title: HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe
id: 0adc67e0-a68f-4ffd-9c43-28905aad5d6a
status: test
description: Detects creation of default named pipes used by the Koh tool
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Koh/blob/0283d9f3f91cf74732ad377821986cfcb088e20a/Clients/BOF/KohClient.c#L12
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-08
modified: 2023-08-07
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: pipe_created
    definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
    selection:
        PipeName|contains:
            - '\imposecost'
            - '\imposingcost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical

title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution
id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
references:
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp
    - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter
    - https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation
    - https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1742203752361128162?s=20
author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r)
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1134.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled'
detection:
    selection_5447:
        EventID: 5447
        FilterName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    selection_5449:
        EventID: 5449
        ProviderContextName|contains: 'RonPolicy'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution
id: 52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d
status: test
description: Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/
    - https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-detect-parent-pid-ppid-spoofing-attacks
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/parent-process-id-ppid-spoofing
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/filename%253A*spoof*%2520filename%253A*ppid*/files
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-23
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\SelectMyParent.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'PPID-spoof'
              - 'ppid_spoof'
              - 'spoof-ppid'
              - 'spoof_ppid'
              - 'ppidspoof'
              - 'spoofppid'
              - 'spoofedppid'
              - ' -spawnto '
        - OriginalFileName|contains:
              - 'PPID-spoof'
              - 'ppid_spoof'
              - 'spoof-ppid'
              - 'spoof_ppid'
              - 'ppidspoof'
              - 'spoofppid'
              - 'spoofedppid'
        - Description: 'SelectMyParent'
        - Hashes|contains:
              - 'IMPHASH=04D974875BD225F00902B4CAD9AF3FBC'
              - 'IMPHASH=A782AF154C9E743DDF3F3EB2B8F3D16E'
              - 'IMPHASH=89059503D7FBF470E68F7E63313DA3AD'
              - 'IMPHASH=CA28337632625C8281AB8A130B3D6BAD'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution
id: c7d33b50-f690-4b51-8cfb-0fb912a31e57
status: test
description: |
    Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata.
    SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project.
references:
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpDPAPI.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpDPAPI.exe'
    selection_other_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' backupkey '
            - ' blob '
            - ' certificates '
            - ' credentials '
            - ' keepass '
            - ' masterkeys '
            - ' rdg '
            - ' vaults '
    selection_other_options_guid:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - ' {'
            - '}:'
    selection_other_options_flags:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' /file:'
            - ' /machine'
            - ' /mkfile:'
            - ' /password:'
            - ' /pvk:'
            - ' /server:'
            - ' /target:'
            - ' /unprotect'
    condition: selection_img or (selection_other_cli and 1 of selection_other_options_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution
id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a
related:
    - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
references:
    - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/
    - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-12-27
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\SharpImpersonation.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'SharpImpersonation.exe'
    selection_cli:
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' binary:'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' user:'
              - ' shellcode:'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' technique:CreateProcessAsUserW'
              - ' technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security
id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34
related:
    - id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
      type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-11-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
    selection_eid:
        EventID: 4697
    selection_cli_cmd:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded %COMSPEC%): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - 'cmd'
            - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_cli_rundll:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        ServiceFileName|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    selection_cli_share:
        ServiceFileName|startswith: '\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\'  # https://twitter.com/svch0st/status/1413688851877416960?lang=en
    condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System
id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-11-15
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection_id:
        Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
        EventID: 7045
    selection_cli_cmd:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        # cobaltstrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded %COMSPEC%): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        ImagePath|contains:
        - 'cmd'
        - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_cli_rundll:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        ImagePath|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    selection_cli_share:
        ImagePath|startswith: '\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\'  # https://twitter.com/svch0st/status/1413688851877416960?lang=en
    condition: selection_id and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
    - id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/EXEFilename'
            - '/CommandLine'
    selection_runas:
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - ' /RunAs 8 '
              - ' /RunAs 4 '
              - ' /RunAs 10 '
              - ' /RunAs 11 '
        - CommandLine|endswith:
              - '/RunAs 8'
              - '/RunAs 4'
              - '/RunAs 10'
              - '/RunAs 11'
    condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml

title: Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity
id: 15619216-e993-4721-b590-4c520615a67d
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service starting
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\services.exe'
    selection_technique_1:
        # Examples:
        #   Meterpreter  getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        #   CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1b (expanded env var): %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        #   CobaltStrike getsystem technique 1: %COMSPEC% /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'echo'
            - '\pipe\'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd'
            - '%COMSPEC%'
    selection_technique_2:
        # meterpreter getsystem technique 2: rundll32.exe C:\Users\test\AppData\Local\Temp\tmexsn.dll,a /p:tmexsn
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'rundll32'
            - '.dll,a'
            - '/p:'
    filter_defender:
        CommandLine|contains: 'MpCmdRun'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_technique_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Commandlines containing components like cmd accidentally
    - Jobs and services started with cmd
level: high

