Service Child Process
id: dcdbc940-0bff-46b2-95f3-2d73f848e33b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.
references:
    - https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Exploits/Print%20Spooler%20RCE/Suspicious%20Spoolsv%20Child%20Process.md
author: Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule)
date: 2021-07-11
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    spoolsv:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\spoolsv.exe'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    suspicious_unrestricted:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\gpupdate.exe'
            - '\whoami.exe'
            - '\nltest.exe'
            - '\taskkill.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
            - '\sc.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\wget.exe'
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
            - '\accesschk.exe'
            - '\wevtutil.exe'
            - '\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\fsutil.exe'
            - '\cipher.exe'
            - '\schtasks.exe'
            - '\write.exe'
            - '\wuauclt.exe'
            - '\systeminfo.exe'
            - '\reg.exe'
            - '\query.exe'
    suspicious_net:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
    suspicious_net_filter:
        CommandLine|contains: 'start'
    suspicious_cmd:
        Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
    suspicious_cmd_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.spl'
            - 'route add'
            - 'program files'
    suspicious_netsh:
        Image|endswith: '\netsh.exe'
    suspicious_netsh_filter:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'add portopening'
            - 'rule name'
    suspicious_powershell:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    suspicious_powershell_filter:
        CommandLine|contains: '.spl'
    suspicious_rundll32_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
    suspicious_rundll32_cli:
        CommandLine|endswith: 'rundll32.exe'
    condition: spoolsv and ( suspicious_unrestricted or (suspicious_net and not suspicious_net_filter) or (suspicious_cmd and not suspicious_cmd_filter) or (suspicious_netsh and not suspicious_netsh_filter) or (suspicious_powershell and not suspicious_powershell_filter) or all of suspicious_rundll32_* )
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

medium

Java Running with Remote Debugging

Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 8f88e3f6-2a49-48f5-a5c4-2f7eedf78710

view Sigma YAML

title: Java Running with Remote Debugging
id: 8f88e3f6-2a49-48f5-a5c4-2f7eedf78710
status: test
description: Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect
references:
    - https://dzone.com/articles/remote-debugging-java-applications-with-jdwp
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-02-01
tags:
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_jdwp_transport:
        CommandLine|contains: 'transport=dt_socket,address='
    selection_old_jvm_version:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'jre1.'
            - 'jdk1.'
    exclusion:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'address=127.0.0.1'
            - 'address=localhost'
    condition: all of selection_* and not exclusion
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

medium

Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP

Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses. This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292. This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.

