title: HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe
id: 0adc67e0-a68f-4ffd-9c43-28905aad5d6a
status: test
description: Detects creation of default named pipes used by the Koh tool
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Koh/blob/0283d9f3f91cf74732ad377821986cfcb088e20a/Clients/BOF/KohClient.c#L12
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\imposecost'
            - '\imposingcost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution
id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1742203752361128162?s=20
author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection_5447:
        EventID: 5447
        FilterName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    selection_5449:
        EventID: 5449
        ProviderContextName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
id: c7d33b50-f690-4b51-8cfb-0fb912a31e57
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
    SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpDPAPI.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpDPAPI.exe'
    selection_other_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' backupkey '
            - ' blob '
            - ' certificates '
            - ' credentials '
            - ' keepass '
            - ' masterkeys '
            - ' rdg '
            - ' vaults '
    selection_other_options_guid:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' {'
            - '}:'
    selection_other_options_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /file:'
            - ' /machine'
            - ' /mkfile:'
            - ' /password:'
            - ' /pvk:'
            - ' /server:'
            - ' /target:'
            - ' /unprotect'
    condition: selection_img or (selection_other_cli and 1 of selection_other_options_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution
id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a
related:
    - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
references:
    - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpImpersonation.exe'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' binary:'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' shellcode:'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' technique:CreateProcessAsUserW'
              - ' technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security
id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34
related:
    - id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-11-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_cli_cmd:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded %COMSPEC%): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cmd'
            - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_cli_rundll:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    selection_cli_share:
        ServiceFileName|startswith: '\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\'  # https://twitter.com/svch0st/status/1413688851877416960?lang=en
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System
id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-11-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_id:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_cli_cmd:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded %COMSPEC%): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        ImagePath|contains:
        - 'cmd'
        - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_cli_rundll:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    selection_cli_share:
        ImagePath|startswith: '\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\'  # https://twitter.com/svch0st/status/1413688851877416960?lang=en
    condition: selection_id and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity
id: 15619216-e993-4721-b590-4c520615a67d
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service starting
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\services.exe'
    selection_technique_1:
        # Examples:
        #   Meterpreter  getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        #   CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded env var): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        #   CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd'
            - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_technique_2:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    filter_defender:
        CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_technique_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Commandlines containing components like cmd accidentally
    - Jobs and services started with cmd
level: high

title: HackTool - Impersonate Execution
id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Impersonate tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
references:
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/
    - https://github.com/sensepost/impersonate
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis
date: 2022-12-21
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_commandline_exe:
        CommandLine|contains: 'impersonate.exe'
    selection_commandline_opt:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' list '
            - ' exec '
            - ' adduser '
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'MD5=9520714AB576B0ED01D1513691377D01'
            - 'SHA256=E81CC96E2118DC4FBFE5BAD1604E0AC7681960143E2101E1A024D52264BB0A8A'
            - 'IMPHASH=0A358FFC1697B7A07D0E817AC740DF62'
    condition: all of selection_commandline_* or selection_hash
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: Potential Access Token Abuse
id: 02f7c9c1-1ae8-4c6a-8add-04693807f92f
status: test
description: Detects potential token impersonation and theft. Example, when using "DuplicateToken(Ex)" and "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" with the "LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag".
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/how-attackers-abuse-access-token-manipulation
    - https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/cyber-security/access-token-manipulation.html
author: Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis
date: 2022-11-06
modified: 2023-04-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - stp.4u
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: 'Advapi'
        AuthenticationPackageName: 'Negotiate'
        ImpersonationLevel: '%%1833' # Impersonation
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Anti-Virus
level: medium