title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System
id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d
status: test
description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
    - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
    - https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM
    - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR)
date: 2019-10-26
modified: 2024-12-01
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30'
detection:
    selection:
        ParentUser|contains:
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        ParentUser|endswith:
            - '\NETWORK SERVICE'
            - '\LOCAL SERVICE'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
        User|endswith: # System
            - '\SYSTEM'
            - '\Système'
            - '\СИСТЕМА'
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
    filter_rundll32:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation
id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter)
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords)
date: 2021-12-20
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        IntegrityLevel:
            - 'System'
            - 'S-1-16-16384'
        User|contains: # covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    selection_special:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\calc.exe'
              - '\cscript.exe'
              - '\forfiles.exe'
              - '\hh.exe'
              - '\mshta.exe'
              - '\ping.exe'
              - '\wscript.exe'
        - CommandLine|re: 'net\s+user\s+'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              # - 'sc stop ' # stops a system service # causes FPs
              - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
              - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil
              - ' /urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -urlcache '  # Used with certutil
              - ' -e* JAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SUVYI'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* SQBFAFgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aWV4I'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* IAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* PAA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - ' -e* aQBlAHgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
              - 'vssadmin delete shadows'  # Ransomware
              - 'reg SAVE HKLM'  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
              - ' -ma '  # ProcDump
              - 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'  # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
              - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
              - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
              - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
              - 'dpapi::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'event::clear'        # Mimikatz
              - 'event::drop'     # Mimikatz
              - 'id::modify'      # Mimikatz
              - 'kerberos::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'lsadump::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'misc::'     # Mimikatz
              - 'privilege::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'rpc::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'sekurlsa::'       # Mimikatz
              - 'sid::'        # Mimikatz
              - 'token::'      # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::cred'     # Mimikatz
              - 'vault::list'     # Mimikatz
              - ' p::d '  # Mimikatz
              - ';iex('  # PowerShell IEX
              - 'MiniDump'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
    filter_main_ping:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ping'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - ' -n '
    filter_vs:
        Image|endswith: '\PING.EXE'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: '\DismFoDInstall.cmd'
    filter_config_mgr:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
    filter_java:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\bin\javaws.exe'
        Image|contains:
            - ':\Program Files (x86)\Java\'
            - ':\Program Files\Java\'
        Image|endswith: '\bin\jp2launcher.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' -ma '
    condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative activity
    - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
    - Monitoring activity
level: high

title: Addition of SID History to Active Directory Object
id: 2632954e-db1c-49cb-9936-67d1ef1d17d2
status: stable
description: An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
author: Thomas Patzke, @atc_project (improvements)
date: 2017-02-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection1:
        EventID:
            - 4765
            - 4766
    selection2:
        EventID: 4738
    selection3:
        SidHistory:
            - '-'
            - '%%1793'
    filter_null:
        SidHistory:
    condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not selection3 and not filter_null)
falsepositives:
    - Migration of an account into a new domain
level: medium

title: HackTool - Impersonate Execution
id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94
status: test
description: Detects execution of the Impersonate tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively
references:
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/
    - https://github.com/sensepost/impersonate
author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis
date: 2022-12-21
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_commandline_exe:
        CommandLine|contains: 'impersonate.exe'
    selection_commandline_opt:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' list '
            - ' exec '
            - ' adduser '
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains:
            - 'MD5=9520714AB576B0ED01D1513691377D01'
            - 'SHA256=E81CC96E2118DC4FBFE5BAD1604E0AC7681960143E2101E1A024D52264BB0A8A'
            - 'IMPHASH=0A358FFC1697B7A07D0E817AC740DF62'
    condition: all of selection_commandline_* or selection_hash
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

title: PUA - AdvancedRun Execution
id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
related:
    - id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility
references:
    - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
    - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1564.003
    - attack.t1134.002
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        - OriginalFileName: 'AdvancedRun.exe'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' /EXEFilename '
              - ' /Run'
        - CommandLine|contains|all:
              - ' /WindowState 0'
              - ' /RunAs '
              - ' /CommandLine '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun/info.yml

title: Potential Access Token Abuse
id: 02f7c9c1-1ae8-4c6a-8add-04693807f92f
status: test
description: Detects potential token impersonation and theft. Example, when using "DuplicateToken(Ex)" and "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser" with the "LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS flag".
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/how-attackers-abuse-access-token-manipulation
    - https://www.manageengine.com/log-management/cyber-security/access-token-manipulation.html
author: Michaela Adams, Zach Mathis
date: 2022-11-06
modified: 2023-04-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1134.001
    - stp.4u
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 9
        LogonProcessName: 'Advapi'
        AuthenticationPackageName: 'Negotiate'
        ImpersonationLevel: '%%1833' # Impersonation
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Anti-Virus
level: medium