status test author Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84

view Sigma YAML

title: Office Application Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP
id: 75e33ce3-ae32-4dcc-9aa8-a2a3029d6f84
status: test
description: |
    Detects an office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint)  that initiate a network connection to a non-private IP addresses.
    This rule aims to detect traffic similar to one seen exploited in CVE-2021-42292.
    This rule will require an initial baseline and tuning that is specific to your organization.
references:
    - https://corelight.com/blog/detecting-cve-2021-42292
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/microsoft-365/enterprise/urls-and-ip-address-ranges?view=o365-worldwide
author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-10
modified: 2025-10-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\excel.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\powerpnt.exe'
            - '\winword.exe'
            - '\wordview.exe'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter_main_local_ranges:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '169.254.0.0/16'
            - '::1/128'  # IPv6 loopback
            - 'fe80::/10'  # IPv6 link-local addresses
            - 'fc00::/7'  # IPv6 private addresses
    filter_main_msrange_generic:
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '2.16.56.0/23' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '2.17.248.0/21' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '13.107.240.0/21' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '20.184.0.0/13' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '23.61.224.0/20' # Akamai-AS
            - '20.192.0.0/10' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '23.72.0.0/13' # Akamai International B.V.
            - '23.3.88.0/22' # Akamai-AS
            - '23.216.132.0/22' # Akamai-AS
            - '40.76.0.0/14' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.10.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.103.0.0/16' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.104.0.0/15' # Microsoft Corporation
            - '51.142.136.0/22' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/51.140.0.0/14-51.142.136.0/22
            - '52.160.0.0/11' # Microsoft Corporation - https://ipinfo.io/AS8075/52.160.0.0/11
            - '95.101.96.0/21' # Akamai-As
            - '204.79.197.0/24' # Microsoft Corporation
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_1:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "outlook.cloud.microsoft",
        #       "outlook.office.com",
        #       "outlook.office365.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.4.0/22'
            - '13.107.6.152/31'
            - '13.107.18.10/31'
            - '13.107.42.0/23'
            - '13.107.128.0/22'
            - '23.35.224.0/20'
            - '23.53.40.0/22'
            - '23.103.160.0/20'
            - '23.216.76.0/22'
            - '40.96.0.0/13'
            - '40.104.0.0/15'
            - '52.96.0.0/14'
            - '131.253.33.215/32'
            - '132.245.0.0/16'
            - '150.171.32.0/22'
            - '204.79.197.215/32'
            - '2603:1006::/40'
            - '2603:1016::/36'
            - '2603:1026::/36'
            - '2603:1036::/36'
            - '2603:1046::/36'
            - '2603:1056::/36'
            - '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:900::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_2:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "outlook.office365.com",
        #       "smtp.office365.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.6.152/31'
            - '13.107.18.10/31'
            - '13.107.128.0/22'
            - '23.103.160.0/20'
            - '40.96.0.0/13'
            - '40.104.0.0/15'
            - '52.96.0.0/14'
            - '131.253.33.215/32'
            - '132.245.0.0/16'
            - '150.171.32.0/22'
            - '204.79.197.215/32'
            - '2603:1006::/40'
            - '2603:1016::/36'
            - '2603:1026::/36'
            - '2603:1036::/36'
            - '2603:1046::/36'
            - '2603:1056::/36'
            - '2620:1ec:4::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:4::153/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:c::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::10/128'
            - '2620:1ec:d::11/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8f0::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:900::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::152/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::153/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 143
            - 587
            - 993
            - 995
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_3:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.protection.outlook.com"
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '40.92.0.0/15'
            - '40.107.0.0/16'
            - '52.100.0.0/14'
            - '52.238.78.88/32'
            - '104.47.0.0/17'
            - '2a01:111:f400::/48'
            - '2a01:111:f403::/48'
        DestinationPort: 443
    filter_main_msrange_exchange_4:
        # Exchange Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.mail.protection.outlook.com",
        #       "*.mx.microsoft"
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '40.92.0.0/15'
            - '40.107.0.0/16'
            - '52.100.0.0/14'
            - '52.238.78.88/32'
            - '104.47.0.0/17'
            - '2a01:111:f400::/48'
            - '2a01:111:f403::/48'
        DestinationPort: 25
    filter_main_msrange_sharepoint_1:
        # SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business",
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.sharepoint.com"
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.136.0/22'
            - '40.108.128.0/17'
            - '52.104.0.0/14'
            - '104.146.128.0/17'
            - '150.171.40.0/22'
            - '2603:1061:1300::/40'
            - '2620:1ec:8f8::/46'
            - '2620:1ec:908::/46'
            - '2a01:111:f402::/48'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_1:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online",
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.officeapps.live.com",
        #       "*.online.office.com",
        #       "office.live.com",
        #       "office.com.akadns.net"
        # ],
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.107.6.171/32'
            - '13.107.18.15/32'
            - '13.107.140.6/32'
            - '20.64.0.0/10'
            - '52.108.0.0/14'
            - '52.244.37.168/32'
            - '2603:1006:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1016:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1026:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1036:2400::/40'
            - '2603:1046:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1056:1400::/40'
            - '2603:1063:2000::/38'
            - '2620:1ec:c::15/128'
            - '2620:1ec:8fc::6/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::171/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2000::a83e:3019/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2d79/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:2002::8975:2da8/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:7000::6fdd:6cd5/128'
            - '2a01:111:f100:a004::bfeb:88cf/128'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_2:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
        # "urls": [
        #       "*.auth.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.msftidentity.com",
        #       "*.msidentity.com",
        #       "account.activedirectory.windowsazure.com",
        #       "accounts.accesscontrol.windows.net",
        #       "adminwebservice.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "api.passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com",
        #       "becws.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "ccs.login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "clientconfig.microsoftonline-p.net",
        #       "cloudapp.azure.com",
        #       "companymanager.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "device.login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "graph.microsoft.com",
        #       "graph.windows.net",
        #       "login-us.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "login.microsoft.com",
        #       "login.microsoftonline-p.com",
        #       "login.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "login.windows.net",
        #       "logincert.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "loginex.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "nexus.microsoftonline-p.com",
        #       "passwordreset.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "provisioningapi.microsoftonline.com",
        #       "web.core.windows.net",
        # ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '172.128.0.0/10'
            - '20.20.32.0/19'
            - '20.103.156.88/32' # msn.com
            - '20.190.128.0/18'
            - '20.231.128.0/19'
            - '40.126.0.0/18'
            - '57.150.0.0/15'
            - '2603:1006:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1007:200::/48'
            - '2603:1016:1400::/48'
            - '2603:1017::/48'
            - '2603:1026:3000::/48'
            - '2603:1027:1::/48'
            - '2603:1036:3000::/48'
            - '2603:1037:1::/48'
            - '2603:1046:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1047:1::/48'
            - '2603:1056:2000::/48'
            - '2603:1057:2::/48'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_msrange_office_3:
        # Microsoft 365 Common and Office Online
        #  "urls": [
        #       "*.compliance.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.data.microsoft.com",
        #       "*.protection.office.com",
        #       "*.security.microsoft.com",
        #       "compliance.microsoft.com",
        #       "defender.microsoft.com",
        #       "protection.office.com",
        #       "security.microsoft.com",
        #       "teams.microsoft.com",
        #  ]
        DestinationIp|cidr:
            - '13.64.0.0/11'
            - '13.107.6.192/32'
            - '13.107.9.192/32'
            - '13.89.179.14/32'
            - '20.40.0.0/14'
            - '20.48.0.0/12'
            - '20.64.0.0/12'
            - '52.123.0.0/16'
            - '52.108.0.0/14'
            - '52.136.0.0/13'
            - '57.150.0.0/15'
            - '80.239.150.67/32' # Arelion Sweden AB
            - '2620:1ec:4::192/128'
            - '2620:1ec:a92::192/128'
        DestinationPort: 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    filter_main_destination_host:
        DestinationHostname|endswith: '.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com'
        DestinationPort: 443
        Protocol: 'tcp'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - You may have to tune certain domains out that Excel may call out to, such as microsoft or other business use case domains.
    - Office documents commonly have templates that refer to external addresses, like "sharepoint.ourcompany.com" may have to be tuned.
    - It is highly recommended to baseline your activity and tune out common business use cases.
level: medium

medium

Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of WinRAR.EXE

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of WinRAR.exe.

status test author Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) id 146aace8-9bd6-42ba-be7a-0070d8027b76

view Sigma YAML

title: Potentially Suspicious Child Process Of WinRAR.EXE
id: 146aace8-9bd6-42ba-be7a-0070d8027b76
related:
    - id: ec3a3c2f-9bb0-4a9b-8f4b-5ec386544343
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of WinRAR.exe.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/
    - https://github.com/knight0x07/WinRAR-Code-Execution-Vulnerability-CVE-2023-38831/blob/26ab6c40b6d2c09bb4fc60feaa4a3a90cfd20c23/Part-1-Overview.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-08-31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WinRAR.exe'
    selection_binaries:
        # Note: add additional binaries that the attacker might use
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

medium

Potentially Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe

Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe

status test author Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel id ca5583e9-8f80-46ac-ab91-7f314d13b984

view Sigma YAML

title: Potentially Suspicious Child Process of KeyScrambler.exe
id: ca5583e9-8f80-46ac-ab91-7f314d13b984
related:
    - id: d2451be2-b582-4e15-8701-4196ac180260
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe
references:
    - https://twitter.com/DTCERT/status/1712785421845790799
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2024-05-13
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\KeyScrambler.exe'
    selection_binaries:
        # Note: add additional binaries that the attacker might use
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\cmd.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
              - '\regsvr32.exe'
              - '\rundll32.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'Cmd.Exe'
              - 'cscript.exe'
              - 'mshta.exe'
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
              - 'regsvr32.exe'
              - 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
              - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

medium

Suspicious Browser Child Process - MacOS

Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.

status test author Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) id 0250638a-2b28-4541-86fc-ea4c558fa0c6

view Sigma YAML

title: Suspicious Browser Child Process - MacOS
id: 0250638a-2b28-4541-86fc-ea4c558fa0c6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned from browsers. This could be a result of a potential web browser exploitation.
references:
    - https://fr.slideshare.net/codeblue_jp/cb19-recent-apt-attack-on-crypto-exchange-employees-by-heungsoo-kang
    - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/execution_initial_access_suspicious_browser_childproc.toml
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-04-05
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1189
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'com.apple.WebKit.WebContent'
            - 'firefox'
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
            - 'Microsoft Edge'
            - 'Opera'
            - 'Safari'
            - 'Tor Browser'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/bash'
            - '/curl'
            - '/dash'
            - '/ksh'
            - '/osascript'
            - '/perl'
            - '/php'
            - '/pwsh'
            - '/python'
            - '/sh'
            - '/tcsh'
            - '/wget'
            - '/zsh'
    filter_main_generic:
        CommandLine|contains: '--defaults-torrc' # Informs tor to use default config file
    filter_main_ms_autoupdate:
        CommandLine|contains: '/Library/Application Support/Microsoft/MAU*/Microsoft AutoUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/msupdate' # Microsoft AutoUpdate utility
    filter_main_chrome:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/Volumes/Google Chrome/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/*/Resources/install.sh' # Install the Google Chrome browser
            - '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_preflight.sh' # Updates the Google Chrome branding configuration files
            - '/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome Framework.framework/*/Resources/keystone_promote_postflight.sh' # Script that performs the post-installation tasks
    filter_main_ms_edge:
        ParentImage|contains: 'Microsoft Edge'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'IOPlatformExpertDevice' # Retrieves the IOPlatformUUID (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
            - 'hw.model' # Retrieves model name of the computer's hardware (parent process - Microsoft Edge)
    filter_main_chromerecovery:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Google Chrome Helper'
            - 'Google Chrome'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/Users/'
            - '/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/recovery/'
            - '/ChromeRecovery'
    filter_optional_null:
        # Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
        CommandLine: null
    filter_optional_empty:
        # Aoids alerting for the events which do not have command-line arguments
        CommandLine: ''
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate browser install, update and recovery scripts
level: medium

low

Download From Suspicious TLD - Blacklist

Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19

view Sigma YAML

title: Download From Suspicious TLD - Blacklist
id: 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19
related:
    - id: b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
references:
    - https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shady-tld-research-gdn-and-our-2016-wrap
    - https://promos.mcafee.com/en-US/PDF/MTMW_Report.pdf
    - https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/
    - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-07
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri-extension:
            - 'exe'
            - 'vbs'
            - 'bat'
            - 'rar'
            - 'ps1'
            - 'doc'
            - 'docm'
            - 'xls'
            - 'xlsm'
            - 'pptm'
            - 'rtf'
            - 'hta'
            - 'dll'
            - 'ws'
            - 'wsf'
            - 'sct'
            - 'zip'
            # If you want to add more extensions - see https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/
        cs-host|endswith:
            # Symantec / Chris Larsen analysis
            - '.country'
            - '.stream'
            - '.gdn'
            - '.mom'
            - '.xin'
            - '.kim'
            - '.men'
            - '.loan'
            - '.download'
            - '.racing'
            - '.online'
            - '.science'
            - '.ren'
            - '.gb'
            - '.win'
            - '.top'
            - '.review'
            - '.vip'
            - '.party'
            - '.tech'
            - '.xyz'
            - '.date'
            - '.faith'
            - '.zip'
            - '.cricket'
            - '.space'
            # McAfee report
            - '.info'
            - '.vn'
            - '.cm'
            - '.am'
            - '.cc'
            - '.asia'
            - '.ws'
            - '.tk'
            - '.biz'
            - '.su'
            - '.st'
            - '.ro'
            - '.ge'
            - '.ms'
            - '.pk'
            - '.nu'
            - '.me'
            - '.ph'
            - '.to'
            - '.tt'
            - '.name'
            - '.tv'
            - '.kz'
            - '.tc'
            - '.mobi'
            # Spamhaus
            - '.study'
            - '.click'
            - '.link'
            - '.trade'
            - '.accountant'
            # Spamhaus 2018 https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/
            - '.cf'
            - '.gq'
            - '.ml'
            - '.ga'
            # Custom
            - '.pw'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - All kinds of software downloads
level: low

low

Download From Suspicious TLD - Whitelist

Detects executable downloads from suspicious remote systems

status test author Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) id b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe

view Sigma YAML

title: Download From Suspicious TLD - Whitelist
id: b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe
related:
    - id: 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects executable downloads from suspicious remote systems
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-13
modified: 2023-05-18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri-extension:
            - 'exe'
            - 'vbs'
            - 'bat'
            - 'rar'
            - 'ps1'
            - 'doc'
            - 'docm'
            - 'xls'
            - 'xlsm'
            - 'pptm'
            - 'rtf'
            - 'hta'
            - 'dll'
            - 'ws'
            - 'wsf'
            - 'sct'
            - 'zip'
            # If you want to add more extensions - see https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TWS238xacAto-fLKh1n5uTsdijWdCEsGIM0Y0Hvmc5g/
    filter:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - '.com'
            - '.org'
            - '.net'
            - '.edu'
            - '.gov'
            - '.uk'
            - '.ca'
            - '.de'
            - '.jp'
            - '.fr'
            - '.au'
            - '.us'
            - '.ch'
            - '.it'
            - '.nl'
            - '.se'
            - '.no'
            - '.es'
            # Extend this list as needed
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - All kind of software downloads
level: low

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